State v. Ellington Clerk\u27s Record Dckt. 39838 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
7-2-2012
State v. Ellington Clerk's Record Dckt. 39838
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Ellington Clerk's Record Dckt. 39838" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4450.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4450
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
Plaintiff/Respondent ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
) 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON) 
Defendant/ Appellant ) 
SUPREME COURT NUMBER 
39838 
CLERK'S RECORD 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICTD 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE HONORABLE JOHN P. LUSTER, PRESIDING JUDGE 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, PRESIDING 
MS. SARA B. THOMAS 
STATE APPELLATE 
PUBLIC DEFENDER 
3050 LAKE HARBOR LN 
BOISE ID 83703 
MR. LAWRENCE WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
700 W JEFFERSON, STE 210 
BOISE ID 83720 
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Date: 6/21/2012 First Judicial District Court - Kootenai County User: BROWN 
Time: 02:15PM ROAReport 
Page 1 of 29 Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date Code User Judge 
1/27/2006 CRCO OREILLY Crimina! Complaint Scott Wayman 
AFPC OREILLY Affidavit Of Probable Cause To Be Assigned 
WAR I OREILLY Warrant Issued - Arrest Bond amount: Scott Wayman 
10,000,000.00 Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan 
Wade Issued 1/27/06 
STAT OREILLY Case status changed: Inactive To Be Assigned 
1/30/2006 HRSC OREILLY Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment/First Eugene A. Marano 
Appearance 01/30/2006 02:00PM) 
WRTA CLAUSEN Arrest Warrant Returned, Served Defendant: To Be Assigned 
Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
STAT CLAUSEN Case status changed: Activate (previously To Be Assigned 
inactive) 
ARRN CLAUSEN Hearing result for Arraignment/First Appearance Eugene A. Marano 
held on 01/30/2006 02:00PM: Arraignment I 
First Appearance 
NCOR CLAUSEN ********NO CONTACT ORDER********** Eugene A. Marano 
1/31/2006 HRSC MITCHELL Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Hearing Benjamin R. Simpson 
02/10/2006 08:30AM) 2 day prelim. 1st day. 
HRSC MITCHELL Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Hearing Benjamin R. Simpson 
02/15/2006 08:30 AM) 2 day prelim. 2nd day. 
MITCHELL Notice of Hearing To Be Assigned 
NCOS CLAUSEN No Contact Order Served To Be Assigned 
ORPD REYNOLDS Order Appointing Public Defender Eugene A. Marano 
MOTN MORELAND Motion to increase bond To Be Assigned 
2/1/2006 PRSD MORELAND Plaintiff's Response To Discovery To Be Assigned 
PROD MORELAND Plaintiff's Request For Discovery To Be Assigned 
2/2/2006 NOAP JOKELA Notice Of Appearance, and Request for Tiemley To Be Assigned 
Preliminary Hearing 
DRQD JOKELA Defendant's Request For Discovery To Be Assigned 
2/6/2006 PSRS MORELAND Plaintiff's Supplemental Response To Discovery To Be Assigned 
SDTR HUTCHINSON Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned-Custodian of To Be Assigned 
Records-KCSD 
2/7/2006 DSRQ MORELAND Defendant's Supplemental Req. For Discovery To Be Assigned 
2/8/2006 PSRS MORELAND Plaintiff's 2nd Supplemental Response To To Be Assigned 
Discovery 
SUBF THOMAS Subpoena Return/found--Sean Lind To Be Assigned 
SUBF THOMAS Subpoena Return/found--B. Maskell To Be Assigned 
SUBF THOMAS Subpoena Return/found--Investigator Fred To Be Assigned 
Swanson . 
SUBF THOMAS Subpoena Return/found--Sean Daly To Be Assigned 
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Date: 6/21/2012 First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County User: BROWN 
Time: 02:15PM ROAReport 
Page 2 of29 Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date Code User Judge 
2/10/2006 PHHD !NMAN Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing he!d on Roni!:lrnin ~ C:imnC!nn ""'-lljfo.AIIIIII I '• ""'II I .,..,~VII 
02/10/2006 08:30 AM: Preliminary Hearing Held 
2 day prelim. 1st day. Date and time certain. 
There will be no status call. 
SUBF HUTCHINSON Subpoena Return/found-Lisa L Carrington To Be Assigned 
SUBF HUTCHINSON Subpoena Return/found-William To Be Assigned 
Klinkenfus,KCSD 
SUBF HUTCHINSON Subpoena Return/found-W. Klinkenfus KCSD To Be Assigned 
2/13/2006 HRSC INMAN Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Hearing Benjamin R. Simpson 
02/16/2006 08:30 AM) 3rd day 
2/14/2006 SUBF HUTCHINSON Subpoena Return/found-Carol E Cunningham To Be Assigned 
SUBF HUTCHINSON Subpoena Return/found-Ronald D Cunningham To Be Assigned 
SDTR HUTCHINSON Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned-Steve Stewart To Be Assigned 
SDTR BARKER Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned Found- To Be Assigned 
Trooper Robinett 
2/15/2006 PHHD INMAN Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing held on Benjamin R. Simpson 
02/15/2006 08:30AM: Preliminary Hearing Held 
2 day prelim. 2nd day. Date and time certain. 
There will be no status call. 
MEMO INMAN Memorandum RE: Implied Malice (PLACE IN Benjamin R. Simpson 
EXPANDO) 
MISC INMAN Citations in Support of Memo RE: Implied Malice Benjamin R. Simpson 
2/16/2006 PHHD INMAN Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing held on Benjamin R. Simpson 
02/16/2006 08:30AM: Preliminary Hearing Held 
3rd day 
ADVS INMAN Case Taken Under Advisement Benjamin R. Simpson 
DEOP INMAN Decision Or Opinion Benjamin R. Simpson 
BOUN INMAN Bound Over (after Prelim) Benjamin R. Simpson 
ORHD INMAN Order Holding Defendant Benjamin R. Simpson 
ORBC INMAN Order Setting Bond and Conditions of Release Benjamin R. Simpson 
2/17/2006 MNPH MORELAND Motion For Preparation Of Preliminary Hearing John P. Luster 
Transcript 
MREX MORELAND Motion To Release Defense Exhibits John P. Luster 
2/21/2006 INFO MORELAND Information John P. Luster 
2/22/2006 MNPH MORELAND Amended Motion For Preparation Of Preliminary John P. Luster 
Hearing Transcript 
2/23/2006 DFNG MORELAND Defendant's Written Plea Of Not Guilty John P. Luster 
2/24/2006 MREX MORELAND Motion To Release Plaintiff's Exhibits John P. Luster 
MISC HUTCHINSON Third Supplemental Response to Discovery John P. Luster 
2/28/2006 ORDR WATKINS Order To Release Plaintiff's Exhibits John P. Luster 
ORDR WATKINS Order To Release Defense Exhibits John P. Luster 
ORPH WATKINS Amended Order For Preparation Of Preliminary John P. Luster 
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Date: 6/21/2012 
Time: 02:15PM 
Page 3 of29 
First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date Code User 
3/1/2006 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/20/2006 03:30 
PM) for extension to file pretrial motions 
MOTN JOKELA Motion to Extend Time to File Pretrial Motions 
NOHG MCCANDLESS Notice Of Hearing 
3/2/2006 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference 
06/16/2006 09:30 AM) 
HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled 
06/19/2006 09:00 AM) TRIALS ARE 
SCHEDULED FOR A TWO WEEK PERIOD 
BOOTH Notice of Hearing 
STRS BOOTH Speedy Trial Limit Satisfied 
3/16/2006 SUBF HUTCHINSON Subpoena Return/found-Charles Robnett 
3/23/2006 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 
05/05/2006 08:00 AM) and Motion for jury to 
view scene 
MNDS MORELAND Motion To Dismiss 
MOTN MORELAND Motion for Jury View 
3/24/2006 NOHG MCCANDLESS Notice Of Hearing 
3/27/2006 ORPC OREILLY Order Finding Probable Cause 
4/7/2006 MOTN MORELAND Motion for Joinder w/CR 06-33 
4/12/2006 PLWL MORELAND Plaintiffs Witness List 
4/18/2006 NOHG MORELAND Notice Of Hearing: Joinder Motion 
SUBF BROOK Subpoena Return/found Bradley R Maskell 11 
Apr06 
SUBF BROOK Subpoena Return/found Steve Stewart 11 Apr 06 
SUBF BROOK Subpoena Return/found William H Klinkefus 11 
Apr06 
SUBF BROOK Subpoena Return/found Lisa I Carrington 11 Apr 
06 
4/19/2006 SUBF HUTCHINSON Subpoena Return/found-Daniel R Gregg 
4/20/2006 INHD BOOTH Hearing result for Motion held on 04/20/2006 
03:30PM: Interim Hearing Held for extension to 
file pretrial motions 
4/25/2006 PSRS MORELAND Plaintiffs 4th Supplemental Response To 
Discovery 
4/28/2006 MATT CAMPBELL Motion & Affidavit for Extension of Time on 
Transcript 
ORDR BOOTH Order extending time for transcript preparation 
SUBF THOMAS Subpoena Return/found-Burt Maines 
SUBF THOMAS Subpoena Return/found-Jovon Larsen 
MNTP MORELAND Motion To Transport 
4/29/2006 FILE MORELAND New File Created #2 is Expando 
User: BROWN 
Judge 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
Scott Wayman 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
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Date: 6/21/2012 
Time: 02:15PM 
Page 4 of29 
First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County 
ROAReport 
Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
User: BROWN 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date 
5/1/2006 
5/5/2006 
5/8/2006 
5/9/2006 
5/10/2006 
5/12/2006 
5/19/2006 
5/22/2006 
5/23/2006 
5/30/2006 
Code 
FILE 
INHD 
ORDR 
SUBF 
SUBF 
SUBF 
SUBF 
SUBF 
SUBF 
NOPH 
LODG 
RCPH 
SUBF 
SUBF 
SUBF 
RCPH 
HRSC 
NOHG 
PSRS 
MNTP 
DFWL 
SUBF 
MISC 
MOTN 
MOTN 
WAIV 
SUBF 
SUBF 
User 
BROVV~J 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BROOK 
BROOK 
BROOK 
BROOK 
BROOK 
BROOK 
CAMPBELL 
CAMPBELL 
MORELAND 
THOMAS 
THOMAS 
THOMAS 
MORELAND 
BOOTH 
MORELAND 
MORELAND 
MORELAND 
MORELAND 
Judge 
New Fi!e Created #3 John P. Luster 
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on John P. Luster 
05/05/2006 08:00AM: Interim Hearing Held 
and Motion for jury to view scene 
Order setting bond ($1 ,000,000.00 combined with John P. Luster 
CR06-33) 
Subpoena Return/found Ann M Thomas 11Apr06 John P. Luster 
Subpoena Return/found Joleen R Larsen 
11Apr06 
Subpoena Return/found Janice Y Bronson 
11Apr06 
Subpoena Return/found Jakie L Bronson 
11Apr06 
Subpoena Return/found Candy Allen 11Apr06 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
Subpoena Return/found Gerry I Groth 11Apr06 John P. Luster 
Notice Of Lodging Of Preliminary Hearing John P. Luster 
Transcript 
Lodged Transcript Preliminary Hearing- (5 John P. Luster 
volumes) 
Receipt Of Preliminary Hearing Transcript 
Public Defender 
Subpoena Return/found-Carol Cunningham 
Subpoena Return/found-Ronald Cunningham 
Subpoena Return/found-Heather McCord 
Receipt Of Preliminary Hearing Transcript 
County Prosecutor 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 
05/31/2006 01:30PM) 
Notice Of Hearing: dismiss 
Plaintiff's 5th Supplemental Response To 
Discovery 
Motion To Transport 
Defendant's Witness List 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
HUTCHINSON Subpoena Return/found-Anthony L Hutchison 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BROOK 
BROOK 
Authority and argument in uspport of motion to John P. Luster 
dismiss 
Motion to Transport 
Motion to continue jury trial 
Waiver Of Speedy Trial 
Subpoena Return/found Trooper Robnett 
23May06 
Subpoena Return/found Ron Cunningham 
19May06 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
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Date: 6/21/2012 First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County User: BROWN 
Time: 02:15PM ROA Report 
Page 5 of29 Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date Code User Judge 
5/30/2006 CIICt: BROOK Subpoena Return/found Care! Cunningham John P. Luster VVIJI 
19May06 
SUBF BROOK Subpoena Return/found Fred Swanson 22May06 John P. Luster 
SUBF BROOK Subpoena Return/found Sean Daly 19May06 John P. Luster 
SUBF BROOK Subpoena Return/found Tim Johnson 19May06 John P. Luster 
5/31/2006 INHD BOOTH Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on John P. Luster 
05/31/2006 01:30PM: Interim Hearing Held 
CONT BOOTH Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled held on John P. Luster 
06/19/2006 09:00AM: Continued TRIALS ARE 
SCHEDULED FOR A TWO WEEK PERIOD 
CONT BOOTH Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference held on John P. Luster 
06/16/2006 09:30AM: Continued 
HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference John P. Luster 
08/11/2006 09:30AM) 
HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled John P. Luster 
08/21/2006 09:00AM) TRIAL IS SCHEDULED 
FOR A TWO WEEK PERIOD 
BOOTH Notice of Hearing John P. Luster 
SUBF HUTCHINSON Subpoena Return/found-Heather Galland John P. Luster 
SUBF HUTCHINSON Subpoena Return/found-Laurie Galland John P. Luster 
SUBF HUTCHiNSON Subpoena Retum/found-Wayne Galland John P. Lustei 
6/2/2006 ORDR BOOTH Order to continue jury trial (6/19/6) John P. Luster 
ORDR BOOTH Order to Transport (defendant to Dr. ofice 6/27/6) John P. Luster 
SUBF BROOK Subpoena Return/found William H Shelton John P. Luster 
19May06 
SUBF BROOK Subpoena Return/found Gary Shelton 19May06 John P. Luster 
SUBF BROOK Subpoena Return/found Jake Bronson 19May06 John P. Luster 
SUBF BROOK Subpoena Return/found Janis Bronson 19May06 John P. Luster 
6/6/2006 PSRS MORELAND Plaintiffs 6th Supplemental Response To John P. Luster 
Discovery 
6/7/2006 SUBF HUTCHINSON Subpoena Return/found-Steve Stewart John P. Luster 
SUBF HUTCHINSON Subpoena Return/foundBradley R Maskell John P. Luster 
6/12/2006 SUBF BROOK Subpoena Return/found Jovon L Larsen 08Jun06 John P. Luster 
6/13/2006 SUBF BROOK Subpoena Return/found Daniel R Gregg 02Jun06 John P. Luster 
6/14/2006 SUBF HUTCHINSON Subpoena Return/found-Ann M Thomas John P. Luster 
SUBF HUTCHINSON Subpoena Return/found-Janice Y Bronson John P. Luster 
SUBF HUTCHINSON Subpoena Return/found-Joleen R Larsen John P. Luster 
SUBF HUTCHINSON Subpoena Return/found-Jakie L Bronson John P. Luster 
SUBF HUTCHINSON Subpoena Return/found-Joel R Larsen John P. Luster 
SUBF HUTCHINSON Subpoena Return/found-Gerry L Groth John P. Luster 
SUBF HUTCHINSON Subpoena Return/found-Lisa L Carrington John P. Luster JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 6 of 848
Date: 6/21/2012 First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County User: BROWN 
Time: 02:15PM ROAReport 
Page 6 of29 Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date Code User Judge 
6/21/2006 SUBF HUTCHINSON Subpoena Return/found-Candy ,~lien John P. Luster 
SUBF HUTCHINSON Subpoena Return/found-William H Klinkefus John P. Luster 
6/30/2006 MOTN BOOTH Motion to release defense exhibits John P. Luster 
ORDR BOOTH Order to release defense exhibits (exhibits John P. Luster 
A,C,D,E & H released to Lisa Beeler 6/30/6) 
7/12/2006 MOTN MORELAND Motion to allow weapon to be fired John P. Luster 
DRSD JOKELA Defendant's Supplemental Response To John P. Luster 
Discovery 
7/13/2006 NOTH OREILLY Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
7/19/2006 DSRS MORELAND Defendant's Supplemental Response To John P. Luster 
Discovery 
7/20/2006 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Continue John P. Luster 
07/21/2006 09:00AM) 
MNCN MORELAND Motion To Continue Pre-trial conference and jury John P. Luster 
trial 
MOTN MORELAND Motion to Shorten Time John P. Luster 
NOHG MORELAND Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
7/21/2006 INHD BOOTH Hearing result for Motion to Continue held on John P. Luster 
07/21/2006 09:00AM: Interim Hearing Held 
DENY BOOTH Hearing result for Motion to Continue held on John P. Luster 
07/21/2006 09:00AM: Motion Denied 
7/25/2006 MOTN MOLLETT Motion To Order Jail To Accept Changes Of John P. Luster 
Clothing For Trial 
ORDR MOLLETT Order For Several Changes Of Clothing John P. Luster 
DSRQ MORELAND Defendant's Supplemental Req. For Discovery John P. Luster 
SUBF BROOK Subpoena Return/found Deputy William Klinkefus John P. Luster 
14Jul06 
PSWL MORELAND Plaintiff's Supplemental Witness List John P. Luster 
PSRS MORELAND Plaintiff's 8th Supplemental Response To John P. Luster 
Discovery 
7/28/2006 SUBF SRIGGS Subpoena Return/found/ John P. Luster 
Burt R Maines 7/26/06 
8/2/2006 DSWL MORELAND Defendant's Supplemental Witness List John P. Luster 
SUBF SRIGGS Subpoena Return/found/Charles Robnett 7/31/06 John P. Luster 
SUBF SRIGGS Subpoena Return/found/Tim Johnson 7/31/06 John P. Luster 
SUBF SRIGGS Subpoena Return/found/Sean Lind 7/31/06 John P. Luster 
8/3/2006 DSRS MORELAND Defendant's Supplemental Response To John P. Luster 
Discovery 
PSWL MORELAND Plaintiff's 2nd Supplemental Witness List John P. Luster 
PSRS MORELAND Plaintiff's 9th Supplemental Response To John P. Luster 
Discovery 
DSWL MORELAND Defendant's Supplemental Witness List John P. Luster JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 7 of 848
Date: 6/21/2012 First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County User: BROWN 
Time: 02:15PM ROAReport 
Page 7 of29 Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date Code User Judge 
8/4/2006 SUBF SR!GGS Subpoena Return/found/Jakie L Bronson 8/2/06 John P. Luster 
SUBF SRIGGS Subpoena Return/found/Janice Y Bronson 8/2/06 John P. Luster 
SUBF SRIGGS Subpoena Return/found/Fred Swanson 8/2/06 John P. Luster 
FILE MITCHELL New File Created #4 John P. Luster 
8/7/2006 MOTN MORELAND Motion to Obscure Road Marker John P. Luster 
PSWL MORELAND Plaintiff's 3rd Supplemental Witness List John P. Luster 
NOHG MORELAND Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
8/8/2006 DSRS MORELAND Defendant's Supplemental Response To John P. Luster 
Discovery 
SUBF SRIGGS Subpoena Return/found/Sean Daly 8/4/06 John P. Luster 
SUBF SRIGGS Subpoena Return/found/Lori A Galland 8/4/06 John P. Luster 
SUBF SRIGGS Subpoena Return/found/Wayne Galland 8/4/06 John P. Luster 
SUBF SRIGGS Subpoena Return/found/Heather Galland 8/4/06 John P. Luster 
SUBF SRIGGS Subpoena Return/found/Ronald D Cunningham John P. Luster 
8/4/06 
SUBF SRIGGS Subpoena Return/found/Carol Cunningham John P. Luster 
8/4/06 
8/9/2006 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference John P. Luster 
08/10/2006 09:30 AM) 
BOOTH Notice of Hearing John P. Luster 
SUBF SRIGGS Subpoena Return/found/Ronald D Cunningham John P. Luster 
8/4/06 
SUBF SRIGGS Subpoena Return/found/Carol E Cunningham John P. Luster 
8/4/06 
8/10/2006 INHD BOOTH Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference held on John P. Luster 
08/10/2006 09:30AM: Interim Hearing Held 
HRVC BOOTH Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference held on John P. Luster 
08/11/2006 09:30AM: Hearing Vacated + 
motion to fire weapon 
BOOTH Notice of Trial John P. Luster 
PRJ I BOOTH Plaintiff's Requested Jury Instructions John P. Luster 
NOTC MORELAND Notice of filing letter from Skelton Engineering John P. Luster 
NFUS MORELAND Notice of Filing Under Seal: Accompanying John P. Luster 
document re: Consultation was not attached to 
Notice of filing. Per Lisa at Public Defender's 
office 
PSRS MORELAND Plaintiff's 10th Supplemental Response To John P. Luster 
Discovery 
SUBF BROOK Subpoena Return/found William Skelton Jr. John P. Luster 
14Jul06 
SUBF- BROOK Subpoena Return/found Gary Skelton 14Jul06 John P. Luster 
SUBF BROOK Subpoena Return/found Heather Mcord 07Aug06 John P. Luster 
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Date: 6/21/2012 First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County User: BROWN 
Time: 02:15 PM ROA Report 
Page 8 of29 Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date Code User Judge 
8/10/2006 MOTN BOOTH Motion to Declare !C 18-4001 and 18-4003 John P. Luster 
Unconstitutional 
MOTN MORELAND Motion to delcare I.C. 18-8004 & 18-4003 John P. Luster 
unconstitutional 
8/11/2006 ORDR BOOTH Order setting trial priority #1 John P. Luster 
8/14/2006 PSRS MORELAND Plaintiffs 11th Supplemental Response To John P. Luster 
Discovery 
8/15/2006 SUBF BROOK Subpoena Return/found Heather McCord John P. Luster 
10Aug06 
SUBF BROOK Subpoena Return/found Dustin Kralik 1 0Aug06 John P. Luster 
SUBF BROOK Subpoena Return/found Amber Schafer 02Aug06 John P. Luster 
SUBF BROOK Subpoena Return/found Anne Nord 1 0Aug06 John P. Luster 
SUBF BROOK Subpoena Return/found Faye Dulcher 11Aug06 John P. Luster 
8/16/2006 SDTR OREILLY Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned/DIRK BAIRD John P. Luster 
Document sealed 
MNTP DOUGLAS Motion To Transport John P. Luster 
ORTP DOUGLAS Order To Transport Johnnie L. Longest II, I DOC Charles W. Hosack 
#32728 for Trial on 8/28/06 
SDTR SRIGGS Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned/North Idaho John P. Luster 
Immediate Care 8/14/06 
SUBF SRIGGS Subpoena Return/found/Dan Gregg 8/13/06 John P. Luster 
PSRS MORELAND Plaintiffs 12th Supplemental Response To John P. Luster 
Discovery 
PSRS MORELAND Plaintiffs 13th Supplemental Response To John P. Luster 
Discovery 
8/17/2006 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/21/2006 03:30 John P. Luster 
PM) 
MNCL MORELAND Motion To Compel John P. Luster 
NOHG MORELAND Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
SUBF SRIGGS Subpoena Return/found/Anthony L Hutchison John P. Luster 
8/15/06 
SDTR SRIGGS Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned/Kootenai John P. Luster 
Medical Center 8/15/06 
SDTR SRIGGS Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned/Or. Patrick J John P. Luster 
Mullen, MD 8/15/06 
SUBF SRIGGS Subpoena Return/found/Lisa Carrington 8/16/06 John P. Luster 
8/18/2006 MISC BOOTH Records from Dr. Patrick Mullen John P. Luster 
PSRS MORELAND Plaintiffs 14th Supplemental Response To John P. Luster 
Discovery 
PSRS MORELAND Plaintiffs 15th Supplemental Response To John P. Luster 
Discovery 
SDTR MORELAND Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned: Medical John P. Luster 
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Date: 6/21/2012 
Time: 02:15PM 
Page 9 of29 
First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County 
ROAReport 
Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
User: BROWN 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date 
8/18/2006 
8/21/2006 
8/22/2006 
8/23/2006 
8/24/2006 
8/28/2006 
8/29/2006 
8/30/2006 
9/5/2006 
Code 
SDTR 
SDTR 
SUBF 
SUBF 
SDTA 
SUBF 
SDTA 
SDTA 
SDTA 
NOTC 
PSRS 
NOTC 
INHD 
MISC 
MISC 
MISC 
MISC 
JTST 
RTSV 
PSRS 
SUBF 
PSRS 
PSRS 
SUBF 
ORDR 
FILE 
User 
MORELAND 
BROOK 
BROOK 
BROOK 
BROOK 
BROOK 
BROOK 
BROOK 
MORELAND 
MORELAND 
MORELAND 
BOOTH 
MORELAND 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BROOK 
MORELAND 
BROOK 
MORELAND 
MORELAND 
SRIGGS 
BOOTH 
OREILLY 
Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned: Medica! 
records:Joleen Larsen/IN EXPANDO 
Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned: Medical 
records: Joel Larsen/IN EXPANDO 
Subpoena Return/found David Schafer 
08Aug06N 
Judge 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
Subpoena Return/found Timothy Olsen 04Aug06 John P. Luster 
Subpoena Duces Tecum Acceptance of Service John P. Luster 
Dirk Baird 1 0Aug06 
Subpoena Return/found Michael Denny 17Aug06 John P. Luster 
Subpoena Duces Tecum Acceptance of Service John P. Luster 
North Idaho Immediate Care 1 0Aug06 
Subpoena Duces Tecum Acceptance of Service John P. Luster 
North Idaho Immediate Care 1 0Aug06 
Subpoena Duces Tecum Acceptance of Service John P. Luster 
North Idaho Immediate Care 1 0Aug06 
Notice of filing (nothing attached) 
Plaintiff's 16th Supplemental Response To 
Discovery 
Notice of filing (nothing attached) 
Hearing result for Motion held on 08/21/2006 
03:30 PM: Interim Hearing Held DA indicates 
Def does not need to be present for hearing 
Request for cameras in the courtroom 
Request/order for cameras in the courtroom -
Court TV 
Request/Order for cameras in the courtroom 
KXLY 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
Request/Order for cameras in the Courtroom- John P. Luster 
Spokesman Review 
Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled held on John P. Luster 
08/22/2006 09:00AM: Jury Trial Started TRIAL 
IS SCHEDULED FOR A TWO WEEK PERIOD 
Return Of ServiceGary Cushman 18Aug06 John P. Luster 
Plaintiff's 17th Supplemental Response To John P. Luster 
Discovery 
Subpoena Return/found Verlin Vanzee 22Aug06 John P. Luster 
Plaintiff's 18th Supplemental Response To John P. Luster 
Discovery 
Plaintiff's 19th Supplemental Response To John P. Luster 
Discovery 
Subpoena Return/found/Anna Davis 8/28/06 John P. Luster 
Amended Order re: cameras in the courtroom John P. Luster 
New File Created #5 John P. Luster JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 10 of 848
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First Judicial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROAReport 
Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
User: BROWN 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date 
9/7/2006 
9/18/2006 
9/21/2006 
9/22/2006 
10/19/2006 
10/25/2006 
10/28/2006 
11/14/2006 
11/28/2006 
Code 
ORES 
VERD 
MOTN 
MOTN 
HRSC 
MISC 
ORDR 
NOTH 
PSIR 
FILE 
PSIA 
MOTN 
PSIA 
MISC 
MOTN 
11/29/2006 LETR 
12/1/2006 
MISC 
NOTH 
MISC 
12/4/2006 MISC 
MISC 
MISC 
MISC 
INHD 
STAT 
User 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
OREILLY 
OREILLY 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
OREILLY 
MORELAND 
BROWN 
MORELAND 
CARROLL 
MORELAND 
MORELAND 
MORELAND 
MORELAND 
MORELAND 
OREILLY 
OREILLY 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
HAMILTON 
Judge 
Order for Evaluation(s) and Setting Sentencing John P. Luster 
Verdict- GUlL TY 3 COUNTS John P. Luster 
Motion To Release Property John P. Luster 
Motion For Judgment Of Acquittal And/Or John P. Luster 
Reconsideration Of Motion For Mistrial and/or 
Motion For New Trial 
Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 12/04/2006 John P. Luster 
03:30PM) 
Amended Notice of Hearing John P. Luster 
Jury Instructions (given) John P. Luster 
Order to Shorten Time John P. Luster 
Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
Presentence Investigation Report John P. Luster 
Document sealed 
New File Created #6 PSI John P. Luster 
Presentence Investigation Report Attachment John P. Luster 
Document sealed 
Motion to Augment record John P. Luster 
Presentence Investigation Report Attachment: 2 John P. Luster 
letters 
Document sealed 
Plaintiff's sentencing materials John P. Luster 
Motion to release Blazer John P. Luster 
Letters from victim's friends John P. Luster 
Plaintiff's sentencing materials John P. Luster 
Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
Request For Cameras In The Courtroom KXL Y John P. Luster 
News4 
Request for cameras in the courtroom - John P. Luster 
GRANTED - KXL Y Video camera 
Request for Cameras in the courtroom - John P. Luster 
Spokesman Review - still camera- GRANTED 
Request for Cameras in the Courtroom - CDA John P. Luster 
PRESS - GRANTED 
Request for Cameras in the Courtroom - video John P. Luster 
camera - KREM - GRANTED - MUST POOL 
WITH KXLY 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 12/04/2006 John P. Luster 
03:30 PM: Interim Hearing Held + PENDING 
MOTIONS 
Case status changed: closed pending clerk 
action 
John P. Luster 
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First Judicial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROAReport 
Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
User: BROWN 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date 
12/4/2006 
12/8/2006 
12/11/2006 
12/12/2006 
12/14/2006 
12/15/2006 
12/18/2006 
12/20/2006 
12/21/2006 
12/26/2006 
1/4/2007 
1/16/2007 
1/23/2007 
1/24/2007 
3/2/2007 
3/12/2007 
3/28/2007 
4/3/2007 
Code 
SNIC 
SNIC 
SNIC 
FILE 
MOTN 
MOTN 
ORDR 
ORDR 
NOTC 
JDMT 
HRSC 
NOTH 
ORDR 
HRVC 
STAT 
APSC 
MNPD 
ORDR 
HRSC 
STAT 
NAPL 
NOHG 
NOTC 
NOTC 
MICR 
NOHG 
User 
HArv11LTO~J 
HAMILTON 
HAMILTON 
BROWN 
JOKELA 
JOKELA 
WATKINS 
WATKINS 
WATKINS 
HAMILTON 
BOOTH 
OREILLY 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
MEYER 
MORELAND 
MORELAND 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
MORELAND 
MORELAND 
MORELAND 
MORELAND 
MORELAND 
MORELAND 
Judge 
Sentenced To Incarceration (118-4001-11 ~v~urder John P. Luster 
II) Confinement terms: Penitentiary determinate: 
12 years. Penitentiary indeterminate: 13 years. 
Sentenced To Incarceration (118-907 John P. Luster 
Battery-aggravated) Confinement terms: 
Penitentiary determinate: 7 years. Penitentiary 
indeterminate: 8 years. 
Sentenced To Incarceration (118-907 John P. Luster 
Battery-aggravated) Confinement terms: 
Penitentiary determinate: 7 years. Penitentiary 
indeterminate: 8 years. 
New File Created #7 John P. Luster 
Motion to Release Plaintiff's Exhibits John P. Lustei 
Objection to Motion to Release Plaintiff's Exhibits John P. Luster 
Order To Release Property 
Order to Release Blazer 
Notice Transmittinig PSI 
Judgment and Sentence 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/07/2007 03:30 
PM) for release of property 
Notice Of Hearing 
Order to release exhibits 
Hearing result for Motion held on 02/07/2007 
03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated for release of 
property 
Case status changed (batch process) 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Motion For Appointment Of State Appellate 
Public Defender 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
Order for appointment of state appellate public John P. Luster 
defender in direct appeal; retaining trial counsel 
for residual purposes 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/13/2007 08:00 John P. Luster 
AM) 
Case status changed: Closed pending clerk John P. Luster 
action 
Notice Of Appeal Due Date From Supreme Court John P. Luster 
Notice Of Hearing re: Motion for judgment of 
acquittal 
Amended Notice of Appeal 
Notice of amended due date for appeal 
Motion For Reconsideration Of Sentence 
Pursuant To l.c.r. 35 
Notice Of Hearing: Rule 35 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 12 of 848
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Page 12 of29 Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date Code User Judge 
4/11/2007 MEMO MORELAND ~v4emorandum in opposition to post trial motions John P. Luster 
4/13/2007 INHD BOOTH Hearing result for Motion held on 04/13/2007 John P. Luster 
08:00AM: Interim Hearing Held 
4/16/2007 STAT MEYER Case status changed (batch process) 
5/3/2007 TRAN MORELAND Transcript Filed: Reporter Bill Rush's appeal, John P. Luster 
1,857 pages 
5/4/2007 CERT MORELAND Certificate Of Mailing Appeal to Attorney General John P. Luster 
& State PD 
5/11/2007 DEOP BOOTH Decision On Defendants post trial motions John P. Luster 
MISC BOOTH Brief in support of motion for judgment of John P. Luster 
acquittal; new trial and/or reconsideration of 
motion for mistrial 
6/5/2007 CERT MORELAND Certificate Of Mailing appeal to Supreme Court John P. Luster 
10/29/2007 ORDR MORELAND Supreme Court Order granting motion to John P. Luster 
augment record and motio to suspend briefing 
schedule 
11/16/2007 ORDR MORELAND Supreme Court Order granting motion to John P. Luster 
augment record and motion to suspend briefing 
schedule 
11/28/2007 TRAN MORELAND Transcript Filed: Reporter Bill Rush's John P. Luster 
supplemental appeal/173 pages 
11/30/2007 CERT MORELAND Certificate Of Mailing Reporter Bill Rush's John P. Luster 
Supplemental appeal transcript/173 pages 
6/24/2008 MOTN OREILLY Motion For New Trial John P. Luster 
7/11/2008 ORDR MORELAND Supreme Court Order granting motion to suspend John P. Luster 
appeal 
7/17/2008 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/20/2008 03:00 John P. Luster 
PM) for new trial 
STAT BOOTH Case status changed: Closed pending clerk John P. Luster 
action 
MNTP MORELAND Motion To Transport John P. Luster 
NOHG MORELAND Notice Of Hearing: 1 0/20/08 John P. Luster 
7/29/2008 ORDR BOOTH Order to transport John P. Luster 
10/17/2008 BRIE CARROLL Brief in Opposition to Motion for New Trial John P. Luster 
10/20/2008 INHD BOOTH Hearing result for Motion held on 1 0/20/2008 John P. Luster 
03:00PM: Interim Hearing Held for new trial 
10/27/2008 STAT MEYER Case status changed (batch process) 
11/4/2008 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/29/2008 03:00 John P. Luster 
PM) to augment the record re: motion for new 
trial - 30 minutes 
STAT BOOTH Case status changed: Closed pending clerk John P. Luster 
action 
NOHG CARROLL Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
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First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County 
ROAReport 
Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
User: BROWN 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date 
12/12/2008 
12/30/2008 
1/5/2009 
1/9/2009 
1/26/2009 
3/16/2009 
4/13/2009 
5/12/2009 
5/18/2009 
6/17/2009 
7/15/2009 
8/5/2009 
11/19/2009 
1/25/2010 
5/31/2011 
6/20/2011 
6/21/2011 
6/27/2011 
Code 
NOTC 
DCHH 
STAT 
MISC 
DRSD 
DEOP 
APSC 
NLTR 
CERT 
CERT 
MISC 
MISC 
MNAU 
MISC 
OPIN 
HRSC 
STAT 
REMT 
MOTN 
MOTN 
ORDR 
MISC 
NOHG 
REMT 
DCHH 
HRSC 
User 
OREILLY 
BOOTH 
MEYER 
BOOTH 
JOKELA 
BOOTH 
CARROLL 
CARROLL 
CARROLL 
CARROLL 
BROWN 
OREILLY 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
CLAUSEN 
CLAUSEN 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
Judge 
Notice Of Filing !n Support Of Defendant's Motion John P. Luster 
For New Trial 
Hearing result for Motion held on 12/29/2008 John P. Luster 
03:00PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Anne MacManus 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: UNDER 100 PAGES to augment 
the record re: motion for new trial - 30 minutes -
Case status changed (batch process) 
Objection to augmentation of record John P. Luster 
Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Objecton to John P. Luster 
Augmentaiton of Record 
Decision On Motion for new trial: newly John P. Luster 
discovered evidence 
Appealed To The Supreme Court John P. Luster 
Notice of Lodging Transcript- M & M -TERRY John P. Luster 
S. ROSADOVELAZQUEZ- 50 PAGES 
Certificate Of Mailing- AG AND PD John P. Luster 
Certificate Of Mailing- SUPREME COURT John P. Luster 
State Of Idaho- RE: Requesting Documents John P. Luster 
State Pd Re: Requesting Documents John P. Luster 
Motion To Augment John P. Luster 
Documents filed John P. Luster 
Opinion Filed #68 John P. Luster 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/27/2011 02:30 John P. Luster 
PM) for status and/or bond hearing 
Case status changed: Reopened 
Remittitur 
Motion for status and/or bond setting 
Motion to Reset Bond 
Order Resetting Bond 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John T. Mitchell 
Defendant's Invocation Of Rights To Silence And John P. Luster 
Counsel 
Notice Of Hearing 
Remittitur 
Hearing result for Motion held on 06/27/2011 
02:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Anne MacManus Brownell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: for status and/or bond hearing 
under 1 00 pages 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference 
08/26/2011 08:00AM) 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
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First Judicial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
User: BROWN 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date Code User Judge 
6/27/2011 HRSC Df"\f"\TU U\..IVIII Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled John P. Luster 
08/29/2011 09:00AM) 3 WEEK JURY 
BOOTH Notice of Hearing John P. Luster 
NOTE BOOTH Bond reduced to $125,000 John P. Luster 
ORDR BOOTH Order setting bail or release on own John P. Luster 
recognizance and conditions 
7/6/2011 PSRQ MCCANDLESS Plaintiff's 3rd Supplemental Request For John P. Luster 
Discovery 
7/7/2011 DSRQ BROWN Defendant's Forth Supplemental Req. For John P. Luster 
Discovery 
DSRQ BROWN Defendant's Fifth Supplemental Req. For John P. Luster 
Discovery 
7/8/2011 MOTN BROWN Motion Requiring Kootenai County Sheriff's Office John P. Luster 
To Accept Clothing For Defendant To Wear 
During Jury Trial 
MOTN BROWN Motion To Release Defendant's Exhibits John P. Luster 
7/12/2011 MNTP BROWN Motion To Transport John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 07/09/11 served LLC John P. Luster 
7/13/2011 MOTN BOOTH Motion to release exhibits John P. Luster 
7/14/2011 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/28/2011 03:00 John P. Luster 
PM) for mediation 
MOTN BROWN Motion For Mediation John P. Luster 
DSRQ BROWN Defendant's Sixth Supplemental Req. For John P. Luster 
Discovery 
DSRQ BROWN Defendant's Seventh Supplemental Req. For John P. Luster 
Discovery 
DSRQ BROWN Defendant's Eigth Supplemental Req. For John P. Luster 
Discovery 
DSRQ BROWN Defendant's Ninth Supplemental Req. For John P. Luster 
Discovery 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 07/12/11 served SS John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 07/12/11 served BRM John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 07/13/11 served DG John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 07/13/11 served DRG John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found served upon Gary John P. Luster 
Cushman ISP Forensics by leaving with Jane 
Davenport (receptionist) on 07/13/11 
NOHG BROWN Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
MISC BROWN Defendant's Response To Plaintiff's Third John P. Luster 
Supplemental Request For Discovery 
7/15/2011 DSRQ BROWN Defendant's Amended Ninth Supplemental Req. John P. Luster 
For Discovery 
SDTI CRUMPACKER Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued to LC John P. Luster JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 15 of 848
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First Judicial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROAReport 
Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current ~udge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
User: BROWN 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date Code User Judge 
7/15/2011 C"of""\11 CRUMPACKER Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued toSS John P. Luster vUII 
7/19/2011 SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 07/13/11 served AS John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 07/14/11 served JL John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 07/15/11 served JRL John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 07/15/11 served JLL John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 07/15/11 served JRL John P. Luster 
FILE BROWN New File Created #8 John P. Luster 
7/20/2011 PRSD DUBE Plaintiffs Response To Discovery (4th, 5th 6th, John P. Luster 
7th, & 8th supp req for disc) 
7/21/2011 ORDR BOOTH Order to Release Exhibits (to PD investigators) John P. Luster 
ORDR BOOTH Order to Release Exhbiits - to KCSD John P. Luster 
ORDR BOOTH Order Requiring Kootenai County Sheriffs Office John P. Luster 
to Accept Clothing for Defendant to Wear During 
Jury Trial 
ORDR BOOTH Order to Transport (to Dr. Hayes 7/28/11 9:00am John P. Luster 
to 1:00pm) 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 07/15/11 served FS John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 07/15/11 served John P. Luster 
Trooper Charles Robinett ISP 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 07/15/11 served AN John P. Lustei 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 07/15/11 served T J John P. Luster 
7/22/2011 SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 07/20/11 served Lori John P. Luster 
Sutton PFPD 
SDTR BAXLEY Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned on 07/20/11 John P. Luster 
served Linda Mattos Custodian Ofr Records 
Kootenai Cty Sheriff Dept 
7/25/2011 MOTN BROWN Motion To Shorten Time John P. Luster 
MNCL LSMITH Motion To Compel Discovery John P. Luster 
NOHG LSMITH Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
7/27/2011 MREX OREILLY Motion To Release Plaintiffs Exhibits John P. Luster 
DSRQ OREILLY Defendant's Tenth Supplemental Req. For John P. Luster 
Discovery 
DSWL OREILLY Defendant's Second Supplemental Witness List John P. Luster 
7/28/2011 DCHH BOOTH Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John P. Luster 
07/28/2011 03:00PM: District Court Hearing Hel 
Court Reporter: Anne MacManus Brownell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 1 00 pages 
7/29/2011 WITD BROWN Third Supplemental Witness List - Defendant's John P. Luster 
SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 7/27/11 SD John P. Luster 
8/1/2011 ORDR BOOTH Order To Release Exhibits John P. Luster 
8/2/2011 FILE BROWN New File Created- #9 EXPANDO John P. Luster JONATHAN W. ELLINGTO 39838 16 of 848
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Page 16 of29 Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date Code User Judge 
8/3/2011 ORDR BOOTH Order for mediation John P. Luster 
8/4/2011 NOTC BROWN Notice Of Filing Of Proposed Mediators John P. Luster 
8/5/2011 MOTN BOOTH Motion to apoint mediator and set mediation John P. Luster 
ORDR BOOTH Order to appoint mediator and set mediation John P. Luster 
SUBF ROSEN BUSCH Subpoena Return/found/J.L./08-03-11 John P. Luster 
SUBF ROSEN BUSCH Subpoena Return/found/J.L./08-03-11 John P. Luster 
SUBF ROSEN BUSCH Subpoena Return/found/J.L./08-03-11 John P. Luster 
SUBF ROSENBUSCH Subpoena Return/found/M.D./08-03-11 John P. Luster 
SUBF ROSEN BUSCH Subpoena Return/found/S.C./08-03-11 John P. Luster 
8/8/2011 PSRS MCCANDLESS Plaintiffs Supplemental Response To Defendants John P. Luster 
Request for Discovery 
NOTC BROWN Notice Of Intent To Produce I.R.E. 404(B) John P. Luster 
Evidence At Trial And Notice of Filing Factual 
Basis For I.R.E. 404(B) Evidence 
8/9/2011 PSRS BROWN Plaintiffs Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
PSRS BROWN Plaintiffs Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
Regarding Expert Witness 
SUBF ROSEN BUSCH Subpoena Return/found/Brad Maskell/07 -29-11 John P. Luster 
PSRS BROWN Plaintiffs Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
8/10/2011 OBJT BROWN Objection To Use Of 404(B) Evidence John P. Luster 
8/11/2011 SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 8/9/11 KE John P. Luster 
MOTN BROWN Motion to Compel Discovery John P. Luster 
DSRQ BROWN Defendant's Eleventh Supplemental Req. For John P. Luster 
Discovery 
8/12/2011 SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 08/1 0/11 served CA John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 08/10/11 served AMT John P. Luster 
a/kla Cunningham 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 08/1 0/11 served JYB John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 08/10/11 served GLG John P. Luster 
8/15/2011 SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 08/09/11 served RC John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 08/09/11 served CC John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 08/09/11 served WG John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 08/09/11 served HM John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 08/09/11 served HG John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 08/1 0/11 served LG John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 08/10/11 served JB John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 08/09/11 served CEC John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 08/09/11 served ROC John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 08/15/11 served BRK John P. Luster 
PSRS BROWN Plaintiffs Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 17 of 848
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First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County 
ROAReport 
Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
User: BROWN 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date Code User Judge 
8/16/2011 HRSC 0/"\/"\TU OVVIII Hearing Scheduled (~Jlotion 08/24/2011 03:00 John P. Luster 
PM) Various defendants motions 
NOTC BROWN Notice Of Mediation John P. Luster 
DSRS BROWN Defendant's Forth Supplemental Response To John P. Luster 
Discovery 
NOHG BROWN Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
NFUS BROWN Notice of Filing Under Seal John P. Luster 
EVAL BROWN Evaluation - Psychological John P. Luster 
Document sealed 
8/17/2011 MNDS BROWN Motion To Dismiss John P. Luster 
DSRQ BROWN Defendant's Twelfth Supplemental Req. For John P. Luster 
Discovery 
8/18/2011 MOTN BOOTH Motion Requiring Kootenai County Sheriff's Office John P. Luster 
to Accept Clothing for Defendant to wear During 
Mediation 
ORDR BOOTH Order Requiring Kootenai County Sheriff's Office John P. Luster 
to Accept Clothing for Defendant to Wear During 
Mediation 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 08/16/11 served ALH John P. Luster 
NOHG BROWN Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
DSRQ BROWN Defendant's Thirteenth Suppiernentai Req. For John P. Luster 
Discovery 
8/19/2011 MEMO BOOTH Memorandum in support of motion to dismiss John P. Luster 
SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 8/17/11 MRD John P. Luster 
OBJT OREILLY Objection To Expert Witness John P. Luster 
DSRQ OREILLY Defendant's FourteenthSupplemental Req. For John P. Luster 
Discovery 
PSRS OREILLY Plaintiff's Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
Regarding Expert Witness 
8/22/2011 MNCN OREILLY Motion To Continue Trial John P. Luster 
RTSV BAXLEY Return Of Service on Subpoena Duces Tecum John P. Luster 
issued to Daniel Hayes PhD & Associates served 
08/22/11 
8/24/2011 MEMO BROWN Amended Memorandum In Support Of Motion To John P. Luster 
Dismiss 
MEMO BROWN Supplemental Memorandum In Support Of John P. Luster 
Motion To Dismiss 
MISC BOOTH State's Response to Defendant's Motion to John P. Luster 
Dismiss 
DCHH BOOTH Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John P. Luster 
08/24/2011 03:00PM: District Court Hearing Hel 
Court Reporter: Anne MacManus Brownell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 pages 
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First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County 
ROAReport 
Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
User: BROWN 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date 
8/24/2011 
8/25/2011 
8/30/2011 
8/31/2011 
9/1/2011 
9/2/2011 
9/12/2011 
Code 
HRVC 
CONT 
HRSC 
HRSC 
HRSC 
MOTN 
PRSD 
ORDR 
FILE 
PSRS 
NOHG 
MOTN 
MROR 
SUBF 
User 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
Judge 
Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference John P. Luster 
scheduled on 08/26/2011 08:00AM: Hearing 
Vacated 
Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled scheduled John P. Luster 
on 08/29/2011 09:00AM: Continued 3 WEEK 
JURY 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/01/2011 09:00 John P. Luster 
AM) pending motions 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled John P. Luster 
11/29/2011 09:00AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference John P. Luster 
11/28/2011 03:00PM) 
Notice of Hearing John P. Luster 
BOOTH Motion to Quash subpoena deces tecum John P. Luster 
MCCANDLESS Plaintiffs Response To Defendant's Ninth, Tenth, John P. Luster 
Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
BOOTH 
OREILLY 
Supplemental Request for Discovery 
Order to continue trial 
New File Created #1 0 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
MCCANDLESS Plaintiffs Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
Regarding Expert Witnesses 
MCCANDLESS Notice Of Hearing 
BROWN Motion To Exclude Impeachment Materials 
BROWN Motion To Release Defendant On Own 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
Recognizance Or To Reduce Bond 
ROSENBUSCH Subpoena Return/found/Charles John P. Luster 
Greear/08-26-11 
SUBF ROSENBUSCH Subpoena Return/found/Tim Johnson/08-26-11 John P. Luster 
MEMO 
REQC 
DCHH 
HRSC 
NFUS 
MISC 
PSRS 
HRSC 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BOOTH 
Memorandum in Support of Objection to Expert John P. Luster 
Witness 
Request for Cameras in the Courtroom- DENIED John P. Luster 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John P. Luster 
09/01/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing Hel 
Court Reporter: Anne MacManus Brownell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 pages 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference 
11/28/2011 03:00 PM) 
John P. Luster 
Notice of Filing Under Seal John P. Luster 
Mediation Agreement John P. Luster 
Document sealed 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
Hearing Scheduled (Bond Hearing 10/03/2011 John P. Luster 
03:00PM) 
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First Judicial District Court • Kootenai County 
ROAReport 
Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
User: BROWN 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date 
9/12/2011 
9/14/2011 
9/15/2011 
9/20/2011 
9/22/2011 
9/23/2011 
9/26/2011 
10/3/2011 
Code 
HRSC 
MNLI 
MNLI 
MNLI 
MNLI 
MNLI 
MNLI 
PSRS 
AFFD 
DEOP 
MISC 
NOHG 
NOHG 
SUBF 
NOTC 
SUBF 
MOTN 
NOHG 
PSRS 
PSRS 
SUBF 
SUBF 
SUBF 
SUBF 
SUBF 
RTSV 
DCHH 
User 
BOOTH 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
LSMITH 
LSMITH 
CRUMPACKER 
BROWN 
ROSEN BUSCH 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BROWN 
ROSENBUSCH 
ROSEN BUSCH 
ROSENBUSCH 
ROSEN BUSCH 
CRUMPACKER 
CRUMPACKER 
BUTLER 
Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (~J1otion to Compel John P. Luster 
10/25/2011 03:00 PM) and in limine 
Motion In Limine (First) Post Arrest Silence John P. Luster 
Motion In Limine (Second) Disturbing Nature John P. Luster 
Testimony 
Motion In Limine (Third) Improper Questions John P. Luster 
Motion In Limine(Fourth) Improper Expert John P. Luster 
Testimony 
Motion In Limine (Fifth) Misleading Offer Of Proof John P. Luster 
Motion In Limine (Sixth) Improper Opinion John P. Luster 
Testimony 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
Affidavit Of Clark Rollins John P. Luster 
Memorandum Opinion and Order re: Defendant's John P. Luster 
motion to dismiss; defendant's Objection to use 
of 404(b) Evidence; Defendant's Objection to 
Expert Witness; Defendant's Motion to Exclude 
Impeached Materials 
Mediation Agreement John P. Luster 
Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
Notice Of Hearing John P. Lustei 
Subpoena Return/found 9/14/11 BR-K John P. Luster 
Notice Of Appearance For Limited Purpose And John P. Luster 
Request To Appear Telephonically At Hearing 
Subpoena Return/found/Daniel Gregg/09-20-11 John P. Luster 
Motion To Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum John P. Luster 
Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
Subpoena Return/found/Bradley John P. Luster 
Maskell/09-20-11 
Subpoena Return/found/Lisa Carrington/09-21-11 John P. Luster 
Subpoena Return/found/R.C./09-20-11 John P. Luster 
Subpoena Return/found/C.C./09-20-11 John P. Luster 
Subpoena Return/found 9/21/11 BRM John P. Luster 
Return Of Service 9/20/11 GJR John P. Luster 
Hearing result for Bond Hearing scheduled on John P. Luster 
10/03/2011 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel 
Court Reporter: Anne Brownell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: + PA's motion to quash subpoena 
Bond Motion granted; PA motion granted 
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First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County 
ROAReport 
Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
User: BROWN 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date 
10/3/2011 
10/4/2011 
10/6/2011 
10/7/2011 
10/11/2011 
10/12/2011 
10/25/2011 
10/26/2011 
10/28/2011 
Code 
ORDR 
ORDR 
MNCN 
ORDR 
SUBF 
HRSC 
SUBF 
SUBF 
SUBF 
SUBF 
SUBF 
SUBF 
NOHG 
MOTN 
MISC 
MISC 
MISC 
DCHH 
DCHH 
CONT 
CONT 
HRSC 
HRSC 
MISC 
NOTC 
User 
BUTLER 
BUTLER 
BROWN 
BUTLER 
KEMPER 
BOOTH 
Judge 
Order re : States ~1otion to Quash Subpoena John P. Luster 
Duces Tecum 
Order Setting Bond and Conditions: $75,000.00 John P. Luster 
Motion To Continue Pretrial Conference and Trial John P. Luster 
Order Denying Release of DF on OR- Hearing John P. Luster 
resulted in Reduced bond 
Subpoena Return/found 10/4/11 SD 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Continue 
10/25/2011 03:00 PM) 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 10/5/11 JRL John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 10/5/11 JLL 
CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 10/5/11 JRL 
CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 10/6/11 GLG 
CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 10/6/11 AMTC 
CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 1 0/6/11 JYB John P. Luster 
BROWN Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
BROWN Motion To Accept Property Bond- Real Property John P. Luster 
BROWN Special Appearance John P. Luster 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
OREILLY 
OREILLY 
Promissory Note 
Property Bond - Real Property 
Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled 
on 10/25/2011 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Anne MacManus Brownell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: and in limine under 100 pages 
Hearing result for Motion to Continue scheduled 
on 10/25/2011 03:00PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Anne MacManus Brownell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 1 00 pages 
Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference 
scheduled on 11/28/2011 03:00 PM: Continued 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled scheduled John P. Luster 
on 11/29/2011 09:00AM: Continued 3 WEEK 
JURY TRIAL 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference 
01/13/2012 01:30PM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled 
01/17/2012 09:00AM) 
Notice of Hearing 
Waiver Of Homestead Rights 
Notice Of Consensual Lien 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
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Date: 6/21/2012 First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County User: BROWN 
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Page 21 of 29 Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date Code User Judge 
10/28/2011 MISC OREILLY Promissory 1'-Jote John P. Luster 
MISC OREILLY Property Bond-Real Property John P. Luster 
11/4/2011 ORDR LARSEN Order Accepting Property Bond - Real Property John P. Luster 
BNDP BROWN Bond Posted- Property (Amount 75000.00) John P. Luster 
DSRQ BROWN Defendant's Fifteenth Supplemental Req. For John P. Luster 
Discovery 
11/7/2011 NODF BROWN Notice To Defendant John P. Luster 
WAVX BROWN Waiver Of Extradition To Idaho John P. Luster 
11/9/2011 WITP BROWN Defendant's Supplemental Witness List - John P. Luster 
Plaintiff's 
SUBF GAVIN Subpoena Return/found 11/09/11 DRG John P. Luster 
SUBF GAVIN Subpoena Return/found 11/09/11 JD John P. Luster 
SUBF GAVIN Subpoena Return/found 11/09/11 BRK John P. Luster 
11/10/2011 SUBF GAVIN Subpoena Return/found I RDC 11/10/11 John P. Luster 
SUBF GAVIN Subpoena Return/found I JLL 11/1 0/11 John P. Luster 
SUBF GAVIN Subpoena Return/found I SMD 11/1 0/11 John P. Luster 
SUBF GAVIN Subpoena Return/found I SS 11/10/11 John P. Luster 
SUBF GAVIN Subpoena Return/found I GLG 11/1 0/11 John P. Luster 
11/14/2011 SUBF GAViN Subpoena Return/found/ LLC 11/1 0/11 John P. Lustei 
11/15/2011 SUBF GAVIN Subpoena Return/found/ BRM 11/08/11 John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 11/11/11 served LC John P. Luster 
11/16/2011 SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 11/13/11 served DG John P. Luster 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 11/14/11 served BM John P. Luster 
(for 01/17/12) 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 11/14/11 served BRM John P. Luster 
(for 01/19/12) 
11/17/2011 SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 11/11/11 RC John P. Luster 
SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found '11 /11/11 HG John P. Luster 
SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 11/11/11 HM John P. Luster 
SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 11/15/11 JL John P. Luster 
SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 11/15/11 LG John P. Luster 
SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 11/15/11 JL John P. Luster 
SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 11/15/11 WG John P. Luster 
SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 11/14/11 LS John P. Luster 
SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 11/15/11 JL John P. Luster 
SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 11/15/11 JRL John P. Luster 
SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 11/15/11 JRL John P. Luster 
11/18/2011 DSWL OREILLY Defendant's Amended Supplemental Witness List John P. Luster 
11/21/2011 ORDR BOOTH Order re:OPS Investigation of Fred Rice John P. Luster JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 22 of 848
Date: 6/21/2012 First Judicial District Court - Kootenai County User: BROWN 
Time: 02:15PM ROAReport 
Page 22 of29 Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date Code User Judge 
11/21/2011 SUBF 0/\VICV U/""\A~L..I Subpoena Return/found on 11/14/11 served Gary John P. Luster 
Cushman (Idaho State Police Forensics) 
11/23/2011 SUBF GAVIN Subpoena Return/found I DS 11/17/11 John P. Luster 
SUBF GAVIN Subpoena Return/found I SL ISP 11/17/11 John P. Luster 
SUBF GAVIN Subpoena Return/found I FW ISP 11/17/11 John P. Luster 
SUBF GAVIN Subpoena Return/found I CG ISP 11/17/11 John P. Luster 
SUBF GAVIN Subpoena Return/found IT J ISP 11/17/11 John P. Luster 
SUBF GAVIN Subpoena Return/found I DK ISP 11/17/11 John P. Luster 
SUBF GAVIN Subpoena Return/found I CB ISP 11/17/11 John P. Luster 
SUBF GAVIN Subpoena Return/found I AN ISP Forensics John P. Luster 
11/17/11 
PSRQ MCCANDLESS Plaintiffs 4th Supplemental Request For John P. Luster 
Discovery 
11/28/2011 MNCL OREILLY Motion To Compel Discovery John P. Luster 
11/29/2011 PSRS BROWN Plaintiffs Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
11/30/2011 MISC BROWN Defendant's Response To Plaintiffs Fourth John P. Luster 
Supplemental Request For Discovery 
SDTR GAVIN Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned/CA 11/30/11 John P. Luster 
SDTR GAVIN Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned/JYB 11/30/11 John P. Luster 
SDTR GAVIN Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned/AMT 11/30/11 John P. Luster 
12/1/2011 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Continue John P. Luster 
12/02/2011 08:00 AM) 
MOTN POOLE Motion To Shorten Time John P. Luster 
NOTH POOLE Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
MNCN BROWN Motion To Continue Trial John P. Luster 
MOTN BROWN Motion To Excuse Defendant's Presence John P. Luster 
12/2/2011 DCHH BOOTH Hearing result for Motion to Continue scheduled John P. Luster 
on 12/02/2011 08:00AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Anne MacManus Brownell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 pages 
DENY BOOTH Hearing result for Motion to Continue scheduled John P. Luster 
on 12/02/2011 08:00AM: Motion Denied 
12/3/2011 FILE CRUMPACKER New File Created #11 John P. Luster 
12/6/2011 SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 11/30/11 JB John P. Luster 
12/7/2011 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel John P. Luster 
01/03/2012 03:00PM) State's Motion 
MNCL BROWN Motion To Compel John P. Luster 
NOHG BROWN Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
12/9/2011 DSRQ BROWN Defendant's Sixteenth Supplemental Req. For John P. Luster 
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Page 23 of 29 Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date Code User Judge 
12/9/2011 SUBF ~1\\/111.1 Subpoena Return/found 12/01/11 JL John P. Luster '-'T"'\V II "'Il 
PSRS BROWN Plaintiffs Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
12/12/2011 WITD BROWN Supplemental Witness List - Defendant's - Re: John P. Luster 
Expert Witness Disclosure 
12/14/2011 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Quash John P. Luster 
12/19/2011 02:00 PM) 
MNLI BROWN Motion In Limine (Seven) Prohibit States John P. Luster 
Witnesses From Inflammatory Terms 
MOTN BROWN Motion To Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum John P. Luster 
12/15/2011 WITP BROWN Fourth Supplemental Witness List- Plaintiffs John P. Luster 
MOTN BROWN Motion To Excuse Defendant's Presence John P. Luster 
MOTN BROWN Motion To Excuse Defendant's Presence John P. Luster 
NOHG BROWN Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
SDTR BAXLEY Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned on 12/13/11 John P. Luster 
served Daniel Hayes PhD LLC & Associates by 
leaving with Dr Daniel Hayes 
SUBF BAXLEY Subpoena Return/found on 12/13/11 served John P. Luster 
WHK 
12/16/2011 SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 12/15/11 WK John P. Luster 
12/19/2011 SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 12/15/11 ALH John P. Luster 
SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 12/15/11 MRD John P. Luster 
DCHH BOOTH Hearing result for Motion to Quash scheduled on John P. Luster 
12/19/2011 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel 
Court Reporter: Anne MacManus Brownell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 pages 
MOTN BROWN Motion To Allow Weapon To Be Fired John P. Luster 
12/20/2011 ORDR BOOTH Order re: Motion to Quash John P. Luster 
MOTN BROWN Motion For Jury View John P. Luster 
NOHG BROWN Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
12/21/2011 DSRQ BROWN Defendant's Sventeenth Supplemental Req. For John P. Luster 
Discovery 
MOTN CARROLL Motion to Introduce Former Testimony Under John P. Luster 
I.R.E. 804 
PRSD CARROLL Plaintiffs Response To Defendant's Sixteenth John P. Luster 
Supplemental Request Discovery 
12/22/2011 NOTH MCCANDLESS Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
12/28/2011 MOTN BROWN Motion To Compel Discovery John P. Luster 
12/29/2011 SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 12/27/11 SS John P. Luster 
SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 12/27/11 SD John P. Luster 
NOHG LSMITH Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
12/30/2011 SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 12/28/11 SCD John P. Luster JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 24 of 848
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First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County 
ROAReport 
Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
User: BROWN 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date 
12/30/2011 
1/3/2012 
1/4/2012 
1/5/2012 
1/6/2012 
1/9/2012 
Code 
SUBF 
MISC 
DCHH 
MOTN 
NOTC 
NOHG 
NOTC 
MISC 
SUBF 
SUBF 
NOHG 
PSRS 
MOTN 
PSRS 
DSRQ 
DSRS 
DSRS 
DSRQ 
DSRQ 
DSRS 
DSRS 
User Judge 
CRU~v1PACKER Subpoena Return/found 12/28/11 ~.~D John P. Luster 
BROWN 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
Defendant's Supplemental Response To John P. Luster 
Discovery RE: Summary Of Expert Opinion Of 
David Rochford 
Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled John P. Luster 
on 01/03/2012 03:00PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Anne MacManus Brownell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: State's Motion + mtn to introduce 
former testimony - under 1 00 pages 
Motion to Determine admissibility of Plaintiffs John P. Luster 
Tentative Audio and Photographic Trial Exhibits 
and Motion to Seal 
Notice of Plaintiffs Tentative Audio and John P. Luster 
Photographic Trial Exhibits 
BROWN Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
BROWN Notice Of Filing 
BROWN Defendant's Supplemental Response To 
Discovery RE: Additional Exhibits Of David 
Rochford 
CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 1/3/12 KK 
CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 1/3/12 DP 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
BROWN 
BROWN 
Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
Plaintiff's Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
MCCANDLESS Motion to Exclude John P. Luster 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BROWN 
Plaintiff's Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
Defendant's Supplemental Req. For Discovery John P. Luster 
RE: Summary Of Expert Opinion Of Gaylan 
Warren 
Defendant's Second Supplemental Response To John P. Luster 
Discovery RE: Additional Exhibits Of David 
Rochford 
Defendant's Supplemental Response To 
Discovery RE: Additional Exhibits Of Gaylan 
Warren 
John P. Luster 
Defendant's Eighteenth Supplemental Req. For John P. Luster 
Discovery 
Defendant's Nineteenth Supplemental Req. For John P. Luster 
Discovery 
Defendant's Third Supplemental Response To John P. Luster 
Discovery RE: Additional Exhibits Of David 
Rochford 
Defendant's Supplemental Response To 
Discovery Re: Summary Of Expert Opinion Of 
Gregg Stutchman 
John P. Luster 
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First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County 
ROAReport 
Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
User: BROWN 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date 
1/10/2012 
1/11/2012 
1/12/2012 
1/13/2012 
1/15/2012 
1/17/2012 
Code 
NOTC 
PSRS 
HRVC 
HRSC 
MOTN 
MOTN 
NOTC 
MOTN 
MOTN 
MOTN 
MOTN 
NOTC 
JTSC 
MOTN 
MISC 
MISC 
MISC 
DCHH 
SUBF 
MISC 
User Judge 
BROVVN f\Jotice Of Plaintiff's ~~~dditional Trial Exhibits John P. Luster 
(Exhibits 74-82) 
MCCANDLESS Plaintiff's Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
Regarding Expert Witness 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
Notice Vacating Hearing John P. Luster 
Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference John P. Luster 
scheduled on 01/13/2012 01:30PM: Hearing 
Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/17/2012 08:00 John P. Luster 
AM) All pending pretrial motions 
Notice of Hearing John P. Luster 
Second Motion For Jury View John P. Luster 
Motion To Remove Roadside Marker John P. Luster 
Notice of Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit re: Defendant's John P. Luster 
Recorded Statements 
Motion in Limine (eleven) prevent Joel Larsen John P. Luster 
from Giving Improper Opinion testimony 
Motion in limine (ten) prevent Opinion Testimony John P. Luster 
lacking foundation 
Motion in Limine (nine) prevent state from John P. Luster 
Misconstruing Evidence about Mr. Ellington's 
Argument with his Fiancee 
Motion in limine (eight) prevent Joel Larsen from John P. Luster 
speculating about Vonette Larsen's Intent 
Notice of Hearing (motions in limine 1-11, 2nd John P. Luster 
motion for jury view, motion to remove roadside 
marker and Motion to Fire Weapon) 1/17/12, 8:00 
am 
Jury Trial Scheduled - trial to commence 
Wednesday, January 18, 2012, 9:00am 
John P. Luster 
Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support John P. Luster 
Request for cameras in courtroom KREM TV- John P. Luster 
DENIED 
Brief in opposition to defendant's Motion to John P. Luster 
dismiss 
Defendant's supplemental response to discovery John P. Luster 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John P. Luster 
01/17/2012 08:00AM: District Court Hearing Hel 
Court Reporter: Keri Veare 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: All pending pretrial motions over 
100 pages 
CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 1/12/12 SE John P. Luster 
BOOTH Reply to State's Brief in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
John P. Luster 
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First Judicial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROAReport 
Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
User: BROWN 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date Code User Judge 
1/18/2012 PSRS con\Atl\1 L.ll '-'-'V¥1 .. Plaintiff's Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
PSRS BROWN Plaintiff's Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
MISC BOOTH Defendant's second supplemental response to John P. Luster 
discovery re: summary of expert opinion of Gregg 
Stutchman 
DCHH BOOTH District Court Hearing Held John P. Luster 
Court Reporter: Keri Veare 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: over 1 00 pages - pretrial motions 
1/19/2012 JTST BOOTH Jury Trial Started John P. Luster 
SDTR BAXLEY Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned on 01/17/12 John P. Luster 
served Brad Maskell KCSD 
SDTR BAXLEY Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned on 01/18/12 John P. Luster 
served Lisa Clemensen KCSD 
PSRS BROWN Plaintiff's Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
1/23/2012 PSRS BROWN Plaintiff's Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
MOTN BOOTH Motion for Mistrial, Motion to Dismiss and John P. Luster 
Memorandum in Support 
1/25/2012 PSRS OREILLY Plaintiff's Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
PSWL OREILLY Fifth Plaintiff's Supplemental Witness List John P. Luster 
PSRS OREILLY Plaintiffs Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
Regarding Expert Witness 
1/26/2012 ORDR BOOTH Order re: monument/memorial removal John P. Luster 
PRJ I BOOTH Plaintiff's Requested Jury Instructions John P. Luster 
PSRS BROWN Plaintiff's Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
1/27/2012 DRJI BOOTH Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions John P. Luster 
1/31/2012 PSI01 BOOTH Pre-Sentence Investigation Evaluation Ordered & John P. Luster 
Sentencing Date 
FOGT BOOTH Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled scheduled John P. Luster 
on 01/18/2012 09:00AM: Found Guilty After 
Trial - Over 500 pages 
HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 03/26/2012 John P. Luster 
03:00PM) 
VERD BOOTH Verdict- Counts I, II and Ill- Guilty John P. Luster 
2/2/2012 MISC BOOTH Jury Instructions (given) John P. Luster 
2/13/2012 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/16/2012 08:00 John P. Luster 
AM) Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and a 
Motion for New Trial 
MOTN OREILLY Motion For New Trial John P. Luster 
MOTN OREILLY Motion For Judgment Of Acquittal John P. Luster 
FILE BAXLEY New File Created #12 John P. Luster 
2/14/2012 NOTH MCCANDLESS Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
MOTN BROWN Motion To Excuse Defendant's Presence John P. Luster JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 27 of 848
Date: 6/21/2012 First Judicial District Court - Kootenai County User: BROWN 
Time: 02:15PM ROAReport 
Page 27 of29 Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date Code User Judge 
2/22/2012 1:11 1:: ~JliTCHELL *****************New Fi!e Created #14 & #15*******• John P. Luster I IL-t..... 
(Expandos) (Binders of documents in support of 
new trial) 
2/27/2012 LETR BOOTH Letter from Bobbie De Bower John P. Luster 
2/28/2012 ORDR BOOTH Order to Excuse Defendant's presence (from John P. Luster 
3/16/12 motion hearing) 
3/8/2012 PLSM OREILLY Plaintiff's Sentencing Materials John P. Luster 
3/13/2012 MISC BOOTH Briefing in Support of Post Verdict Motions John P. Luster 
MOTN BOOTH Motion to continue Post Verdict Motions Hearing John P. Luster 
(no objection by State) 
MOTN BOOTH Motion to Continue Sentencing (objection by John P. Luster 
Sttate) 
MISC BOOTH Citations in Support of Motion for New Trial John P. Luster 
3/14/2012 ORDR BOOTH Order to continue hearing John P. Luster 
CONT BOOTH Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John P. Luster 
03/16/2012 08:00AM: Continued Motion for 
Judgment of Acquittal and a Motion for New Trial 
MISC BOOTH +++++DENIED+++++ Order to Continue John P. Luster 
Sentencing (needs hearing) 
3/15/2012 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Continue John P. Luster 
03/16/2012 09:00 AM) 
STIP BOOTH Stipulation to Shorten time John P. Luster 
NOTC BOOTH Notice of Hearing John P. Luster 
3/16/2012 DCHH BOOTH Hearing result for Motion to Continue scheduled John P. Luster 
on 03/16/2012 09:00AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Valerie Nunemacher 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 pages 
DENY BOOTH Hearing result for Motion to Continue scheduled John P. Luster 
on 03/16/2012 09:00 AM: Motion Denied 
HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/24/2012 02:30 John P. Luster 
PM) Post trial motions 
3/20/2012 NOTC BOOTH Notice of Sentencing Materials John P. Luster 
PSIR BROWN Presentence Investigation Report John P. Luster 
Document sealed 
3/23/2012 REQC BROWN Request for Cameras in the Courtroom John P. Luster 
3/26/2012 ORDR BOOTH Order - authorizing cameras in the courtroom - John P. Luster 
KREM 
NOTC BOOTH Notice of filing in support of sentencing John P. Luster 
NOTC BOOTH Notice of filing in response to presentence John P. Luster 
investigation 
NOTC BOOTH Supplemental Notice of Filing in support of John P. Luster 
Sentencing 
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Time: 02:15PM 
Page 28 of29 
First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County 
ROAReport 
Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
User: BROWN 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date 
3/26/2012 
3/28/2012 
4/3/2012 
4/16/2012 
4/19/2012 
4/23/2012 
4/24/2012 
4/26/2012 
5/4/2012 
Code 
DCHH 
APSC 
MOTN 
MOTN 
ORDR 
SNMD 
SNMD 
SNMD 
FILE 
ORDR 
MEMO 
PLTX 
NOHG 
MOTN 
MOTN 
BRIE 
NOTC 
NOTC 
PSRS 
DCHH 
MICR 
PSRS 
User 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
CARROLL 
CARROLL 
CARROLL 
BROWN 
CARROLL 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BROWN 
BROWN 
BUTLER 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BROWN 
BUTLER 
BROWN 
BROWN 
Judge 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on John P. Luster 
03/26/2012 03:00PM: District Court Hearing Hel 
Court Reporter: Amy Wilkins - CDA Reporting 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 1 00 pages 
Appealed To The Supreme Court John P. Luster 
Motion for admittance to bail or release upon the John P. Luster 
defendant's own recognizance and stay 
execution of sentence pending appeal 
Motion for appointmento f state appellate public John P. Luster 
defenderin direct appeal; retaining trial counsel 
for residual purposes 
Order for appointment of state appealate public John P. Luster 
defender in direct appeal; retaining trial counsel 
for residual purposes 
Sentenced ModifiedSentence modified on John P. Luster 
3/26/2012. (118-4001-11 Murder II) 
Sentenced ModifiedSentence modified on John P. Luster 
3/26/2012. (118-907 Battery-aggravated) 
Sentenced ModifiedSentence modified on John P. Luster 
3/26/2012. (118-907 Battery-aggravated) 
New File Created- 16 EXPANDO- PSI John P. Luster 
Judgment and Sentence John P. Luster 
Memorandum in opposition to defendant's post John P. Luster 
trial motion 
Plaintiffs Exhibit List for Defendant's Post Trial John P. Luster 
Motions 
Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
Motion To Shorten Time John P. Luster 
Motion for Reconsideration of Setnence Pursuant John P. Luster 
ot ICR 35 
Reply Brief John P. Luster 
Notice of Filing in Support of Defendant's Motion John P. Luster 
for New Trial 
Notice of Filing in Support of Defendant's Post John P. Luster 
Verdict Motions 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John P. Luster 
04/24/2012 02:30PM: District Court Hearing Hel 
Court Reporter: Val Nunemacher 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Post Trial Motions - less than 250 
pages 
Motion For Reconsideration Of Sentence John P. Luster 
Pursuant To l.c.r. 35 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Response To Discovery John P. Luster JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 29 of 848
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Page 29 of29 
First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County 
ROAReport 
Case: CR-2006-0001497 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
User: BROWN 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date Code User Judge 
~:;:11 A f')n1? f\JAPL BROWN Notice Of Appeal Due Date From Supreme Court John P. Luster VI 1~11'-VI'-
6/15/2012 DEOP BOOTH Memorandum Decision and Order re: John P. Luster 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial and Motion for 
Judgment of Acquittal 
6/21/2012 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Bond Hearing 07/09/2012 John P. Luster 
03:00 PM) Appeal bond/Rule 35 15 minutes 
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[JORIGINAL 
BARRY McHugh 
Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way/Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1971 
Telephone: (208) 446-1800 
BRYANT BUSHLING 
S iAI E GF !OAHO ) ~~~~~~y OF KdOTENAii SS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Case No. F06-1497 
Plaintiff, ) 
) MOTION TO RESET BOND 
vs. ) 
) 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW, BRYANTBUSHLING, DeputyProsecutingAttomeyfor Kootenai County, 
Idaho, and hereby moves the Court for an Order resetting the defendant's bond to $1,000,000.00. 
This motion is made for the reason the IDOC, rather than transport the Defendant to Kootenai 
County following publication of the Supreme Court's opinion, State v. Ellington, simply released the 
Defendant on June 17, 2011, from prison. 
Therefore, bond in this matter should be reset to $1,000,000.00, the amount bail was set 
before the Defendant's conviction and, furthermore, the Defendant should be ordered to report to the 
Kootenai County Public Safety Building no later than 5:00p.m., June 22,2011. ~~ ~ ~e./ ~tt;:{?~>{\\ 
~~ 4- II(_ ltd~ +~LW.. (:fvv- L?r Zoll, ~ Z~ 'fDrr:....__) Lr+ \Ju)7<-
MOTION TO RESET BOND: Page 1 l1-''?t-er. 
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Attorney for the Defendant Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Prosecutor's Certificate of Transmittal 
I hereby certify that on the & day of ~ , 20 II, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was caused to be sent via facsimll to defense counsel. 
PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE 
FAXED 
::JvJ..)e..- L...-t~.._r, ~/ 
MOTION TO RESET BOND: Page 2 
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D ORIG~ ... AL 
r~ ···, ~-J..~fE:_ i)i IDAHO 
::.uLUNTY OF 1~<noTr~.~Al)r:c: r 1 EO: · "' en 1 '"' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ~fl THE 
I JUN 20 PH 3: I 0 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTE 
STATE OF IDAJIO, ) 
) Case No. F06-1497 
Plaintiff, ) 
) ORDER RESETTINGBOND 
vs. ) 
) 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
The Court having before it the State's motion to reset bond, and good cause appearing now, 
therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant is ordered to report to the Kootenai County 
Public Safety Building no later than 5:00p.m., June 22, 2011 and that bond in this matter shall be 
reset to $1,000,000.00. 
ENTERED this ).Qtaay ofr<r'---4'~~=--.=.::e.....=------' 2011. • ..._::: 
CLERK'S CERT~CATE 0 LING 
I hereby certifY that on the_&_ day of y ~ , 011, that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing were mailed/delivered by regular U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, Interoffice Mail, Hand 
Delivered, or F_axed to: At-ti.tt CiT~c:V / 
Prosecutor t.Jt./fp-I '6'11 Defense Attorney L.;.ifk-t112 I Def;.t ___ _ 
KCPSB lr/ t.ffe ...-f Y.P7 Auditor Police Agency ______ _ 
BofKlin.g Co. Other I 
-J ~~c.- L- ~+c.-;, (~~ __. {Y(f ftp 
CLIFFORD T. HAYES 
CLERK OF THE DI TRICT COURT 
ORDER RESETTING BOND: Page 1 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION FOR STATUS AND/OR BOND 
SETTING 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for a Status Hearing to address the status of 
bond and procedural status of the case post the conviction being vacated by the Idaho Supreme 
Court. 
Counsel requests that this motion be set for hearing in order to present oral argument, 
evidence and/or testimony in support thereof. Requested time is 10 minutes. 
-'7 /") {'t:--
DATED this £-U day of June, 2011. 
BY: 
A TAYLOR 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
MOTION FOR STATUS AND/OR BOND SETTING Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
l-\ t\l'\.do ck \\vc. .. "'-'\ 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by~ } 
~of the same as indicated below on the -zott-day of June, 2011, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 
Via Fax 
Interoffice Mail 
MOTION FOR STATUS AND/OR BOND SETTING Page2 
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 r ·~/27/2011 Page 1 of4 
Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20110627 Motion for Status 
Conference and Bond hearing 
Judge John Patrick Luster 1 
Clerk Kathy Booth \ Court Reporter Anne MacManus Brownell PA David Robins ~ ~/7/ DA Anne Taylor 
Date 6/27/2011 Location f1*-e6URTR~M1- ~ 
Time ll~l Note 
02:41:19 PM Calls case- PA Robins, DA Taylor present with defendant- in 
J custody - for status conference following remand by the supreme 
court. We also have a bond motion 
II 02:42:01 PIDE Ready 
02:42:03 PM DA Ready 
02:42:06 PM J Trial setting is our first priority. The last trial was 3 weeks - is that 
a safe assumption? 
02:42:27 PM PA Yes 
I 02:42:30 PM II DA I Yes, 3 weeks estimation I 02:42:44 PM ID We'll need to hire another expert reconstructionist and I think that 
will take about 3 months. 
I 02:43:20 PM II J lis Trooper Daley no longer available to the state? 
02:43:33 PM PA I don't know. His availability - given the nature of the ruling of the Supreme Court I'll have to hire another reconstruction expert. 
02:44:17 PM We'd like to be on the August or September docket. I've not 
DA heard of Trooper Robinett, who took the measurements, etc. is 
unavailable. 
I 02:44:46 PM IIJ 11 recall Trooper Dailey. 
02:44:58 PM DA Trooper Robinett took measurements and Trooper Dailey testified. Fred Rice was a rebuttal witness. 
02:45:37 PM PA The new witness will replace Trooper Rice and I ask for setting 
out due to having 6 months. I 02:46:14 PM I~ I think we should be scheduled for trial soon- Fred Rice was a 
rebuttal witness 
02:46:56 PM IJ I Recess to review calendar prior to resetting. ~~ •~ A nM PA !n September ! am to attend training 
02:47:54 PM J That's the time I'm unavailable - recess 
file://R:\LogNotes- HTML\District\Criminal\Luster\CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan W... 6/27/2011 
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 r -127/2011 Page 2 of4 
02:53:15 PM J Back in session- TRIAL STARTING AUGUST 29, 2011 that 
should be enough time to address the state's concerns. 
02:54~~ Nothing to add 
02:54:07 PM August 29 will work well. Will there be a pretrial? 
02:54:17 PM 
02:54:26 PM A11n111~t ?R ?f"\11 A·flfl <:om fnr DT(' lf"'R 1 A 1 _ rnorli.,+inn _ +horo i~ 1 "'·"::J""U\. &...'-'' .-v I I v.VU' ""Ill lVI I I'-' 1'\JI '\. IV. I - IIIVUIQLIVII - I.IIVI V I.;) 
J a roster of Judges and I'm familiar with some Judges who will participate. This is voluntary but if there is an agreement I'll help 
find a mediator. The Rule isn't effective until July 1. 
I 02:56:19 PM I PA No questions 
02:56:22 PM DA No questions 
"". ,...~:26 PM J Let's proceed with the motion 
lro2:56:38 PM DA Calls #1 
02:56:55 PM c Swears 
02:56:57 PM Janice I've been a KC resident for 25 years. I've known Jonathan 20 
Bronson years and if he's released he can live with me and I can assist him with rides to court and attorney meetings, etc. 
02:57:47 PM XE I'm not related to defendant 
02:57:49 PM I 
02:57:59 PM I J Witness to step down 
02:58:06 PM I DA Calls defendant 
02:58:09 PM I c Swears 
02:58:26 PM After I was sentenced I went to the Idaho State Prison. I was in 
Oklahoma and ICC and was released from ICC. I was released 
Friday June 17, 2011. I went to Utah when released and I stayed 
with my brother Joel. I contacted DA and returned to Idaho to turn 
myself back in. When in prison I got my GED. I worked in the 
Jonathan warehouse which is distributing chemicals, toilet paper, etc. I had 
Wade the job 2 years and 3 months. I worked in the kitchen in max. I did 
Ellington not have any disciplinary actions against me. If I'm released I 
promise to appear and to abide by court orders. I have 
opportunities at employment. When I get my license, it's expired, 
I have a couple job options. I have 4 brothers in Utah. If I was 
aiiowed to go to Utah my famiiy wouid assist me to get to court 
and I would have job opportunities in Utah. 
I 03:02:30 PM llxE by PA I None 
03:0~ Excused 
I 03:0 • , I No other evidence 
03:03:05 PM No additional evidence- bond is currently set for $1 mil as it was 
set prior to trial. We ask for ROR or $499,000 or $99,000. He 
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does have possibility for employment in Utah and in Kootenai 
County- relatives in Utah and friends in KC. He has a good 
employment history and has worked his whole life. He held the 
same job in the prison system for over 2 years. He has extensive 
family relationships and has a lot of friends here. Ms. Bronson 
has come today and was in court previously. He has people to be 
of support to him. Dated May 27 we have a unanimous Supreme 
r.n11rt n,:::ori~inn - n~n,:::o ~1 - innil"'~tinn thi~ I"'~C!O \AI~C! !::11 I"'II"\C!O 1"'!::1111 V--• • __ ....,,_,_, 1 f""-:;j"' - 1 11 1""'1--LII 1:::1 LIIIU V"""U"" WW'IIo.4U \.A VI"-.JU"-' V(,AII 
and that absent Fred Rice's testimony the outcome may have 
been different. Mr. Rice will not be present for testimony this time. 
DA Defendant was released and went to Utah and had he wanted to he could have disappeared into the night. There was no where for 
defendant to turn himself in when released on Friday. He 
contacted me on Monday and he voluntarily came back. He spent 
17-18 hours on a bus and went back to jail - he's here to stand 
trial and is here for the duration and is no reason for him to have 
a $1 mil bond. We ask for ROR- if not we ask for $99,000 or 
$499,000 due to custody status. He's currently in 23 hour per day 
lock down and if bond is below the $500,000 mark he can get into 
general population. $99,000 or less and he can be an inmate 
worker and he's a person who could and should be allowed to 
work while in custody 
03:07:55 PM Hardship in jail is not a relevant factor. His ability to work and 
enjoy his stay is not relevant. The only thing I heard from the 
stand re: employment is speculation. The rules contemplate ties 
to our community. I appreciate the testimony of his friend Ms. 
Bronson - we should be hearing from many friends. The amount 
PA of jail he spent is not a factor as to bond reduction. When he 
committed the alleged crime he fled. You are also to take into 
account the likelihood of a conviction. You sat through it and I 
believe there is a good likelihood of conviction. This is a potential 
life offense. An ROR is in appropriate. He's had 5 or 6 DUI's Our 
concern is protection to the community- re: criminal history. 46(c) 
factors justify imposition of $1 mil bond. 
03:11:23 PM Def does have a history of DUI- misdemeanor history. He didn't 
come to court with a varied felony history. We need to look at the 
likelihood of a conviction. It's our position that the previous trial 
DA was not tried on the facts and I think this one will be. He's been 
sentenced to 25 years and he was let out of prison and he came 
back to come and face the charges. He'll go to court and we'll go 
to triai 
03:12:42 PM Comments - a primary concern is the likelihood that he will 
J reappear. I don't believe that the circumstances have changed 
significantly since the case was originally tried - I don't know if 
there was much if any bond argument. 
03:14:25 PM PA The bond was stipulated to at $1 mil 
03:14:41 PM DA re: bond history- it was stipulated at $1 mil because it had been 
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I II 
03:15:05 PM 
J 
03:24:26 PM PA 
vv.,4:~fDA 
l,£3:2~.5.:: PA 
03:26:43 PM 
J 
! 03:27:55 PM II Def 
~:28:29PM 
:28:29 PM lEnd 
II set at $10 mil before. 
Rule 46 factors have been set forth by counsel. The court is to 
take into account employment status, history and financial 
situation. The PSI indicates defendant has always stayed 
employed for the most part. He's been in prison for the last 5 or 6 
years and I don't know that there is any reason to believe that he 
has any resources available and his financial situation has not 
improved. There is some iimited contact with this community. He 
does have significant contact with Utah. We've heard from Ms. 
Bronson that she will assist him and we've heard from a brother 
who may be able to assist him. The nature of the charges are 
substantial. The court will also give consideration of the likelihood 
of a conviction. My opinion doesn't make a whole lot of difference 
re: supreme court ruling. The likelihood of a conviction has shifted 
substantially. Defendants prior criminal history- he has a 
significant prior criminal history - I expected on the remittitur to 
have Mr. Ellington before this court but apparently for some 
reason the I DOC released defendant and he did the right thing 
and turned himself into custody and that's a factor that needs to 
be taken into account. The court has to consider what a 
reasonable bail is and his employment situation would make a 
difference in what a reasonable bail would be. I think there needs 
to be a reduction in bail - rule 46 - I don't think it should make a 
difference under the bond rules if he wants to be an inmate 
worker or not. BOND $125,000- my feeling is that he's not in a 
position to post any bond but if someone is willing to assist him 
the amount is sufficient to assure that he'll be back. 
I neglected to ask- if he is able to post bond I ask for no contact 
with the victims 
J~s no intention of contacting them. 
Provides names of victims to the court 
If you are able to make the bail the conditions are no criminal 
offense (PC finding) - sign waiver of extradition at the jail, appear 
in court, no alcohol consumption, notify the court and counsel of 
address change. I'll not make a restriction that you remain in KC. 
No driving of any kind. No contact with victims. 
II • mrlP.r~t~l d and agree 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www .fortherecord .com 
I 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff 
V. 
CASE NO. CR- "'00b- f L4 CVI 
ORDER SETTING BAIL or 
.:r or'\ e< 1:!-,aV\ £II u~vgfvv? 
RELEASE ON OWN RECOGNIZANCE and 
CONDITIONS 
Defendant 
The above case having come before the Court on the below date and the Court having 
considered the factors in I.C.R. 46, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that bail be set in the amount of \ .., s. IV"V"l ~ $ ~ Ill'\ . lJ\.JV and the following are established as the conditions of release: 
THE DEFENDANT SHALL: 
1. ~ Commit no new criminal offenses (i.e. no offenses greater than an infraction); 
PC finding is sufficient; 
2. lf Sign waiver of extradition and file with the Court; 
3. ~ke all court appearances timely; 
4. ~t consume alcohol; 
5. K"Promptly notify the Court and defense counsel of any change of address; 
6. WMaintain regular contact with defense counsel; 
7. ¥'Not drive, operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle vlitseHt tt valid hcense-and 
Insnutnee, 
8. D Obtain a Substance Abuse/Batterer's Evaluation from an approved evaluator by: 
------
9. D Submit to urinalysis testing on a D daily, D weekly basis through __________ _ 
and authorize results to be provided to D Court, D Prosecuting Attorney's office; 
10J/J Other: ~)o t:PM.\.0 ,.\-- tA.Ji \-~ ~o-e I Le.tv$o ~ UPvtaiA f.a~..s~ 
J"o l 't! t: "' k,v s ~ v , t= .:::I'Pt WII' 't!' < 
ORDER SETTING BAIL AND CONDITIONS OF RELEASE PA0-1001 11/05 
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D ORI~'I\JAL 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
STATE OF IDAHO } Q0UNTY OF KOOTENAI 88 
rilED: 
2011 JUL-8 PM 1: f8 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________________________ ) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fe I 
MOTION TO RELEASE 
DEFENDANTS EXHIBITS 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order releasing to Mark Durant or Mary 
Fisher ofthe Public Defender Office the Defendant's exhibits admitted into evidence during the Trial 
before Judge John Luster. This request is made on the grounds that the exhibit(s) will be necessary 
for the defense in this m? 
DATED this day ofJuly, 2011. 
MOTION TO RELEASE 
DEFENDANTS EXHIBITS 
BY: 
OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI nTY PUBLIC FENDE 
ETAYLOR 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby c~ify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by facsimile 
on the () day ofJuly, 2011, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 
MOTION TO RELEASE 
DEFENDANTS EXHIBITS Page 2 
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TRANSMISSION VERIFICATION REPORT 
DATE; TIME 
FAX NO./NAME 
DURATION 
PAGE(S) 
RESULT 
MODE 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
07/08 12:35 
94451833 
00:00:24 
03 
OK 
STANDARD 
ECM 
TIME : 07/08/2011 12:35 
NAME : PUBLICDEFENDER 
FAX 2084451701 
TEL : 
SER.#: BROL0J230759 
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
.JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
----------~~~---------·) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION TO RELEASE 
DEFENDANTS EXHIBITS 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, 
Deputy Pub lie Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order releasing to Mark Durant or Mary 
Fisher of the Public Defender Office the Defendant's exhibits admitted into evidence during the Trial 
before Judge John Luster. This request is made on the grounds that the exhibit(s) will be necessary 
for the defense in this matter., 
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QORIGr-·AL 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
(q{;; 
STA1E OF rDAHO } 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI SS 
FILED 
The Law Office of the Public Defender ofKootenai County 
PO Box 9000 2QII JUL 12 AH 9: 46 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
--------------------------~ 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION TO TRANSPORT 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant by and his attorney, Anne Taylor, Deputy Public 
Defender and hereby moves the Court for an Order directing the Kootenai County Sheriff to 
transport the above named defendant to Dr. Daniel Hayes, 2199 Ironwood Center Drive, Coeur 
d'Alene, Idaho 83814 for the purpose of evaluation. 
Testing and interview of the defendant is to be confidential, and the defendant requests 
that no jail personnel be present during the testing and interview of the defendant. 
DATED this If-b. day ofJuly, 2011. 
BY: 
TAYLOR 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
MOTION TO TRANSPORT Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing 
a copy of the same as indicated below on the /I day of July, 2011, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 £ ViaFax 
Interoffice Mail 
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2011/JUL/13/WED 13:23 KO KO PROSECUTORS 
!QlR©fr. · .r.. ~ L""U u \\:::!)I .• 1...' . : _, 
BARRY GH 
Prosecuting Attoiu.ey 
501 Govt. WayfBox 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1971 
Telephone: (208). 446-1800 
FAX No. 208-446-1840 
IN. THE DISTRICT CO'OR.T OF THE FIRST JT~lJ>ICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plamtiff, 
vs. 
JONA1HAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
') 
) 
Case No. F06-1497 
MOTION TO 
RELEASE EXHIBITS 
P. 001/002 
COMES NOW, AR'THUR. VE:R:HA.REN. Deputy Prosecuting Attom~yfor Kootenai Courity 
Idaho. and hm-cby moves the above entitled Court for an order releasing to the Kootenai County 
Sheriffs Department, the Plaintiff's exhibits (ie: exhibit #14 7, 148, 151, 1 S2 and 163) entered in the 
above matter by the State at the Jury Trial Hearing held on 8-26-06 in front of the Honorable Judge 
Luster. S~ch request is based.'upon the fact that 'the Kootenai County Sheriff's Department need 
these documents in order to aid in the State and ne~essaey law enforcement personal in their 
preparation of 1he State· s case for trial. 
DATED this j 3 day of_;["i.::!lol. _C1,._v_"'----'' 2011.. 
A .. ~ ,jvV·~. AR~RHAREN '". 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
: . Prosea~~s Cm:tifi~f~namittw · · 
· I hereby certifY that on the I }lay of v V\ 2011, a true and· correct copy of . 
FUB4C DEFENDERS Nt/ . vftA ljvtv'--the foregoing was caused to be FAXED as fo~ows: rt:' J I I . .. 
. - r .. .. 
MOTION TO RELEhSE EXHIBITS ~age 1 
Received Jul-13-11 01:15pm Frcm-208 446 1840 Tc-JUDGE LUSTER Pais 01 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
STATE Qr: lp4Ho fOUNTY.or: ki •1 1-lLED ' .l)OTEtv.4i SS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
___________________________) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION FOR MEDIATION 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order appointing a mediator and setting 
the case for mediation. 
Counsel requests a hearing for status regarding this Motion. Time requested is fifteen (15) 
minutes. 
DATED this } jt"--' day of July, 2011. 
BY: 
MOTION FOR MEDIATION Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by facsimile 
on the I Lf day ofJuly, 2011, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-183 3 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
--------------------------
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT 
The Court having before it the Motion to Transport, and good cause appearing, now, 
therefore 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Kootenai County Sheriff transport the above named 
defendant to Dr. Daniel Hayes, 2199 Ironwood Center Drive, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 on July 
28th, 2011 from 9:00AM to 1:OOPM. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the testing and interview of the defendant is to be 
confidential. No jail personnel are to be present during the testing or interview. 
arv-
DATED this f v day ofJuly, 2011. 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT Page 1 
JOHN P. LUSTER 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally se ed by placing 
a copy of the same as indicated below on theq} day of July, 2011, addresse to: 
Kootenai County Public Defender FAX 446-ftdt ft'r , 
Kootenai County Jail FAX 446-1407 / / 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 / 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT Page2 
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QORIGIN- t 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
___________________________) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fe I 
ORDER TO RELEASE EXHIBITS 
The Court having before it the Defendant's Motion, and good cause appearing now, 
therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above entitled Defendant's Exhibit(s) entered at the 
Trial, and the same hereby are, released to Mark Durant or Mary Fisher of the Public Defender 
office. 
t'-'" 
DATED this\ 8 day of July, 2011. 
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D ORIG1tt'1.. 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defmder 
POBox9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-i 700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
_,..-...,, 
REQEIVED BY d! & ) Lfi=-- .,_ 
'JUL: 2"2 2011 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) · CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
) Fel 
) 
) ORDER TO RELEASE EXHIBITS 
) 
) 
) 
________________________ ) 
ORDER TO RELEASE EXHIBITS Paael 
etttmsoz ~a1sn1 3Danr.woJ~ ldge:zo ll·Zz-tnr 
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2011/JUL/13/WED 13:24 KO KO PROSECUTORS FAX No. 208-446-1840 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TilE FIRST JUDICIAL 
STATE.OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Case No. CR06-1497 
) 
Plain~ .) ORDER TO RELEASE 
' EXHlBITS ) 
vs. ) 
) 
JONATHAN~ELLINGTON, ) 
)· 
Defendant. ) 
The Court having before it the above Motion, and good cause appearmg now, therefore; 
ITIS HEREBYOlUJE:RED that the abo-ve _entitled Plaintiff's exhibits (ie: exhibit~H47. 148. 
151, 152 and 163) entered in the above matter by the State at the Jury Trial hearing held on 8-26-06 
in front of the Honorable::: Judge::: Luster, are hereby to be released to the Kootenai County Sheriff's 
Department 
ENTERED this '2011. 
C'>~ P'"*== \ ~A 
ruDGE LUSTER 
Rscsivsd Jul-13-11 01:15pm From-208 446 1840 To-JUDGE LUSTER Pa111 02 
.>!' 
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l:)ORIGINAL 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
10 Ct 
STATE OJ=: !DAJiO } 
COUNT-' OF KOrJTr-1,.41 SS FILED: , '- ~. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________________________ ) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through her attorney, Anne C. 
Taylor, Deputy Public Defender and hereby moves the Court for an Order Shortening Time for 
hearing the Motion for Work Release in this matter. 
This motion is made pursuant to I.C.R. 45(c) and 12(d) on the grounds that another 
hearing in this matter is c~tly set for this day and time and also for Court convenience. 
DATED this 2 day of July, 2011. 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 
C . Y PUBLIC DJFENDE RE OF THE KOOT.ENAI~ ~ ~ I 
BY: ~ ~j} ~~---.:J 
A'NNElfA~ 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by facsimile 
on the ~5 day of July, 2011, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor 446-1833 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME Page 2 
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[)ORL .NAL 
STATE 01= iDNiU cou~trv or:: mr;rc· .• ol }SS 
Anne C. Taylor? Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
filED I if&. 
ZO/IJUL25 PM 2:1~5 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 
__________________________ ) 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16( e )(2) hereby moves the Court 
to order the State to comply with Defendant's Forth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Requests 
for Discovery filed herein on or about July 14, 2011, and further moves the Court for sanctions. 
Specific discoverable items being requested are as follows: 
1. All notes, memoranda, phone records, e-mails and/or any other record, including the 
contents thereot: of any contact between any agent of the State, particularly any personnel 
of the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, and Idaho State Police Corporal 
Fred Rice, from January 1, 2006 and the present time. 
"We have no way to know whether or not the prosecutor had any knowledge ofthe falsity 
of Cpl. Rice's testimony given his past testimony and training materials, but we recognize 
the serious constitutional implications of the possibility." 
State v. Ellington, __ P .3d __ , 2011 WL 2090231 (Idaho 2011 ). 
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY Page 1 
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2. All notes, memoranda, phone records, e-mails and/or any other record, including the 
contents thereof, of any contact between any agent of the State, particularly any personnel 
ofthe Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, and Idaho State Police Corporal 
Sean Daly, from January 1, 2006 and the present time. 
3. Aii notes, memoranda, phone records, e-mails and/or any other record, including the 
contents thereof, of any contact between any agent of the State, particularly any personnel 
ofthe Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, and Joel Larsen, from January 1, 
2006 and the present time. 
4. All notes, memoranda, phone records, e-mails and/or any other record, including 
the contents thereof, of any contact between any agent of the State, particularly any 
personnel of the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, and Jovan Larsen 
from January 1, 2006 to the present time. 
5. All notes, memoranda, phone records, e-mails and/or any other record, including 
the contents thereof, of any contact between any agent of the State, particularly any 
personnel of the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, and Jovan Larsen 
from January 1, 2006 to the present time. 
DATED this L_ ~ day of July, 2011. 
BY: 
OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI 
COYN\TY PUBLIC DE~DER ~ 
, L u_Y~ A~~OR ~ 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by facsimile 
on the d-5 day of July, 2011, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor 446-1833 
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D ORIGINf. 
BARRY McHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way/Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Telephone: (208) 446-1800 
srAJE Of .[W«) }ss 
.rotMY (J r«JTEN.AJ 
flED: I CJ Lr 
2011 Jut 27 AH fO: t 0 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. CR-F06-1497 
MOTION TO RELEASE 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS 
COMES NOW, ARTHUR VERHAREN, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County 
Idaho, and hereby moves the above entitled Court for an order releasing to the Prosecutor's office the 
Plaintiffs exhibit(s), admitted into evidence at the jury trial before Judge Luster. This request is 
made on the grounds that the exhibit(s) are needed for trial. 
DATED this 'L f day of Jk '- '( , 2011. 
MOTION TO RELEASE PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBITS: Page 1 
BARRY McHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney for 
Kootenai Coun , Idaho 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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Prosecutor's Certificate of Transmittal 
rt./1 ,...--; .. ~ 
I hereby certify that on the ___ day of ~ vvv I , 2011, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was caused to be mailed: 
PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE 
FAXED 
MOTION TO RELEASE PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBITS: Page 2 
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/ 
I.og of 1K-COURTROOM1 r '28/2011 Page 1 of2 
r 
11 Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20110728 Motion for Medi tion 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth ~-:. 
::urt Reporter Anne MacManus Brow--n· ,e~~ __ \'/_ / '' \, ;d\71 DA Anne Taylor ·--""'= ~"-x/ ~" J '\ 
Time Speaker Note 
04:02:42 PM J 
04:02:44 PM Calls case- PA VerHaren, DA Taylor and Chapman present with 
defendant - in custody - for hearing on a motion for mediation 
!~========~~======== 
04:04:33 PM PA 
04:04:58 PM 
J 
I 04:07:00 PM I PA 
04:07:14 PM 
DA 
Chapman 
04:08:38 p 
04:08:56 PM J 
I 
04:09:23 PM I DA 
. _Chapman 
I 04:09:45 PM I J 
V'l:i 11'1:1\...luest mediation and that a mediator be appointed. 
r to the court by the end of the day. 
Perhaps counsel can submit a list to me and we can agree on 
one. 
there are a number of active and retired judges who participate 
in this . We have trial coming up on August 29th and there are a 
number of issues. Mediation need not resolve everything but 
resolution of some items can speed the trial up. Submit order 
and list of proposed mediators by 5:00pm August 3. 
They had a motion to compel noticed up for today 
The motion to compel is going to take a long time if we're going 
to do it. I ask that you vacate the hearing today and ask the court 
to provide us time- 1 1/2 hours- before trial. We have high 
hopes as to the mediation. I have a client who has been waiting 
5 1/2 years to try this thing and I don't want to wait any longer. 
I No objection to vacate the motion to compel 
You can vacate your motion hearing and I'll provide you time for 
hearing on motions prior to trial. 
I'd like the record to reflect that we do not withdraw the motion 
but simply vacate the hearing. 
Contact my clerk tomorrow or next week to schedule a hearing. 
file://R:\LogNotes- HTML\District\Criminal\Luster\CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan W... 7/28/2011 
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 c "'28/2011 
04:10:04 PM I 
04:10:04 PM lEnd 
I 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. CR-F06-1497 
ORDER TO 
RELEASE EXHIBITS 
The Court having before it the State's motion, and good cause appearing now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above entitled Plaintiffs Ex.hibit(s) entered at the 
jury trial, and the same hereby are, released to the Prosecutor's office. 
ENTERED this \ 7.-r- day of Avav 2 t '2011. 
~.L?4::.l"A 
JUDGE 
ORDER TO RELEASE EXHIBITS 
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CERTIF~ OF MAILING/SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the .. day of a~ , 20)) , copies ofthe 
foregoing were mailed, postag~ prepaid, faxed, or sent t)interoffice mail to: 
y_ dLJ&-) ~ 3 , , Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County 
.4- Jf/h :P,4j)/d I~ k, Deputy Public Defender for Kootenai County 
Defendant, , c/o KCSO 
__ Idaho Department of Correction (certified copy via fax 208 327-7 445) 
__ Probation & Parole (3 certified copy) 
__ Kootenai County Sheriffs Department 
__ Idaho Dept. of Transportation (certified copy via fax 20J334-8739) 
__ Information Systems Department, Idaho Supreme Co~ Supreme Court Building, 
W. 451 State Street, Boise, ID 83720 j! 
J ~ I i 
,. t l ; 
· '~ CLIFF(j~ T. HA S .' 
,.-;Lil ,.;·1~ . . ~CLER:J(.OR{HE STPCJCOURT 
(/ f[/7 ~/ "'t· ,2! ·., ___ \ -- /.-- -;r 
/ "-. \ . ' " B I / 
De'puty Clerk 
ORDER TO RELEASE EXHIBITS 
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88/83/2811 88;13 2884461781 PUBLICDEFENDER 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Pub He Defender 
The Law Office of the Publl.c Defender of Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar NumbCT.: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
PAGE 82/E12 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Plaintiff, Fel 
v. ORDER FOR MEDIATION 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
____________________________________________________ ) 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion by the defendant. and no objection by the 
State, be granted. The panies shall jcipate in mediation. 
ORDERED this 3 ../ day of August, 2011. 
~~7~)~~ 
JOBNLUSTER 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CLERK!S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 11 
I hereby certify th~t a true and correct co':31fb.?.,regoi~g was personally .J~ byplacing 
a copy ofthe same as md1cated below on the 9'a~:y of Af!gust, 2011, addre!>'ed to: 
7 : .......... ! . 
l ........ I 
Kootenai CountY Public Defender FAX 446-2186 / , ·'· . .._ ~' · . 1 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX(~a6-l833-'··,· .... ·., ... ·- \\ · -;-' ?_J 
""- '"----<"1' {.,__ . ·- ... _ \ r< /~ \ r 
. ....._____ ______ ... · •·. ·· ...... ·-.,, __ / ~
\, ··--. --~·· 
"\ 
ORDER. FOR MeDIA.TIOI\l Pago 1 
Received Aua-03-11 08:36am From-2084461701 To-JUDGE LUSTER Paae 02 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai Countr 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________________________ ) 
... 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fe I 
MOTION TO APPOINT 
MEDIATOR AND SET MEDIATION 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order to appoint Judge Kerrick as 
Mediator in this matter. Counsel for the defendant further moves the Court to order that Mediation 
be set. 
This motion is ~e grounds that this is the agreed upon Mediator among the parties. 
DATED this aay of August, 2011. 
MOTION TO APPOINT 
MEDIATOR AND SET MEDIATION 
BY: 
Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing 
a copy of the same as indicated below on the day of August, 2011, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 
Via Fax 
Interoffice Mail 
MOTION TO APPOINT 
MEDIATOR AND SET MEDIATION Page 2 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fe I 
ORDER TO APPOINT 
MEDIATOR AND SET MEDIATION 
______________________________ ) 
The Court having before it the Motion to Appoint Mediator and Set Mediation and good 
cause appearing, now, therefore 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judge Kerrick be appointed as Mediator in this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mediation be set for time o.9y:eecJ vr.:>G:V\ 
. 5 \-"" be br.,c ... nE>tBV\ ,Ci,_,'-(,'1? ~ 5 
DATED this __ day of August, 2011. a. .... cJ U vcJfJ e kev·v• 'c..\,<::_ 
b~_\ce£~ 
JOHN P. LUSTER 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
/-: 
CLERK'S CER1JFICATE / · 
I hereby certify that a true and correct coW:J!/the foregoinp was persona.Jly served by placing 
a copy of the same as indicated below on the ~ day of Af. ... ~ust, 2011, $fddressed to: 
Kootenai County Public Defender fAX-446::-2186 // \\ / ,:· 1. 'I i_y Kootenai Coupty Prosecutor F 1'3(446-1833 -\:J;,~?;:_ / / <._- /-- 1 9'J 'i~£(~'</'1•3<66 <__ /' (! . / 
ORDER TO APPOINT 
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[J ORIGIN .. ·'-
BARRY McHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney 
STATE OF IDAHO 
gOUNTY oF KOOTENAI} SS 
riLED; 
501 Government Way/Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 446-1800 
2nfl AUG -8 PH 2: 53 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR 06-1497 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO 
PRODUCE I.R.E. 404(B) 
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL AND 
NOTICE OF FILING 
FACTUAL BASIS FOR 
I.R.E. 404(B) EVIDENCE 
\ . -
COMES NOW, Arthur Verharen, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, and 
hereby advises both the Honorable Court and Counsel for the Defendant of the state's intention 
to introduce at trial the following evidence: 
1. That at the time of the Defendant's contact with the Larson family on January 1, 
2006, the Defendant had an active bench warrant in the amount of$10,000.00. 
Attached is a copy of the ROA report pertaining to that matter. 
2. That following the Defendant's apprehension and after his contact with the Larson 
family on January 1, 2006, the Defendant had a blood alcohol level of .19. Attached 
is a copy ofhis blood alcohol level as documented by an analysis conducted by ISP. 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO PRODUCE l.R.E 404(B) EVIDENCE AT TRIAL AND 
NOTICE OF FILING FACTUAL BASIS FOR I.R.E 404(B) EVIDENCE - I 
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3. That at the time of the Defendant's contact with the Larson family on January 1, 
2006, the Defendant's driver's license was suspended in the State ofldaho. Attached 
is a copy ofthe Defendant's DMV printout. 
DATED this 7 day of August, 2011. 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the £:?' day of August, 2011, a true and 
foregoing was FAXED to PUBLIC DEFENDER~ j)v<A / 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO PRODUCE l.R.E 404(B) EVIDENCE AT TRIAL AND 
NOTICE OF FILING FACTUAL BASIS FOR l.R.E 404(B) EVIDENCE- 2 
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HFS 
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01/09/2,006 daho State Police Forensic Services 
1000 Hubbard, Ste.240 Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 {208)769-1410 
CL Case No.: 
A,~ncy: 
C20060002 
SP10 - ISP-PATROL 
IDISP0100 
Agency Case No.: C06000005 
Crime Date: Jan 1, 2006 
Criminalistic Analysis Report - ALCOHOL TESTING 
Evidence Received Information 
cvtaence Received: 
Add. Crime Date: 
How Received: 
Haz. Materials: 
lnv. Officer: 
Delivered By: 
Received By: 
Victims and Suspects 
Vic/Susp Name 
Oi/03/2006 
IN PERSON 
BIOHAZARD/CHEMICAL 
SGT. TIM B. JOHNSON 
P. HONEYMAN 
J. HUTCHISON ph. (208)769-1410 
Suspect ELLINGTON, JONATHAN WADE 
EVIDENCE DESCRIPTION: 
DOB Sex Race 
1- AGENCY EXHIBIT NO. 1. BLOOD COLLECTION KIT. 
DATE SAMPLE COLLECTED: 01/01/2006. 
__________ LABORATORY RESULTS ________ __ 
ETHYL ALCOHOL DETECTED: 0.19 grams/100 cc. of blCJc-d. 
JEREMY T. JOHNST 
January W , 
lh 
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01/09/2006 daho State Police Forensic Services 
1000 Hubbard, Ste.240 Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 (208)769-1410 
CL Case No.: 
f:>.n;;mcy: 
C20060002 
SP10- ISP-PATROL 
IDISP0100 
Agency Case No.: C06000005 
Crime Date: Jan 1, 2006 
Criminalistic Analysis Report -ALCOHOL TESTING 
A F F I D A V I T 
STATE OF IDAHO 
ss. 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
Page 2 
JEREMY T. JOHNSTON, being first duly sworn, deposes and says the following: 
1. That I am a forensic scientist with the Idaho State Police, Forensic 
Services and am qualified to perform the examination and draw conclusions 
of the type shown on the attached report; 
2. That Forensic Services is part of the Idaho State Police; 
3. That I conducted a scientific examination of evidence described in the 
attached repo~t in the ordinary course and scope of my duties with the 
Forensic Laboratory; 
The conclusion(s) expressed in this report is/are correct to the best of 
my knowledge; 
That the case identifying information reflected in this report came from 
the evidence packaging, a c~se report, or another reliable source. 
Forensic Scientist Signature: 
Date of Signature: 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this/Lfth day o~UJ ~~~ 
A true and accurate copy of the report described 
affidavit. 
~J.oL~ 
Notary Public, State~Idaho 
Commission Expires: ~tember 08, 2010 
1 2006. 
to this 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 73 of 848
Date: 8/8/2011 
Tirne: 11 :49 AM 
Page 1 of 5 
Fi,.. Judicial District Court - Kootenai Counf 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2002-0000990 Current Judge: Robert Caldwell 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
User: KCPA 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date 
1/20/2002 
1/22/2002 
1/23/2002 
1/24/2002 
1/28/2002 
1/29/2002 
2/1/2002 
2/12/2002 
2/21/2002 
2/22/2002 
2/25/2002 
2/27/2002 
3/4/2002 
3/8/2002 
3/18/2002 
3/27/2002 
Code 
NEWC 
AFPC 
ADFS 
ORPC 
HRSC 
ARRN 
ORPD 
APNG 
STDR 
BNDS 
NODF 
ADMR 
HRSC 
HRSC 
STRS 
NOAP 
DRQD 
PRQD 
PRSD 
DRSD 
PRSD 
SUBF 
MNSP 
HRSC 
HRHD 
NOHG 
SUBF 
HRVC 
HRVC 
SUBF 
User 
OREILLY 
OREILLY 
OREILLY 
OREILLY 
OREILLY 
CLAUSEN 
CLAUSEN 
CLAUSEN 
CLAUSEN 
DELANEY 
DELANEY 
MITCHELL 
MITCHELL 
MITCHELL 
MITCHELL 
ROSE 
ROSE 
ROSE 
ROSE 
ROSE 
ROSE 
SMITH 
OREILLY 
REYNOLDS 
REYNOLDS 
HAMILTON 
HILDRETH 
REYNOLDS 
REYNOLDS 
HILDRETH 
New Case Filed 
Affidavit Of Probable Cause 
Advisory Form & Notice Of Suspension And 
Refusal 
Judge 
To Be Assigned 
To Be Assigned 
To Be Assigned 
Order Finding Probable Cause Eugene A. Marano 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment/First Eugene A. Marano 
Appearance 01/22/2002 02:00PM) 
Hearing result for Arraignment/First Appearance Eugene A. Marano 
held on 01/22/2002 02:00PM: Arraignment I 
First Appearance 
Order Appointing Public Defender Eugene A. Marano 
Appear & Plead Not Guilty Eugene A. Marano 
Statement Of Defendant's Rights 
Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 1000.00 ) 
Notice To Defendant 
Administrative assignment of Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference 
02/27/2002 11:30 AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled 
03/18/2002 09:00 AM) 
Speedy Trial Limit Satisfied 
Notice Of Appearance 
Defendant's Request For Discovery 
Plaintiff's Request For Discovery 
Plaintiff's Response To Reqeust for Discovery 
Defendant's Response To Discovery 
Eugene A. Marano 
To Be Assigned 
To Be Assigned 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Plaintiff's Supplemental Response To Defendant's Eugene A. Marano 
Request for Discovery 
Subpoena Return/found/Thomas N. Yarbrough Eugene A. Marano 
Motion To Suppress Eugene A. Marano 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Suppress/Limine Eugene A. Marano 
03/18/2002 04:30 PM) 
Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference held on Eugene A. Marano 
02/27/2002 11:30 AM: Hearing Held 
Notice Of Hearing 
Subpoena Return/found-Thomas N Yarbrough 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Hearing result for Motion to Suppress/Limine held Eugene A. Marano 
on 03/18/2002 04:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled held on Eugene A. Marano 
03/18/2002 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Subpoena Return/found-Thomas N Yarbrough Eugene A. Marano 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 74 of 848
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Fi,. · Judicial District Court - Kootenai Coun• 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2002-0000990 Current Judge: Robert Caldwell 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
User: KCPA 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date 
3/29/2002 
5/28/2002 
5/29/2002 
5/31/2002 
6/3/2002 
6/13/2002 
7/16/2002 
8/7/2002 
8/9/2002 
8/26/2002 
8/30/2002 
9/4/2002 
9/19/2002 
9/20/2002 
Code 
HRSC 
HRVC 
HRSC 
BNDS 
BNDE 
NODF 
SUBF 
HRSC 
NOHG 
MNSP 
FTAH 
WARS 
STAT 
SUBF 
STAT 
HRSC 
WART 
INHD 
STDR 
BNDE 
CSUR 
HRVC 
KITE 
HRSC 
User 
CARLSON 
CARLSON 
REYNOLDS 
REYNOLDS 
REYNOLDS 
DELANEY 
DELANEY 
DELANEY 
HILDRETH 
TAYLOR 
MILLER 
MILLER 
REYNOLDS 
REYNOLDS 
REYNOLDS 
REYNOLDS 
SMITH 
CLAUSEN 
CLAUSEN 
CLAUSEN 
CLAUSEN 
CLAUSEN 
MORELAND 
MORELAND 
REYNOLDS 
MILLER 
REYNOLDS 
REYNOLDS 
Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 05/28/2002 
03:30PM) 
Judge 
Eugene A. Marano 
Notice of Hearing Eugene A. Marano 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 05/28/2002 Eugene A. Marano 
03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled 
08/07/2002 09:00AM) 
Notice of Trial 
Bond Posted -Surety (Amount 10000.00 ) 
Surety Bond Exonerated (Amount 1 ,000.00) 
Notice To Defendant 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Subpoena Return/found-Thomas N Yarbrough Eugene A. Marano 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Suppress/Limine Eugene A. Marano 
09/04/2002 11:15 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing Eugene A. Marano 
Second Motion To Suppress Eugene A. Marano 
Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled held on Eugene A. Marano 
08/07/2002 09:00AM: Failure To Appear For 
Hearing Or Trial 
Warrant Issued - Bench Failure to Appear For 
Hearing 8/8/02 
Case status changed: Inactive 
Notice of Bond Forfeiture 
Subpoena Return/found/Thomas N Yarbrough 
Case status changed: reopened 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment/First 
Appearance 08/26/2002 02:00 PM) 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Benjamin R. Simpson 
Warrant Returned Failure to Appear For Hearing Eugene A. Marano 
Hearing result for Arraignment/First Appearance Benjamin R. Simpson 
held on 08/26/2002 02:00PM: Interim Hearing 
Held 
Statement Of Defendant's Rights Benjamin R. Simpson 
Surety Bond Exonerated (Amount 1 0,000.00) Def Eugene A. Marano 
surrendered 8/30/02 
Certificate Of Surrender Eugene A. Marano 
Hearing result for Motion to Suppress/Limine held Eugene A. Marano 
on 09/04/2002 11:15 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Inmate Request Form Re: Plea Agreement Eugene A. Marano 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Suppress/Limine Eugene A. Marano 
10/03/2002 03:45 PM) 
Notice of Hearing Eugene A. Marano 
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Fi,. Judicial District Court - Kootenai Coun' 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2002-0000990 Current Judge: Robert Caldwell 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
User: KCPA 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date 
10/3/2002 
10/4/2002 
10/16/2002 
10/28/2002 
10/30/2002 
11/19/2002 
11/27/2002 
11/29/2002 
12/23/2002 
Code 
HRHD 
REDU 
SNPF 
DSBP 
PROS 
SNIC 
JDMT 
SPRO 
STAT 
SUBF 
ASCP 
STAT 
WARB 
STAT 
WART 
STAT 
HRSC 
HRHD 
HRSC 
HRHD 
SNIC 
JDMT 
STAT 
DFAD 
User 
RICKARD 
RICKARD 
RICKARD 
RICKARD 
RICKARD 
RICKARD 
RICKARD 
RICKARD 
RICKARD 
SMITH 
MILLER 
REYNOLDS 
REYNOLDS 
REYNOLDS 
CLAUSEN 
CLAUSEN 
CLAUSEN 
CLAUSEN 
CLAUSEN 
HAMILTON 
HAMILTON 
HAMILTON 
HAMILTON 
MILLER 
Judge 
Hearing result for Motion to Suppress/Limine held Eugene A. Marano 
on 1 0/03/2002 03:45 PM: Hearing Held 
Charge Reduced Or Amended (118-8004 {M}{2} Eugene A. Marano 
Driving Under The Influence (second Offense)) 
Sentenced To Pay Fine (118-8004 {M}{2} Driving Eugene A. Marano 
Under The Influence (second Offense)) 
Dismissed By Prosecutor (149-673 Safety Eugene A. Marano 
Restraint-fail To Use) 
Probation Ordered (118-8004 {M}{2} Driving Eugene A. Marano 
Under The Influence (second Offense)) Probation 
term: 2 years. 
Sentenced To Incarceration (118-8004 {M}{2} Eugene A. Marano 
Driving Under The Influence (second Offense)) 
Confinement terms:Jail: 365 days.Suspended 
jail: 318 days.Credited time: 47 days. 
Judgment Eugene A. Marano 
Supervised Misdemeanor Probation Order Eugene A. Marano 
Case status changed: closed pending clerk 
action 
Subpoena Return/found/Thomas N Yarbrough 
Application To Show Cause Why Probation 
Should Not Be Revoked 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Case status changed: reopened Eugene A. Marano 
Warrant Issued- Bench Bond amount: 10000.00 Eugene A. Marano 
Failure to Comply With Conditions of Probation 
Case status changed: Inactive Eugene A. Marano 
Warrant Returned Failure to Comply With Eugene A. Marano 
Conditions of Probation 
Case status changed: Activate (previously Eugene A. Marano 
inactive) 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment/First Barry E. Watson 
Appearance 11/19/2002 02:00PM) 
Hearing result for Arraignment/First Appearance Barry E. Watson 
held on 11/19/2002 02:00PM: Hearing Held 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment/First 
Appearance 11/27/2002 02:00PM) 
Eugene A. Marano 
Hearing result for Arraignment/First Appearance Eugene A. Marano 
held on 11/27/2002 02:00PM: Hearing Held 
Sentenced To Incarceration (IPV Probation Eugene A. Marano 
Violation-misdemeanor) Confinement terms:Jail: 
30 days.Suspended jail: 10 days. 
Judgment Eugene A. Marano 
Case status changed: closed pending clerk 
action 
Defendant's Change Of Address 
Eugene A. Marano 
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Fi• Judicial District Court - Kootenai Coun' 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2002-0000990 Current Judge: Robert Caldwell 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
User: KCPA 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date 
12/23/2002 
1/29/2003 
Code 
PROA 
NTWD 
User 
MILLER 
MILLER 
Probation Agreement 
Notice Of Withdrawal 
Judge 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
2/28/2003 AFPV RQSE .. .. . .. . Affidavit Of Probation Violation Eugene A. Marano 
~~rWa~·~t:r~rt~87'"'1'}'''tl~~"~6§~1!~J~Wal!t~Wrrso~lfie<t;;o:aerne~-anmuJm:~:o'Gn'alol>~Et1Qe~'Mifitf¥~ 
3/5/2004 
11/3/2004 
11/3/2005 
1/3/2006 
1/5/2006 
1/25/2006 
1/31/2006 
2/28/2006 
3/9/2006 
4/12/2006 
STAT 
REVR 
REVR 
HRSC 
STAT 
HRHD 
ORPD 
MISC 
NOAP 
AFPV 
HRSC 
CONT 
HRSC 
HRHD 
NOTE 
REYNOLDS 
DUBE 
DUBE 
DUBE 
CARROLL 
CARROLL 
CARROLL 
CARROLL 
CARROLL 
CLAUSEN 
CLAUSEN 
REYNOLDS 
REYNOLDS 
MOLLETT 
MOLLETT 
TAYLOR 
TAYLOR 
Failure to comph7wiYiimiHtror15'.ofProllation ~ .~ · · · 
3/6/03 
Case status changed: Inactive 
Reviewed And Retained. BW outstanding for 
failure to comply with probation conditions. 
**********ACCOUNT IS IN 
COLLECTIONS********** - Step 1, Failure to Pay 
Fines and Fees - Charge # 1, Driving Under The 
Influence (second Offense) Appearance date: 
11/3/2004 
Reviewed And Retained. BW outstanding for 
failure to comply with probation. 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment/First 
Appearance 01/03/2006 02:00PM) 
Case status changed: Reopened 
Hearing result for Arraignment/First Appearance 
held on 01/03/2006 02:00PM: Hearing Held 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade Order 
Appointing Public Defender Public defender 
Public Defender 
REFER TO JUDGE MARANO TO RESET 
Notice Of Appearance 
Affidavit Of Probation Violation/Addendum to 
OSC Dated 2/28/03 
Hearing Scheduled (Order to Show Cause 
02/28/2006 10:15 AM) 
Hearing result for Order to Show Cause held on 
02/28/2006 10:15 AM: Continued 
Hearing Scheduled (Order to Show Cause 
04/12/2006 10:30 AM) 
Notice of Hearing 
Hearing result for Order to Show Cause held on 
04/12/2006 10:30 AM: Hearing Held 
Clerk's Notation-PV Evidentiary Hearing to be set 
after August 1, 2006 regarding 1/24/06 OSC 
Addendum 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Barry E. Watson 
Eugene A. Marano 
Barry E. Watson 
Barry E. Watson 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
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Fi~ Judicial District Court - Kootenai Coun' 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2002-0000990 Current Judge: Robert Caldwell 
Defendant: Ellington, Jonathan Wade 
State of Idaho vs. Jonathan Wade Ellington 
Date Code User 
4/12/2006 SNIC JOKELA Sentenced To Incarceration (IPV Probation 
Violation-misdemeanor) Confinement terms:Jail: 
288 days.Credited time: 102 days. 
ORPV JOKELA Order After Hearing On Probation Violation/ 
Contempt 
STAT JOKELA Case status changed: closed pending clerk 
action 
8/22/2006 MOTN MCCANDLESS Motion to Withdraw Probation Violation 
Addendum of 01/24/2006 
8/31/2006 ORDR JOKELA Order to Withdraw Probationh Violation 
Addendum of 01/24/06 
8/2/2007 NTWD WATKINS Notice Of Withdrawal 
12/31/2008 ADMR MEYER Administrative assignment of Judge (batch 
process) 
2/23/2009 SCAN POOLE Scanned 
User: KCPA 
Judge 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
Eugene A. Marano 
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CL K DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
--------------------------~) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
OBJECTION TO 
USE OF 404(B) EVIDENCE 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne C. Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and herby objects to the state using 404(b) evidence. First, the 404(b) is 
not proper material. Second, the State did not give proper notice. 
Counsel request that this motion be set for hearing in order to present oral argument, 
evidence and/or testimony in support thereof. Requested time is 10 minutes. /' 
. \(j\:L (\. \ ,/\ DATED thts 1 day of Augus~ 2011. , ' ~
TAYLOR 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by facsimile 
on the [()+- day of August, 2011, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor 208-446-1833 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 2011 AUG II AM 9: 50 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 ~1 
QftP(~TY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 
___________________________) 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(e)(2) hereby moves the Court 
to order the State to comply with Defendant's Tenth and Amended Ninth Supplemental Requests 
for Discovery filed herein on or about July 27, 2011 and July 15, 2011, and further moves the 
Court for sanctions. Specific discoverable items being requested are as follows: 
1. A complete copy of the Idaho State Police investigation regarding the testimony of 
Fred Rice given in this case in 2006. 
2. Identity of any witness to testify as an expert. 
3. Curriculum Vitae of any expert witness expected to testify at Trial. 
4. A written summary or report of any testimony that the state intends to introduce 
pursuant to Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Idaho Rules ofEvidence at trial or hearing, 
describing the witness's opinions, the facts and data for those opinions, and the 
witness's qualifications. 
5. Any records that the expert witness has reviewed to form his opinions. 
6. Any papers, notes, documents, photographs, videos, images, animated reenactments, 
or tangible objects, generated by or for the expert witness within the possession, 
custody or control of the State ofldaho. 
7. Whether the proposed expert has testified in that capacity previously. 
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8. Which States and Counties the proposed expert has previously testified. 
9. Whether or not the proposed expert has been furnished copies ofthe transcript, or any 
portions of the transcript, and /or from any other court proceeding herein including 
any preliminary hearing held herein of any witnesses testimony or arguments or 
statements of counsel for either party from the first Trial Re: Sean Daly or Fred Rice. 
DATED this { rJ!" day of August, 2011. 
BY: 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by facsimile 
on the lD day of August, 2011, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor 446-1833 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
___________________________) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fe I 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
COMES NOW, Jonathan Ellington, the above named defendant, by and through his 
attorney, Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court pursuant to the 5th 
and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution; and Article I, Section 13 ofthe Idaho 
Constitution for an Order to Dismiss the charges in the above entitled matter with prejudice. 
This Motion is made on the grounds that the Idaho and Federal Constitutions' bans on 
double jeopardy bar a retrial of Mr. Ellington, and on the grounds that a new trial would be the 
result of outrageous government conduct and therefore would violate Mr. Ellington's due process 
rights under the Idaho and Federal Constitution. This motion is based upon prosecutorial 
misconduct as cited and examined in Supreme Court Opinion No. 68 filed May 27, 2011. 
Counsel requests that this Motion be set for hearing in order to present oral argument, 
evidence and/or testimony in support thereof. Requested time is 30 minutes. 
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DATED this __ Q~- day of August, 2011. 
BY: 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing 
a copy of the same as indicated below on the l-:::f- day of August, 2011, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 
___:{_ Via Fax 
Interoffice Mail 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 /. 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 · 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendant. 
__________________________ ). 
COMES NOW, Jonathan Ellington, the above named defendant, by and through his 
attorney, Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby submits this Memorandum in 
support ofhis Motion to Dismiss previously filed with this Court. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
See, State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727 (2011). 
ISSUES 
1. Retrial of Mr. Ellington constitutes double jeopardy. 
1.A Double jeopardy for prosecutorial misconduct intended to cause a mistrial 
applies to Mr. Ellington's case under the federal Constitution. 
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l.B Double jeopardy for prosecutorial misconduct intended to cause a mistrial 
applies to Mr. Ellington's case under the Idaho Constitution. 
l.C Retrial of Mr. Ellington would violate double jeopardy under the federal 
Constitution because of prosecutoriai misconduct intended to cause a mistriaL 
l.D Retrial of Mr. Ellington would violate double jeopardy under the Idaho 
Constitution because of prosecutorial misconduct intended to avoid an acquittal. 
2. The charges against Mr. Ellington should be dismissed with prejudice because the 
government's outrageous conduct violated his right to Due Process under the federal and 
Idaho Constitutions. 
ISSUE 1. 
ARGUMENT 
Double jeopardy attaches when a jury is sworn under both the Idaho and federal 
Constitutions. State v. Stevens, 126 Idaho 822, 825-26 (1995). Double jeopardy ofthe 5th 
Amendment of the federal Constitution applies to the States through the 14th Amendment. 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1963). The Idaho Constitution has its own double 
jeopardy clause in Art. 1 § 13. "The double jeopardy clauses in the Idaho and federal 
constitutions prohibit putting one in jeopardy twice for the same crime. This protection applies 
not only to multiple punishments, but also to multiple prosecutions for the same crimes." State v. 
Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 343 (2005). 
In this case, Mr. Ellington has already been tried and convicted. The current case before 
the Court is a retrial ordered by the Idaho Supreme Court. Therefore, Mr. Ellington is being 
placed in jeopardy a second time for the same charges and the double jeopardy bar should apply 
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unless Mr. Ellington waived his right or the reversal of his first trial was the equivalent of 
"[wiping] the slate clean." NC. v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 721 (1969); see also State v. Hansen, 
127 Idaho 675, 679 (Ct.App.1995). Additionally, under the federal Constitution there is an 
exception that applies to the waiver and usual effect of a reversal where the state committed 
misconduct with the intent to cause a mistrial. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673 (1982). 
The Idaho Constitution provides more protection against government malfeasance and therefore 
has a broader exception to waiver and usual effect of a reversal where the prosecutor 
intentionally committed misconduct to avoid an acquittal. See State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 
988 (1992); State v. Sharp, 104 Idaho 691 (1983); see also People v. Batts, 68 P.3d 357, 360 
(Cal. 2003). Mr. Ellington's second trial should be dismissed as violating the bar against double 
jeopardy under both the federal and the Idaho Constitution due to the prosecutorial misconduct 
that occurred in the first trial. The proceeding arguments will make it clear that Mr. Ellington 
may not be tried again. 
ISSUE 1.A 
ARGUMENT 
"The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: 'Nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put injeopardy oflife or limb."' Thompkins v. McKune, No. 11-3022, 2011 WL 
3555415 at *3 (Kan.2011) quoting Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 727-28 (1998) (quoting 
U.S. Const. amend. V). A double jeopardy bar is a rare remedy for governmental misconduct. 
See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673 (1982). The rarity of the application of double 
jeopardy is due to the fact that the vast majority of cases involving governmental misconduct 
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leading to a mistrial are by necessity the product of a motion by the defendant. !d. at 672. Thus, 
when a defendant is confronted by governmental misconduct and moves for a mistrial, the 
motion is interpreted as a waiver of the defendant's right to be tried before that particular 
tribunaL !d. The waiver does not apply, however, "where the prosecutor's actions giving rise to 
the motion for mistrial were done 'in order to goad the [defendant] into requesting a mistrial.'". 
!d. at 673, quoting US. v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976). 
The Supreme Court has never held that, in a case involving government misconduct 
acknowledged by an appellate Court, unless the case was set for new trial on the basis of the 
mistrial motion, the double jeopardy bar cannot apply. The Supreme Court has held that in cases 
of reversal on appeal the "slate [is] wiped clean" and there is no bar to retrial except in the case 
of insufficient evidence. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 442 (1981) quoting N C. v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,721 (1969), citing Burks v. US., 471 U.S. 1 (1978). Without referencing 
the Bullington line of cases, some Courts have interpreted Kennedy to imply a successful mistrial 
motion is a requirement for a Kennedy double jeopardy bar. In US. v. McAleer, 138 F.3d 852, 
856 (1Oth Cir. 1998) quoting Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673, the Court held that 
{t}he Kennedy prosecutorial misconduct exception is a narrow 
one, designed to protect the defendant's right to "have his trial 
completed before the first jury empaneled [sic J to try him. " 
Without this exception a prosecutor could intentionally provoke a 
defendant into requesting a mistrial and the defendant would then 
be prevented from later invoking a double jeopardy bar to his 
retrial. Such a result would render a defendant's "valued right to 
complete his trial before the first jury" a "hollow shell. " Id. 
Defendants, however, do not require such protection because 
without the declaration of a mistrial, they were not deprived of 
their "valued right" to have their case submitted to the first jury, 
and perhaps have the dispute end with an acquittal. For these 
reasons, we conclude that the mistrial exception for prosecutorial 
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misconduct set forth in Kennedy simply does not apply to 
Defendants. 
A number of Courts have followed this reasoning in rejecting double jeopardy claims. See Walls 
v. Hemmingway, 27 Fed.Appx. 553 at *3 (6th Cir. 2001); US. v. Elmardoudi, 611 F.Supp.2d 
864, 870 (N.D.Iowa 2007); State v. Dumars, 154 P.3d 1120, 1128 (Kan.App. 2007). 
McAleer's reasoning, however, has not gone unchallenged. In US. v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 
912, 916 (2d Cir.l992), the Second Circuit stated that under the narrow circumstances that a 
prosecutor set out specifically to avoid an acquittal, double jeopardy may be implicated 
regardless of whether there was a successful motion for mistrial. 
If any extension ofKennedy beyond the mistrial context is 
warranted, it would be a bar to retrial only where the misconduct 
of the prosecutor is undertaken, not simply to prevent an acquittal, 
but to prevent an acquittal that the prosecutor believed at the time 
was likely to occur in the absence of his misconduct. Ifjeopardy 
bars a retrial where a prosecutor commits an act of misconduct 
with the intention of provoking a mistrial motion by the defendant, 
there is a plausible argument that the same result should obtain 
where he does so with the intent to avoid an acquittal he then 
believes is likely. The prosecutor who acts with the intention of 
goading the defendant into making a mistrial motion presumably 
does so because he believes that completion of the trial will likely 
result in an acquittal. That aspect of the Kennedy rationale 
suggests precluding retrial where a prosecutor apprehends an 
acquittal and, instead of provoking a mistrial, avoids the acquittal 
by an act of deliberate misconduct. Indeed, ifKennedy is not 
extended to this limited degree, a prosecutor apprehending an 
acquittal encounters the jeopardy bar to retrial when he engages 
in misconduct of sufficient visibility to precipitate a mistrial 
motion, but not when he fends off the anticipated acquittal by 
misconduct of which the defendant is unaware until after the 
verdict. There is no justification for that distinction. 
!d. 
To be sure, McAleer's insistence on a successful mistrial does not seem to be in line with the 
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spirit of the Kennedy exception. No explanation is given why prosecutorial misconduct aimed at 
causing a mistrial but ignored by a Court and allowed to successfully, though improperly, 
convict a defendant, should not be a bar to retrial when that conviction is eventually overturned. 
If the purpose of the Kennedy exception is to protect the double jeopardy protection from 
becoming a hollow shell due to prosecutor misconduct designed to violate it, that conduct should 
bar retrial whether or not it successfully accomplishes a mistrial or worse convicts a defendant in 
a manner repugnant to the rule of law. Indeed, Wallach has been accepted by the First Circuit as 
well as many States. People v. Batts, 68 P.3d 357, 380 n.26 (Cal. 2003) (accepting the Wallach 
approach for California). 
The 5th Amendment bar for double jeopardy in cases of prosecutorial misconduct applies 
to Mr. Ellington. McAleer's strictly narrow interpretation of Kennedy does not serve either the 
best interests of Americans or the spirit of the Constitution. Wallach is the correct application of 
the law because it takes into account the possibility of prosecutorial misconduct intended to 
cause a mistrial but allowed instead to cause a conviction. In such cases, of which Mr. 
Ellington's is one, stubborn insistence on McAleer's narrow rule would vitiate the protections of 
the Constitution against the very thing the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were written and 
intended to combat- Government Malfeasance. Wallach is therefore the only possible way to 
interpret Kennedy and the Constitution, and Mr. Ellington's case is one to which the Kennedy 
rule applies. 
ISSUE l.B 
ARGUMENT 
The Idaho Constitution bars double jeopardy separately from the federal Constitution. 
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Idaho Const. Art. 1 § 13 ("No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ... "). 
Idaho Courts take a broad view of when Kennedy's mistrial exception comes into play. In State 
v. Hansen, 127 Idaho 675, 679 (Ct.App.1995), the Appeals Court held that there was "no logical 
distinction ... in reference to their import for double jeopardy purposes, between seeking a 
mistrial and requesting that a jury be stricken and the case dismissed." However, Idaho has 
never stated whether Art. 1 § 13 does or does not bar retrial in a case of reversal. See State v. 
Byington, 139 Idaho 516, 518 n.1 (Ct.App.2003). Nor has Idaho ever considered the question of 
whether a case where the Idaho Supreme Court found willful prosecutorial misconduct but 
overturned on other grounds implicates the double jeopardy bar in the Idaho Constitution. 
The Idaho Constitution is not coterminous with the federal Constitution. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has stated that it "may adopt federal precedent under the state constitution but 
only to the extent that [it] believe[s] the federal law is not inconsistent with the protections 
afforded by our state constitution." State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988 (1992). Citizens of 
Idaho benefit from protections beyond those enumerated in the federal Bill of Rights and 
interpreted by the Supreme Court. In Guzman, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the Leon good 
faith exception because the Idaho exclusionary rule of Art. 1 § 17 is intended to 
1) provide an effective remedy to persons who have been subjected 
to an unreasonable government search and/or seizure; 2) deter the 
police from acting unlawfully in obtaining evidence; 3) encourage 
thoroughness in the warrant issuing process; 4) avoid having the 
judiciary commit an additional constitutional violation by 
considering evidence which has been obtained through illegal 
means; and 5) preserve judicial integrity. 
Guzman, 122 Idaho at 993. 
In State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 751 (1988), the Idaho Supreme Court held that a pen 
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register was a search because Art. 1 § 17 embodied the broader protections enunciated by Justice 
Brennan in his dissent in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 747 (1979). The Idaho Supreme 
Court adopted Justice Brennan's reasoning that 
whether privacy expectations are legitimate within the meaning of 
Katz depends not on the risks an individual can be presumed to 
accept when imparting information to third parties, but on the 
risks he should be forced to assume in afree and open society. 
Thompson, 114 Idaho at 750 quoting Smith 442 U.S. at 747 (J. 
Brennan dissenting). 
In State v. Cada, 129 Idaho 224, 230 (Ct.App.1996), the Appeals Court rejected the narrow view 
of curtilage in US. v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987). The Court instead once again adopted the 
dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan, as well as that of the New Mexico Court of Appeals. Id. 
citing Dunn, 480 U.S. at 306 (J. Brennan dissenting); State v. Sutton, 1816 P.2d 518 
(N .M.App.1991 ). The Sutton approach was subsequently adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court 
in State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 462, 467 (1997). 
"The double jeopardy clauses in the Idaho and federal constitutions prohibit putting one 
in jeopardy twice for the same crime. This protection applies not only to multiple punishments, 
but also to multiple prosecutions for the same crimes." State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 343 
(2005). In State v. Reichenberg, 128 Idaho 452, 457, 459 (1996) the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that where the issue is whether or not double jeopardy applies to a non-criminal conviction, Art. 
1 § 13 is coextensive with Amend. 5. However, in State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 912-14 (1972), 
the Idaho Supreme Court had applied the protections of double jeopardy to juvenile proceedings 
six years prior to the Supreme Court's concurrence inBreedv. Jones, 421 U.S. 519,529-30 
(1978). 
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In State v. Sharp, 104 Idaho 691 (1983) overruled on other grounds State v. Alanis, 109 
Idaho 884 (1984), the Supreme Court ruled on the applicability of Kennedy to a case where the 
defendant's request for a mistrial was denied and in fact the trial had merely been continued and 
no acquittal or conviction of any kind been entered. While the decision in Sharp has been 
criticized for its failure to recognize the procedural posture of the case by Justice Bistline in his 
dissenting opinions in Sharp and Alanis, the continuing implication of the holding in Sharp is 
that in Idaho a request for a mistrial will receive review under Kennedy. See Alanis, 109 Idaho at 
898 (J. Bistline dissenting); Sharp, 104 Idaho at 695 (1983). 
The Supreme Court's holding in Sharp is supported by the decisions of other states. In 
State v. Jorgenson, 10 P .3d 1177, 1179 (Az.2000), the Supreme Court of Arizona rejected the 
"plurality rule" of Kennedy. The Arizona Supreme Court stated 
Application of double jeopardy is not only doctrinally correct 
when egregious and intentional prosecutorial misconduct has 
prevented acquittal, it is also required as a matter of pragmatic 
necessity. Any other result would be an invitation to the occasional 
unscrupulous or overzealous prosecutor to try any tactic, no 
matter how improper, knowing that there is little to lose if he or 
she can talk an indulgent trial judge out of a mistrial. The worst 
that could then happen is reversal for a new trial and another shot 
at a conviction. This, of course, is exactly the type of governmental 
abuse at which the double jeopardy clause was aimed 
!d. at 1180. 
Jorgenson cited the decisions of various other states supporting its decision. !d. at 1179 citing 
State v. Rogan, 984 P.2d 1231, 1250 (Hi.l999); State v. Breit, 930 P.2d 792,806-7 (N.M. 1996); 
State v. Colton, 663 A.2d 339, 347 (Ct. 1995); Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 322-23 
(Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v. Murchinson, 465 N.E.2d 256,258 (Mass. 1984); Collier v. State, 
747 P.2d 225 (Nev. 1987); State v. Cochran, 751 P.2d 1194 (Wash.App.l988). 
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Idaho should continue the precedent set by Sharp and follow Jorgenson and the other 
states holding that in cases involving prosecutorial misconduct, review can be made on double 
jeopardy grounds regardless of whether the defendant's motion for mistrial was successful. This 
broader protection for Idaho citizens is not oniy a pragmatic shield necessary to ward off 
governmental misconduct, but best interprets Art. 1 § 13 of the Idaho Constitution and values for 
which it stands. Certainly, the same Idaho Constitution which demanded better protection for its 
citizens as regards police misconduct, even in good faith, in following a warrant, cannot possibly 
be said to afford those same citizens no protection from the costs and anxieties of retrial where 
the prosecution and government have acted in bad faith to undermine their rights. It is 
particularly difficult to see how a contrary decision would maintain judicial integrity where the 
appellate court has stated in its opinion that a prosecutorial pattern of misbehavior exists on the 
record. 
Therefore, Mr. Ellington is afforded the protection of Art. 1 § 13 against his retrial which 
is the result of prosecutorial misconduct. 
ISSUE l.C 
ARGUMENT 
As stated in Issue 1.A, the Supreme Court held in Kennedy that where a prosecutor has by 
misconduct forced a defendant to ask for a mistrial in order to prevent an acquittal, retrial is 
barred by double jeopardy. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673. Courts applying Kennedy often look to 
the strength of the prosecution's case. See US. v. Pavloyianis, 996 F.2d 1467, 1474 (2d. Cir. 
1993); Wallach, 979 F.2d at 916;. Courts also look to see ifthe prosecution's actions were 
"malevolent." /d. at 917. 
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In Pavloyianis, the 2nd Circuit held there was no intent by the prosecution to force a 
mistrial. Pavloyianis, 996 F.2d at 1474. In that case, the prosecution used a witness who 
perjured testimony on a collateral issue of the extent of the defendant's involvement in a drug 
ring. !d. The Cow-t found that the prosecution had a strong case regardless and that there was no 
indication that the prosecution was concerned. /d. In State v. Pugsley, 128 Idaho 168, 173-74 
(Ct.App. 1995), the Appeals Court held that under the Kennedy rule, the defendant had not 
proved intentional misconduct because the district court found that the police had accidentally 
misplaced a videotape and therefore neither the police nor the prosecution had the requisite 
intent. 
The case before the Court is replete with evidence that the prosecution worried it had lost 
the case. The prosecution went so far as to put Corporal Rice on the stand in rebuttal to lie to the 
jury. The Idaho Supreme Court found that the prosecutor improperly commented on Mr. 
Ellington's post arrest silence, "inflamed the jury in [] eliciting an unnecessary and prejudicial 
response from a witness regarding the disturbing nature of the crime and [] repeatedly using 
versions of the phrase 'ran over your wife' in questioning Mr. Larson," misled the Court as to the 
content of Dr. Ross's testimony, used Dr. Ross's testimony "to influence the jury's passions and 
prejudices," and that "Trooper Daly's [testimony was] gratuitous and prejudicial." The 
prosecution's conduct in Mr. Ellington's first trial can only be explained by the weakness of its 
case. While it is true that the offering of perjured testimony was clearly a clandestine attempt at 
getting a conviction, a number of the prosecutor's instances of misconduct were brazen enough 
to receive censure from the trial judge. As the Idaho Supreme Court stated, at the first trial "the 
prosecutor seems to have completely ignored the court's admonition to 'move on,' by 
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immediately asking another inflammatory question." ld. at* 12. The fact that after the 
prosecutor failed to achieve his objective of forcing a mistrial he called on Cpl. Rice to perjure 
himself in a last ditch attempt to save his case should not save the State from the application of 
the double jeopardy bar of the 5th A,_uendment. There is no question here as to the prosecutor's 
intent to force a mistrial, malevolence, or the weakness of his case. Therefore, Mr. Ellington's 
retrial is barred by the 5th Amendment. 
ISSUE 1.D 
ARGUMENT 
As argued in Issue 1.B, Art. 1 § 13 of the Idaho Constitution is not coextensive with the 
5th Amendment. While no Court in Idaho has ever definitively stated whether or not Idaho 
follows Kennedy's narrow rule, the history of Art. 1 § 13 establishes that it provides more 
protection from governmental misconduct than the federal Constitution. In Gibbs, 94 Idaho at 
214, the Idaho Supreme Court held that applying double jeopardy under Art. 1 § 13 "embod[ied] 
a more realistic concept of juvenile proceedings and better comport[ ed] with the growing 
recognition that juveniles are entitled to fundamental elements of due process." As discussed in 
Issue 1.B, in Guzman, 122 Idaho at 993, the Court held that the Idaho Constitution would bar 
evidence obtained by police in good faith reliance on a faulty warrant. Clearly, the Idaho 
Constitution cannot be circumscribed to such a narrow exception as the one left open by 
Kennedy. 
Many other states have rejected the Kennedy rule. The California Supreme Court 
commented in People v. Batts, 68 P.3d 357, 360 (Cal. 2003) 
the standard adopted by the federal high court in Kennedy has 
been widely viewed as unduly narrow and as not fully protective of 
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the interest that the double jeopardy clause was intended to 
safeguard, and in the two decades since Kennedy was decided a 
number of state courts have interpreted the double jeopardy 
guarantee of their own state constitutions as embodying a broader 
protection. 
The California Supreme Court went on to hold that 
the state double jeopardy clause also may bar retrial when the 
prosecution, believing (in view of events that occurred during trial) 
that a defendant is likely to secure an acquittal at that trial, 
knowingly and intentionally commits misconduct in order to thwart 
such an acquittal. 
!d. at 360-61. 
The California Supreme Court cited support in part from a wide range of academic papers 
calling the Kennedy rule "inadequate because it protects only a very narrow range of a 
defendant's legitimate double jeopardy interests." Id. at 375-6, citing Henning, Prosecutorial 
Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies (1999) 77 Wash.U. L.Q. 713, 803-808 (Constitutional 
Remedies ); Ponsoldt, When Guilt Should Be Irrelevant: Government Overreaching as a Bar to 
Reprosecution Under the Double Jeopardy Clause After Oregon v. Kennedy, supra, 69 Cornell 
L.Rev. 76, 94-99 (Government Overreaching); Rosenthal, *689 Prosecutor Misconduct, 
Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence (1998) 71 
Temple L.Rev. 887, 892-895, 909-917, 961 (Emerging Jurisprudence); Thomas, Solving the 
Double Jeopardy Riddle (1996) 69 So.Cal. L.Rev. 1551, 1563-1564; Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent 
in Constitutional Criminal Procedure (1987) 135 U.Pa. L.Rev. 1365, 1425-1428 ( Prosecutorial 
Intent). 
The California Supreme Court also found that as of 2003, six other states had adopted 
broader tests. !d. at 376, citing State v. Kennedy (1983) 295 Or. 260, 666 P .2d 1316, 1326 ( 
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Kennedy II); Pool v. Superior Court (1984) 139 Ariz. 98, 677 P.2d 261, 271-272 (Pool); Com. 
v. Smith (1992) 532 Pa. 177,615 A.2d 321,325 (Smith); State v. Breit (1996) 122 N.M. 655, 
930 P.2d 792, 803 (Breit); Bauder v. State of Texas (Tex.Crim.App.l996) 921 S.W.2d 696, 699 
(Bauder); State v. Rogan (1999) 91 Hawai'i 405, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 (Rogan).). In addition, 
some state appellate courts have rejected Kennedy. See People v. Dawson, 397 N.W.2d 277 
(Mich.App.l986); State v. White, 354 S.E.2d 324 (N.C.App. 1987). 
The California Supreme Court developed its own test because the tests of other states 
failed to adequately support their rules with the interests that double jeopardy seeks to protect. 
The Court held that the interest at issue had to be a defendant's right to be tried by that particular 
tribunal, now violated by an overbearing prosecutor. The Court found that in Batts, the 
prosecution had set out to prevent an acquittal but had not intended a mistrial when it engaged in 
misconduct. The Court then wrote: 
The federal test's application to the facts of this case ... illustrates 
the narrow scope and limitations of that test. Had the prosecutors 
intentionally committed their misconduct not to cause a mistrial, 
but instead to improperly prejudice the jury to convict in order to 
avoid a likely acquittal, the prosecutors' misconduct clearly would 
implicate defendants' double jeopardy interests, which, as we have 
seen, include a defendant's " ' "valued right to have his trial 
completed by a particular tribunal. " ' "And yet that aspect of a 
defendant's double jeopardy interests lies outside the high court's 
narrow test, and is unprotected by it. Because the state double 
jeopardy clause is implicated when a prosecutor, believing that a 
particular jury is likely to return an acquittal, intentionally 
commits misconduct in order to improperly prejudice the jury and 
obtain a conviction-and because the majority's narrow test in 
Kennedy fails to protect that aspect of a defendant's double 
jeopardy interests-we conclude that the federal test, standing 
alone, is insufficient to protect interests that our state 
Constitution's double jeopardy clause is intended to safeguard. 
!d. at 376, quoting People v. Marshall, 13 Cal.4th 799, 824, 55 
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Cal.Rptr.2d 347,919 P.2d 1280 (1996) [construing federal and 
state double jeopardy clauses]; see also Government Overreaching, 
69 Cornell L.Rev. 76, 81. 
The Californian bar to double jeopardy is similar, if slightly weaker than, the Idaho bar. 
The California Constitution Art. I.§ 15 states "Persons may not twice be put in jeopardy for the 
same offense .... " cf. Idaho Const. Art. 1 § 13 ("No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense ... "). The Idaho Supreme Court has also held that double jeopardy protects a 
person's "valued right to have the trial completed by a particular jury ... " State v. Manley, 142 
Idaho 338, 344 (2005). Considering the similarity of the Idaho and California Constitutions, the 
test developed by the California Supreme Court in Batts is also the proper test under Idaho 
Const. Art. 1 § 13. 
Moreover, as argued in Issue 3., the Idaho Constitution is a bulwark against improper 
police actions even where made in good faith. Guzman. It would be manifestly absurd for that 
same Constitution to now turn a blind eye to intentional governmental misconduct designed to 
rob a citizen of a "valued right." Therefore, Mr. Ellington's case may not be retried because the 
prosecution in his first trial engaged in misconduct designed to prevent an acquittal, regardless of 
whether it was designed to cause a mistrial. 
ISSUE 2. 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Ellington is entitled to due process oflaw under the 14th Amendment of the federal 
Constitution and under Art. 1 § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. The "outrageous government 
conduct" doctrine holds that "[i]f the government's involvement in a criminal endeavor shocks 
the 'universal sense of justice,' then the Due Process Clause bars prosecution." US. v. Haynes, 
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216 F.3d 789, 797 (9th Cir.2000), quoting US. v. Ryan, 548 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir.1976). The 
"outrageous government conduct" doctrine stems from dictum in US. v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 
431-2 (1973) ("While we may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of 
iaw enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principies wouid absoiuteiy bar the 
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction, cf. Rochin v. California, 
342 U.S. 165, (72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183) (1952), the instant case is distinctly not of that 
breed."). Courts hold that there are two remedies in cases of outrageous government conduct: 1. 
Dismiss the indictment with prejudice or 2. Suppress the evidence obtained by the outrageous 
government conduct. !d. at 796; see also US. v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1980); US. 
v. Bontkowski, 865 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1989). Whether outrageous government misconduct 
occurred is a question oflaw for the Court. See US. v. Pitt, 193 F .3d 751 (3d Cir. 1999), as 
amended, (Oct. 15, 1999); US. v. Nguyen, 250 F.3d 643 (8th Cir. 2001); US. v. Sotelo-Murillo, 
887 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1989); State v. Hoverson, 2006 ND 49, 710 N.W.2d 890 (N.D. 2006); 
Com. v. Lindenmuth, 381 Pa. Super. 398, 554 A.2d 62 (1989). 
Outrageous government conduct is commonly if not always a defense raised in situations 
where law enforcement has "instigat[ ed] a crime." 2 Crim. Prac. Manual § 41: 12 quoting State v. 
Lively, 921 P.2d 1035, 1046 (Wa.l996). Courts also look at the amount of pressure the 
government brought to bear on the violator. !d. citing Lively, 921 P.2d at 1047; People v. 
Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83 (1978); State v. Shannon, 892 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 
1995). The Courts look to see if the government controlled the illegal activity "from start to 
finish." !d. quoting Lively, 921 P.2d at 1048; citing US. v. Carcione, 592 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 
1979), and US. v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146, 150 (lOth Cir. 1975). 
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Fourth, the police motive was not to prevent further crime or to 
protect the populace, but, rather, to "creat[e] crimes to prosecute." 
And finally, "and perhaps most important, " the government's 
misconduct was "repugnant to a sense ofjustice. " 
!d. quoting Lively, 921 P.2d at 1048, citing Isaacson, 378 NE2d at 
83, Shannon, US. v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986), 
opinion vacated on other grounds on reh'g, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 
1986), and US. v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1984). 
In People v. Auld, 815 P.2d 956,959 (Colo.App.1991), the Colorado Court of Appeals 
held the government's conduct was outrageous and barred prosecution where acts were 
"committed by the district attorney and law enforcement agencies for the purpose of duping a 
court into becoming an accomplice in their law enforcement function." In Auld, the government 
had filed false documents, made false statements to the judge, and created a counterfeit 
prosecution in order to ensnare the defendant, a defense lawyer. !d. 
Mr. Ellington's case is clearly one involving outrageous government conduct and 
deserves the severest sanction. As in Auld, the prosecutor in this case not only misled the Court 
as to the evidence to be presented by Dr. Ross and engaged in actively undermining the cause of 
justice by trying the case purely on emotion, but the prosecutor also (at least) allowed a law 
enforcement official to perjure himself on the stand. 
CONCLUSION 
At some point, a line must be drawn. For the reasons herein stated, the Court is asked to 
dismiss this instant matter with prejudice. 
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DATED this J1__ day of August, 2011. 
BY: 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of tttyoregoing was personally served by 
placing a copy of the same as indicated below on the / day of August, 2011, addressed 
to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 
__)(__ ViaFax 
Interoffice Mail 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS Page 18 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 101 of 848
l]ORIGh .. AL 
STATE OF IDAHO } 
COUNTY OF KOOTEW! . ss FILED: - ,w-l. 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 7011 ~ur, 22 PM 2: 49 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
t I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TH~ 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JONATHANWADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________________________ ) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order continuing the Trial now set 
for August 29, 2011. 
This motion is made on the grounds that the State's accident reconstruction opinion has 
not been completed and needs to be submitted to our experts prior to the time of Trial. 
VIet 
DATED this 22- day of August, 2011. 
BY: 
~~A W OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC I ;DEROF?!/\y 
~~~-=- ) 
~ETAYLOR 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing 
a copy of the same as indicated below on the f7..;}_ day of August, 2011, addressed to: 
K 1"\1"\tPn<li rmlnhr Prn.,Pf'lltnr pAy Ll.Llh_l s;!11 
.&.'L'-"'-":'-""..1...1.\.4..1. '-"'-''-'".&..&.") .L.&.'-'U--"""'-'-'.1. .&.J..L..cllo. I IV .LV..J-J 
X. Via Fax 
Interoffice Mail 
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 r·· ~/24/2011 Page 1 of3 
Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20110824 Motions 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth 
Court Reporter Anne MacManus Brownell 
PA Art VerHaren ) ~ 
i 
I 
6~ ~~~~ fa~~~s ~-------..... ':::' / "'),~ 
. DA Brad Chapman r ~ , ~ J 
Date 8/2~~==t=io=n===~~:==;;=ll"'~-=*==e=;-di==::u~,~~R;;;:aO~O~)fvff~1 ~~~====II 
03:08:59 PM Calls case - PA VerHaren and Robins present, DA Taylor and 
J Chapman present with defendant - in custody - for defendants 
motions. I have a motion to dismiss noted up for hearing today 
03:09:41 PM DA T"'"'"" T~o. ..... :: :: :: =~~nge in how we'd like to proceed today 
03:09:53 PM J Re: oending motions- not properly noticed up for heari~g !::~::.1 
03:10:10 PM We'd like to continue the trial and have a day when we can have 
the motion to dismiss and compel heard. We received some 
DA discovery today and there is still an accident reconstruction report 
pending. We need to move the trial today and deal with that 
motion today 
03:10:50 PM PA VerHaren We have no objection to continuing the trial 
03:11:02PM J 
03:11:48PM PA 
Robins 
03:12:04 PM DA Taylor 
03:12:31 PM 
03:13:43 PM 
PA 
VerHaren 
I have consulted my calendar - we looked at the calendar in 
anticipation of this motion 
We discussed October with potential problems and the week in 
November after Thanksgiving 
We'd like to shoot for the date in October - we need time to review 
the accident reconstructionists report. 
We'd appreciate the court scheduling this in November. Our 
witness Dailey needs another couple of weeks to get the report 
done and I received a report from another officer involved today 
and forwarded it on - diagrams and photos. I have another murder 
trial set October 3 before Judge Simpson which may take 1-2 
weeks. Our witness will be out of the country the last of October 
and 1st of November 
He's been waiting for a fair trial for over 5 1/2 years. I asked the 
court to set the trial quickly - I ask the court to set it October 17 
He's been waiting 5 1/2 years for a fair trial. We were forced to 
ask the court to continue this in order to meet the state's expert 
witness. We all know of the expert witness last time. I ask that you 
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 <' Q/24/2011 Page 2 of3 
set this on October 17. I'm not sure it will take 3 weeks if we can 
get past the emotions. I don't know what's taking them so long -
DA the remittitur was issued quite some time ago. 
Chapman We owe it to defendant to get him a fair trial as timely as we can. 
We hated to ask for a continuance this time but ask that it be set 
October 17. 
03:16:02 PM It's apparent the case is not ready to proceed at the end of this 
month. When I set this matter the state was reluctant to have it 
set that quickly and now it's necessary to reschedule this. 
Defendant has some concerns to expedite this- there are 
concerns including the court's schedule. We're talking about a 
difference of 4 weeks in scheduling. The end of October I have 
J civil cases that may interfere and one is very complicated and has 
been continued and is entitled to first priority consideration. The 
best time available would be the setting after Thanksgiving 
weekend - that should allow time for a motion hearing and to get 
the witnesses lined up. CONTINUE TRIAL- RESET NOVEMBER 
29, 2011 TUESDAY What time frame are you looking for to hear 
your motions? 
03:20:08 PM With the trial being continued I hope the court can hear our 
DA Taylor motions during that time frame. I don't know that I'll have a problem with 11/29 trial date- I did talk to our experts about 
10/17. I'll talk to them about 11/29 as soon as possible 
03:21:16 PM If that becomes problematic I'll see about a Sr. Judge to assist 
J and we'll take care of this and have an informal scheduling 
conference. Hearing on your Motion - Thursday September 1, 
2011 
03:22:24~fDATaylor The motions should take a couple of hours 
03:22:31 PM J We can set this at 9:00 am Thursday September 1, 2011 
I 03:23:32 PM II DA Taylor I There will be some additional things filed 
I 03:23:41 PM I DA There will be an objection to the state proceeding under a 
Chapman different theory than last time 
03:23:58 PM We can take those up on September 1 . If there are any new 
motions by either side I don't know that the court will hear them. 
We have a number of motions that need to be heard and are on 
J file. The parties are on notice and we'll proceed September 1 on 
I I 
those motions. Go ahead and file your motions and notice them 
up and depending on the motions we may or may not be able to 
hear them. 
03:24:57 PM DA Taylor The state filed a subpoena DC for Dr. Hayes - he's out of the 
office this week. Submits motion/order to quash 
03:25:31 PM PA Perhaps the court will consider continuing this to 9/1/ VerHaren 
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03:25:54 PM J 
DA 
Chapman 
If it's an issue that still needs to be resolved it can be deferred to 
9/1 
I just know that he's not in the office this week. 
It's also not the correct way to subpoena medical records 
Quash subpoena as to today 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www.fortherecord.com 
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DDRIGII\. .... L 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
CL .. 'l< DISTRiCT COURT 
&\'-----
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendant. 
___________________________) 
COMES NOW, Jonathan Ellington, the above named defendant, by and through his 
attorney, Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby submits_ this Memorandum in 
support ofhis Motion to Dismiss previously filed with this Court. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
See, State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727 (2011). 
ISSUES 
1. Retrial of Mr. Ellington constitutes double jeopardy. 
l.A Double jeopardy for prosecutorial misconduct intended to cause a mistrial 
applies to Mr. Ellington's case under the federal Constitution. 
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l.B Double jeopardy for prosecutorial misconduct intended to cause a mistrial 
applies to Mr. Ellington's case under the Idaho Constitution. 
l.C Retrial of Mr. Ellington would violate double jeopardy under the federal 
Constitution because of prosecutorial misconduct intended to cause a mistrial. 
l.D Retrial of Mr. Ellington would violate double jeopardy under the Idaho 
Constitution because of prosecutorial misconduct intended to avoid an acquittal. 
2. The charges against Mr. Ellington should be dismissed with prejudice because the 
government's outrageous conduct violated his right to Due Process under the federal and 
Idaho Constitutions. 
ISSUE 1. 
ARGUMENT 
Double jeopardy attaches when a jury is sworn under both the Idaho and federal 
Constitutions. State v. Stevens, 126 Idaho 822, 825-26 (1995). Double jeopardy of the 5th 
Amendment of the federal Constitution applies to the States through the 14th Amendment. 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1963). The Idaho Constitution has its own double 
jeopardy clause in Art. 1 § 13. "The double jeopardy clauses in the Idaho and federal 
constitutions prohibit putting one in jeopardy twice for the same crime. This protection applies 
not only to multiple punishments, but also to multiple prosecutions for the same crimes." State v. 
Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 343 (2005). 
In this case, Mr. Ellington has already been tried and convicted. The current case before 
the Court is a retrial ordered by the Idaho Supreme Court. Therefore, Mr. Ellington is being 
placed in jeopardy a second time for the same charges and the double jeopardy bar should apply 
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unless Mr. Ellington waived his right or the reversal of his first trial was the equivalent of 
"[wiping] the slate clean." NC. v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 721 (1969); see also State v. Hansen, 
127 Idaho 675, 679 (Ct.App.1995). Additionally, under the federal Constitution there is an 
exception that applies to the waiver and usuai effect of a reversal where the state committed 
misconduct with the intent to cause a mistrial. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673 (1982). 
The Idaho Constitution provides more protection against government malfeasance and therefore 
has a broader exception to waiver and usual effect of a reversal where the prosecutor 
intentionally committed misconduct to avoid an acquittal. See State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 
988 (1992); State v. Sharp, 104 Idaho 691 (1983); see also People v. Batts, 68 P.3d 357, 360 
(Cal. 2003). Mr. Ellington's second trial should be dismissed as violating the bar against double 
jeopardy under both the federal and the Idaho Constitution due to the prosecutorial misconduct 
that occurred in the first trial. The proceeding arguments will make it clear that Mr. Ellington 
may not be tried again. 
ISSUE 1.A 
ARGUMENT 
"The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: 'Nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.'" Thompkins v. McKune, No. 11-3022, 2011 WL 
3555415 at *3 (Kan.2011) quoting Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 727-28 (1998) (quoting 
U.S. Const. amend. V). A double jeopardy bar is a rare remedy for governmental misconduct. 
See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673 (1982). The rarity of the application of double 
jeopardy is due to the fact that the vast majority of cases involving governmental misconduct 
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leading to a mistrial are by necessity the product of a motion by the defendant. Id. at 672. Thus, 
when a defendant is confronted by governmental misconduct and moves for a mistrial, the 
motion is interpreted as a waiver of the defendant's right to be tried before that particular 
tribunal. !d. The waiver does not apply, however, "where the prosecutor's actions giving rise to 
the motion for mistrial were done 'in order to goad the [defendant] into requesting a mistrial."'. 
Id. at 673, quoting US. v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976). 
The Supreme Court has never held that, in a case involving government misconduct 
acknowledged by an appellate Court, unless the case was set for new trial on the basis of the 
mistrial motion, the double jeopardy bar cannot apply. The Supreme Court has held that in cases 
of reversal on appeal the "slate [is] wiped clean" and there is no bar to retrial except in the case 
of insufficient evidence. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 442 (1981) quoting NC. v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 721 (1969), citing Burks v. US., 471 U.S. 1 (1978). Without referencing 
the Bullington line of cases, some Courts have interpreted Kennedy to imply a successful mistrial 
motion is a requirement for a Kennedy double jeopardy bar. In US. v. McAleer, 138 F.3d 852, 
856 (lOth Cir. 1998) quoting Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673, the Court held that 
[t] he Kennedy prosecutorial misconduct exception is a narrow 
one, designed to protect the defendant's right to "have his trial 
completed before the first jury empaneled [sic} to try him. " 
Without this exception a prosecutor could intentionally provoke a 
defendant into requesting a mistrial and the defendant would then 
be prevented from later invoking a double jeopardy bar to his 
retrial. Such a result would render a defendant's "valued right to 
complete his trial before the first jury" a "hollow shell. " ld. 
Defendants, however, do not require such protection because 
without the declaration of a mistrial, they were not deprived of 
their "valued right" to have their case submitted to the first jury, 
and perhaps have the dispute end with an acquittal. For these 
reasons, we conclude that the mistrial exception for prosecutorial 
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misconduct set forth in Kennedy simply does not apply to 
Defendants. 
A number of Courts have followed this reasoning in rejecting double jeopardy claims. See Walls 
v. Hemmingway, 27 Fed.Appx. 553 at *3 (6th Cir. 2001); US. v. Elmardoudi, 611 F.Supp.2d 
864, 870 (N.D.Iowa 2007); State v. Dumars, 154 P.3d 1120, 1128 (Kan.App. 2007). 
McAleer's reasoning, however, has not gone unchallenged. In US. v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 
912, 916 (2d Cir.1992), the Second Circuit stated that under the narrow circumstances that a 
prosecutor set out specifically to avoid an acquittal, double jeopardy may be implicated 
regardless of whether there was a successful motion for mistrial. 
If any extension of Kennedy beyond the mistrial context is 
warranted, it would be a bar to retrial only where the misconduct 
of the prosecutor is undertaken, not simply to prevent an acquittal, 
but to prevent an acquittal that the prosecutor believed at the time 
was likely to occur in the absence of his misconduct. If jeopardy 
bars a retrial where a prosecutor commits an act of misconduct 
with the intention of provoking a mistrial motion by the defendant, 
there is a plausible argument that the same result should obtain 
where he does so with the intent to avoid an acquittal he then 
believes is likely. The prosecutor who acts with the intention of 
goading the defendant into making a mistrial motion presumably 
does so because he believes that completion of the trial will likely 
result in an acquittal. That aspect of the Kennedy rationale 
suggests precluding retrial where a prosecutor apprehends an 
acquittal and, instead of provoking a mistrial, avoids the acquittal 
by an act of deliberate misconduct. Indeed, if Kennedy is not 
extended to this limited degree, a prosecutor apprehending an 
acquittal encounters the jeopardy bar to retrial when he engages 
in misconduct of sufficient visibility to precipitate a mistrial 
motion, but not when he fends off the anticipated acquittal by 
misconduct of which the defendant is unaware until after the 
verdict. There is no just(fication for that distinction. 
!d. 
To be sure, McAleer's insistence on a successful mistrial does not seem to be in line with the 
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spirit of the Kennedy exception. No explanation is given why prosecutorial misconduct aimed at 
causing a mistrial but ignored by a Court and allowed to successfully, though improperly, 
convict a defendant, should not be a bar to retrial when that conviction is eventually overturned. 
If the purpose of the Kennedy exception is to protect the double jeopardy protection from 
becoming a hollow shell due to prosecutor misconduct designed to violate it, that conduct should 
bar retrial whether or not it successfully accomplishes a mistrial or worse convicts a defendant in 
a manner repugnant to the rule oflaw. Indeed, Wallach has been accepted by the First Circuit as 
well as many States. People v. Batts, 68 P.3d 357, 380 n.26 (Cal. 2003) (accepting the Wallach 
approach for California). 
The 5th Amendment bar for double jeopardy in cases ofprosecutorial misconduct applies 
to Mr. Ellington. McAleer's strictly narrow interpretation of Kennedy does not serve either the 
best interests of Americans or the spirit of the Constitution. Wallach is the correct application of 
the law because it takes into account the possibility of prosecutorial misconduct intended to 
cause a mistrial but allowed instead to cause a conviction. In such cases, of which Mr. 
Ellington's is one, stubborn insistence on McAleer's narrow rule would vitiate the protections of 
the Constitution against the very thing the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were written and 
intended to combat- Government Malfeasance. Wallach is therefore the only possible way to 
interpret Kennedy and the Constitution, and Mr. Ellington's case is one to which the Kennedy 
rule applies. 
ISSUE l.B 
ARGUMENT 
The Idaho Constitution bars double jeopardy separately from the federal Constitution. 
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Idaho Const. Art. 1 § 13 ("No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ... "). 
Idaho Courts take a broad view of when Kennedy's mistrial exception comes into play. In State 
v. Hansen, 127 Idaho 675, 679 (Ct.App.1995), the Appeals Court held that there was "no logical 
distinction ... in reference to their import for doubie jeopardy purposes, between seeking a 
mistrial and requesting that a jury be stricken and the case dismissed." However, Idaho has 
never stated whether Art. 1 § 13 does or does not bar retrial in a case of reversal. See State v. 
Byington, 139 Idaho 516, 518 n.1 (Ct.App.2003). Nor has Idaho ever considered the question of 
whether a case where the Idaho Supreme Court found willful prosecutorial misconduct but 
overturned on other grounds implicates the double jeopardy bar in the Idaho Constitution. 
The Idaho Constitution is not coterminous with the federal Constitution. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has stated that it "may adopt federal precedent under the state constitution but 
only to the extent that [it] believe[s] the federal law is not inconsistent with the protections 
afforded by our state constitution." State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988 (1992). Citizens of 
Idaho benefit from protections beyond those enumerated in the federal Bill of Rights and 
interpreted by the Supreme Court. In Guzman, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the Leon good 
faith exception because the Idaho exclusionary rule of Art. 1 § 17 is intended to 
1) provide an effective remedy to persons who have been subjected 
to an unreasonable government search and/or seizure; 2) deter the 
police from acting unlawfully in obtaining evidence; 3) encourage 
thoroughness in the warrant issuing process; 4) avoid having the 
judiciary commit an additional constitutional violation by 
considering evidence which has been obtained through illegal 
means: and 5) preserve judicial integrity. 
Guzman, 122 Idaho at 993. 
In State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 751 (1988), the Idaho Supreme Court held that a pen 
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register was a search because Art. 1 § 17 embodied the broader protections enunciated by Justice 
Brennan in his dissent in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 747 (1979). The Idaho Supreme 
Court adopted Justice Brennan's reasoning that 
whether privacy expectations are legitimate within the meaning of 
Katz depends not on the risks an individual can be presumed to 
accept when imparting information to third parties, but on the 
risks he should be forced to assume in a free and open society. 
Thompson, 114 Idaho at 750 quoting Smith 442 U.S. at 747 (J. 
Brennan dissenting). 
In State v. Cada, 129 Idaho 224,230 (Ct.App.1996), the Appeals Court rejected the narrow view 
of curtilage in US. v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987). The Court instead once again adopted the 
dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan, as well as that of the New Mexico Court of Appeals. Id. 
citing Dunn, 480 U.S. at 306 (J. Brennan dissenting); State v. Sutton, 1816 P.2d 518 
(N.M.App.1991). The Sutton approach was subsequently adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court 
in State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 462, 467 (1997). 
"The double jeopardy clauses in the Idaho and federal constitutions prohibit putting one 
in jeopardy twice for the same crime. This protection applies not only to multiple punishments, 
but also to multiple prosecutions for the same crimes." State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 343 
(2005). In State v. Reichenberg, 128 Idaho 452, 457, 459 (1996) the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that where the issue is whether or not double jeopardy applies to a non-criminal conviction, Art. 
1 § 13 is coextensive with Amend. 5. However, in State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 912-14 (1972), 
the Idaho Supreme Court had applied the protections of double jeopardy to juvenile proceedings 
six years prior to the Supreme Court's concurrence in Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529-30 
(1978). 
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In State v. Sharp, 104 Idaho 691 (1983) overruled on other grounds State v. Alanis, 109 
Idaho 884 (1984), the Supreme Court ruled on the applicability of Kennedy to a case where the 
defendant's request for a mistrial was denied and in fact the trial had merely been continued and 
no acquittal or conviction of any kind been entered. While the decision in Sharp has been 
criticized for its failure to recognize the procedural posture of the case by Justice Bistline in his 
dissenting opinions in Sharp and Alanis, the continuing implication of the holding in Sharp is 
that in Idaho a request for a mistrial will receive review under Kennedy. See Alanis, 109 Idaho at 
898 (J. Bistline dissenting); Sharp, 104 Idaho at 695 (1983). 
The Supreme Court's holding in Sharp is supported by the decisions of other states. In 
State v. Jorgenson, 10 P.3d 1177, 1179 (Az.2000), the Supreme Court of Arizona rejected the 
"plurality rule" of Kennedy. The Arizona Supreme Court stated 
Application of double jeopardy is not only doctrinally correct 
when egregious and intentional prosecutorial misconduct has 
prevented acquittal, it is also required as a matter of pragmatic 
necessity. Any other result would be an invitation to the occasional 
unscrupulous or overzealous prosecutor to try any tactic, no 
matter how improper, knowing that there is little to lose if he or 
she can talk an indulgent trial judge out of a mistrial. The worst 
that could then happen is reversal for a new trial and another shot 
at a conviction. This, of course, is exactly the type of governmental 
abuse at which the double jeopardy clause was aimed. 
!d. at 1180. 
Jorgenson cited the decisions of various other states supporting its decision. !d. at 1179 citing 
State v. Rogan, 984 P.2d 1231, 1250 (Hi.1999); State v. Breit, 930 P.2d 792, 806-7 (N.M. 1996); 
State v. Colton, 663 A.2d 339, 347 (Ct. 1995); Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 322-23 
(Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v. Murchinson, 465 N.E.2d 256, 258 (Mass. 1984); Collier v. State, 
747 P.2d 225 (Nev. 1987); State v. Cochran, 751 P.2d 1194 (Wash.App.1988). 
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Idaho should continue the precedent set by Sharp and follow Jorgenson and the other 
states holding that in cases involving prosecutorial misconduct, review can be made on double 
jeopardy grounds regardless of whether the defendant's motion for mistrial was successful. This 
broader protection for Idaho citizens is not only a pragmatic shield necessary to ward off 
governmental misconduct, but best interprets Art. 1 § 13 of the Idaho Constitution and values for 
which it stands. Certainly, the same Idaho Constitution which demanded better protection for its 
citizens as regards police misconduct, even in good faith, in following a warrant, cannot possibly 
be said to afford those same citizens no protection from the costs and anxieties of retrial where 
the prosecution and government have acted in bad faith to undermine their rights. It is 
particularly difficult to see how a contrary decision would maintain judicial integrity where the 
appellate court has stated in its opinion that a prosecutorial pattern of misbehavior exists on the 
record. 
Therefore, Mr. Ellington is afforded the protection of Art. 1 § 13 against his retrial which 
is the result of prosecutorial misconduct. 
ISSUE 1.C 
ARGUMENT 
As stated in Issue 1.A, the Supreme Court held in Kennedy that where a prosecutor has by 
misconduct forced a defendant to ask for a mistrial in order to prevent an acquittal, retrial is 
barred by double jeopardy. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673. Courts applying Kennedy often look to 
the strength of the prosecution's case. See US. v. Pavloyianis, 996 F.2d 1467, 1474 (2d. Cir. 
1993); Wallach, 979 F.2d at 916; . Courts also look to see if the prosecution's actions were 
"malevolent." !d. at 917. 
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In Pavloyianis, the 2nd Circuit held there was no intent by the prosecution to force a 
mistrial. Pavloyianis, 996 F.2d at 1474. In that case, the prosecution used a witness who 
perjured testimony on a collateral issue of the extent of the defendant's involvement in a drug 
ring. !d. The Court found that the prosecution had a strong case regardless and that there was no 
indication that the prosecution was concerned. !d. In State v. Pugsley, 128 Idaho 168, 173-74 
(Ct.App. 1995), the Appeals Court held that under the Kennedy rule, the defendant had not 
proved intentional misconduct because the district court found that the police had accidentally 
misplaced a videotape and therefore neither the police nor the prosecution had the requisite 
intent. 
The case before the Court is replete with evidence that the prosecution worried it had lost 
the case. The prosecution went so far as to put Corporal Rice on the stand in rebuttal to lie to the 
Jury. The Idaho Supreme Court found that the prosecutor improperly commented on Mr. 
Ellington's post arrest silence, "inflamed the jury in [] eliciting an unnecessary and prejudicial 
response from a witness regarding the disturbing nature of the crime and [] repeatedly using 
versions of the phrase 'ran over your wife' in questioning Mr. Larson," misled the Court as to the 
content of Dr. Ross's testimony, used Dr. Ross's testimony "to influence the jury's passions and 
prejudices," and that "Trooper Daly's [ testimony was] gratuitous and prejudicial." The 
prosecution's conduct in Mr. Ellington's first trial can only be explained by the weakness of its 
case. While it is true that the offering of perjured testimony was clearly a clandestine attempt at 
getting a conviction, a number of the prosecutor's instances of misconduct were brazen enough 
to receive censure from the trial judge. As the Idaho Supreme Court stated, at the first trial "the 
prosecutor seems to have completely ignored the court's admonition to 'move on,' by 
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immediately asking another inflammatory question." Id. at *12. The fact that after the 
prosecutor failed to achieve his objective of forcing a mistrial he called on Cpl. Rice to perjure 
himself in a last ditch attempt to save his case should not save the State from the application of 
the double jeopardy bar of the 5th Amendment. There is no question here as to the prosecutor's 
intent to force a mistrial, malevolence, or the weakness of his case. Therefore, Mr. Ellington's 
retrial is barred by the 5th Amendment. 
ISSUE 1.D 
ARGUMENT 
As argued in Issue l.B, Art. 1 § 13 of the Idaho Constitution is not coextensive with the 
5th Amendment. While no Court in Idaho has ever definitively stated whether or not Idaho 
follows Kennedy's narrow rule, the history of Art. 1 § 13 establishes that it provides more 
protection from governmental misconduct than the federal Constitution. In Gibbs, 94 Idaho at 
214, the Idaho Supreme Court held that applying double jeopardy under Art. 1 § 13 "embod[ied] 
a more realistic concept of juvenile proceedings and better comport[ ed] with the growing 
recognition that juveniles are entitled to fundamental elements of due process." As discussed in 
Issue l.B, in Guzman, 122 Idaho at 993, the Court held that the Idaho Constitution would bar 
evidence obtained by police in good faith reliance on a faulty warrant. Clearly, the Idaho 
Constitution cannot be circumscribed to such a narrow exception as the one left open by 
Kennedy. 
Many other states have rejected the Kennedy rule. The California Supreme Court 
commented in People v. Batts, 68 P.3d 357, 360 (Cal. 2003) 
the standard adopted by the federal high court in Kennedy has 
been widely viewed as unduly narrow and as not fully protective of 
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the interest that the double jeopardy clause was intended to 
safeguard, and in the two decades since Kennedy was decided a 
number of state courts have interpreted the double jeopardy 
guarantee of their own state constitutions as embodying a broader 
protection. 
The California Supreme Court went on to hold that 
the state double jeopardy clause also may bar retrial when the 
prosecution, believing (in view of events that occurred during trial) 
that a defendant is likely to secure an acquittal at that trial, 
knowingly and intentionally commits misconduct in order to thwart 
such an acquittal. 
!d. at 360-61. 
The California Supreme Court cited support in part from a wide range of academic papers 
calling the Kennedy rule "inadequate because it protects only a very narrow range of a 
defendant's legitimate double jeopardy interests." Id. at 375-6, citing Henning, Prosecutorial 
Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies (1999) 77 Wash.U. L.Q. 713, 803-808 (Constitutional 
Remedies ); Ponsoldt, When Guilt Should Be Irrelevant: Government Overreaching as a Bar to 
Reprosecution Under the Double Jeopardy Clause After Oregon v. Kennedy, supra, 69 Cornell 
L.Rev. 76, 94-99 ( Government Overreaching ); Rosenthal, *689 Prosecutor Misconduct, 
Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence (1998) 71 
Temple L.Rev. 887, 892-895, 909-917, 961 ( Emerging Jurisprudence); Thomas, Solving the 
Double Jeopardy Riddle (1996) 69 So.Cal. L.Rev. 1551, 1563-1564; Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent 
in Constitutional Criminal Procedure (1987) 135 U.Pa. L.Rev. 1365, 1425-1428 ( Prosecutorial 
Intent). 
The California Supreme Court also found that as of 2003, six other states had adopted 
broader tests. !d. at 376, citing State v. Kennedy (1983) 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316, 1326 ( 
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Kennedy II); Pool v. Superior Court (1984) 139 Ariz. 98, 677 P.2d 261, 271-272 (Pool); Com. 
v. Smith (1992) 532 Pa. 177, 615 A.2d 321, 325 (Smith); State v. Breit (1996) 122 N.M. 655, 
930 P.2d 792, 803 (Breit); Bauder v. State of Texas (Tex.Crim.App.1996) 921 S.W.2d 696, 699 
(Bauder); State v. Rogan (1999) 91 Hawai'i 405, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 (Rogan).). In addition, 
some state appellate courts have rejected Kennedy. See People v. Dawson, 397 N.W.2d 277 
(Mich.App.1986); State v. White, 354 S.E.2d 324 (N.C.App. 1987). 
The California Supreme Court developed its own test because the tests of other states 
failed to adequately support their rules with the interests that double jeopardy seeks to protect. 
The Court held that the interest at issue had to be a defendant's right to be tried by that particular 
tribunal, now violated by an overbearing prosecutor. The Court found that in Batts, the 
prosecution had set out to prevent an acquittal but had not intended a mistrial when it engaged in 
misconduct. The Court then wrote: 
The federal test's application to the facts of this case ... illustrates 
the narrow scope and limitations of that test. Had the prosecutors 
intentionally committed their misconduct not to cause a mistrial, 
but instead to improperly prejudice the jury to convict in order to 
avoid a likely acquittal, the prosecutors' misconduct clearly would 
implicate defendants' double jeopardy interests, which, as we have 
seen, include a defendant's " ' "valued right to have his trial 
completed by a particular tribunal. " ' " And yet that aspect of a 
defendant's double jeopardy interests lies outside the high court's 
narrow test, and is unprotected by it. Because the state double 
jeopardy clause is implicated when a prosecutor, believing that a 
particular jury is likely to return an acquittal, intentionally 
commits misconduct in order to improperly prejudice the jury and 
obtain a conviction-and because the majority's narrow test in 
Ken_nedy fails to protect that aspect of a defendant's double 
jeopardy interests-we conclude that the federal test, standing 
alone, is insufficient to protect interests that our state 
Constitution's double jeopardy clause is intended to safeguard. 
!d. at 376, quoting People v. Marshall, 13 Cal.4th 799, 824, 55 
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Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280 (1996) [construing federal and 
state double jeopardy clauses]; see also Government Overreaching, 
69 Cornell L.Rev. 76, 81. 
The Californian bar to double jeopardy is similar, if slightly weaker than, the Idaho bar. 
The California Constitution Art. I. § 15 states "Persons may not twice be put in jeopardy for the 
same offense .... " cf. Idaho Const. Art. 1 § 13 ("No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense ... "). The Idaho Supreme Court has also held that double jeopardy protects a 
person's "valued right to have the trial completed by a particular jury ... " State v. Manley, 142 
Idaho 338, 344 (2005). Considering the similarity of the Idaho and California Constitutions, the 
test developed by the California Supreme Court in Batts is also the proper test under Idaho 
Const. Art. 1 § 13. 
Moreover, as argued in Issue 3., the Idaho Constitution is a bulwark against improper 
police actions even where made in good faith. Guzman. It would be manifestly absurd for that 
same Constitution to now tum a blind eye to intentional governmental misconduct designed to 
rob a citizen of a "valued right." Therefore, Mr. Ellington's case may not be retried because the 
prosecution in his first trial engaged in misconduct designed to prevent an acquittal, regardless of 
whether it was designed to cause a mistrial. 
ISSUE 2. 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Ellington is entitled to due process of law under the 14th Amendment of the federal 
Constitution and under Art. 1 § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. The "outrageous government 
conduct" doctrine holds that "[i]f the government's involvement in a criminal endeavor shocks 
the 'universal sense of justice,' then the Due Process Clause bars prosecution." U.S. v. Haynes, 
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216 F.3d 789, 797 (9th Cir.2000), quoting US. v. Ryan, 548 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir.1976). The 
"outrageous government conduct" doctrine stems from dictum in US. v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 
431-2 (1973) ("While we may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of 
law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the 
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction, cf. Rochin v. California, 
342 U.S. 165, (72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183) (1952), the instant case is distinctly not of that 
breed."). Courts hold that there are two remedies in cases of outrageous government conduct: 1. 
Dismiss the indictment with prejudice or 2. Suppress the evidence obtained by the outrageous 
government conduct. Id. at 796; see also US. v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1980); US. 
v. Bontkowski, 865 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1989). "Dismissing an indictment with prejudice 
encroaches on the prosecutor's charging authority," and is allowed only "in cases of flagrant 
prosecutorial misconduct." US. v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir.1991). Whether 
outrageous government misconduct occurred is a question of law for the Court. See US. v. Pitt, 
193 F.3d 751 (3d Cir. 1999), as amended, (Oct. 15, 1999); US. v. Nguyen, 250 F.3d 643 (8th Cir. 
2001); US. v. Sotelo-Murillo, 887 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1989); State v. Hoverson, 2006 ND 49, 710 
N.W.2d 890 (N.D. 2006); Com. v. Lindenmuth, 381 Pa. Super. 398, 554 A.2d 62 (1989). 
Outrageous government conduct is commonly if not always a defense raised in situations 
where law enforcement has "instigat[ ed] a crime." 2 Crim. Prac. Manual § 41:12 quoting State v. 
Lively, 921 P.2d 1035, 1046 (Wa.l996). "The Government's involvement must be malum in se 
or amount to the engineering and direction of the criminal enterprise from start to finish." US. v. 
Sedaghaty, Cr. No. 05-60008-HO, WL 3563145 (D.Or.2011) citing US. v. Citro, 842 F.2d 
1149, 1153 (9th Cir.1988). Courts also look at the amount of pressure the government brought 
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to bear on the violator. § 41:12 citing Lively, 921 P.2d at 1047; People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 
78, 83 (1978); State v. Shannon, 892 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1995). The Courts 
look to see if the government controlled the illegal activity "from start to finish." Id. quoting 
Lively, 921 P.2d at 1048; citing US. v. Carcione, 592 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1979), and US. v. 
Spivey, 508 F.2d 146, 150 (lOth Cir. 1975). 
Fourth, the police motive was not to prevent further crime or to 
protect the populace, but, rather, to "creat[e} crimes to prosecute." 
And finally, "and perhaps most important," the government's 
misconduct was "repugnant to a sense of justice." 
Id. quoting Lively, 921 P.2d at 1048, citing Isaacson, 378 NE2d at 
83, Shannon, U.S. v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986), 
opinion vacated on other grounds on reh'g, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 
1986), and U.S. v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1984). 
In People v. Auld, 815 P.2d 956, 959 (Colo.App.1991), the Colorado Court of Appeals 
held the government's conduct was outrageous and barred prosecution where acts were 
"committed by the district attorney and law enforcement agencies for the purpose of duping a 
court into becoming an accomplice in their law enforcement function." In Auld, the government 
had filed false documents, made false statements to the judge, and created a counterfeit 
prosecution in order to ensnare the defendant, a defense lawyer. Id. 
In U.S. v. Stinson, Nos. 07-50408, 07-50409, WL 3374231 at *7 (9th Cir.2011), the 9th 
Circuit reviewed a claim of outrageous government conduct where the prosecutor had used a 
witness with a history of perjury and who was highly compensated. The Court held the conduct 
was not outrageous, but only because the jury was made aware of the perjury. 
As for the witness's history of perjury, the jury was made aware of 
this history on direct and cross-examination and was free to weigh 
the testimony accordingly. The court explicitly instructed the jury 
that it could consider previous acts of perjury in deciding whether 
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or not to believe a witness. This is not a case in which the 
credibility of a witness came into question only after the trial or in 
which the government knowingly introduced false testimony. In 
light of the "traditional safeguards" of disclosure to the jury on 
cross-examination and the jury instruction, the government's 
conduct regarding Smith was not outrageous. 
Id. citing U.S. v. Cuellar, 96 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir.l996); 
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Mesarosh v. United States, 
352 U.S. 1 (1956). 
Mr. Ellington's case is clearly one involving outrageous government conduct and 
deserves the severest sanction. As in Auld, the prosecutor in this case not only misled the Court 
as to the evidence to be presented by Dr. Ross and engaged in actively undermining the cause of 
justice by trying the case purely on emotion, but the prosecutor also (at least) allowed a law 
enforcement official to perjure himself on the stand. This case involves the introduction of 
perjured testimony in a rebuttal witness, with no possible opportunity for the defendant to 
discover it or the jury to learn of it. See State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727, 747 
(2011). Under the standard of Stinson, this case undoubtedly involves outrageous government 
conduct. Therefore, the charges against Mr. Ellington should be dismissed with prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
At some point, a line must be drawn. For the reasons herein stated, the Court is asked to 
dismiss this instant matter with prejudice. 
2~/' DATED this --f, __ day of August, 2011. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
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) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendant. 
__________________________) 
COMES NOW, Jonathan Ellington, the above named defendant, by and through his 
attorney, Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby submits this Supplemental 
Memorandum in support of his Motion to Dismiss previously filed with this Court. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
See, State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727 (2011). 
ISSUES 
1. The Court should use its supervisory power to dimiss the charges against Mr. 
Pll" . l-. . d" 
.._, .mgton w1t .. preJU Ice. 
ARGUMENT 
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In federal courts, charges may be dismissed with prejudice under the courts' supervisory 
powers. See US. v. Sedaghaty, Cr. No. 05-60008-HO, WL 3563145 at *6 (D.Or.,2011) citing 
US. v. Barrera-Mareno, 951 F.2d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir.1991). 
If the conduct does not rise to the level of a due process violation, 
the court may nonetheless dismiss under its supervisory powers. 
These powers may be exercised for three reasons: to remedy a 
constitutional or statutory violation; to protect judicial integrity by 
ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations 
validly before a jury; or to deter future illegal conduct. 
Barrera-Mareno, 951 F.2d at 1091, citing US. v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 
1090 (9th Cir.1991) (Simpson II). 
A Court considering use of its supervisory powers analyzes the case on the three grounds for 
dismissal. Id. at 1092-93. In Barrera-Mareno, the Court foundn that dismissal was not 
warranted by a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 1092. In looking at the the issue of judicial 
integrity, the Court found that was only implicated where the executive's misconduct took place 
within the courtroom. Id. citing Simpson II, 927 F.2d at 1090-91. In order for illegal conduct by 
the prosecutor to warrant a dismissal, it must be intentional and flagrant and must cause 
substantial prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 1093 citing Simpson IL 927 F.2d at 1091; US. v. 
Jacobs, 855 F.2d 652, 655 (9th Cir.1988). Use of supervisory powers to dismiss with prejudice 
must be done "with a view toward balancing the interests involved." US. v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 
499, 507 (1983) (use of supervisory powers to overturn a conviction), citing U.S. v. Payner, 447 
U.S. 727, 735-736 n. 8 (1980); Elkins v. US., 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960); US. v. Caceres, 440 
U.S. 741, 755 (1979); cf. Nardone v. US., 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939). 
Idaho Courts have supervisory powers. See State v. Medina, 128 Idaho 19, 29 
(Ct.App.1996). In fact, in State v. Seifart, 100 Idaho 321, 324 (1979), the Idaho Supreme Court 
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directly reference the United States Supreme Court's supervisory powers in defining its own as 
regards reforming sentences. Furthermore, in State v. Hansen, 105 Idaho 816, 822 (1983) (J. 
BISTLINE, dissenting), Justice Bistline specifically referred to the supervisory power of the 
Court in reference to the dismissal of a case for outrageous government conduct. Therefore, it 
may be inferred that Idaho Courts have comparable supervisory powers as federal courts 
regarding the ability to dismiss a case with prejudice for prosecutorial misconduct. The Idaho 
Court of Appeals in 2007, while reviewing the prosecutorial misconduct of Mr. Verharen, the 
prosecutor in this case, found it fitting to quote the following language of Justice Blackmun of 
the Supreme Court: 
Twice during the past year-in United States v. Young, 470 US. I, 
I05 S.Ct. I038, 84 L.Ed.2d I (1985), and again today-this Court 
has been faced with clearly improper prosecutorial misconduct 
during summations. Each time, the Court has condemned the 
behavior but affirmed the conviction. F arty years ago, Judge 
Jerome N. Frank, in dissent, discussed the Second Circuit's similar 
approach in language we would do well to remember today: 
"This court has several times used vigorous language in 
denouncing government counsel for such conduct as that of the 
[prosecutor] here. But, each time, it has said that, nevertheless, it 
would not reverse. Such an attitude of helpless piety is, I think, 
undesirable. It means actual condonation of counsel's alleged 
offense, coupled with verbal disapprobation. If we continue to do 
nothing practical to prevent such conduct, we should cease to 
disapprove it. For otherwise it will be as if we declared in effect, 
'Government attorneys, without fear of reversal, may say just 
about what they please in addressing juries, for our rules on the 
subject are pretend-rules. If prosecutors win verdicts as a result of 
"disapproved" remarks, we will not deprive them of their 
victories; we will merely go through the form of expressing 
displeasure. The deprecatory words we use in our opinions on 
such occasions are purely ceremonial. ' Government counsel, 
employing such tactics, are the kind who, eager to win victories, 
will gladly pay the small price of a ritualistic verbal spanking. The 
practice of this court-recalling the bitter tear shed by the Walrus 
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as he ate the oysters-breeds a deplorably cynical attitude towards 
the judiciary" (footnote omitted). 
State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 88-89 (Ct.App.2007), quoting 
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 205-06 (1986) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting), quoting United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 
155 F.2d 631, 661, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 742, 67 S.Ct. 49, 91 
L.Ed. 640, 329 U.S. 742 (1946). 
Specially concurring, Judge Pro Tern Schwartzman wrote: 
This case represents yet another in a long line or pattern of 
repetitious misconduct from this prosecutorial office. A catalogue 
of cases in which the doctrine of "harmless error" has reared its 
head and saved the conviction on appeal creates a less than 
enviable appellate track record. See State v. Vandenacre, I3I 
Idaho 507, 960 P.2d I90 (Ct.App.I998); State v. Brown, 13I 
Idaho 6I, 95I P.2d I288 (Ct.App.I998); State v. Lovelass, I33 
Idaho I60, 983 P.2d 233 (Ct.App.I999); State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 
56 I, 2I P.3d 498 (Ct.App.200I); State v. Kuhn, I39 Idaho 7I 0, 85 
P.3d 1109 (Ct.App.2003). Two unpublished opinions also come 
readily to mind: State v. Blythe, Docket No. 25557, I35 Idaho 493, 
20 P.3d 29, 2000 WL I344686 (Ct.App. April 7, 2000), and State 
v. Gadberry, Docket No. 26604/26605 (Ct.App. Sept. 26, 200I). As 
our own Supreme Court has noted in State v. Guzman, I22 Idaho 
98I, 984 n. I, 842 P.2d 660, 663 n. I (1992): 
Mistakes must not become the practice instead of the exception. A 
court on observing that a pattern of mistakes has developed, on 
seeing yet another "mistake," might readily decide to view such 
circumstance with a jaundiced eye, and rule accordingly. 
Phillips, 144 Idaho at 89. 
To Judge Schwatzman's list one may add State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570 (Ct.App. 2007); State v. 
Gamble, 146 Idaho 331 (Ct.App. 2008); State v. Perry, 144 Idaho 665 (Ct.App. 2007); and of 
course State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727 (2011). 
"From a review of the record in this case it seems that the prosecutor was attempting to 
use every opportunity possible to appeal to the passions and prejudices of the jurors, including 
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ignoring warnings and admonitions by the judge to try the case based on the facts." State v. 
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727, 745 (2011). There is no question in this case that the 
conduct of the prosecutor and police in this case went far beyond harmless error. !d. Applying 
any of the three reasons for a Court to use its supervisory powers to dismiss a case with 
prejudice, this case implores such a result. The prosecution willfully subjected the courtroom to 
a trial so far removed from considerations of justice that a retrial would be an insult to Mr. 
Ellington's right to be tried by a single jury, an indictment of the Court system whose response to 
flagrant prosecutorial misbehavior is to force the defendant to endure the charade a second time 
waiting all the while in prison, and an encouragement to further instances of deplorable state 
conduct since the state will know that at worst its actions will keep the defendant in prison while 
it has the luxury of a another attempt. Taking into account that this incident occurred five years 
ago while evidence has gone stale, during which time Mr. Ellington has been kept in jails and 
prisons, the proper resolution of this case would be to dismiss it. Mr. Ellington therefore urges 
the Court to exercise its supervisory power and dismiss this case with prejudice. 
[T] he general requirement [is] that States in their prosecutions 
respect certain decencies of civilized conduct. Due process of law, 
as a historic and generative principle, precludes defining, and 
thereby confining, these standards of conduct more precisely than 
to say that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that 
offend 'a sense ofjustice. 'See Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking 
for a unanimous Court in Brown v. State of Mississippi, 297 US. 
278, 285-286, 56 S.Ct. 461, 464-465, 80 L.Ed. 682. 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952). 
CONCLUSION 
At some point, a line must be drawn. For the reasons herein stated, the Court is asked to 
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dismiss this instant matter with prejudice. 
~~ 
DATED this t- / day of August, 2011. 
' 
BY: 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
FTHEPUBLIC 
TENAI COUNTY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by 
placing a copy of the same as indicated below on the d., ?J day of August, 2011, addressed 
to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 
..:t- ViaFax 
Interoffice Mail 
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[J ORrGiftJAL 
BARRY MCHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way/Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 446-1800 
ASSIGNED ATTORNEY: 
ARTHUR VERHAREN 
DAVID G. ROBINS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST mDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-06-0001497 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
_____________________________ ) 
COMES NOW, David G. Robins, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in and for Kootenai 
County, Idaho, and submits the following brief in opposition to the defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter, "Memorandum"). 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS 
Defendant asserts that the double jeopardy of the Idaho and United States Constitution 
preclude a retrial of Mr. Ellington (hereafter, "Defendant") on double jeopardy grounds. 
ARGUMENT 
1. DOUBLE JEOPARDY HAS NO IMPLICATION IN THIS CASE GIVEN ITS 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE. 
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy oflife or limb. Double jeopardy is, "the right of the defendant to have his 
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trial completed before the first jury empaneled (sic) to try him." Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 US 
667, 673 (1982). However, this provision does not preclude the Government's retrying a 
defendant whose conviction is set aside because of an error in the proceedings leading to 
conviction. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671-672 (1896), United States v. Tateo, 377 
U.S. 463 (1964), North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). 
A clear application of well-established law demonstrates that the Fifth Amendment does 
not preclude Defendant from being retried. 
Defendant argues that under Oregon v. Kennedy that his retrial is barred. Memorandum, 
Pg. 3, citing 456 U.S. 667 (1982). In Kennedy, the Supreme Court recognized a narrow exception 
to the aforementioned law. !d. at 667. The Kennedy court found that if a mistrial is declared at 
the defendant's request, double jeopardy does bar a second prosecution for the same offense if 
governmental misconduct was intended to "goad" the defendant into moving for a mistrial. !d. at 
676. In interpreting this exception, many courts have held that Kennedy applies only when a 
mistrial is declared during the original trial. US v. McAleer, 138 F. 3d 852, 855-56(10th Cir. 
1998), et al. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly explained that Kennedy should not be 
extended to cases involving post-verdict dismissals: 
Defendants argue that the prosecutor's repeated questioning of Mary Gilmore 
about her Fifth Amendment privilege was intended to provoke them into seeking 
a mistrial. Therefore, Defendants maintain, under the Kennedy exception for 
prosecutorial misconduct, their retrial would violate double jeopardy. 
Defendants' reliance on Kennedy is misplaced, however, because no mistrial was 
declared in this case. The district court never granted Defendants' motions for a 
mistrial. The case proceeded to the jury and guilty verdicts were returned. 
Defendants did not obtain a mistrial, but instead succeeded in having the district 
court set aside the guilty verdicts. Although Defendants attempt to characterize 
the district court's order setting aside the jury verdicts and granting a new trial as 
the functional equivalent of a mistrial, Defendants miss a crucial distinction. The 
Kennedy prosecutorial misconduct exception is a narrow one, designed to protect 
the defendant's right to "have his trial completed before the first jury empaneled 
to try him." Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673, 102 S.Ct. at 2088. Without this exception 
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a prosecutor could intentionally provoke a defendant into requesting a mistrial 
and the defendant would then be prevented from later invoking a double 
jeopardy bar to his retrial. Such a result would render a defendant's "valued right 
to complete his trial before the first jury" a "hollow shell." Id. Defendants, 
however, do not require such protection because without the declaration of a 
mistrial, they were not deprived of their "valued right" to have their case 
submitted to the first jury, and perhaps have the dispute end with fuJ. acquittal. 
For these reasons, we conclude that the mistrial exception for prosecutorial 
misconduct set forth in Kennedy simply does not apply to Defendants. 
!d. at 855-56. This logic has been applied and followed in a number of courts. See 
Memorandum, pg. 5 (Defendant acknowledges this holding has been followed by a number of 
courts). 1 Defendant contends that McAleer was challenged by US. v. Wallach in their brief. 
Memorandum, pg. 5.2 Defendant argues that "no explanation is given why prosecutorial 
misconduct aimed at causing a mistrial but ignored by a Court . . . should not be a bar to retrial 
when that conviction is eventually overturned." Memorandum, pg 6. This argument willfully 
ignores the explanation provided in McAleer cited above, in addition to the other flaws in 
Defendant's argument. 3 
Defendant's argument is further flawed in that they also ignore that their citations from 
Wallach in their brief is dicta. US v. Wallach, 979 F. 2d 912 (2nd Cir. 1992). Furthermore, 
Defendant's legal argument is ignorant of the dicta of Kennedy wherein they wrote: 
If a mistrial were in fact warranted under the applicable law, of course, the 
defendant could in many instances successfully appeal a judgment of conviction 
on the same grounds that he urged a mistrial, and the Double Jeopardy Clause 
would present no bar to retrial. 
456 US at 676. Even the Wallach court recognized, "We have some doubt that the 
Supreme Court expected its carefully worded statement of the rule in Kennedy to be extended 
1 It seems to the author of this brief that the courts embracing McAleer are concerned about the difficulty and 
judicial irregularities that would occur if the dicta if Wallach were applied, in addition to the common-sense 
application of existing precedent. 
2 The State notes that McAleer was decided in 1998, whereas Wallach was decided in 1992. 
3 Simply stated, ]i.fcAleer recognizes that the fundamental protection provided by double jeopardy is to protect the 
right of a defendant to be tried by the first jury impaneled to try him. If no mistrial is declared and the jury returns a 
verdict, this right is satisfied and double jeopardy will not apply. 
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beyond the context of a trial that ends with the granting of a defendant's motion for a mistrial." 
979 F.2d at 915.4 
Recognizing that Wallach is dicta and the subsequent decisions of several courts 
(McAleer, et al) should lead this honorable court to conclude that Defendant's double jeopardy 
rights are not implicated because no mistrial was declared during his first trial. Defendant was 
not deprived of his double jeopardy right to have the matter decided by the first jury impaneled 
to try him. 
2. EVEN IF DOUBLE JEOPARDY APPLIED TO OUR CASE, THERE HAS 
BEEN NO SHOWING OF THE INTENT NECESSARY TO BAR A RETRIAL 
UNDER APPLICABLE LAW. 
Defendant argues that, "there is no question here as to the prosecutor's intent to force a 
mistrial ... therefore, Mr. Ellington's retrial is barred by the 5th Amendment." Memorandum, pg 
12. This statement is meant to incorporate the Kennedy standard. Assuming, arguendo, that 
Kennedy applies, the Defendant's assertions are mere hyperbole that ignores the content and 
context of Defendant's first trial. First, the State will address the Kennedy standard. 
Under Kennedy, if a prosecutor committed misconduct "in order to goad the [defendant] 
into requesting a mistrial," there may be a bar to a retrial when the mistrial motion is tendered by 
the defendant and granted during the course of trial. 446 US at 673, citing United States v. 
Dinitz, 424 US 600 (1976). The question of barring a retrial becomes one of intent to terminate 
the proceedings. !d. As the redoubtable Judge Posner intelligently stated, "the only relevant 
intent is intent to terminate the trial, not intent to prevail at this trial by impermissible means." 
4 The author also notes for this court that the Kennedy standard has been embraced by Idaho Courts. State v. 
Fairchild, 829 P. 2d 550 (Idaho App. 1992), State v. Sharp, 662 P. 2d 1135 (Idaho 1983). The State further notes 
that the procedural posture of these cases involved mistrials granted during trial, and not after a successful appeal. 
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USv. Oseni, 996 F. 2d 186 (7th Cir, 1993). Defendant in our case cannot show any intent by the 
prosecutor to terminate the trial, and their motion must fail. 5 
Defendant, in his brief, points to the instances of misconduct found by the Idaho 
Supreme Court. Memorandum, pg. 12. What Defendant fails to acknowledge is that every time 
Defendant moved for a mistrial during his first trial, the prosecutor repeatedly and properly 
objected to the motion. The prosecutor offered extensive argument when it was warranted. As 
such, there is a demonstrable lack of intent to terminate the trail. The State also notes that 
Defendant in his brief writes, "(misconduct) was clearly a clandestine attempt to get a 
conviction," further supporting the State's argument that there is no intent to terminate the trial, 
only intent to secure a conviction. Memorandum, pg. 11. Given the totality ofthe facts adduced 
trial and the nature of the misconduct, it cannot be reasonable argued or found that the prosecutor 
acted with the intent to subvert Defendant's double jeopardy rights. 
In sum, Defendant fails and will fail to show that the prosecutor acted with the intent to 
terminate the trial, thus barring Defendant's retrial under Kennedy and its progeny. 
CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons, the State respectfully requests that Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss be denied. 
5 In US v. Pavloyianis, the court heid the required ir1tent was on where, "prosecutoriai misconduct was undertaken 
with the specific intent "to subvert the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause." 996 F.2d 1467, 1473 
(2nd Cir. 1993). This is an alternative phrasing that support Judge Posner's articulated standard. 
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DATED this 4 day of v ~ Vbt)Gt '2011. 
DAVID G. ROBINS 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the __1!/_ day of Ju~ , 20 II, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was caused to be mailed, faxed,'"and/ J1a.Ild-Cielivered to: 
xxxxxx 
Kootenai County Public Defender 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Plaintiff, Fe I 
v. ORDER TO CONTINUE TRIAL 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
___________________________) 
The Court having before it the Motion to Continue Trial and good cause appearing, now, 
therefore 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Trial scheduled for August 29,2011 is to be continued 
and regularly reset. 
DATED this t""' ~ S day of August, 2011. 
JOHNP. LUSTER 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correc~the foregoing was personally 
a copy of the same as indicated below on th day of August, 2011, add 
Kootenai County Public Defender FAX 446-1701 } --......_ 
Kge~eH:tti CoWity Jail FAX 446-1401-
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-183 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________________________ ) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order to Exclude Impeachment 
Materials filed by the State regarding Dr. Daniel Hayes on August 8, 2011. 
This motion is made on the grounds that the impeachment materials are irrelevant to 
creditability and further would confuse the jury. 
lr--
DATED this l5 day of August, 2011. 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS 
THE LAW OFFICE OF THE P~LIC 
D~NDER OF ~TENAI{CO~TY 
I Jl t ~ 
BY: ~~~}~G) 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20110901 Motions 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth 
PA Art VerHaren 
I 
~; ~~~; ~~~~~~s 
_ DA Brad Chapman 
Date 119/1/2011 I Location 111 K-COURTRO~M1 "-.../ 
Time II Speaker II Note 
09:01:51 AM 
11======9 
09:03:28 AM 
09:04:18 AM 
I 09:04:2 
09:04:52AM 
D Calls case - PA VerHaren, PA Robins, DA Taylor and DA Chapman present with defendant - in custody for hearing on motions. I received a late submission faxed to me this am from the PA's office. 
PA 
Robins 
J 
DA 
Chapman 
The motions to compel may not be ready today - we intend to 
proceed today as far as we can on the motion to dismiss. I am 
reviewing counsel's objection to expert. I'd like to address the 404 
(b) motion today as well. 
We're ready to proceed. 
Let's deal with the motion to dismiss first. 
I'll try not to repeat too much of the information submitted in the 
briefing. I thought long and hard before I filed this motion. Our 
intern did a lot of work and we determined that if I didn't do it I'd be 
on the witness stand at a later date explaining why I didn't. 
The Supreme Court issued a remittitur. The angry court reversed 
the conviction as to this court's decision on the motion for new 
trial. The majority of the opinion, except the portion dealing with 
Mr. Rice, deals with the conduct of the prosecution in the case. It 
goes on and on and it says we find merit in these assignments of 
error and remanded for new trial as was the request of the state 
appellate PD. To expect a different result would be illogical. The 
court is leaving some of the tough decisions to the trial court. I 
don't intend to take a lot of time -the matter has been briefed. We 
are asking the court to make a tough decision. On this record, as 
shown in the briefing, the court has the authority in this instance to 
dismiss the matter with prejudice. This court does have the 
authority and should use that authority. re: Twohill factors -
protection of society, deterrence. Deterring the executive branch 
of the government from the executive branch from acting as they 
did -through out this opinion there is much left unsaid. They didn't 
reach the issue if the trial errors were reversible. The motions for 
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I mistrial were made but none were granted. Defendant has been incarcerated going on 6 years. The actions of the state at the first trial deserve the sanction, the extreme sanction of dismissal and this court has the power to do that and end this and enter the 
order dismissing the action. 
09:14:00 AM I understand the analysis under Kennedy. Even if the court were 
I persuaded to accept your argument how can the supervisory 
.... powers come into play? Even if I had the powers it would be for 
the Magistrate division. 
09:14:58 AM The Federal court does have those powers and exercises them 
against outrageous government conduct which is what we have 
here. Our constitution mirrors in many ways the constitution of the 
state of Idaho. The judiciary has its own powers. So the analogy is 
there and in the separation of powers doctrine in constitution of 
DA the state of Idaho powers in the Judiciary of the state of Idaho. It 
Chapman may not be set forth in black and white. This court has the 
inherent power to grant the dismissal. The circumstances are 
extraordinary and implore extraordinary action. The situation is 
unique. When those people drafted our constitution they 
contemplated that the powers of Judiciary could act as a check for 
the powers of the executive branch. 
09:18:48 AM DAdoes an excellent job for his client. He mentions angry court-
that angry court simply ordered a new trial and not dismissal with 
PA prejudice. The judiciary cannot encroach on the powers of the 
Robins executive. I don't view this as double jeopardy. It is well 
established that if a first conviction is overturned and it is retried it 
is not double jeopardy. 
09:21:00 AM The language of the court is pretty clear that this court should 
J have ultimately granted a mistrial during the trial and it seems to 
be the type of argument the defense is arguing. 
09:21:48 AM We're not there yet. Assuming Kennedy analysis is there it must 
show that the state goated them into asking for a mistrial to avoid 
double jeopardy. PA objected, and argued and he was against the 
mistrial. I would not that there was nothing in closing argument. 
The Kennedy standard doesn't apply and no reckless intent on 
PA behalf of the PA can be shown. 
Robins 
Idaho courts have title and chapters that control. The 
u 
circumstances of this case don't merit the dismissal. Under the 
federal supervisory power test -1 didn't address that in my brief 
because I don't' think this court has it. I don't think you have the 
power to dismiss this because there was an angry court. 
09:26:41 AM I'm a citizen of the US and the state of Idaho. I'm proud to live in a 
I state where we have a court with the courage to investigate who 
I Idaho people are and where Idaho is and interpret the constitution of the state of Idaho in their own way. California, on independent 
I state grounds, rejects Kennedy- that portion that can be read as 
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the state would have the court read it - reject the mistrial. When a 
PA, an experienced intelligent? When this court tells the PA to 
stop saying "what happened next when the defendant ran over 
your wife" and he did it again and again, what other motive could 
DA he have? 
Chapman In the briefing is the quotation from a prior case from KCPA's 
,...u;,..,.. ,.,.,..,.j h" +hn 1.-l ..... hn Ann~ll ... +~ f"'n11ric> frn,..... 10AA _ +ha rt11n+a 
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is in my briefing - reads gist of quote - I respectfully propose that 
no "do over". The client has been waiting for a fair trial for over 6 
years. It's time to draw the line. 
09:34:00AM J Let's move on to the 404(b) issues. The state has filed their notice for 3 items. 
09:34:18 AM I understand the state intends to offer misd PV warrant, alleged 
suspension of DL and alcohol content. I object to all. I don't know 
how the existence of a 3-4 year old bench warrant meets the 
DA prongs of this. There is no purpose for that to come in. I don't 
Taylor understand how if a license is suspended it can come in for 
anything other than propensity evidence. Alcohol evidence - the 
alcohol level was obtained a number of hours after the accident 
and that is not relevant either. That is not proper planned or 
opportunity evidence. 
09:36:50AM There was a lot of evidence by Rice and Skelton re: 
perception/reaction time. If alcohol was a state that may have 
J some bearing on his ability to perceive and then react. It might 
even turn favorably if his action to perceive and react was different 
than the average person. 
09:38:02 AM I take issue with the state wanting to introduce a certain alcohol 
level - it can't be determined that was his level at the time of the 
DA accident. The fact of alcohol consumption is not what I'm arguing 
Taylor against- it's the level of .19. The testing was done some time after the accident. I don't think the level itself should come in. I'd like to 
hold the rest of my argument until after I hear why they intend to 
offer the other evidence. 
09:39:35 AM It's for impeachment purposes. I'm not sure you can do the 
analysis yet because the state hasn't introduced it yet. We don't 
intend to introduce it in our case in chief- it will only become 
PA relevant if he testifies or Dr. Hayes testifies. The fact of the blood alcohol 1 hour after the accident. bench warrant outstandina for a VerHaren -- ------ - --- -- ------ ---- -----------, ------ -- - - -- -- ..., few years and suspended license may result in your immediate 
arrest on contact with a police officer. It's the state's opinion is that 
the fear is fear of law enforcement contact. A lot depends on if 
defendant testifies and Dr. Hayes testifies and what they say. 
09:42:54AM I stand on what I said re: alcohol level. Re: Dr. Hayes testimony. 
DA He can only be impeached with a prior felony conviction and the 
existence of a misd warrant is irrelevant. He was out there being 
chased by 2 cars - neither one of them was a police car. It seems 
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the state may be attempting to present a different theory of the 
case. 
,...,... ~,.. .-1 '1 A 
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10:01:40 AM 
J 
DA 
Taylor 
10:06:15 AM J 
10:06:49 AM 
DA 
Taylor 
10:08:30 AM PA 
Robins 
10:09:12 AM 
10:09:53 AM 
J 
PA 
Robins 
II 10:11 :34 AM J 
110:11:58AM II 
n ;,, .,ession 
I have reviewed the state's objection. I largely stay on our 
memorandum. I know that this court will be extremely careful this 
time. I'm looking at their last paragraph. I don't know how Dr. Ross 
can tell the position of Ms. Larson on the roadway when the 
accident happened. He can talk about injuries and document 
injuries. He cannot tell where someone is on the roadway when an 
accident occurs. He testified to that during the first trial. Transcript 
page 1257 Dr. Ross said he couldn't tell the speed and his 
testimony won't be able to help with that this time either. The state 
indicates they want him to testify that she was standing and 
visible. There will be other testimony that she was standing but his 
testimony if she was visible to def is speculative. Rule 403 - there 
is unfair prejudice and a risk to inflame the jury. The long 
description by him of the injuries of Ms. Larson is not the issue -
the only purpose to put him on is to inflame the jury. His testimony 
does not add anything to the elements that state has to prove and 
is in no way necessary and is unfairly prejudicial and would be a 
waste of time as well. We ask the court to exclude the testimony. 
The supreme court has indicated some testimony relevant and 
some not - why should I exclude the testimony entirely? 
The court indicated that based on the representations of the PA it 
was not improper for this court to allow it but that's not what 
happened. It's not the only evidence that the state says they want 
to use his testimony for. We're not fighting that she's deceased. 
The state will add emotion injected into a case where it doesn't 
belong. 
The defense cannot control the my presentation in this case. 
Because they are not contesting a fact doesn't mean that it is not 
relevant and cannot be admitted. 
It seems that there is no question that Ms. Larson died and that 
was as a result of being struck by Mr. Ellington's vehicle. This 
came out from testimony of the very first officer. The testimony of 
Dr. Ross would have to have bearing on other issues. 
He's a forensic pathologist and can testify as others can't. It's 
entirely proper for me to put a forensic pathologist on to say she 
died from the accident. PA would have you look at Dr. Ross's 
testimony in a vacuum. I'm pretty sure the Dr. will not testify 
exactly where the accident happened. 
The testimony never reached the direction I was told it was 
headed - how do we avoid those problems again? 
J1 have read the entire transcript and I believe he testified the 
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wounds were consistent with being struck and not being dragged. 
The offer of proof is consistent there with. We can constrain the 
nature of injuries but I don't know that is necessary on these facts. 
The position of the body is relevant when you're talking about skid 
marks, perception time. I'll not have Dr. Ross testify as to that but 
what he actually saw. He can testify as to the wounds. Experts 
can review information and apply what they have learned in their 
.a. __ :_: __ \AIL.-.&. L..- --- ... ·•- -··"'.....,....,...,,h...,.,,~ ~n~.o. rol.o.\l~nl".o. l1t'Y1 
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Robins going to assert that the injuries were consistent with someone being struck. 
This is allegedly a vehicular homicide. Indicating the injuries is 
expected and for a jury to not expect explanation of the injuries is 
over speculative. He'll not show pictures or do anything to inflame 
the passion of the jury. The Supreme Court found no error with the 
testimony. They merely commented on Mr. VerHaren. A limiting 
instruction might be appropriate. 
10:17:13 AM The state is not offering any way that the testimony would help. 
The only thing that could be contested is thaf there were no drag 
marks on her. No one testified that she was dragged at all. The 
supreme court stated they didn't find PA VerHaren committed 
DA fraud - I think the court's concerns re: Dr. Ross's testimony are 
Taylor valid concerns. Dr. Ross clearly said he couldn't associate a 
speed with the injuries on Ms. Larson's body. I think that whether 
he sits on the stand and can say whether or not an injury hurts or 
not inflames the jury. That's what we're asking the court to 
prevent. This is not evidence that should come in. This is not 
relevant testimony and should be excluded. 
10:21:08 AM J The last motion is the defendants to impeach testimony re: Dr. Hayes 
10:21:36 AM PA Ready VerHaren 
10:21:39 AM We received the packet August 8 which indicates prior 
consultation Dr. Hayes did. The state tried to impeach Dr. Hayes 
testimony by saying he does a lot of work for us. He's trained and 
is one of the few psychologists in the area that will have jail 
clients, in custody, do an evaluation with him. To paint the 
DA relationship that it's us and him is a violation of our clients right to 
Taylor counsel. If Ellington were a wealthy man he could go out of state 
and get a different evaluation. Because he has the PO and is in 
custody we're stuck with one Dr. What the state is doing infringes 
on his right to counsel. All of the documentation that they submit 
has other persons names on them and this is a privacy issue. This 
packet of materials should be allowed. 
10:24:30 AM 
It is permissible to try to impeach re: bias. That's what those 
documents summarize. I don't intend to introduce the bills at trial. 
PA The analogy is one of someone's prior felony conviction. At trial 
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VerHaren someone may admit prior felony convictions. I don't know what 
he'll say in testimony. I don't know if he'll admit he does other work 
for the PO or what he's paid. I don't think that the evidence should 
be excluded. We need to wait and see what he's going to say. 
10:26:23 AM I don't think it's a problem for him to ask Dr. Hayes if he's paid as 
DA an expert but to ask what he's paid on every case is improper. The 
"T"-- -•-- state needs to be careful so that they're not saying that the li::iYIUI defense office is paying Dr. Hayes. The state needs to be careful 
in this line of questioning with respect to Dr. Hayes. 
10:27:27 AM Those are the motions submitted to the court. It was not my intent 
to rule on the motions today. Some I probably could and others 
will need to wait until the trial is under way. I want to submit written 
ruling to set for the exact parameters the court expects the parties 
J to adhere to. The primary motion to dismiss has raised some 
interesting issues. I'll take these matters UNDER ADVISEMENT. 
One of the primary issues is that we don't have a copy of the 
transcript - these went down to Boise. The court may contact the 
parties for copies. 
10:29:28 AM DA There were 2 motions to compel discovery set for today. Chapman 
10:30:02 AM J I was under the impression that they may or may not be pursued today. 
10:30:21 AM DA We were unable to serve a subpoena today - the motions to 
Chapman compel is re; testimony to be submitted on the motion to dismiss. We'll re-notice up the motions to compel. 
10:31:01 AM PA It would be helpful if they would specifically delineate what they're 
VerHaren seeking on the motion to compel. 
10:31:27 AM DA I don't think that the state has an objection to us providing a copy 
Taylor of the transcript 
10:33:32 AM DA We'll get the court a copy - paper or electronic if that would suffice 
Chapman - we can let counsel look at it before we do. We're going to need a 
copy of the transcript lodged before we do. 
10:34:11 AM I'll look into that - I don't know if that is something that can be 
retrieved from the Supreme Court. The last time we tried this 
matter the court allowed cameras in the courtroom. I have elected 
J to not allow that this time. Not because of anything perceived inappropriate - ! don't fee! there was any adverse impact last time. 
I don't intend to change my overall view but I'll not permit it this 
time to assure that if there are concerns re: presence of the 
cameras that it won't exist this time around. 
10:36:41 AM 
1110:36:41 AM II End I 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
file://R:\LogNotes- HTML\District\Criminal\Luster\CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wa... 9/1/2011 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 147 of 848
Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 c-- l"l/1/2011 Page 7 of7 
www .fortherecord .com 
file://R:\LogNotes- HTML\District\Criminal\Luster\CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wa... 9/1/2011 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 148 of 848
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CR- 2006-1497 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 
ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS; DEFENDANT'S OBJEC-
TO USE OF 404(b) EVIDENCE; 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
EXPERT WITNESS; DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS Defendant. 
Arthur W. Verharen and David G. Robins, Kootenai County Prosecuting 
Attorney's Office for Plaintiff State of Idaho. 
Anne C. Taylor and J. Bradford Chapman, Kootenai County Public 
Defender's Office for Defendant Jonathan Wade Ellington. 
I. SUMMARY 
A summary of this case is set forth in the Idaho Supreme Court opinion State v. 
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727 (2011). Important to the pending motions, after a 
three week trial, on September 7, 2006, a jury convicted the Defendant of two counts of 
aggravated battery and one count of second-degree murder. During the trial, the 
Defendant made multiple motions for a mistrial based on the prosecuting attorney's 
conduct, and this Court denied the motions. The Defendant also moved for a new trial 
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on the same basis, as well as the basis that Corporal Rice presented false testimony, 
and this Court denied the motion. 
The Defendant appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, alleging numerous errors. 
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instances of prosecutorial misconduct and evidentiary error, as well as concluding Cpl. 
Rice presented "false testimony," reversed this Court's denial of the Defendant's motion 
for a new trial, vacated the conviction and sentence, and remanded the case to this 
Court "for a new trial." ld. at 53, 253 P.3d at 727. Remittur issued on June 20, 2011. 
Retrial of the Defendant is scheduled to commence November 29, 2011. 
On August 8, 2011, the State filed a "Notice of Intent to Produce I.R.E. 404(b) 
Evidence at Trial and Notice of Filing Factual Basis for I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence." The 
Defendant responded with an "Objection to Use of 404(b) Evidence," on August 10, 
2011. The Defendant also filed a "Motion to Dismiss" on August 17, 2011, and 
supported the Motion to Dismiss with the following briefs: "Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss" (August 19, 2011 ), "Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss" 
(August 24, 2011 ), and "Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss" 
(August 24, 2011 ). The State responded with its "State's Response to Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss" dated August 24, 2011, and the "State's Supplemental Response to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss." 
The Defendant also filed an "Objection to Expert Witness" on August 19, 2011, 
objecting to the State's use of expert witness Dr. Marco Ross, and a "Motion to Exclude 
Impeachment Materials" on August 25, 2011, regarding materials the State intends to 
use to impeach the Defendant's expert witness. The State responded with a "State's 
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Response to Defendant's Objection to Expert Witness" and "Memorandum in Support of 
Admission of I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence at Trial." On September 1, 2011, the parties 
appeared and presented oral argument on each of the motions.1 This Court took the 
matter under advisement and no\AJ issues its opinion and order. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
The Defendant moves to dismiss all pending charges on the grounds that "the 
Idaho and Federal Constitutions bans (sic) on double jeopardy bar a retrial of [the 
Defendant], and on the grounds that a new trial would be the result of outrageous 
government conduct and therefore would violate Mr. Ellington's due process rights 
under the Idaho and Federal Constitution." (Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p.1.) 
Because the Defendant has moved to dismiss on both double jeopardy and due 
process grounds, this Court will analyze each claim separately. 
1. While the Degree of the Prosecuting Attorney's Misconduct was 
Great, the Defendant has Not Met His Burden and Shown the Intent 
and Purpose for the Misconduct as Kennedy Requires 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person 
shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Article 
I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution similarly provides "no person shall be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense .... " As stated by the Idaho Court of Appeals recently in 
State v. Corbus: 
1 The Defendant also filed two motions to compel, one on July 25, 2011, and one on August 11, 2011. 
The parties agreed at the September 1, 2011, hearing that because the parties have made significant 
disclosures and there is a need to review the disclosed and undisclosed material, the parties would 
renotice these motions and specify for this Court any remaining discovery issues. Therefore, this Court 
and the parties did not address any impending discovery issues at the September 1, 2011, hearing. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS; DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTION TO USE OF 404(b) EVIDENCE; DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO EXPERT WITNESS; 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS (State of Idaho v. Jonathan Wade 
E1tington::{CR . 2013fh--1-49:Z}) - 3 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 151 of 848
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Idaho and United States Constitutions 
affords a defendant three basic protections. It protects against a second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for 
the same offense after conviction, and multiple criminal punishments for 
the same offense. 
222, 229, 114 S.Ct. 783, 788-89, 127 L.Ed.2d 47, 56 (1994) and State v. McKeeth, 136 
Idaho 619, 624, 38 P.3d 1275, 1280 (Ct. App. 2001) (emphasis added)? The United 
States Supreme Court has elaborated on the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause, 
stating: 
As a part of this protection against multiple prosecutions, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause affords a criminal defendant a "valued right to have his 
trial completed by a particular tribunal." Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 
689, 69 S.Ct. 834, 837, 93 LEd. 974 (1949). The Double Jeopardy 
Clause, however, does not offer a guarantee to the defendant that the 
State will vindicate its societal interest in the enforcement of the criminal 
laws in one proceeding. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 483-484, 91 
S.Ct. 547, 556, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (plurality opinion); Wade v. Hunter, 
336 U.S., at 689, 69 S.Ct., at 837. If the law were otherwise, "the purpose 
of law to protect society from those guilty of crimes frequently would be 
frustrated by denying courts power to put the defendant to trial again." 
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 671-672, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2087-2088 (1982) 
(emphasis added). 
Whether a defendant's prosecution complies with the constitutional protection 
against being placed twice in jeopardy is a question of law. Corbus, 151 at 370, 256 
P.3d at 778, citing State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct. App. 
2000). It is the defendant's burden to show that the prosecution has not complied with 
2
"The Idaho Appellate Courts have consistently applied one analysis to double jeopardy claims arising 
under both the United States and Idaho Constitutions. Buell v. Idaho Dept. of Transp. 254 P.3d 1253, 
1257 (Ct. App. 2011), citing Berglund v. Potlatch Corp., 129 Idaho 752, 757, 932 P.2d 875, 880 (1996); 
State v. Sharp, 104 Idaho 691, 693, 662 P.2d 1135, 1137 (1983); State v. Randles, 115 Idaho 611, 615, 
768 P.2d 1344, 1348 (Ct.App.1989). 
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the constitutional protections of the Double Jeopardy Clauses. See, State v. Sharp, 104 
Idaho 691, 693-694, 662 P .2d 1135, 1137-1138 (1983), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 844, 7012 P.2d 585 (1985). 
Jeopardy attaches v.then a jurf is sv.torn. State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 898, 
712 P.2d 585, 599 (1985); Crist v. Bretz. 437 U.S. 28, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 
(1978). Neither party disputes that jeopardy attached when the jury was sworn in the 
Defendant's first trial on August 22, 2006. A defendant's motion for a mistrial 
constitutes "a deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or 
innocence determined before the first trier of fact." Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676, 102 S.Ct. 
at 2089, citing United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 93, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2195, 57 L.Ed.2d 
65 (1978). Neither party disputes that by requesting a multiple mistrials and a new trial 
the Defendant in this case elected to forgo his right to have the jury in the first case 
determine his guilt or innocence. 
Generally, if a defendant consents to or requests termination of the initial trial, the 
Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial. Sharp, 104 Idaho at 693-694, 662 P.2d at 
1137-1138, citing Kennedy; United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 96 S. Ct. 1075 
(1976), Statev. Werneth, 1011daho241, 611 P.2d 1026 (1980).3 However, the United 
States Supreme Court established an exception to this rule in Kennedy: 
Prosecutorial conduct that might be viewed as harassment or 
overreaching, even if sufficient to justify a mistrial on defendant's motion, 
therefore, does not bar retrial absent intent on the part of the prosecutor to 
subvert the protections afforded by the Doubie Jeopardy Ciause. vVhere 
prosecutorial error even of a degree sufficient to warrant a mistrial has 
3When a defendant objects to the termination of a trial by the State or the court, double jeopardy bars 
retrial unless the state can show "manifest necessity" for the termination. State v. Sharp, 104 Idaho 691, 
693-694, 662 P.2d 1135, 1137-1138 (1983), overruled on other grounds by State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 
844, 7012 P.2d 585 (1985), citing Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 98 S.Ct. 824 (1978); Downum v. 
United States, 372 U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct. 1033 (1963). 
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occurred, "[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the 
course to be followed in the event of such error." United States v. Dinitz. 
supra, 424 U.S., at 609, 96 S.Ct., at 1080. 
456 U.S. at 676, 102 S.Ct. at 2089. 
The issue presented here is whether the State is barred from retrying the 
Defendant because the overreaching and harassing misconduct of the prosecuting 
attorney forced the Defendant to move for a mistrial on multiple occasions and 
ultimately compelled the Defendant to seek a new trial. This is not the first time an Idaho 
Court has been asked to apply the exception annunciated in Kennedy. In State v. 
Sharp, the Idaho Supreme Court evaluated the exception: 
A defendant who moves for, or consents to a mistrial may raise a bar to 
retrial if the conduct that induced the mistrial motion was prosecutorial or 
judicial conduct designed specifically to provoke the defendant into calling 
for a mistrial. This exception is allowed only because: 
"[W]here the prosecutor's actions giving rise to the motion for 
mistrial were done 'in order to goad the [defendant] into requesting 
a mistrial.' ... [T]he defendant's valued right to complete his trial 
before the first jury would be a hollow shell if the inevitable motion 
for mistrial were held to prevent a later invocation of the bar of 
double jeopardy in all circumstances." 
The United States Supreme Court in Oregon v. Kennedy, supra, has now 
specifically limited this exception to allow for a retrial of the defendant 
unless there is conduct intended to provoke the defendant into declaring a 
mistrial. A mere showing of prejudice is not sufficient. 
104 Idaho at 693-694, 662 P.2d at 1137-1138, citing Kennedy (emphasis added; 
internal citations omitted). 
The parties have presented this Court with cases in which the defendants take 
the position that the Kennedy exception applies when the prosecuting attorney engages 
in serious misconduct, regardless of the purpose and a mistrial results, and the state 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS; DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTION TO USE OF 404(b) EVIDENCE; DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO EXPERT WITNESS; 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS (State of Idaho v. Jonathan Wade 
-- -- -Eitingtofio(GB -200£-=-J49711:--&-~--~- ~=-- = ~ -=---- ---- ---~-- =- --_ --c:_ --=- --~~-=- ~- -~---- -:-- _ 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 154 of 848
counters that the Kennedy exception only applies to cases where the defendant 
receives a mistrial and the intent of the prosecuting attorney's misconduct is clear. See 
United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 915-16 (2nd Cir. 1992), United State v. McAleer, 
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Defendant in this case also invites this Court to expand the exception of Kennedy to a 
situation where the prosecuting attorney's misconduct is of such a degree that a new 
trial results, regardless of the purpose or intent. Conversely, the State takes an 
extremely narrow view of Kennedy, arguing that the exception applies only in cases 
where the purpose for the misconduct is to force a mistrial to avoid acquittal, going so 
far as to argue that a pro forma objection to a Defendant's request for a mistrial is 
evidence of a lack of intent. 
The Defendant's arguments are logical and reflect this Court's concern that the 
Defendant and the taxpayer have endured the consequences of the prosecuting 
attorney's misconduct and Cpl. Rice's false testimony, but the State actors remain 
unaffected by the Idaho Supreme Court's findings and conclusions. However, even 
though the State remains in the same position and has suffered no adverse 
consequences as a result of the prosecuting attorney's misconduct, this Court also has 
significant concerns regarding the expansion of the Kennedy exception to this case. 
First, courts have only applied the Kennedy exception in cases where the 
Defendant moved for and received a mistrial, and the trial court acted to dismiss the 
charges against the defendant because the prosecution clearly engaged in misconduct 
to avoid an acquittal. These cases show that the primary concern is allowing the State 
a "do over" at the expense of the Defendant's Fifth Amendment right to have his trial 
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completed by a particular tribunal. This case, however, is different because this Court 
did not grant the Defendant's motions for a mistrial, 4 the Defendant did not appeal the 
denial of the motions for a mistrial, and the Idaho Supreme Court did not reverse the 
Defendant's conviction based on the pmsecutOi's misconduct. Instead, the Idaho 
Supreme Court reversed the Defendant's conviction based on the erroneous denial of 
the Defendant's motion for a new trial. Because no court has applied the Kennedy 
exception to a case where a new trial is ordered on remand because of a court's error, 
this Court is reluctant to do so in this case. 
Second, the Kennedy exception requires a court to evaluate the behavior of the 
prosecuting attorney. While the Defendant would like this Court to reassess the 
prosecuting attorney's misconduct at this stage, this Court need not reiterate the 
findings and conclusions of the Idaho Supreme Court. This Court acknowledges that 
the Idaho Supreme Court identified multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct, 
sufficiently described the egregious nature of the conduct, and identified specifically the 
refusal of the prosecuting attorney to follow the directives of this Court. State v. 
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727. Thus, it is clear that the prosecuting attorney's 
misconduct impacted the tenor, and ultimately the fairness, of the first trial to such a 
degree that a new trial is warranted. This Court need not repeat the findings of the 
Idaho Supreme Court or enter new findings for purposes of this opinion. 
Of most concern to this Court is the inquiry the Kennedy exception requires this 
4 However, had this Court granted any of the Defendant's motions for a mistrial or new trial this Court 
would have engaged in an Oregon v. Kennedy analysis and most likely determined that the prosecuting 
attorney's misconduct and the false testimony of Cpl. Rice had significant bearing on the Defendant's 
decision move for a mistrial. Upon retrial, this Court will employ a similar analysis under Oregon v. 
Kennedy if it is warranted by the presentation of the evidence and the conduct of the prosecuting 
attorney. 
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Court to conduct into the purpose of the prosecuting attorney's misconduct. Such an 
inquiry is certainly warranted in cases such as Kennedy where the prosecuting 
attorney's misconduct clearly reflects the goal of goading a defendant into seeking a 
mistrial to avoid acquittal and the behavior is assessed and addressed as part of the 
trial proceedings. Such an evaluation may even be appropriate upon appellate review 
of a denial of a defendant's motion for a mistrial. However, the Defendant here is not 
challenging, and did not challenge on appeal, this Court's denial of his motions for a 
mistrial. Instead the Defendant has received the relief of a new trial on remand. Given 
the current procedural posture of this case, an analysis of the prosecuting attorney's 
misconduct testimony at this stage may be unwarranted. 
Even so, a review of the trial transcript and the Ellington decision reveals that 
while the prosecuting attorney's misconduct may have been for the purpose of forcing a 
mistrial to avoid acquittal or conviction on a lesser charge, other motives or intentions 
are also discernible. Arguably, the prosecuting attorney may have sought to obtain a 
conviction at any cost, in disregard of the Defendant's constitutional rights and the cost 
to the taxpayer. On the other hand, the strength, or lack thereof, of the evidence may 
have given the prosecuting attorney impetus to try to tip the scales of justice in favor of 
the State. It is also possible that the misconduct had no particular purpose, but was a 
continuation of a general practice of the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney's Office. 
See State v. Perrv, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 
89 156 P.3d 583, 590 (Ct. App. 2007) (Judge Schwartzman specially concurring)5, State 
5Regarding instances of "prosecutorial misconduct" in the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, 
Judge Schwartzman wrote: "This case represents yet another in a long line or pattern of repetitious 
misconduct from this prosecutorial office. A catalogue of cases in which the doctrine of "harmless error'' 
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- -----v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570 181 P.3d 496 (2007). Unfortunately, the misconduct may have 
simply served the personal needs, philosophies, or ambitions of the prosecuting 
attorney. Given the myriad of possible purposes for the prosecuting attorney's 
misconduct, as well as this Court's limited ability to identify the definitive intent or 
purpose for the misconduct, this Court cannot make the conclusion Kennedy requires. 
In sum, while this Court agrees with the Defendant and the Idaho Supreme Court 
that the prosecuting attorney engaged in misconduct to a degree that it severely 
affected the tenor and fairness of the first trial, it is the purpose, not the degree, of the 
conduct that Kennedy requires this Court to consider. Because this Court cannot 
discern the purpose or intent for the misconduct, and because no court has expanded 
the exception in Kennedy to cases where a defendant receives a new trial on remand 
for reasons other than prosecutorial misconduct, this Court declines to apply the 
Kennedy exception. As a result, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied and the 
Defendant will receive a new trial. 
2. While the Defendant's Conviction May Have Been Obtained in 
Violation of Due Process, there is No Bar to Subsequent Retrial 
has reared its head and saved the conviction on appeal creates a less than enviable appellate track 
record. See State v. Vandenacre. 131 Idaho 507, 960 P.2d 190 (Ct.App.1998); State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 
61, 951 P.2d 1288 (Ct.App.1998); State v. Lovelass. 1331daho 160, 983 P.2d 233 (Ct.App.1999); State v. 
Cortez, 135 Idaho 561, 21 P.3d 498 (Ct.App.2001); State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 85 P.3d 1109 
(Ct.App.2003). Two unpublished opinions also come readily to mind: State v. Blythe, Docket No. 25557, 
135 Idaho 493, 20 P.3d 29, 2000 WL 1344686 (Ct.App. 2000), and State v. Gadberry, Docket No. 
26604/26605 (Ct.App. 2001 ). As our own Supreme Court has noted in State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 
984 n. 1, 842 P.2d 660, 663 n. 1 (1992): Mistakes must not become the practice instead of the exception. 
A court on observing that a pattern of mistakes has developed, on seeing yet another 'mistake,' might 
readily decide to view such circumstance with a jaundiced eye, and rule accordingly." 
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The Defendant also argues that the charges should be dismissed for violation of 
his due process rights. While the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
requires that the federal government provide due process of law, the Fourteenth 
Amendment specifically applies to the states: "nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " Article 1, Section 13 of the 
Idaho Constitution requires that a person not be "be deprived of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law." As set forth in State v. Jacobson, whether or not a 
Defendant's due process rights have been violated is a: 
two-step process to determine due process rights: first, deciding whether a 
governmental decision would deprive an individual of a liberty or property 
interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause; and second, if a liberty or property interest is implicated, a 
balancing test must be applied to determine what process is due. State v. 
Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 740, 170 P.3d 881, 883 (2007) (citing Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-35, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902-03,47 L.Ed.2d 18, 32-
34 (1976)) .... 
. . . The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in 
essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's 
accusations." State v. Carr, 128 Idaho, 181, 184, 911 P.2d 774, 777 (Ct. 
App. 1995) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 
1038, 1045, 35 L.Ed.2d 297, 308 (1973)) .... Upon identification of a 
liberty interest, the court must evaluate the facts to determine if due 
process was satisfied. Rogers, 144 Idaho at 742, 170 P.3d at 885. 
150 Idaho 131, 134-135, 244 P.3d 630, 633 -634 (Ct. App. 2010). Ultimately whether 
the Defendant's due process rights were violated is a question of law. Jacboson, 150 
Idaho at 134, 244 P.3d at 633, citing State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 
794 (Ct.App.2001 ). It is the defendant's burden to demonstiate facts that constitute a 
due process violation. kL citing State v. Cantrell, 139 Idaho 409, 412, 80 P.3d 345, 348 
(Ct.App.2003). 
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The Defendant primarily argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause provides a bar 
to retrial, but the Defendant does mention due process concerns. The Defendant's 
liberty interest is certainly at issue because he would be deprived of his freedom if he is 
convicted of the crimes charged .. AJso, Defendant must receive a fair opportunity to 
defend himself and the Due Process Clause requires that this Court evaluate the ability 
of the Defendant to do so given the circumstances of the case. 
It appears that the Defendant seeks a review of the actions of the prosecuting 
attorney and the presentation of false testimony by Cpl. Rice in the first trial. However, 
the Idaho Supreme Court, as the appellate and therefore reviewing court, has already 
reviewed the record and evaluated the due process concerns, stating: 
We also note that 'a conviction by the knowing use of perjured testimony 
is fundamentally unfair' as a violation of due process. United States v. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 91, 103, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2397 (1976). We have no way to 
know whether or not the prosecutor had any knowledge of the falsity of 
Cpl. Rice's testimony given his past testimony and training materials, but 
we recognize the serious constitutional implications of the possibility. It is 
extremely disturbing to this Court that an Cpl. of the law would present 
false testimony in any case especially a murder case. In this case, 
however, it is impossible to believe there was any truth to the testimony of 
Cpl. Rice. It is abhorrent to this Court, as it would be to any other court, 
that a man can be sentenced to twenty five years for second degree 
murder based primarily on the false testimony of a trooper of this State. 
Ellington, 151 Idaho at 75, 253 P.3d at 749. In making this conclusion, the Idaho 
Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty of knowing whether the Defendant's rights 
were violated such that he did not receive the process due in the first trial. 
This Court is in a similarly difficult position. As the trial court, this Court is not 
tasked with the authority to review the previous trial for due process error and must 
decline to address the Defendant's due process concerns as part of the Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss. However, this Court, in accordance with the attention that the Due 
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Process Clause deserves, will ensure that the Defendant receives the process due 
upon retrial, that being a fair trial by an impartial jury untainted by prosecutorial 
misconduct or false testimony. Therefore, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied. 
3. The District Court Does Not Possess Supervisory Powers 
The Defendant also asks this Court to exercise its supervisory powers and 
dismiss the charges against him. The State identifies that this Court does not have 
supervisory powers and therefore lacks the authority to dismiss the charges. The State 
is correct that while federal courts are the beneficiaries of Article Ill of the United States 
Constitution, and the Idaho Supreme Court enjoys supervisory powers as per Article I 
and Article V of the Idaho Constitution, this Court does not have such supervisory 
powers. Further, had the Defendant desired that the Idaho Supreme Court dismiss the 
charges on the grounds set forth in the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Defendant 
could have asked the Idaho Supreme Court to exercised its supervisory powers and 
dismissed the charges on appeal. However, the Defendant did not advocate for the use 
of supervisory powers by the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Idaho Supreme Court did 
not sua sponte invoke its supervisory authority. Instead, the Defendant sought and the 
Idaho Supreme Court granted the Defendant the relief requested, a new trial. The 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is therefore denied. 
B. DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO USE OF 404(b) EVIDENCE 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person acted in conformity therewith. 
It may however be admissible for other purposes ... " Before submitting the evidence, 
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~there must be a showing that the prior bad act actually occurred and that those acts are 
relevant "to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than 
propensity." State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 54, 205 P.3d 1185, 1191 (2009), citing State 
v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569, 165 P.3d 273, 283 (2007). Next, there must be a 
determination as to "whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the 
probative value of the evidence." I.R.E. 403; Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188. 
Admissibility of evidence is always within the trial court's discretion. ld., 147 Idaho at 
54, 205 P .3d at 1188. 
State gave notice that it intended to present the following evidence as per I.R.E. 
404 (b): 
1. That at the time the Defendant's contact with the Larsen family on 
January 1, 2006, the Defendant had an active bench warrant in the 
amount of $10,000.00. Attached is a copy of the ROA report pertaining 
to that matter. 
2. That following the Defendant's apprehension and after his contact with 
the Larsen family on January 1, 2006, the Defendant had a blood 
alcohol level of .19. Attached is a copy of his blood alcohol level as 
documented by an analysis conducted by ISP. 
3. That at the time of the Defendant's contact with the Larsen family on 
January 1, 2006, the Defendant's driver's license was suspended in 
the State of Idaho. Attached is a copy of the Defendant's DMV printout. 
(Notice of Intent to Produce I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence at Trial and Notice of Filing Factual 
Basis for I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence.) The Defendant objects because the State failed to 
give proper notice and that the evidence is irrelevant to the charges at issue. The State 
responds that it intends to use the evidence to rebut a potential "fight or flight defense," 
that may be propounded by the Defendant's expert witness. 
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This Court is somewhat persuaded by the Defendant's arguments. In regards to 
the outstanding bench warrant, in order for the evidence to be admissible the State 
must prove that the Defendant knew that the warrant, apparently issued three years 
earlier on ~v~arch 6, 2003, for a failure to comply \AJith a probation condition, \AJas 
outstanding. The State has not provided this Court or the Defendants with a factual 
basis that the Defendant knew about the warrant and must do so before introducing the 
evidence at trial. Additionally, the "Register of Actions" print out supplied by the State is 
not a factual basis, but the bench warrant or a copy thereof however, would be. Lastly, 
the Defendant is correct that the admissibility of the evidence is dependent on the 
testimony of Dr. Hayes, and since the testimony of Dr. Hayes will not be given until trial, 
this Court is not in a position to determine the relevance of the outstanding bench 
warrant at this time. Thus, this Court reserves the issue of admissibility of the 
outstanding bench warrant for trial. 
As for the evidence of the Defendant's blood alcohol level of .19, the Defendant 
points out that whether his car struck Mrs. Larsen is not in dispute, and he has admitted 
that he drank alcohol after the events with the Larsen family, but before he was arrested 
by the police. The Defendant, then, contends that evidence of the Defendant's blood 
alcohol level when it was taken is irrelevant. This Court tends to agree, but like the 
evidence of the outstanding warrant, the relevance of the rebuttal evidence of the 
Defendant's blood alcohol level cannot be determined until the Defendant's expert 
testifies. Thus, this Court reserves the question of admissibility of the Defendant's 
blood alcohol level for trial. 
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Lastly, the State desires to introduce evidence that the Defendant's driver's 
license was suspended. The State also intends to introduce this evidence as rebuttal 
evidence. This Court notes that like the bench warrant, the State must show that the 
Defendant knew his driver's license was suspended and provide a factual basis for the 
evidence at trial. But, for the same reasons that the Defendant's expert testimony must 
be admitted first, this Court will reserve the issue of admissibility of the suspension of 
the Defendant's driver's license for trial. 
C. DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO EXPERT WITNESS 
The State has disclosed Dr. Marco Ross as an expert it intends to use at trial. 
The State has asserted that Dr. Ross will "describe the injuries of the Defendant." The 
Defendant objects to the use of Dr. Ross's testimony as irrelevant because whether the 
Defendant's vehicle struck Ms. Larsen and caused her injuries is not at issue and Dr. 
Ross cannot testify as to where Ms. Larsen was standing when she was struck. 
During the first trial, Dr. Ross testified as to the injuries suffered by Ms. Larsen, 
but did not testify as to where Ms. Larsen was standing when she was struck by the 
Defendant's vehicle. On appeal, the Defendant alleged that the prosecuting attorney 
committed a fraud upon the court by claiming that Dr. Ross would testify about where 
Ms. Larsen was standing when she was struck and the speed of the Defendant's 
vehicle, but instead Dr. Ross's "testimony focused only on the gruesome nature of the 
injuries in order to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury." Ellington, 151 Idaho 
at 63-64, 253 P.3d at 737-738. The Idaho Supreme Court ultimately determined that 
the record showed that Dr. Ross' testimony included "distinguishing injuries that were 
the result of being struck and those that were the result of being run over, which was 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS; DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTION TO USE OF 404(b) EVIDENCE; DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO EXPERT WITNESS; 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS (State of Idaho v. Jonathan Wade 
Ellington (CR- 2006- 1497))- 16 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 164 of 848
· ·relevant to the issue of what direction Mrs. Larsen may have been facing and where she 
was located." ld. However the Idaho Supreme Court also noted that Dr. Ross's 
testimony was "focused on cataloguing and describing in detail each of Mrs. Larsen's 
injuries" and concluded that "the offer of proof was misleading as to the majority of Dr. 
Ross' testimony, and highlights yet another attempt by the prosecutor to influence the 
jury's passions and prejudices." ld. The Defendant also argued on appeal that the 
introduction of Dr. Ross's testimony was unfairly prejudicial and cumulative. ld., 151 
Idaho at 67-68, 253 P.3d at 741-742. The Idaho Supreme Court did not assign error on 
these grounds. 
This Court notes the arguments of the parties and the decision of the Idaho 
Supreme Court, and concludes that Dr. Ross's testimony is relevant and prejudicial, but 
not unfairly prejudicial to the Defendant. Therefore, the testimony as asserted in the 
"State' Response to the Defendant's Objection to Expert Witness" is relevant. However, 
this Court will allow the Defendant to request an offer of proof prior to Dr. Ross's 
testimony, and will reevaluate the admissibility of Dr. Ross' testimony based on the 
State's offer of proof. Additionally, this Court admonishes the State that Dr. Ross 
cannot testify as to where Mrs. Larsen was standing in the road. Lastly, this Court 
notifies both parties that it will closely observe and evaluate Dr. Ross's testimony to 
ensure that it is presented for a proper purpose, and is not cumulative and not 
presented in a manner that inflames the passions and prejudices of the jury. 
D. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS 
The Defendant moves to exclude certain materials in the State's possession that 
may be introduced to impeach Dr. Hayes. The State is in possession of billing records 
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that show Dr. Hayes frequently performs work at the request of defense counsel and 
these records show that Dr. Hayes may be predisposed to favor the Defendant. The 
State asserted at oral argument that it did not intend to introduce the bills at trial, but 
wou!d inquire of Dr. Hayes regarding the work he has performed for defense counsel. 
The Defendant argues Dr. Hayes frequently performs work for defense counsel 
because he is the only professional in the area that meets defense counsel's needs and 
that the billing material contains confidential information of other patients and cases that 
must be protected. 
Altough the Idaho Rules of Evidence do not specifically address impeachment of 
witnesses by evidence of bias, the right to do so is unquestionable. The bias, prejudice, 
or motive of a witness to lie concerning issues presented in a trial is always material and 
relevant to effective cross-examination. State v. Arzaiza, 124 Idaho 82, 856 P.2d 872 
(1993), citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.CT. 1105 (1974). The scope or extent 
of cross-examination tending to show interest or bias of a witness rest largely in the 
sound discretion of the trial court. Hall v. Bannock County, 81, Idaho 256, 340 P.2d 855 
(1959). 
This Court will grant the Defendant's motion to exclude in part. First, this Court 
sees no need to reference the fact that the Defendant enjoys the representation of the 
public defender's office. This fact is irrelevant and may prejudice the jury. The public 
defender is a "law office" or "law firm" and must only be referred to as such during the 
proceedings. Second, the State is prohibited from introducing any billing information as 
an exhibit and may not introduce evidence of the hourly rate Dr. Hayes charges the 
defense counsel for performing evaluations of clients. However, the State may elicit 
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·· ··· -testimony from Dr. Hayes for impeachment purposes regarding the number of case Dr. 
Hayes has worked on for defense counsel, whether he received payment for that work, 
whether or not Dr. Hayes is being paid to testify as an expert witness in this case, and 
whether Dr. Hayes has been paid to testify as an expert witness other cases. However, 
based on the nature of Dr. Hayes' testimony and the proceedings at trial, the Defendant 
may reassert its objection throughout the proceedings. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. The Defendant's 
Objection to Use of 404(b) Evidence is hereby RESERVED. The Defendants' Objection 
to Expert Witness is hereby RESERVED. The Defendant's Motion to Exclude 
Impeachment Materials is hereby GRANTED IN PART, and may be reasserted at trial. 
t"" 
DATED this I l.f day of September, 2011. 
~o-L.~d~ 
Joh'n Patrick Luster 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
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JONATHAN ELLINGTON, EXPERT WITNESS 
Defendant. 
_____________________________) 
COMES NOW, Jonathan Ellington, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and herby submits this Memo.randum in aid of his 
Objection to the state using Marco Ross MD as an expert in this matter. 
I. ISSUES 
A. The testimony Marco Ross has to offer is irrelevant. 
B. The testimony Marco Ross has to offer is overly prejudicial and inflammatory. 
II. FACTS 
At the first trial, the State offered Marco Ross as an expert in pathology. State v. 
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727, 737 (2011). The State told the Court during its offer of 
proof that 
Dr. Ross would help distinguish the injuries by explaining how 
each one was caused to help establish Mrs. Larsen's location on 
the roadway. The court also acknowledged the prejudice that 
describing the injuries would have, stating that much of the 
testimony "may very well be cumulative and unnecessary. " 
However, the court weighed the danger of the cumulative evidence 
and prejudice and determined that the probative value was not 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
OBJECTION TO EXPERT WITNESS Page 1 
I 
:I 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 171 of 848
outweighed, and the evidence should not be excluded in the form of 
barring Dr. Ross from testifying. 
!d. at 742. 
However, in front of the jury, 
Dr. Ross described Mrs. Larsen's injuries in great detail, and then 
testified that the injuries to her chest were more consistent with 
being struck by a motor vehicle than dragged by one and that the 
injuries to her head were consistent with being run over by a tire. 
This allegedly went to the issue of which way she may have been 
facing, and may have provided potential information as to where 
she was placed in the roadway. However, Dr. Ross did not actually 
testify to where Mrs. Larsen was standing and what direction she 
was facing. The vast majority of the testimony was focused on 
cataloguing and describing in detail each of Mrs. Larsen's 
injuries. 
!d. at 737. 
The Idaho Supreme Court found 
the offer was at the least misleading as to the majority of the focus 
of Dr. Ross' testimony, and highlights yet another attempt by the 
prosecutor to influence the jury's passions and prejudices. 
!d. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. The testimony Marco Ross has to offer is irrelevant. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 (20 11) states 
"Relevant Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence. 
I.R.E. 402 makes inadmissible any evidence that is not relevant. Relevance is a prerequisite to 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
OBJECTION TO EXPERT WITNESS Page2 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 172 of 848
the admission of any and all evidence in Idaho. See State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 248 P.3d720, 
722 (2010). 
In this case, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the evidence Marco Ross gave at trial 
was a 
descr[iption of] Mrs. Larsen's injuries in great detail, and . .. that 
the injuries to her chest were more consistent with being struck by 
a motor vehicle than dragged by one and that the injuries to her 
head were consistent with being run over by a tire. 
Id at 737. 
Certainly, the extent of Mrs. Larson's injuries was in no way relevant to "any fact that is of 
consequence." Mr. Ellington is charged with murder, not great bodily injury. Furthermore, 
whether or not Mrs. Larsen's injuries were caused by being struck, run over, or dragged by Mr. 
Ellington's vehicle by itself is of no consequence to the question of whether he committed 
homicide. Therefore, Marco Ross's testimony should be excluded by the Court as irrelevant to 
this trial. 
B. The testimony Marco Ross has to offer is overly prejudicial and inflammatory. 
I.R.E. 403 states 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion ofthe issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
The Idaho Supreme Court ruled that Marco Ross's testimony was "certainly cumulative to some 
degree" and that it was "yet another attempt by the prosecutor to influence the jury's passions and 
prejudices." Ellington 253 P.3d at 737, 741. This Court also determined that the evidence would 
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be cumulative and prejudicial but held it was probative to show where Mrs. Larsen was standing. 
!d. at 742. However, the State never connected Marco Ross's inflammatory and cumulative 
testimony as to the injuries Mrs. Larsen suffered to her position on the roadway. !d. at 73 7. The 
Idaho Supreme Court heid that the State's proffer of evidence prior to Marco Ross's testimony 
was misleading. !d. 
In People v. Robinson, 124 P.3d 363, 404 (Cal.2005), the California Supreme Court 
found that where the State had used cumulative and unfairly prejudicial victim impact evidence 
during the penalty phase of a capital trial and that penalty phase had to be retried, the defendant's 
lawyer should have objected and moved "in limine to restrict the admission of[the] evidence." 
Restriction of inadmissible evidence is precisely what Mr. Ellington intends by this motion. 
The State seeks to introduce the same witness on the same grounds in Mr. Ellington's 
second trial with no way to assure the Court that a "vast majority of the testimony [of Marco 
Ross] [will not be] cataloguing and describing in detail each of Mrs. Larsen's injuries." !d. The 
State's claim that this time Marco Ross's testimony will actually serve to show where Mrs. 
Larsen was standing is not credible. I.R.E. 403 states evidence should be excluded if its 
probative value is "substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice .. "(emphasis added). 
The Court has already experienced how Marco Ross's testimony weighs on the scale of 
prejudice in one trial and this experience should lead the Court to conclude that the danger of a 
repeat performance is too substantial to allow Marco Ross to be given leave to testify. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In view of the State's misrepresentation of the probative value of Marco Ross's testimony 
in Mr. Ellington's first trial as well as its use of Marco Ross's testimony to inflame his last jury 
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thereby violating his due process rights, Mr. Ellington respectfully asks this Court to find that 
Marco Ross's testimony has no relevance at his new trial, and that furthermore the danger that 
the State will once again attempt to use Marco Ross's testimony to inflame the jury is too great to 
aiiow him to take the stand. 
DATED this 3\~ r-\ - day of August, 2011. · 
A AYLOR 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certW that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by facsimile 
on the ?l£6 day of August, 2011, addressed to: .. 
Kootenai County Prosecutor 208-446-183 3 
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D ORIGII\JAL 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) / 
) CASE NUMBER CR-06-000 1497 
Plaintiff, ) Fe I 
) 
v. ) 
) MOTION IN LIMINE (FIRST) 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, ) POST ARREST SILENCE 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW, Jonathan Ellington, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, 
Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby requests the Court for an order preventing the 
prosecution from soliciting from its witnesses and the State's witnesses from testifying about any 
post-arrest silence of Mr. Ellington. 
The Kootenai County Prosecutor has been admonished previously for soliciting comments on 
post-arrest silence. See State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 709 (1999). Most recently the prosecutor in Mr. 
Ellington's prior trial was found by the Idaho Supreme Court to have committed the same error. 
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53,253 P.3d 727,735 (2011). As the Idaho Supreme Court wrote in 
its opinion, "there was absolutely no reason for the prosecutor to engage in this line of questioning in 
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the first place, particularly given that he clearly knew the line of questioning would create a high risk 
of an improper comment on Mr. Ellington's silence." !d. 
Furthermore, such comments are a violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. 
In Rule 8.4 it is stated: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the 
acts of another; 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice; 
ID.R.P.C. 8.4 (2011). 
When a prosecutor intentionally engages in violating a person's constitutional rights, those 
actions are both prejudicial to the administration of justice and acts of abuse. 
The advocate's function is to present evidence and argument so that 
the cause may be decided according to law. Refraining from abusive 
or obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate's right to 
speak on behalf of litigants. 
ID.R.P.C. 3.5 cmt. 4. 
Moreover, a prosecutor bears a special responsibility to protect the integrity of a criminal trial. 
A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister ofjustice and not 
simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it 
specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded 
procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient 
evidence, and that special precautions are taken to prevent and to 
rectifY the conviction of innocent persons. 
ID.R.P.C. 3.8 cmt. 1. 
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Therefore, any attempt by the prosecution to solicit testimony as to Mr. Ellington's silence 
would be an ethical violation as well as a violation of Mr. Ellington's rights. 
Therefore, Mr. Ellington's right to remain silent guaranteed by the Constitution of the State 
ofldaho and the United States of America would be violated to allow such testimony. 
DATED this ~ day of September, 2011. 
BY: 
A ETAYLOR 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing a 
copy ofthe same in the interoffice mailbox on the Jd-...f4- day of September, 2011, addressed 
to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor f{j #..'( 4'/lJ~ I~ 
l ~ ckr:~,IJLili 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION IN LIMINE (SECOND) 
DISTURBING NATURE TESTIMONY 
COMES NOW, Jonathan Ellington, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, 
Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby requests the Court for an order preventing the 
prosecution from soliciting testimony, in violation of his right to a fair trial, about the disturbing 
nature of the incident involving Mr. Ellington. 
The Kootenai County Prosecutor has a history of i?.ttempting to convince the jury of the 
upsetting nature of cases that come before this Court. See State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82 (Ct.App. 
2007). As recently as Mr. Ellington's prior trial the Idaho Supreme Court found the prosecution to 
have committed the same error by having Eric Hartmann, a forensic audio analyst, testify that he left 
his job after two months due to the disturbing nature of this case. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 
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253 P.3d 727, 735-737 (2011). The Idaho Supreme Court quoted from State v. Phillips: "[A]ppeals 
to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible." 
!d. at 736, quoting Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87. Nor should the Prosecutor be allowed to use as a guise 
the false argument that his witness needs to be rehabilitated before his character has even been 
attacked. 
We find that the testimony the prosecutor was attempting to elicit 
from Mr. Hartmann was similarly highly prejudicial and 
irrelevant. While the prosecution here claims that the question was 
relevant to rebut anticipated impeachment or attacks on Mr. 
Hartmann's character by the defense by attempting to establish 
that Mr. Hartmann was not fired for poor pe1jormance, a witness's 
credibility and character may not be supported before it has been 
attacked. 
ld. citing I.R.E. 608(a), (b); Pierson v. Brooks, 115 Idaho 529, 
532-34 (Ct.App.1989). 
Mr. Ellington would also remind the Court that at his first trial, shortly after being told 
that such testimony "was unnecessarily elicited here from the witness" (Tr., p.545, Ls.16-17) and 
that the State's effort to "bring[] out Mr. Hartmann's disturbing reflection on this case ... 
simply doesn't have a place in this case" (Tr., p.547, Ls.21-23), the State paid this Court's 
admonishment absolutely no heed. When the State's very next witness, Anthony Hutchinson, 
one of the firefighter EMTs who had attempted to render aid to Mrs. Larsen, testified that he was 
no longer an EMT, Mr. Verharen asked him when he resigned and, upon learning that he had 
resigned in April 2006 Gust four months after the incident at issue in this case), asked: "And the 
reason you resigned?" (Tr., p.581, L.23- p.582, L.4.) This time, however, defense counsel was 
ready, and was able to object before the witness could answer. (Tr., p.582, L.3.) Thankfully, the 
objection was sustained. (Tr., p.582, L.4.) 
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Furthermore, such comments are a violation ofthe Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. 
In Rule 8.4 it is stated: 
It is professional misconductfor a lawyer to: 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules ofProfessional Conduct, 
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the 
acts of another; 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice; ... 
ID.R.P.C. 8.4 (2011). 
When a prosecutor intentionally engages in trying a case based on emotion instead of facts, those 
actions are both prejudicial to the administration of justice and acts of abuse. 
The advocate's function is to present evidence and argument so that 
the cause may be decided according to law. Refraining from abusive 
or obstreperous conduct is a corollmy of the advocate's right to 
speak on behalf of litigants. 
ID.R.P.C. 3.5 cmt. 4. 
Moreover, a prosecutor bears a special responsibility to protect the integrity of a criminal trial. 
A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister ofjustice and not 
simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it 
specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded 
procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient 
evidence, and that special precautions are taken to prevent and to 
rectifY the conviction of innocent persons. 
ID.R.P.C. 3.8 cmt. 1. 
Therefore, any attempt by the prosecution to solicit testimony as to the disturbing nature of the case 
would be an ethical violation as well as a violation of Mr. Ellington's right to Due Process. 
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Therefore, Mr. Ellington's right to a fair trial on the facts rather than emotional arguments, as 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the State of Idaho and the United States of America, would be 
violated to allow such testijl;'. 
~·~~~-·· L:lf. ' "" . 1 ""'' VA l.t.U thiS v aay or ~epremoer, LV 11. 
BY: 
OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI 
CO PUBLIC DEFENDE 
A TAYLOR 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing a 
copy ofthe same in the interoffice mailbox on the };)_ "1!:::: day of September, 2011, addressed 
to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor Bj ~ 4 L/ la -I 033 
clu.Mif<d.Mta; -.j_) 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION IN LIMINE (THIRD) 
IMPROPER QUESTIONS 
COMES NOW, Jonathan Ellington, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, 
Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby requests the Court for an order preventing the 
prosecution from using improper questions in violation of Mr. Ellington's right to a fair trial, 
calculated to inflame the passions of the jury. 
The Kootenai County Prosecutor's Office has many times attempted to inject vitriol and 
inflammatory material into criminal cases in the First Judicial District. See State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 
570 (Ct.App.2007); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82 (Ct.App.2007); State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710 
(Ct.App.2003); State v. Blythe, No. 25557 (unpublished) (Ct.App.2000); State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 
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561 (Ct.App.l999); State v. Lovelass, 133 Idaho 160 (Ct.App.l999). As recently as Mr. Ellington's 
prior trial the Idaho Supreme Court found the prosecution to have committed misconduct by 
ask[ing} four questions in a row that included a version of the 
phrase "ran over your wife" in order to apparently establish 
whether }vfr. Ellington was in the wrong lane of travel when lvfrs. 
Larsen was hit. These included the colorful phrases "After he got 
done running over your wife, " "How long after-he ran over your 
wife," "After he got done running over your wife," and "How 
long-after he got done running over her, " all asked one after the 
other. After defense counsel objected and the prosecutor was told 
by the court to "move on, " the prosecutor immediately asked again 
what Mr. Larsen did "after Mr. Ellington ran over your wife." 
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727, 737 (2011). 
The Idaho Supreme Court agreed with Mr. Ellington that "intentional, gratuitous references to Mr. 
Larsen's wife having been run over were calculated to, and did, appeal to the emotions of the jurors, 
and as such, constituted misconduct." !d. at 737. The Idaho Supreme Court also commented that 
"[t]he court should not have to lecture the prosecutor in front of the jury in order to get its point 
across that the current line of questioning is inappropriate and the prosecutor should move to a 
different one." !d. 
Long ago, our Idaho Supreme Court recognized that the limits on 
permissible closing argument apply most stringently to a 
prosecuting attorney: 
A prosecuting attorney is a public officer, "acting in a quasi 
judicial capacity." It is his duty to use all fair, honorable, 
reasonable, and lawful means to secure the conviction of the guilty 
who are or may be indicted in the courts of his judicial circuit. He 
should see that they have a fair and impartial trial, and avoid 
convictions contr<Lry to law. Nothing should tempt him to appeal to 
prejudices, to pervert the testimony, or make statements to the jury, 
which, whether true or not, have not been proved. The desire for 
success should never induce him to endeavor to obtain a verdict by 
arguments based on anything except the evidence in the case, and 
the conclusions legitimately deducible from the law applicable to 
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the same .... 
It will be observed from the foregoing authorities that the courts do 
not look with favor upon the action of prosecutors in going beyond 
any possible state of facts which can be material as to the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant in a particular case for which he is upon 
trial. Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the 
machinery of the court, and that they occupy an official position, 
which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their 
statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the 
presence of the jury than they will give to counsel for the accused. 
It seems that they frequently exert their skill and ingenuity to see 
how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, and generally in 
so doing they transgress upon the rights of the accused. It is the 
duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair trial, and 
that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to the jury, and 
above all things he should guard against anything that would 
prejudice the minds of the jurors, and tend to hinder them from 
considering only the evidence introduced. 
State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87 (Ct.App.2007), quoting State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 
35, 43-44 (1903). 
Furthermore, such comments are a violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. 
In Rule 8.4 it is stated: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the 
acts of another; 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice; ... 
ID.R.P.C. 8.4 (2011). 
When a prosecutor intentionally engages in trying a case based on emotion instead of 
facts, those actions are both prejudicial to the administration of justice and acts of abuse. 
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The advocate's function is to present evidence and argument so that 
the cause may be decided according to law. Refrainingfrom abusive 
or obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate's right to 
speak on behalf of litigants. 
ID.R.P.C. 3.5 cmt. 4. 
Moreover, a prosecutor bears a special responsibility to protect the integrity of a criminal trial. 
A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister ofjustice and not 
simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it 
specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded 
procedural justice,. that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient 
evidence, and that special precautions are taken to prevent and to 
rectify the conviction of innocent persons. 
ID.R.P.C. 3.8 cmt. 1. 
Therefore, any attempt by the prosecution to appeal to the emotions of the jury would be an 
ethical violation as well as a violation of Mr. Ellington's right to Due Process. 
Therefore, Mr. Ellington's right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by the Constitution of the State 
of Idaho and the United States of America, on the facts rather than emotional arguments would be 
violated to allow such testimony. IAL_ 
DATED this V£ day of September, 2011. 
BY: 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing a 
copy ofthe same in the interoffice mailbox on the /;2....,. day of September, 2011, addressed 
to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor ~~r'fl/&2-1?33 
cJwyt 0~~ 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 . 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fe I 
MOTION IN LIMINE (FOURTH) 
IMPROPER EXPERT TESTIMONY 
COMES N 0 W, Jonathan Ellington, the above named defendant. by and through his attorney, 
Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby requests the Court for an order preventing the 
prosecution from soliciting improper expert testimony, in violation ofMr. Ellington's right to a fair 
trial, calculated to inflame the passions of the jury. 
The Kootenai County Prosecutor's Office has man)· times attempted to inject vitriol and 
inflammatory material into criminal cases in the First Judicial District. See State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 
570 (Ct.App.2007); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82 (CLApt1.2007); State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710 
(Ct.App.2003); State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561 (Ct.App.1999); State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho 160 
(Ct.App.1999). As recently as Mr. Ellington's prior trial the Idaho Supreme Court found the 
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prosecution to have committed misconduct by soliciting "testimony focused only on the gruesome 
nature of the injuries in order to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury" from the pathologist 
Dr. Ross. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727, 737 (2011). As the Court pointed out, 
"[w]hile a prosecutor 'may strike hard biows, he is not at iiberty to strike foul ones."' !d. quoting 
Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
Furthermore, soliciting such testimony is a violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct. In Rule 8.4 it is stated: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduci, 
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the 
acts of another; 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice; ... 
ID.R.P.C. 8.4 (2011). 
When a prosecutor State intentionally engages in trying a case based on emotion instead of facts, 
those actions are both prejudicial to the administration of justice and acts of abuse. 
The advocate's function is to present evidence and argument so that 
the cause may be decided according to law. Refrainingfrom abusive 
or obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate's right. to 
:;peak on behalf of litigants. 
ID.R.P.C. 3.5 cmt. 4. 
Moreover, a prosecutor bears a special responsibility to protect the integrity of a criminal trial. 
A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister ofjustice and not 
simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it 
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specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded 
procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient 
evidence, and that special precautions are taken to prevent and to 
rectify the conviction of innocent persons. 
ID.R.P.C. 3.8 cint. 1. 
Therefore, any attempt by the prosecution to appeal to the emotions of the jury would be an 
ethical violation as well as a violation of Mr. Ellington's right to Due Process. 
Therefore, Mr. Ellington's right to afair trial, as guaranteed by the Constitution of the State 
of Idaho and the United States of America, on the facts rather than emotional arguments would be 
violated to allow such testimony. (}(/ 
DATED this~ day of September, 2011. 
OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI 
CO TY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
BY: 
A TAYLOR 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoi~ was personally served by placing a 
copy of the same in the interoffice mailbox on the / ~ day of September, 201 1, addressed 
to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor ~.fit t(l{(, -(~3 
r -l.~. • r-/, .. ~ .. -..... ~11 f { \~ ~(&J -\.6 / 
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QORIGINAL 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
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ALEC: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION IN LIMINE (FIFTH) 
MISLEADING OFFERS OF PROOF 
COMES NOW, Jonathan Ellington, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, 
Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby requests the Court for an order preventing the 
prosecution from introducing inflammatory evidence using misleading offers of proof in violation of 
Mr. Ellington's right to a fair trial. 
The Kootenai County Prosecutor's Office has a long history of violating the rules of the 
Court and engaging in misleading conduct in order to unfairly prejudice the jury. See State v. 
Gamble, 146 Idaho 331 (Ct.App.2008) (prosecutor misstated the law by telling the jury it did not 
have to find defendant completed the meth production process); State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570 
(Ct.App.2007) (prosecutor misstated the evidence about crucial element); State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 
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561 (Ct.App.1999) (prosecutor placed facts not in evidence before the jury); State v. Vandenacre, 
131 Idaho 507 (Ct.App.1998) (prosecutor asked defendant about his prior felonies without first 
establishing relevancy as required by I.R.E. 609). As recently as Mr. Ellington's prior trial the Idaho 
Supreme Court found the prosecution to have committed misconduct by having: 
Dr. Ross describe[] Mrs. Larsen's injuries in great detail, and 
then testif[y] that the injuries to her chest were more consistent 
with being struck by a motor vehicle than dragged by one and that 
the injuries to her head were consistent with being run over by a 
tire. This allegedly went to the issue of which way she may have 
been facing, and may have provided potential information as to 
where she was placed in the roadway. However, Dr. Ross did not 
actually testify to where Mrs. Larsen was standing and what 
direction she was facing. The vast majority of the testimony was 
focused on cataloguing and describing in detail each of Mrs. 
Larsen's injuries. 
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727, 737 (2011). 
I d. 
The Court wrote that it 
[would] not go so far as to hold that the prosecutor committed a 
fraud upon the court . .. , however, the offer was at the least 
misleading as to the majority of the focus of Dr. Ross' testimony, 
and highlights yet another attempt by the prosecutor to influence 
the jury's passions and prejudices. 
Furthermore, misleading the Court is a violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct. In Rule 3.3 (2011) it is explicitly stated: 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(I) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to 
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to 
the tribunal by the lawyer; 
(2) fail to disclose to the tribuna/legal authority in the controlling 
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the 
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position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or 
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the 
lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered 
material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the 
lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, !f 
necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer 
evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal 
matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. 
In commentary on Rule 3.3, the Rules of Professional Conduct elucidate the importance 
of honesty when introducing evidence: "Paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer refuse to offer 
evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless of the client's wishes. This duty is 
premised on the lawyer's obligation as an officer of the comi to prevent the trier of fact from 
being misled by false evidence." Cmt. 5. 
In Rule 8.4 it is stated: 
ID.R.P.C. 8.4. 
It is professional misconductfor a lawyer to: 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the 
acts of another; 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation; 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice; ... 
Moreover, a prosecutor bears a special responsibility to protect the integrity of a criminal trial. 
A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister ofjustice and not 
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simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it 
specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded 
procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient 
evidence, and that special precautions are taken to prevent and to 
rectify the conviction of innocent persons. 
ID.R.P.C. 3.8 cmt. 1. 
Therefore, any attempt by the prosecution to mislead this Court would be an ethical violation 
as well as a violation of Mr. Ellington's right to Due Process. 
Therefore, Mr. Ellington's right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Constitution of the State of 
Idaho at!d the United States of America would be violated to allow the prosecution to introduce 
prejudicial evidence through misleading offers of proof. 
DATED this _0 __ day of September, 2011. 
OFFICE OF THE KOOTE 
C TY PUBLIC EF 
BY: 
A TAYLOR 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the fore~oing was personally served by placing a 
copy of the same in the interoffice mailbox on the /c).. b day of September, 2011, addressed 
to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor~~ c.(L.f~-f8o~ 
~~d_~ 
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QORIGINAL 
Anne C Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION IN LIMINE (SIXTH) 
IMPROPER OPINION TESTIMONY 
COMES NOW, Jonathan Ellington, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, 
Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby requests the Court for an order preventing the 
prosecution from soliciting and/or the State's witnesses from testifying, in violation of Mr. 
Ellington's right to a fair trial, to an opinion on questions within the province of the triers of fact. 
The Kootenai County Prosecutor's Office has long hi story of inserting either its own opinion 
or those ofwitnesses in violation ofDue Process. See State v. Perry, 144 Idaho 665 (Ct.App.2007) 
(Prosecutor solicited testimony vouching for witnesses' testimony and then commented on it at 
closing); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82 (Ct.App.2007) (Prosecutor attempted to appeal to jury's 
passion or prejudice by telling them they should be "irritated" and "upset" six times); State v. Kuhn, 
Page 1 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 195 of 848
139 Idaho 710 (Ct.App.2003) (Prosecutor called defendant a liar and accused him of perjury); State 
v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho 160 (Ct.App.l999) (Court found troubling Prosecutor's "less than artful" 
statements expressing his personal beliefs in closing). As recently as Mr. Ellington's prior trial the 
Idaho Supreme Court found the prosecution to have committed the same error when Trooper Daly 
testified that the incident in this case was not an accident. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 
727, 739 (2011). The Idaho Supreme Court held: 
!d. 
As in Warren, this conclusion was impermissible opinion testimony 
because a juror could have determined whether or not he or she 
thought that Mr. Ellington acted intentionally given the evidence 
presented; that there was a lack of any evidence of evasive action, 
and that Mr. Ellington seemed to be infull control of the vehicle. 
As stated in Warren, this type of opinion "is more suited to a 
closing argument than expert testimony. " Thus, we find that 
Trooper Daly's testimony that there was "not an accident" was 
clearly inadmissible opinion testimony on Mr. Ellington's state of 
mind that was not helpful to thejury . .. 
!d. quoting State v. Warren, 139 Idaho 599, 606 (2003); State v. 
Turner, 136 Idaho 629, 633 (Ct.App.2001) (citing State v. Parks, 
71 Or.App. 630, 693 P.2d 657, 659-60 (1985) ("I see it as 
analogous to the question in a civil action, 'In your opinion was the 
defendant negligent?' And that's objectionable, not because it's the 
ultimate issue to be determined by the jury, but because the witness 
is not better able than the jury to reach a conclusion on that 
issue.")). 
The Court went on to find: 
Trooper Daly gratuitously and unnecessarily injected his clearly 
inadmissible opinion that A1r. Ellington acted intentionally. Not 
only was his answer an inadmissible intrusion into the jury's 
domain of determining the defendant's state of mind, it was also 
completely unsolicited and wholly unnecessary. As an officer of the 
State, Trooper Daly's gratuitous and prejudicial response is 
imputed to the State, whether or not the State intended to elicit that 
response. Had Mr. Ellington raised this issue as another instance 
of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal, we would have found, once 
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again, that the State's conduct was improper. 
!d. 
Furthermore, soliciting such opinions is a violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct. In Rule 8.4 it is stated: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
knowingly assist or induce another to do so,· or do so through the 
acts of another; 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice; ... 
ID.R.P.C. 8.4 (2011). 
When a prosecutor State intentionally engages in trying a case based on emotion instead of facts, 
those actions are both prejudicial to the administration of justice and acts of abuse. 
The advocate's function is to present evidence and argument so that 
the cause may be decided according to law. Refraining/rom abusive 
or obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate's right to 
speak on behalf of litigants. 
ID.R.P.C. 3.5 cmt. 4. 
Moreover, a prosecutor bears a special responsibility to protect the integrity of a criminal trial. 
A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister ofjustice and not 
simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it 
specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded 
procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient 
evidence, and that special precautions are taken to prevent and to 
rectify the conviction of innocent persons. 
ID.R.P.C. 3.8 cmt. 1. 
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Therefore, any attempt by the prosecution to solicit prejudicial opinion testimony invading 
the province ofthe jury would be an ethical violation as well as a violation of Mr. Ellington's right to 
Due Process. 
Therefore, Mr. Ellington's right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by the Constitution of the State 
ofldaho and the United States of America, by the jury and not "expert" witnesses would be violated 
to allow such testimony. L 
DATED this ~day of September, 2011. 
BY: 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing a 
copy ofthe same in the interoffice mailbox on the /J... ~ day of September, 2011, addressed 
to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor L(c.( LA- f8"3:; 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Case No. CR F 2006-1497 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) AFFIDAVIT OF CLARK ROLLINS 
) 
) JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
CLARK ROLLINS, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am over 18 years of age and competent to testify. I make this affidavit based on my 
personal knowledge. 
2. I have been employed by the Idaho State Police since December 1, 1985. 
2. My current assignment is as an Idaho State Police Headquarters Captain. 
3. My duties include management and oversight of the Idaho State Police Office of 
Professional Standards. 
4. The Office of Professional Standards is the internal investigations unit for the Idaho 
State Police; its purpose is to investigate allegations of Idaho State Police employee misconduct. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CLARK ROLLINS - 1 
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5. The Idaho State Police has nothing in its personnel or Office of Professional Standards 
investigations records that implicates Cpl. Charles Greear's veracity, nor is there any other 
potential exculpatory evidence concerning him. 
6. This concludes my affidavit. 
"111-DATED this~ day of September 2011. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CLARK ROLLINS - 2 
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Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20111003 Bond Hearing 
Judge Luster 
Clerk Wanda Butler 
Court Reporter Anne Brownell 
Date 10/3/?01111 • ---tion 111K-COURTROOM1 IF=========~====~=== ==-=-=-=·-============~11=============================91 
Time Spo<!!!!l,.,!u• II Note 
04:27:44 PM Judge State vs. Ellington Mr. Ellington present in custody with Ms. 
Luster Taylor. Mr. McHugh present for state. 
04:28:17 PM J 
04:28:34 PM Mr. 
McHugh 
04:28:39 PM J 
04:28:44 PM 
04:32:25 PM 
Mr. 
McHugh 
Law clerk made some contacts and indicated she would not be 
appearing today and would contact you tomorrow. 
THank you. 
Bond and motion to quash. 
Have a subpeona duces tecum internal investigation relating to 
Fred Rice. Because internal and employment, had an objection, 
ISP has essentially refused to give it to us, filed motion to quash, 
not so much as to object, information provide to court to see if it 
ought to be disclosed, personal matter gets us out of middle. 
Interim provided copy of letter from Mr. Rice's attorny bindings on 
ISP provided counsel with attachment, doesn't answer fully what 
Ms. Taylor is seeking, 8/1/11 notice of contemplated discplinary 
action and OPS investigation. Presuming those are seperate 
docs, expunged or sealed not be released absent his permission 
or court order. That is the position of agency precludes us from 
disclosing it even if we had opinion on it. Public writting. Could be 
resovled at least by way of our suggestion, documents produced 
to court to be reviewed and nature of questions they are looking at 
and relevant to their defense. Agency position employment 
matter, refusing to disclose, why we filed motion, ask for relief, 
Ms. Altig wanted to appear, don't know if break down in 
communication, she was dealing with Mr. Verharen figured 
available by phone. Ask the court to consider all the matters 
submitted. 
Get that investigation, our posistion that you should order it be 
turned over to us. Mr. Rice privacy interest, he waived when he 
talked to Associated Press and reprinted. Give you copies of what 
I have. Reinstated and ISP had exonerated him of any perjury. 
Don't think Mr. Rice claiming privacy sounds very good in light of 
him speaking to the press as he has. Give you my copies. IF you 
have copy of Letter from Colonel Russell exonerated Mr. Rice, 
found on internet, this whole issue is partially private. Only part 
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privacy that recommends disciplinary action. Found in first 
paragraph of letter from ISP. Situation where some private some 
not, part hidden, info I want, not fair. Get a copy of that 
investigation, public records request, Ms. Altig's opposition, she 
cites statutes in Title 9- Title 9 Section 335. Talks about 
exemption from disclosure .... reads ....... invasion of privacy doesn't 
apply letter on internet. Confidential source, not the case. 
T~rhnirc:. nr nrnf'~rh 1r~c:. - nn rl'c:. nnt niu~ ~\111~\1 nnlif'~ c:.~f'r~tc:. _ I--· II II-- -· t"'' -----· -- ··- -·- ··-"' ;::,··- -··-1 ...... -··-- ---·-.. -perjury side. Endanger life of Officer, not that either. Nothing in 
that title that says we shouldn't have it. We have testimony of MR. 
Rice perception reaction time. Accident or intention act. Debris 
Ms. field, helped locating place where collision took place. Back in 
Taylor 2006 and will be again now. Another case, Zaconey case Ada or Canyon County. Testimony quite opposition. Investigation say 
something if Mr. Rice was not truthful in this case or the Zakoney 
case. Mr. Rice big training officer for ISP for years. He would have 
trained other people in case, Charlie Greer - input measurement 
produce diagrams for trial exhibits, Fred Rice trained him too. If 
not telling truth in this case or the Zakoney case. Important to 
know. Right to prepare cross and examine people in trial. This 
investigation important exculpatory, Brady material. IF not order, 
ask that it be in court's file to determine if its turned over to us or 
not. Fact ISP says exonerate Mr. Rice of everything, investigative 
body says no, fire, and perjury, one thing, held and hidden, 
doesn't look right. Need a copy of that. 
04:40:09 PM Looking at title 9 agree subsections in 335 are as represented by 
counsel. 934 (c)(1) doesn't contain same references back 
exception related to investigative matters, disclosed, dont' have to 
disclose in general, not talking about a criminal investigation, 
talking an internal employee investigation. Don't know its a they, 
maybe one person, came up with different rule. Reference to 335 
solves the problem. Employment, doc evaluating disciplinary 
actions, don't think 335 gets us to answer. Talk about how Rice 
Mr. trained Robinett or Greer. Measurements not issue - what do you 
McHugh do with them. Not come into play opining on issues that she finds 
problematic in trial. We have an expert to testify to that. Mr. Rice 
won't be called or who he trained how to take measurements. 
Thats the expert who is not Fred Rice. Take a look at info 
contained in the document recommended disciplinary action 
relevant in that document, who testify at next trial, appropriate 
method to proceed. Ms. Taylor says we think something is there, 
don't know. For those reasons, ask court to enter order as 
suggested. 
04:43:52 PM Guess the bottom line, court inclined to do what state suggests. 
Best way to determine if info appropriate to Mr. Ellington. 
Supreme court decision, Curiosity what is in that report, I have 
reviewed the newspaper articles on this issues, have some 
questions and my review of transcript, sure shared by OF and 
State. don't know that is sufficient it be ordered to be produced. 
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Question as to being on trial, if state intended to call Corp. Rice, if 
not, not sure how that investigation would have bearing on 
proceeding. Indicates he trained Robinett. Didn't comply with own 
training, how training defective. It is integral part of decision 
ordered new trial from appellate court. Share Ms. Taylor's doubts 
J properly protected in Title 9. Best course to do what state 
suggested, produced to court, make determination as to records 
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needed to address after examination we can discuss. Ms. Taylor 
prepare order consistent with that and then conduct another 
hearing to determine issues. 
04:47:27 PM Language of order, last page of letter, discplinary action and OPS 
Ms. recs. Reference those in order, not sure everythign presented by 
McHugh Cpl Rice was attached, maybe include other docs as well. in 
reference to his part in the evaluation. 
04:48:19 p J I Sub peon a duces tecum what in order I 
04:48:41 PM Ms. Make sure have attachments - I can provide those if I undrestand 
Taylor Mr. McHugh 
04:48:54 PM Mr. I Language of order broad enough 
I McHugh 
04:49:09 PM J j1 want everything Ms. Taylor wants. I 
04:49:18 PM D She prepared the subpeona. For purposes of motion, court will accept the Sept 8 letter from ISP and two - 3 newpaper articles attached supporting documents in this matter. 
04:50:07 PM Motoin 
04:50:09 PM Ms. bond Reduction Motion Call Joel Ellington Taylor 
04:50:16 PM Clerk 11 Adi •• i •• isters oath for tesetimony 
04:50:34 PM He is my brother - younger. I live in Pleasant Grove Utah. I have 
interacted with him in last 3 or 4 months. When he was released 
from Boise up to 3 or 4 days. I did pick him up at release from 
Boise. I saw him every 2 or 3 months for 2 years. I took him my 
home in Pleasant Grove. There for Friday until next Wednesday. 
Joel Scott He did look for employment. He had interviews with Fugal Sons in 
Ellington Pleasant Grove a large INC in Utah they indicated they are still interested in employing him. I am full time ARMY national guard. 
Home most of the time, gone two weeks, occassionai weekends, 
being there without interruption until next July. We did have 
communication with entities here in Kootenai and DOC what 
would be procedure. No indication he would be sent here 
immediately unless warrant issued. 
04:53:36 PM Mr. Objection Mchugh 
04:53:42 PM Don't know rule of evidence apply to bond hearing --maybe guide 
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J witness. 
04:53:59 PM During week prior to release. Spoke with case agent and ISP reps 
dealing with these issues. I DOC, sheriffs office, and court clerk, 
Kootenai and Ada County. Court Clerk here in Kootenai County. I 
did not able to speak at length with them. Yes, prior to him 
walking out the doors of prison. He was with me when that 
·--· 
happened. First contact besides employers was with you Ann. He 
.JU~I 
was eager to satisfy questions in Idaho re his case. We worked Ellington 
with your office to satisfy requirement. I helped him with a bus 
ticket. Yes, came here only reason I am here. He would go to our 
home and reside there. He has a choice of two rooms not to be 
flippant. He has transportation. Yes, assist him with court 
appearances, have access to phone for attorney contact. No 
alcohol allowed in my home. 
04:56:40 PM ~ ex h 
04:56:45 PM Joel Full time with guard. Explains time working. Ellington 
04:59:15 PM Ask to reduce bond to $50,000. Set trial- last contact with expert 
Ms. trial still set to go - not before you - something would ask in future 
Taylor to reset trial ask to reduce bond to do work while case moves 
forward. 
05:00:03 PM Mr. Motoin before court - oppose ..... 
I McHugh 
05:00:18 PM JBailiff shows $125,000 I 
05:00:25 PM Ms. $125,000 
I Taylor 
05:00:30 PM No changed circumstances. Last time, brother would allow him to 
stay there, nothing new to submit. Helps to have him here to flush 
Mr. out, that was option available to him. Nothing has changed in the 
McHugh meantime. Don't know how that impacts the date at all. Still ave 
situation still on serious charges. History of b/w outstanding on 
time of arrest and another out of Kootenai County, history of b/w, 
nothing changes what was set prior to this hearing. 
05:02:17 PM There have been things changed. Information come to court's 
Ms. attention, most importantly, Mr. Ellington is not a flight risk, he 
Taylor voluntarily came back, brother brought him here_ Important to know job available to him. Bond could be made if reduced to 
amount requested. 
05:03:10 PM Bond is entitlement prior to trial. Certian exception, defendant 
entitled to reasonable bond. Mr. Ellington doesn't fall in those 
exception. Rule 46 factors include not limited to employment, 
history and financial condition, order for new trial from Supreme 
court commence in November in this year. Previous trial, time in 
penitentiary, entitled to new trial, court has to take that into 
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account. Intervening factors, trial, prison, in and out, and other 
factors come into play. Employment status history, and financial-
he has been unemployed last several years, according to brother 
has a possibility of employment in state of Utah. Employment 
history not remarkable. Assistance of Court appointed counsel, 
think bond would be posted by family member. Begs question 
amount of bond appearance and what family would make sure he 
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PSI mindful of family connections. Joel Ellington mentioned in PSI 
and named here at previous bond hearing. First opportunity to 
examine Joel Ellington under oath and face behind name older 
brother, employment with ARMY and residence in Pleasant Grove 
J Utah and willing to take in Mr. Ellington and assure attendance. Past and present residence. Resided in Idaho at time of incident. 
State of Utah. Persons agree to assist defendants, advanced by 
Joel Ellington, current charge and aggravating factors of possible 
penalty, attempted murder, serious offense, facing, if he is 
convicted, aware acutely what consequences would be. 
Likelihood of conviction, difficult won't speculate. I sat on trial, 
know result, supreme court concluded close issue, defer to 
judgment of Supreme Court in that regard. Question resolved, 
only substantial questions litigated in new trial. Released without 
restrictions, concerned right now. Court would be concerned, in 
operation of any motor vehicle. Strong ties not likely to flee. At 
time he had a girlfriend. Connections with community somewhat 
limited. 
05:10:05 PM Clear he submitted back to court after released from Prison. He 
called office and was surprised he was released. Those all factors 
take into account. Didn't anticipate Mr.Joel Ellington. Motion to 
release on OR, don't think that would have been supported by 
change and prior criminal history. At this point and time some info 
justify some consideration, he did return, brother help with return, 
allowed to bail out, how much cost -- someone else, from 
someone else, make some more assurances for appearance to 
court. Justify for some reduction reduce bail to $75,000 two 
conditions reside with Joel Ellington in Pleasant Grove Utah 
contact with attorney, appear for all court proceedings, no 
operating of motor vehicle, even if lawfully licensed. Ms. Taylor 
prepare order. 
05:12:39 PM Ms. No questions. Taylor 
05:12:42 PM Mr. Accept and understand conditions. Ellington 
05:12:49 PM Mr. Have part of that with no direct or 3rd party contact with victim 
McHugh f ·1 .am1y. 
05:13:02 PM J Absolutely no direct or indirect contact with Larson family. 
j~[oF Agree. 
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05:13:16 PM end 
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10/04/2011 11:17 2084461701 PUBLICDEFENDER 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene. Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------------------~> 
CASE NUMBER CR~06~0001497 
Fel 
ORDER SETTING 
BOND AND CONDITIONS 
PAGE 01/02 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that bond in this matter is reduced to $75,000.00 and the 
following are established as conditions of release. The Defendant Shall: 
1. Reside with his brother, Joel Ellington, in Utah. 
2. Maintain regular contact with his attorney. 
3. Appear at all court hearings. 
4. Shall not operate a motor vehlcle. 
5. Shall not have any contact with any member of the Larsen family directly or 
i11directly. 
DATED this_ day of October, 2011. 
ORDER SETTING 
BOND AND CONDITIONS 
Received Oct-04-11 11 :40am Frcm-2084461701 
.TO~P. LUSTER 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Tc-J UDGE LUSTER 
Page 1 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
.I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing 
a copy of the same as indicated below on the i:[ '1-j,..._ day of October, 2011, addressed to: 
vKootenai County Public Defender FAX 446-1701 - .. r ~ ~ 07.tJ 
vKootenai County Jail FAX 446-1407 
..){ootenru County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 
ORDER SETI'ING 
BOND AND CONDITIONS Page2 
Jo/~/u u)~ 
.:::tr-a3cr 
Received Oct-04-11 11 :40am Frcm-2084461701 Tc-JUDGE LUSTER Paae 02 
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10/0~12011 11:19 2084461701 PUBLICDEFENDER PAGE 01/02 
STATE OF IDAHO } ss 
COUN1Y OF KQOJm r . Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender ofKootrmai County 
POBox 9000 
FILED: tO fl 
AT 8 (j() O'CLOCKA.M { 1~KJ5iE~~~ft /L Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
--------------------------~) 
CASE NUM:BER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
ORDER RE: STATE'S MOTION TO 
QUASH SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the state's Motion to Quash the Subpeona Duces Tecum is 
Denied bLlt modified: 
1. The OPS investigation, in its entirety, including any documentation or attachments 
considered during the investigation, shall be filed i.n this case with the Court for an in 
camera rev1ew. 
2. The disciplinary action recommendation that resulted after the OPS investigation, 
shall be filed in this case with the Court for an in camera review. 
After review, the Coun will detennine whether the panies will receive copies ofthe documents. At 
the Court's discretion, there may be further hearing in the matter. 
DATED this ~\fay of October, 2011. 
ORDER RE: STATE'S MOTION 
TO QlJASli SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
Received Oct-04-11 11:43am From-Z084461701 
f'JL OJJc~ 
JOHN P. LUSTER 
DISTRICT niDGE 
To-JUDGE LUSTER 
Page1 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and l:'orrcct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing 
a copy of the same as indicated below on the t../.'f k.. day of October, 20 l.1, addrwscd to; 
Kootenai County Public Defender FAX 446-1701 - ~ k dl31o IO/ r/ tJ~ 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 # d-3d-
ORDER RE: STATE'S MOTION 
TO QUASJl SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM Page 2 
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QORIGINAL STATE OF II:W() } SS COUNTV Cf I«JJT&W . 
AlEf} (q U 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
2011 OCT -4 PH 2: 46 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 ~~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHANWADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________________________ ) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION TO CONTINUE PRETRIAL 
CONFERENCE AND TRIAL 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order continuing the Pretrial 
Conference currently set for November 28,2011 and the Trial currently set for November 29,2011. 
This motion is made on the grounds that Defendant's accident reconstruction expert is 
unavailable during this ~i~. ~ 
DATED this~ day of October, 2011. 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND TRIAL Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing 
a copy ofthe same as indicated below on the Lf day of October, 2011, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor Fi-'JC 446=1833 
__$.._ ViaFax 
Interoffice Mail 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND TRIAL Page 2 
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D ORIGII\ .. L 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fe I 
ORDER TO RELEASE DEFENDANT ON 
DEFENDANT'S OWN RECOGNIZANCE 
_____________________________ ) 
The Court having before it the Motion To Release Defendant On Defendant's Own 
Recognizance and good cause appearing, now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above named defendant be released from the custody, t.J 
p~'J 
of the Kootenai County Sheriff on his own recognizance. , J p '.(~.&.' e J 
DATED this __ day of Att~ttst, 2011. Ae\1'.'~ "'~ '1/ .. """'{) ,. ~t 
W~ Oc\DbLV\_ u ')" '{f' fecr V' ) J~ :~:~J 
DIST TJU  
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing a copy 
of the same as indicated below on the (Q'f-L day of~' 2011, addressed to: 
Cuuuv't... q 
VKootenai County Public Defender FAX 446--1-+G-1 ,:).l 81..0 * (.Q "?;1 
Kootenai County Jail FAX 446-1407 
,ftootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 t.Ja Q d OJ. /!:x)_;;/--l_jj/_ 
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 · 1 0/25/2011 Page 1 of 1 
Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan 20111025 Motion To Compel' 
CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan 20111025 ~n To ~ue ~ 
Judge Luster ( 
Clerk Blair Bielec ,G 11 A A 
Date 10/25/2011 Location 111 K-COURTROOM1 
~ ...... 
I Time II Speaker II Note I 03:33:34 PM I Judge Luster Calls Case --- Ellington present with Ms Taylor A. Verherin PA 
03:34:14 PM PO motion in limine, there are some issues, would like to continue the trial 
03:34:42 PM would like to cont into January, our expert is due in another trial 
PO back East and was scheduled in that trial before we got notice 
of ours 
03:35:16 PIDE no objection, later part of January if possible 
03:36:41 PM 
03:37:32 PM 
03:37:59 PM 
03:38:29 PM 
03:39:01 PM 
03:39:10 PM 
03:39:15 p 
03:39:40 PM 
03:39:55 PM 
03:41:24 PM 
03:42:05 PM 
03:42:27 PM 
PO PA and I spoke and we agreed to meet to discuss exhibits and try to cut down on time 
I Judge Luster II 9th of January--- 3 weeks 
IPA II have a murder trial with Judge Simpson at the beginning of January, would like the 16th start date if possible 
I Judge Luster II We could start it the 17th of January 
PA 
PO 
Judge Luster 
PA 
Judge Luster 
PO 
Judge Luster 
END 
I that works 
I that works 
11/17/2012 for 3 week jury 
are we going to have a pre trial? 
13th of January, that is the Friday before 1/13/2012 9:30am 
Not a usual date, this is a special date and time for Mr 
Ellington, I will have to rearrange my normal criminal schedule. 
wondering if that day would be a good time to look at pictures 
and maybe have a ruling before trial 
yes, that should be a good day to make available for those 
issues 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www.fortherecord.com 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CASE NO. CR-2006-1497 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ORDER RE: OPS INVESTIGATION 
OF FRED RICE 
JONATHON WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
Barry McHugh and Arthur W. Verharen, Kootenai County Prosecuting 
Attorney's Office for Plaintiff State of Idaho. 
Anne C. Taylor and J. Bradford Chapman, Kootenai County Public 
Defender's Office for Defendant Jonathan Wade Ellington. 
On August 11, 2011, the Defendant moved to compel production of "the Idaho 
State Police Investigation of Fred Rice" ("OPS Investigation") as well as other 
information. On September 22, 2011, the State filed a "Motion to Quash," arguing that 
Officer Rice's personnel records were confidential, and that this Court should conduct 
an in camera review of the information. At a hearing on October 3, 2011, the State 
informed this Court that the Idaho State Police would not release the OPS Investigation 
without a court order. This Court then ordered the Idaho State Police to produce the 
ORDER RE: OPS INVESTIGATION OF FRED RICE-1 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 215 of 848
documents for an in camera review. This Court received the original OPS Investigation 
from the Idaho State Police on October 17, 2011, and reviewed the material. 
As per I.C.R. 16 and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963), the 
prosecution must disclose to the defense all exculpatory evidence knovv'n to the state or 
in its possession. "The duty to disclose encompasses impeachment evidence as well as 
exculpatory evidence." Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 27-28, 995 P.2d 794, 797-98 
(2000), citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, (1985). 
"In the situation where a general request for Brady materials is made and when the 
exculpatory information in the possession of the prosecutor may be unknown to the 
defense, the reviewing court must look to the whole record and determine whether 'the 
omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist."' Grube, 134 
Idaho at 27-28, 995 P.2d at 797-98, citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112, 96 
S.Ct. 2392, 2402 (1976). 
The evidence must be disclose because, as stated by the United States 
Supreme Court, "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused 
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady, 373 
U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1197. "Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability 
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." Grube, 134 Idaho at 27-28, 995 P.2d at 797-98, citing Bagley, 473 
U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383, citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34, 115 S.Ct. 
1555, 1565-66 (1995). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome. ld. 
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A review of the OPS Investigation shows that its contents are material to the guilt 
or innocence of the Defendant, and therefore must be produced. Therefore, this Court 
hereby Orders that the OPS Investigation be produced to the Defendant. This Court's 
order, ho'lJever, should not be interpreted as a comment or ruling on the admissibility of 
the OPS Investigation materials. 
This Court also recognizes the sensitive nature of the material, and the need to 
ensure that the material is used for a proper purpose. As a result, this Court hereby 
orders that the parties are prohibited from releasing the OPS Investigation materials to 
any member of the public or the media, and that the materials may only be used for 
evidentiary and investigatory purposes in these proceedings. Any other use of the 
materials must be approved by this Court. 
The contents of the OPS Investigation are duplicative and voluminous. As a 
result this Court, by letter, requested that the parties identify the documents not already 
in their possession and request production of the specific documents. The Defendant 
responded on November 9, 2011. The State did not respond to this Court's letter. 
After review of the contents of the OPS Investigation this Court hereby releases 
copies of the following OPS Investigation Documents to the parties: 
BINDERS #1 & #2 
Office of Professional Standards Case Review Form dated July 12, 2011 and July 15, 
2011 
Interoffice Memorandum From Captain Lonnie Richardson to Captain Clark Rollins, 
dated July 12, 2011 Re: OPS 2011-005 Master Corporal/ Specialist Fred Rice 
Interoffice Memorandum From Captain Eric Dayley to Captain Lonnie Richardson, 
dated July 6, 2011, Re: OPS 2011-005 
Interoffice Memorandum from Lieutenant Chris Schenck to Captain Clark Rollins, dated 
June 24, 2011, Re: OPS 2011-0005 Fred Rice 
Idaho State Police OPS Administrative Investigation Report OPS Case Number OP 
2011-005 
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Attachment #1 to Administrative Investigation Report 
Idaho Vehicle Collision Report for Albert Ciccone 
Incident Report of Officer Rahn Olaso for Albert Ciccone 
Hand Diavvn Diagrams for investigation of Albert Ciccone 
Attachment #4 to Administrative Investigation Report: 
Idaho State Police Receipt for Property, September 18, 2007 with attached list. 
Pre-Booking Information Sheet, January 1, 2006 for Jonathan Ellington 
Bench Warrant Probation Violation dated March 5, 2003 for Ellington 
Affidavit of Probation Violation I OSC Warrant Request November 27, 2002 Ellington 
Notice of Suspension, Jonathan Ellington, Undated 
Idaho State Police Forensic Services Toxicology Discipline 
Probable Cause Affidavit by Sgt. Brad R. Maskell (unsigned) 
Attachment 6 to Administrative Investigative Report: 
Idaho State Police Administrative Incident Report OPS 2011-005 dated April12, 2011 
Memorandum from Captain Clark Rollins to Specialist Fred D. Rice Re: "Notification of 
Investigation." 
Attachment #8 to Administrative Investigative Report 
Recorded Statement Guide Form Dated Ma_y_ 4, 2011 
Attachment #1 0 to Administrative Investigation Report 
Mahoney Criminal Defense Group - Relentless Defense, Accident Reconstruction 
Article printed from internet on April 18, 2011. 
Attachment #11 to Administrative Investigation Report 
Marc Green Ph.D, Human Factors, Driver Reaction Time article, printed from internet 
on April 18, 2011 
Attachment #12 to Administrative Investigation Report 
Idaho State Police "Administrative Investigation Warning" to Fred Rice from Detective 
JM Donahue, Dated May 5, 2011 
Attachment #13 to Administrative Investigation Report 
Hand Drawing by Fred Rice re: Ciccone Case 
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Attachment #14 to Administrative Investigation Report 
Hand Drawing by Fred Rice re: Ellington Case 
Attachment #17 to Administrative Investigation Report 
Traffic Collision Investigation Power Point Presentation by Fred Rice, printed and 
reviewed on May 11, 2011. 
Attachment #18 to Administrative Investigation Report 
Reconstructionists' Use of Perception Reaction Time, article by Jerry J. Eubanks, 
undated 
LOOSE DOCUMENTS 
lA Case Report Form Dated Ma_y 31, 2011 and June 6. 2011 
ISP Administrative Incident Report 
April 12, 2011 
Memorandum from Captain Clark Rollins to Specialist Fred D. Rice, re: "Notification of 
Investigation" 
Email from Clark Rollins to Fred Rice Re: OPS Extension May 27, 2011 
Interoffice Memorandum from Major Kevin Hudgens to Fred Rice, Dated May 31, 
2011, Re: Administrative Leave Without Pay 
Letter from John Kawsnoski to Col. G. Jerry Russel, dated June 2, 2011 
Email from Clark Rollins to Fred Rice Re: OPS Investigation June 6, 2011 
Letter from Steve Smith to Major Powell, unsigned and undated 
Email from Clark Rollins and Ralph Powell, July 11, 2011 
Letter from Robert Huntley to Leanne Lundquist, July 14, 2011 
Email from Clark Rollins to Ralph Powell, with forwards from Steve Richardson and 
Fred Rice, dated July 21, 2011 
Email from Clark Rollins to Fred Rice, dated July 22, 2011, OPS 2011 Review 
Extension 
Notice of Contemplated Disciplinary Action, August 1, 2011, from Major Ralph Powell 
to Fred Rice 
Email from Clark Rollins to Fred Rice, August 10, 2011, Re: Preliminary Hearing 
Testimony Transcript 
Letter from Col. G. Jerry Russel to Cpl. Fred Rice, Re: Letter of Exoneration of Idaho 
State Police September 8, 2011 
"Exhibit A" -Idaho State Police Procedure 07.02 Crash Investigation 
"Exhibit B" -Idaho State Police Procedure 07.03 Crash Reconstruction 
"Exhibit C"- Traffic Accident Reconstruction Volume 2, by Lynn B. Frick 
"Exhibit D"- From Crash to Courtroom: Collision Reconstruction for Lawyers and Law 
Enforcement by John B. Kwasnoski 
"Exhibit E"- Marc Green Ph.d Human Factors, "Driver Reaction Time" 
"Exhibit F" - Marc Green Ph.d Human Factors, "Let's Get Real About Perception 
Reaction Time" 
"Exhibit G"- Forensic Aspects of Driver Perception and Response" by PaulL. Olson 
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"Exhibit H"- Human Factors by Joseph E. Badger 
"Exhibit I" - Reaction and Perception Powerpoint 
"Exhibit J" - Letter from Lofgren Associates Inc. to Col. Jerry Russell dated August 3, 
2011 
This Court will retain the original OPS Investigation file in its chambers through 
the duration of the proceedings before this Court, and will return the original OPS 
Investigation to the Idaho State Police upon conclusion of the proceedings. 
DATED this 2. I day of f\J~m'"2011. 
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John Patrick Luster 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent by U.S. 
M_.fi~, postage prepaid, sent by facsimile transmission, or sent by interoffice mail on the CX-.J- day of November 2011 to the following: 
KOOTENAI COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
Barry McHugh and Arthur Verharen 
Hand Delivery 
LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER OF KOOTENAI COUNTY 
Anne C. Taylor and J. Bradford Chapman 
~ Hand Delivery 
Stephanie Altig 
Idaho Attorney General's Office 
Idaho State Police 
Boise, ID 
Fax (208) 884-7228 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
STATE OF IOAI-K) } SS 
COt.;ffiY OF KOOTENAI 
EilED: 
!14< 
?011 NOV 28 PM 2: 45 
c~tr~ l>t y /2 
r {(;/ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
__________________________) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16( e )(2) hereby moves the Court 
to order the State to comply with Defendant's Tenth and Amended Ninth Supplemental Requests 
for Discovery filed herein on or about November 4, 2011, and further moves the Court for 
sanctions. 
DATED this 2giJ... day of November, 2011. 
BY: 
A 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by facsimile 
on the [[d day ofNovember, 2011, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor 446-1833 
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[lORJGINAL 
Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Nwuber: 5836 
/0lo 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________________________ ) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne C. Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order Shortening Time for hearing 
the Motion to Continue Trial in this matter. 
This motion is made pursuant to I.C.R. 45(c) and 12(d) on the grounds that will be 
presented orally in Court. 
~~ 
DATED this ____ \ __ day of December, 2011. 
BY: 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 
OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI 
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
/ \ 
l .o / . . ) \ JLt/LLL/· ----~~ 
A~ETAYLOR 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by facsimile 
on the (~day of December, 2011, addressed to: 
KootenaiCountyProsecutor 208-446-1833 d~ d~ 
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QORIG[ AL 
STATE Or ION10 }~ 
COUNTY OF KO:I:t\AI SS 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
FILED· ( q {.;. 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
?Uil OFC -I AH 10: 46 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________________________ ) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order continuing the Trial now set 
for January 17, 2012. 
Counsel requests that this motion be set for hearing in order to present oral argument, 
evidence and/or testimony in support thereof . 
. Lj 
DATED this / day of December, 2011. 
MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL 
THE LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC 
DEF_9NDER OF KOOTE:t;_~l COUNTY 
I . / \ ( ( ' . / 
BY: \ ;\_ ~L~ L~(. \ ) 
ANNE TAYLOR - ~ . 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing 
a copy ofthe same as indicated below on the \ sr- day of December, 2011, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor Fi\..X 446-1833 
___'!1_ Via Fax 
Interoffice Mail 
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DaR~ .JNAL 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
) Fel 
) 
) MOTION TO EXCUSE 
) DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE 
) 
) 
______________________________ ) 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order excusing the defendant's 
presence at the Motion to Continue Trial set in the above entitled matter on December 2, 
2011. This motion is made on the grounds that defendant is currently in Utah and would not 
have time to travel to Kootenai County prior to the Motion to Continue hearing. 
\
:V 
DATED this ______ day of December, 2011. 
MOTION TO EXCUSE 
DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE 
BY: 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by 
facsimile on the \ ~ day of December, 2011 addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 c '"'.12/2011 Page 1 of2 
Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20111201 Motion to Continue 
H=======i 
D 
Time 
08:28:11 AM 
08:32:22 AM 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth 
Court Reporter Anne MacManus Brownell 
PA Art VerHaren 
DA Anne Taylor 
DA Brad Chapman 
DA 
PA 
tion 
Note 
Calls case- PA VerHaren, DA Taylor and Chapman present-
defendant is not present. I do not have the files before me today. 
I filed 3 motions - the first is to have defendant's absence excused 
for today, motion to shorten time for hearing and motion to 
continue 
ave no objection to the first 2 motions 
Motion to continue the trial - we have lost confidence in the expert 
we hired in this case b because the expert is now consulting with 
PAin another case currently pending and that same expert 
previously worked for the defendant in a civil matter. Submits 
copies of billing to show that PA is consulting with Hayes and 
Associates. Dr. Hayes consulted in the civil case and now the PA 
office has hired them for the now pending criminal case. They 
were our expert when the case came back to us last summary -
PA VerHaren was fully aware that he was our expert. Given the 
history of this case I do not feel comfortable with this expert. I 
have found another expert that I'm ready to hire but he cannot be 
ready in January. 
I object- they had 2 prior continuances. There is no valid reason 
for a continuance. This is somewhat the reverse of logic. That 
case involved a fall and this is an accident reconstructionist. 
08:33:06 AM J This is the Amber Clark case? I do have the civil action if this is 
the one that involves the death of a child in foster care. 
PA 
08:34:13 AM 
m familiar with the case. 
Experts are witnesses to testify as to what they believe in- at 
least that's what they are supposed to be doing. We object to 
another continuance. 
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 c ~/2/2011 Page 2 of2 
08:34:16 AM 
DA 
Chapman 
08:38:14 AM 
J 
I 08:42:26 AM II I 
I 08:42:26 AM II End I 
The history of this matter dates back some 5 years and but for the 
conduct of the state we would not be here talking about this- this 
was a brilliant tactical move on behalf of the state. We do not feel 
we can go forward in defending our client having developed an 
adversarial relationship with our primary expert witness - or at 
least potential adversarial relationship. What would that look like 
on post conviction? We cannot have confidence in our ability to 
nP.rform o11r Rth ~mP.nrlmP.nt rl11tv tn riP.f nivP.n thP r11rrPnt 
r-------- ---- --·· _.. .. ·-··-···-··- --·J ... _ --· ;:::;~··-·· ···- --··-··• 
situation. We have not heard how the state is prejudiced. The 
gravity of the situation - 25 year sentence - the case has been 
going on for years and we have been potentially prejudiced. We 
ask that the court continue the trial setting in January. The 
performance of our grave duty to Mr. Ellington cannot go forward -
we just can't do it under these circumstances. It is a brilliant move 
on behalf of the state. We ask the court to continue and set it in 
April or at the Court's convenience. It's a matter of our 6th 
amendment duty or we wouldn't be asking. 
This matter has been tried and is back on Supreme Court order 
directing new trial. It is frustrating that this matter has not moved 
along as it should. Originally the defendant was adamant that he 
wanted a speedy trial and the state wanted some time to prepare. 
Since that time there have been 2 other trial settings. Every time I 
continue this matter I have to set 3 straight weeks for trial and this 
plays havoc with the court's trial calendar. That is not my primary 
concern. I'm left without any sensibility of the defense as to what 
their concern is. That appears to be somewhat of an absurd 
notion. The mere fact that Mr. Hayes may be working for the state 
in another case- absent a showing - doesn't indicate to the court 
that his opinion is compromised. There is no showing that the 
state will control the expert. Absent some other showing I'm not 
satisfied that the state using the expert in another case justifies a 
continuance. DENY MOTION PA TO PREPARE ORDER. 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www.fortherecord.com 
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J: rr-rrorr r r r k.J l J I -, ~ (~- I i ' ; , l--o STATE OF IDAHO } COUNT'/ OF K()('TEf,!AI SS 
BARRY McHUGH FILErJ (C? G, Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way/Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 446-1800 
70 II DEC -7 PH 3: 17 
ASSIGNED ATTORNEY: 
ARTHUR VERHAREN 
DAVID G. ROBINS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
II 
vs. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CRF-06-0001497 
MOTION TO COMPEL 
II 
COMES NOW, David G. Robins, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, 
and pursuant Idaho Criminal Rule 16G) hereby moves this Honorable Court to order the 
Defendant to comply with the state's multiple requests for expert/scientific reconstruction 
reports. 1 This information is properly discoverable pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(c)(1), 
16(c)(2), 16(c)(4) & 16(g) and is necessary to conduct a fair and equitable trial. 
DATED this£ day of December, 2011. 
dv~{U , 
AVID G. ROBINS 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
1 See Plaintiffs First and Fourth Supplemental Request for Discovery. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
II II 
MOTION TO COMPEL- 2 
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{j ORIGINAL 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI } SS 
FR.EO: . ( q~ 
20 II DEC I 4 PH 3: 0 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________________________ ) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION IN LIMINE (SEVEN) 
PROHIBIT STATES WITNESSES FROM 
INFLAMMATORY TERMS 
COMES NOW, Jonathan Ellington, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, 
Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby requests the Court for an order preventing the any 
ofthe states' witnesses from using inflammatory terms such as death scene, homicide scene, murder 
scene, etc. when referring to the scene of the incident. In comparison proper terms would include 
incident, accident, or collision or the names ofthe roads when referring to the scene of the incident. 
DATED this~ day of December, 2011. 
OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI 
BY: 
AYLOR 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
MOTION IN LIMINE (SEVEN) 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by facsimile 
on the I jb day of December, 2011, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 208-446-1833 
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[)ORI~.NAL 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
) Fel 
) 
) MOTION TO EXCUSE 
) DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order excusing the defendant's 
presence at the State's Motion to Compel hearing set in the above entitled matter on January 
3, 2012. This motion is made on the grounds that defendant is currently in Utah and counsel 
for Mr. Ellington believes what the State seeks will be submitted to them prior to the hearing 
and it would be a wasted trip to Kootenai County. 
DATED this -----J;2.- day ofDecember, 2011. 
MOTION TO EXCUSE 
DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE 
BY: 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby cert~ that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by 
facsimile on the IS '<L-' day ofDecember, 2011 addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 
MOTION TO EXCUSE 
DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE PAGE2 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 237 of 848
[JORIG 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office ofthe Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
2011 OEC 15 PH 2:53 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
) Fel 
) 
) MOTION TO EXCUSE 
) DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE 
) 
) 
----------------------------~) 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order excusing the defendant's 
presence at the Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum set in the above entitled matter on 
December 19, 2011. This motion is made on the grounds that defendant is currently in Utah 
and would not have time to travel to Kootenai County prior to the hearing. 
DATED this I ~ day ofDecernber, 2011. 
MOTION TO EXCUSE 
DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE 
OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI 
CO~TY PUBLI~EF~ER 
BY I J /, tAiL (Ld:---
k&T'XYLOR 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by 
facsimile on the Is= day of December, 2011 addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 < ~/19/2011 Page 1 of 1 
Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20111219 Motion to ash 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth 
Court Reporter Anne MacManus B wnell 
PA Art VerHaren 
DA Anne Taylor 
Date jj12/19/20 11 II Location 
03:08:16 PM J 
03:09:02 PM 
DA 
===== 
03:11:36 p PA 
03:11:49 PM J 
3:12:08 PM PA 
03:12:12 PM J 
03:15:00 PM PA 
03:15:12 PM 
DA 
03:16:44 PM J 
03:17:21 PM J 
Note 
Calls case -PA VerHaren, DA Taylor, DA Chapman present for a 
motion to Quash subpoena 
It would be a HIP A violation for them to get into his file. We have 
complied with the discovery rule- PA has been copied with the 
reports. There is nothing to say that I need to do more than notify of 
the synopsis of the report. Rule 16 Rebuttal witness - part of my 
concern is that we have the subpoena DC that is HIP A protected 
and we've complied with the rules but my concern is that we're 
setting them up to call an undisclosed witness. 
re 2 reports of the Dr. Hayes examination. 
I'm not really sure what we're trying to do - I only have a motion to 
quash subpoena 
Files copies of the report 
That's appropriate - I just want to make sure what we're dealing with 
here. 
I'm seeking the date Dr. Hayes used to make the reports. 
18-207(4)(c) I have to give the reports to PA and i've done ihai and 
PA can ask my client to go sit with their expert and they have not 
requested that. The evaluations are extensive and he's written it all 
down. Getting a medical file on a person is not appropriate. We've 
complied and the subpoena should be quashed. 
Under advisement. I'll look at the code. I think I agree with the state 
that the HIP A concerns are not there. 
I'll retain the reports and get something out in a few days as we 
have a trial coming up. 
subpoena was issued for the 23 rd 
et it out tomorrow or the next day. 
Produced by FTR GoldTM 
www.fortherecord.com 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF KOOF,\:\1 } 88 
ALED /1 (; 
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CLERK ~CT COURT 
crE,J$~Zi1 ~ 
!1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________________________ ) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION TO ALLOW 
WEAPON TO BE FIRED 
COMES NOW, Jonathan Ellington, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, 
Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order allowing the gun 
used by Mr. Larson during the incident that led to Mr. Ellington's charges to be fired during the Jury 
Trial. 
Counsel requests a hearing and oral argument in support of the Motion. Time requested is 
fifteen (15) minutes. 
DATED this 
MOTION TO ALLOW 
WEAPON TO BE FIRED 
\ q\b-day of December, 2011. 
OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI 
BY: 
A 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by facsimile 
on the fqt-- dayofDecember, 2011, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 208-446-1833 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CASE NO. CR- 06-1497 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO QUASH 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
Barry McHugh and Arthur W. Verharen, Kootenai County Prosecuting 
Attorney's Office, for Plaintiff State of Idaho. 
Anne C. Taylor and J. Bradford Chapman, Law Office of the Kootenai 
County Public Defender; for Defendant Jonathan \Nade Ellington. 
On December 13, 2011, the State served Dr. Daniel Hayes, expert for the 
Defendant with a Subpoena Duces Tecum, requesting the following documents: "ALL 
RECORDS, NOTES, TESTS OF DOCUMENTATION PERTAINING TO DANIEL 
HAYES DIAGNOSIS OF JONATHAN ELLINGTON." The Defendant moved to quash 
the subpoena as per I.C.R. 17(b), arguing that the requested documentary evidence is 
not discoverable as per I.C.R. 16(c)(4) and (g), or I.C. § 18-207. This Court heard from 
the parties on December 19, 2011, and now issues this Order. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 16(c)(4) requires the defendant to provide a 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO QUASH - 1 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 243 of 848
written summary or report of any testimony that the defense intends to 
introduce pursuant to Rules 702, 703 or 705 . . . The summary provided 
must describe the witness's opinions, the facts and data for those opinions 
and the witness's qualifications. Disclosure of expert opinions regarding 
mental health shall also comply with the requirements of I.C. § 18-207. 
The defense is not required to produce any materials not subject to 
disclosure under paragraph (g) of this Rule, or any material otherwise 
protected from disclosure by his constitutional rights. 
Section 18-207 of the Idaho Code applies when the defendant suffers from a mental 
condition that requires treatment. Idaho Criminal Rule 16(g) also provides that 
except as to scientific or medial reports, this rule does not authorize the 
discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda or other internal defense 
documents made by the defendant or the defendant's attorneys or agents 
in connection with the investigation or defense of the case, or of 
statements made by ... defense witnesses to the defendant, defendant's 
agents or attorneys. 
The State's request for "all the records, notes, tests, and documentation" in is 
overbroad and overreaching. Thus, this Court grants the Defendant's motion to quash in 
part, and quashes the States' subpoena as to "all records, notes, tests and 
documentation." This Court, however, hereby orders the Defendant to disclose and/or 
supplement disclosure with 1) the written summary required by I.C.R. 16(c)(4), 2) any 
scientific or medical reports discoverable as per I.C.R. 16(g), and 3) any documents 
required by I. C. 18-207, if these documents have not already been disclosed. 
+Y\. 
DATED this 20 day of December, 2011. 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO QUASH - 2 
b ~ ()J;_l cc:>/~ 
John Patrick Luster 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER RE: 
MOTION TO QUASH was sent by U.S. Mail, pg5\age prepaid, sent by facsimile 
transmission, or sent by interoffice mail on the ~ day of December, 2011 to the 
following: 
KOOTENAI COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
Barry McHugh and Arthur Yerharen 
-Hans Delivery f-0 X J./L/0 ----I ~3 
LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER OF KOOTENAI COUNTY 
Anne C. Taylor and J. Bradford Chapman 
Hand-Delive~ ?ax «'ii-- c;?!&1r 
~y. (QJuiC 
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DoRtGINAL 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
STAff OF IDAHO ... , .} SS 
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FILED 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
--------------------------~) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION FOR JURY VIEW 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne C Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order for the Jury to view the scene 
of the alleged offense. 
I. C. § 19-2124 provides authority for a court to order a jury view of a place in which 
an offense is alleged to have occurred. The decision to permit a jury view is entrusted to the sound 
discretion of the trial court and is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Klier, 69 Idaho 
491,210 P.2d 388 (1949); State v. Meyers, 94 Idaho 570,494 P.2d 574 (1972); State v. Welker, 129 
Idaho 805, 932 P.2d 928 (Ct. App. 1997). 
In exercising its discretion, a trial court may consider many factors, including whether the 
scene has been altered or changed since the time of the alleged offense, Klier, supra, Myers, supra; 
whether, based upon the trial testimony, something critical needs to be seen by the jury, State v. 
MOTION FOR JURY VIEW Page 1 
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Welker, 129 Idaho 805, 932 P .2d 928 (Ct. App. 1997); the possibility of injury because of the 
physical makeup of the premises, id.; whether the view would be time consuming; US. v. Triplett, 
195 F .3d 990 (8th Cir. 1999); whether the view would be cumulative to trial exhibits and testimony; 
id.; whether there is anything so factuaiiy pecuiiar to the case that cannot be addressed through the 
normal adversarial process, US. v. Woolfolk, 197 F.3d 900 (7th Cir. 1999); whether there is sufficient 
evidence in the form of testimony, diagrams~ video or photographs, US. v Crochiere, 129 F.3d 233 
(1st Cir. 1997); and, whether cross examination has been permitted regarding the details of the scene, 
id. 
The scene of the alleged offense is a roadway which will not change in width and slope; both 
of which are crucial for the jury to understand the expected testimony. In this case photographs are 
not sufficient. The angle of the camera and area of focal point in the photographs do not give an 
accurate view of the entire scene. Looking at the roadway in person and viewing through pictures 
are entirely different. Counsel for the defendant has viewed numerous photographs of the scene, and 
also has viewed the area in person and believes it is necessary for the jury to see the scene to 
accurately understand the testimony . 
. /) /\z--
DATED this _?U ___ day ofDecember, 2011. 
BY: 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
MOTION FOR JURY VIEW Page2 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certi~hat a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by facsimile 
on the [} Q day ofDecember, 2011, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor 
MOTION FOR JURY VIEW Page 3 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 248 of 848
rl: r-rr-rrrrr ( '' . ' . ,~ '111\.··11\/\J 
BARRY McHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way/Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Telephone: (208) 446-1800 
20ll DEC 21 M110: 24 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATEOFIDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. CR-F06-1497 
MOTION TO INTRODUCE 
FORMER TESTIMONY 
UNDER I.R.E. 804 
COMES NOW, Arthur,Verharen, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby moves to 
introduce at retrial the testimony of witness Carol Cunningham given at trial in this matter in 
2006 for the reason that said witness has a health condition that has affected her memory. At 
hearing on this motion, plaintiff intends to establish the unavailability of Mrs. Cunningham 
through the testimony Brandy Bremner, Mrs. Cunningham's daughter. Requested hearing time 
is 30 minutes. 
DATED this fl:tJ day ofDecember, 2011. 
~l/vV\J~~ 
AR R VERHAREN I 
Deputy Prosecuting .LA;Lttomey 
MOTION TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE UNDER I.R.E. 804 - I 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the /?(, day ofDecember, 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was caused to be sent as follows: 
PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE 
FAXED 
MOTION TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE UNDER I.R.E. 804 - 2 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________________________ ) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16( e )(2) hereby moves the Court to 
order the State to comply with Defendant's Sixteenth Request for Discovery filed herein on or about 
December 9, 2011. Specifically we are seeking copies of all classes and courses taken by Law 
Enforcement Personnel. This information is necessary for cross examination due to our expert 
witness' opinion. 
A copy of the Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Sixteenth Supplemental Request for 
Discovery is attached. 
DATED this *-1 <t) day of December, 2011. 
BY: 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by facsimile 
on the fJ-?.o,c, day of December, 2011, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor 446-1833 
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r + Uill DISTIUCT COURT OF TEll FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEll 
I STATE OF IDAHO~ IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOO~AI 
I 
i 
STATE OF IDAHO. ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR 06--1497 
vs. I 
I [ 
Plaintiff, 
JONA-rnr W. ELLlNGTON, 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEJi'ENDANT'S SIXTEENTH, 
SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST 
DISCOVERY 
i Defendant. 
l 
c4ms NOW, Arthur Verllar~ Deputy Pro~g Attorney for Kootenai County and, 
responds ~J Defendant's Sixteenth Supplemental Request for Discovery as follows: 
1. . Training records for law enforcement personne11hat will be testifying at trial will not 
be provided, unless by order of 'the co~ as said records fall outside the scope of 
lr.c.R.l6. 
2. Cuniculum Vitaes for expert witnesses have been provided to the Defendant. 
3. The traffic accident manual utilized by Trooper Robinett is the Traffic Accident 
~Investigation Manual written by J. Standard Baker. For lllOre infol'IIUition in that 
I 
~gard :please refer to Defendant's crossw~tion of Trooper Robinett at trial 
)(pages 548-649 of the trial transcript). 
l 
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i 
4. A ~PY of the billing from John Daly has been provided to the Defendant. 
5. !Copies oflawsuits filed against Kootenai County by the Larsons are public 
ldocwnents available to the Defendant through the recorqs division of the Kootenai 
I 
-~County Courthouse. 
6. Copies of lawsuits filed against Deputy K.linkefus by the Larsous are public 
documents available to the Defendant through the records division of the Kootenai 
Cou:ttty Courthouse. · 
D · ED this 'Z1J day ofDecember, 2011. I -
! 
I 
I 
1 
I 
Deputy ProS6CUting Attomey 
I . 
I· CER~ATEOFMAUJNG 
I · eby certify that on the day of December, 20111 a true and eotteet eopy of 
theforego' wasFAXEDroPUBUCD~ l/c- - . 
I 
I 
j 
I 
I 
I 
I. ; :PI.AINT4 RBSPONSB !0 DmtENl:>AN'T'S SlX'flmNTH 
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 c 3/2012 Page 1 of2 
Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20120103 Motion to Compel and 
Motion to Introduce Former Testimony ~ 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth 
) (~& Court Reporter Anne MacManus Brownell PA Art VerHaren DA Anne Taylor 
Date 1/3/201? II 1 --.. tion 111 K-C~~TR0ervrr 
~ 
Time Speak!!jl Note 
03:00:28 PM J Calls case PA VerHaren, DA Taylor present for hearing on 
motions 
03:00:48 PM Motion to introduce prior testimony- Carol Cunningham her 
PA daughter said she has a health issue that greatly affects her 
memory - DA said she'd stipulate. 
03:01:34 PM DA I agree- we have not discussed the logistics about how it would be read into the record but it will be read into the record. 
03:01:55 ~1¥ We'll work it out. 
03:02:04 p J n, . _ ~ on motion to compel I' 
03:02:13 PM We're seeking training records of the officers - that was not 
provided. We're specifically looking for training records of Robnett 
DA and specifically any officers trained in auto/pedestrian accident 
reconstruction. I don't think it's too difficult to get me and I need it 
for a full and fair examination of the officers. 
03:03:11 PM I thought it was for training records for all officers that would 
testify at the trial and that falls outside what is normally 
PA considered discovery relevant to the defense. ICR 16 - it falls 
outside the scope. DA has made it more specific today and 
maybe that is relevant as to Trooper Robinett. 
03:04:33 PM DA I am also looking for other officers records not limited to Trooper Robinett-
03:05:01 PM Some officers were strictly fact witnesses and not specifically as 
J to the accident reconstruction - does your inquiry go to those or 
oniy the ones who wiii testify as to the accident reconstruction. 
03:05:45 PM DA Only those as to auto/pedestrian reconstruction but if they get up there and talk about it then I want their records. 
03:06:15 PIDE 1 h"'""" "'O object ·-·-. 
03:06:24 PM If we limit the this discovery re: any officer who would testify as to 
J auto/pedestrian reconstruction it is relevant but an officer who will 
not testify to that it would be inappropriate. 
fi1e://R:\LogNotes- HTML\District\Crimina1\Luster\CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wa... 1/3/2012 
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 c 3/2012 Page 2 of2 
03:07:19 PM PA 
03:07:22 DA 
03:07:28 PM 
PA 
03:08:35 PM DA 
03:09:00 PM PA 
03:09:11 PM DA 
03:09:21 PM 
J 
03:10:32 p~ 
03:10:32 PM End 
No questions 
1 No questions 
I have a motion to determine admissibility of exhibits and motion 
to seal and motion of tentative audio and video and I'd like to 
lodge with the court and have it taken up at a later time. I made 
copies of the first 73 exhibits - if there is going to be an objection 
~OIIn!=:AI ~~n r~i!=:A it ~nrJ thA ~OIIrt ~~n h~VA ~oniA!=: to !=:AA wh~t 
---··--· --·· ·-·-- ·--··- -··- ---·· ----· ------ --.-·-- ----- ------
the objection might be. 
We wanted to discuss the jury view motion- not noticed up but 
PA has no objection 
I OK and I have no objection 
We're in agreement that the jury should see the area. 
Last time there was a motion to view and the roadway and 
proximity to other roadways is appropriate. I see no reason to 
change the position I changed previously. MOTION GRANTED 
DA to prepare order. 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www.fortherecord.com 
I 
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BARRY McHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way/Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 446-1800 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR 06-1497 
MOTION TO DETERMINE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF PLAINTIFF'S 
TENTATIVE AUDIO AND 
PHOTOGRAPIDC TRIAL 
EXHIBITS AND MOTION 
TO SEAL 
' ' ' I~ 
COMES NOW, Arthur Verharen, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, and 
hereby requests that the Court determine the admissibility of plaintiffs tentative audio and 
photographic trial exhibits which have been provided to the Defendant and to the Court and 
further requests that the Court seal said exhibits. 
DATED this '1f!_____ day ofDecember, 2011. 
~E=f¥4-v/ 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the :! 0 day of December, 2011, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was FAXED to PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE. 
~VLMr~ 
1 I 
MOTION TO DETERMINE ADMISSIBILITY OF PLAINTIFF'S TENTATIVE AUDIO 
AND PHOTOGRAPHIC TRIAL EXHIBITS AND MOTION TO SEAL - 1 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 257 of 848
·STAlE Cf IWV } SS· COtMYr.l KOOTEN.AJ . . 
BARRY McHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney 
fUO· 
501 Government Way/Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 446-1800 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR 06-1497 
Plaintiff, 
vs. MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Arthur Verharen, deputy prosecutor, 
and hereby moves this Court to exclude at trial in this matter, when the jury is present: 
1. Reference to Defendant's statements to law enforcement; 
2. Reference to this matter as an accident; 
3. Reference to the Idaho Supreme Court's Opinion, State v. Ellington; 
DATED this s- day ofDecember, 2011. 
- AR~~~ 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ,-: day of December, 2011, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was caused to be FAXED to the PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE. 
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[lORIGINA~ 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
~~1ENAI}SS 
f\\.EO: 
?.U\2 J~N \ \ p~ 2: 59 
~ u.::rv•· 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________________________) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
SECOND 
MOTION FOR JURY VIEW 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne C Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order for the Jury to view the chase 
sequence on Ramsey and Brunner; Brunner to Weir; Weir to Seasons; and then back the same 
route to Ramsey and Brunner, and then Ramsey to Scarcella, and last Scarcella to the scene of 
the accident. 
I. C. § 19-2124 provides authority for a court to order a jury view of a place in which 
an offense is alleged to have occurred. The decision to permit a jury view is entrusted to the sound 
discretion of the trial court and is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Klier, 69 Idaho 
491,210 P.2d 388 (1949); State v. Meyers, 94 Idaho 570,494 P.2d 574 (1972); State v. Welker, 129 
Idaho 805, 932 P.2d 928 (Ct. App. 1997). 
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\. 
In exercising its discretion, a trial court may consider many factors, including whether the 
scene has been altered or changed since the time of the alleged offense, Klier, supra, Myers, supra; 
whether, based upon the trial testimony, something critical needs to be seen by the jury, State v. 
Welker, 129 Idaho 805, 932 P.2d 928 (Ct. App. 1997); the possibility of injury because of the 
physical makeup of the premises, id.; whether the view would be time consuming; US. v. Triplett, 
195 F.3d 990 (8th Cir. 1999); whether the view would be cumulative to trial exhibits and testimony; 
id.; whether there is anything so factually peculiar to the case that cannot be addressed through the 
normal adversarial process, US. v. Woolfolk, 197 F.3d 900 (ih Cir. 1999); whether there is sufficient 
evidence in the form oftestimony, diagrams, video or photographs, US. v Crochiere, 129 F.3d 233 
(1st Cir. 1997); and, whether cross examination has been permitted regarding the details of the scene, 
id. 
Counsel for the defendant has viewed the roadways and has listened to many witnesses testify 
in previous hearings about the roadways, and believes it is necessary for the jury to see the roadways 
to accurately understand the testimony and weigh creditability. 
DATED this \ \V day of January, 2012. 
OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI 
CO TY PUBLIC D E R 
BY: 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by facsimile 
on the u~ day of January, 2012, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor 208-446-1833 
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?]ORIGINAL ~-W ~TEN.AJ }SS 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender FILED: 
The Law Office of the Public Defender ofKootenai County 
PO Box 9000 2012 JAN 1 \ Pt\ 2: 59 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
___________________________) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION TO REMOVE 
ROADSIDE MARKER 
;I 
I 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order to Remove the Roadside Marker 
from the scene of the accident 
This motion is made on the grounds that it wasn't not present until counsel moved for a Jury 
View and it is an attempt to appeal to the emotions of the Jury. 
DATEDthis \ \VdayofJanuary,2012. 
MOTION TO REMOVE 
ROADSIDE MARKER 
\ 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing 
a copy of the same as indicated below on the ll b.---day of January, 2012, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 
-$ ViaFax 
Interoffice Mail 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________________________ ) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fe I 
MOTION IN LIMINE (EIGHT) 
PREVENT JOEL LARSEN FROM 
SPECULATING ABOUT VONETTE 
LARSEN'S INTENT 
COMES NOW, Jonathan Ellington, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, 
Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby requests the Court grant an order preventing the 
prosecution witnesses from providing specuiative testimony as to Vonette Larsen's intent or any state 
of mind during this incident in violation of Mr. Ellington's right to a fair trial. 
As Mr. Ellington punched the gas to escape from Joel Larsen who was firing rounds from 
a massive handgun into his vehicle, Vonette Larsen, who had been running northward across the 
road directly in front of him, put her hands up and actually started to move back toward the 
middle ofthe road. (Tr., p.780, Ls.18-25, p.781, Ls.12-16.) Mr. Larsen asserted at the first trial 
that his wife must have known she was not going to make it to the north shoulder of the road and, 
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SPECULATING ABOUT VONETTE LARSEN'S INTENT Page 1 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 264 of 848
thus, tried to go back. (Tr., p.781, Ls.12-15, p.855, Ls.l0-14.) However, what Mrs. Larsen was 
thinking in her final seconds of consciousness is pure speculation. Thus, it is equally plausible 
that she was actually trying to move into Mr. Ellington's path were her arms raised in an attempt 
to force him to stop. 
I.R.E. 602 states 
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced 
sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal 
knowledge of the matter. 
I.R.E. 403 states 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion ofthe issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
In this case, Joel Larsen's testimony as to his wife's state of mind was pure speculation. His 
testimony was highly prejudicial to Mr. Ellington's case in that his speculation was an obvious 
attempt to portray his wife as completely innocent thereby making Mr. Ellington more culpable. The 
Idaho Rules of Evidence do not allow for speculation to be entered as evidence. Considering the 
incredibly low probative value of Joel Larsen's testimony as to his wife's intent and its highly 
prejudicial impact on the case, Joel Larsen should not be allowed to speculate about his wife's intent 
or any other state of mind she may have had in this new trial. 
Therefore, Mr. Ellington's right to a fair trial free from speculative evidence guaranteed by 
the Constitution of the State ofldaho and the United States of America would be violated to allow 
such testimony. 
MOTION IN LIMINE (EIGHT) 
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DATED this \~day of January, 2012. 
BY: 
OrE · OF THE KOOTENAI 
c T~ P~LI4CEFE R/\. ~ • . l ,1 . I "'-~vV J ___) 
TAYLOR 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby c\~at a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by facsimile 
on the day of January, 2012, addressed to: 
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QORIGINHL 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________________________) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION IN LIMINE (NINE) 
PREVENT STATE FROM 
MISCONSTRUING EVIDENCE ABOUT 
MR. ELLINGTON'S ARGUMENT WITH 
HIS FIANCEE 
COMES NOW, Jonathan Ellington, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, 
Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby requests the Court grant an order preventing the 
prosecution from soliciting witness testimony about arguments between Mr. Ellington and his then 
fiancee Ann Thomas in violation of his right to a fair trial. 
The State tried to convince the jury that Mr. Ellington was an angry man on January 15\ 
2006. The State wanted to rely on a dispute between Mr. Ellington and Ann Thomas that sent 
him into a lengthy rage. (See, e.g., Tr., p.119, Ls.5-8, p.125, Ls.1-9.) Ms. Thomas made it clear 
that Mr. Ellington and she had simply had a "disagreement," and that there had been no 
screaming, shouting, etc. (Tr., p.l162, Ls.3-6, p.1163, L.24, p.1175, Ls.10-14.) She further 
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testified that this disagreement stemmed from the fact that Mr. Ellington was frustrated because 
Ms. Thomas was in poor health and had not been taking care of herself as she should have been. 
(Tr., p.1165, Ls.8-10, p.1175, Ls.15-19; see also Tr., p.1185, Ls.10-19 (describing Ms. Thomas' 
various health conditions and her failure to take care ofherself, as well as Mr. Ellington's 
concern for her welfare).) Ms. Thomas's testimony was verified by testimony of the store clerks 
at the Twin Lakes Trading Post who met him after speaking with Ms. Thomas but prior to the 
accident. While Mr. Ellington was at the Trading Post, he "seemed to be in a very happy mood." 
(Tr., p.1332, Ls.l3-20.) He spent most of his time there chatting and laughing with the clerks. 
(See Ex. Kat 01:33- 07:15.). No evidence was presented that Mr. Ellington was in a bad mood. 
In I.R.E. 403 it is stated: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion ofthe issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Lll State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 574 (Ct.App.2007), the Court found that the Kootenai 
County Prosecutor had misstated the evidence. In that case after defense counsel's closing 
argument urged the jury to find that Beebe lacked intent to use force or fear, the prosecutor 
presented a rebuttal that included the following: 
... the bottom line, it comes down to this question of intent. 
Defense says how do we know he intended this. Well, beyond his 
actions, which speak for themselves, we know it because we have 
it from his own mouth. He confessed repeatedly, in fact 
persistently and consistently he confessed. He told the police I 
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!d. 
intended to do this. 
Neither police officer testified that Beebe said, "I intended to do 
this, " or that he intended to use force or fear to take money. 
Rather, one officer testified that Beebe stated that there was no 
need for the clerk to physically identify him because "I did it. " 
Another officer testified that when he asked Beebe whether he 
"tried to rob the store, "Beebe responded "I guess. " 
The Court held that though perhaps subtle, the difference between the prosecutor's 
characterization of the defendant's statements and the testimony was enough to warrant a new 
trial as this evidence dealt with a key element of the offense. !d. 
In this case, the prosecution's attempts to paint Mr. Ellington as angry or looking for 
trouble on the day of the incident is not supported by the evidence. The prosecution was clearly 
misleading the jury by putting so much emphasis on an argument that simply was not what the 
prosecution needed for its theory. Certainly the evidence the prosecutor was relying on in Mr. 
Ellington's past trial was less substantial than that which the prosecutor in Beebe had misused. It 
cannot be said that the prosecutor's attempt to mislead the jury is on a less important issue, since 
if Mr. Ellington was in a bad mood it would have added something substantial to the State's case. 
"While a prosecutor 'may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones."' State 
v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727, 737 (2011) quoting Berger v. US., 295 U.S. 78, 88 
(1935). The State's preoccupation with Mr. Ellington and Ms. Thomas' premarital bliss is a foul 
ball. After the previous trial, the State cannot, in good faith, taint this trial with repeated 
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questions about an argument between them as if it were of some import to this case. Any 
attempt by the prosecution to do so violates I.R.E. 403 as well as ID.R.P.C. 3.1, which states 
Therefore, Mr. Ellington's right to a fair trial free from misleading evidence guaranteed 
by the Constitution of the State ofldaho and the United States of America would be violated to 
allow such testimony. ~ 
DATED this~ day of January, 2012. 
BY: 
ANNE TAYLOR 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby c(1~'at a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by facsimile 
on the day of January, 2012, addressed t~ 
I \ ('\ _....._ 
;ot~yPrMJ2:;833 lJyw_~ 
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D ORIGII\lr\L 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OJ? THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION IN LIMINE (TEN) 
PREVENT OPINION TESTIMONY 
LACKING FOUNDATION 
_____________________________ ) 
COMES NOW, Jonathan Ellington, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, 
Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby requests the Court grant an order preventing the 
State from soliciting witnesses testimony, in violation of his right to a fair trial, to an opinion as to 
how close the window of the car driven by Jovon Larsen was to breaking without any foundation. 
Despite an utter lack of foundation for her opinion, Ms. J oleen Larsen was allowed to testify, 
over a defense objection, that the "window was very close to breaking." (Tr., p.355, Ls.2-11.) 
In I.R.E. 703 it is stated: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the testimony of the 
vvitness in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those 
opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the 
perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding 
of the testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in 
issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical or other specialized 
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knowledge within the scope of Rule 702 
In this case the State made no attempt to introduce evidence that Joleen Larsen was an expert 
in window breaking. In fact, it introduced no evidence whatsoever of damage Mr. Ellington may 
have caused when banging on her window. Nor was it ever referenced by the officers invoived. 
Thus, there was no foundation whatsoever for Ms. Joleen Larsen's opinion as to what happened to 
her window. Without some form of evidence, no witness for the State should be permitted by the 
Court to testify as to the "almost breaking" of any windows. 
Therefore, Mr. Ellington's right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by the Constitution of the State 
ofldaho and the United States of America, would be violated to allow such testimony absent proper 
foundation. 
DATED this \~ dayofJanuary, 2012. 
OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI 
COUN PUBLIC DEFEND 
BY: 
A A LOR 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby Ct:ff.ti,f~th}f a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by facsimile 
on the -----i-0ay of January, 2012, addressed to: 
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QORIGINAL 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________________________) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION IN LIMINE (ELEVEN) 
PREVENT JOEL LARSEN FROM GIVING 
IMPROPER OPINION TESTIMONY 
COMES NOW, Jonathan Ellington, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, 
Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby requests the Court grant an order preventing the 
prosecution witnesses from providing opinion testimony that Mr. Ellington intended to hit Vonette 
Larsen in violation of Mr. Ellington's right to a fair trial. 
Mr. Larsen testified that, after backing away from the Honda such that the Blazer was pointed 
east southeast, Mr. Ellington turned left instead of driving diagonally into the eastbound lane. (See 
Tr., p. 781, Ls.3-8, p.854, L.24- p.855, L.1 ); see also Exs. H & L (diagrams of crash scene showing 
acceleration marks curving around the back of the Honda).) This testimony is belied by the physical 
evidence, i.e., the acceleration marks that Mr. Ellington's Blazer left as he tried to flee the gunshots. 
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Generally, these acceleration marks are straight (with an ever-so-slight leftward curve). From this 
(as well as Mr. Larsen's claim that Mr. Ellington was staring at his wife the whole time), Mr. Larsen 
clearly wished for the jury to infer that Mr. Ellington was intentionally trying to hit Mrs. Larsen. 
(See Tr., p.780, L.19- p.781, L.ll, p.854, L.20- p.855, L.l.) In fact, he explicitly stated that 
opinion for the jury. (Tr., p.855, L.17.) 
I.R.E. 701 states 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the testimony of the 
witness in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those 
opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the 
perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding 
of the testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in 
issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical or other specialized 
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. 
I.R.E. 704 states 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise 
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate 
issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 
In State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53,253 P.3d 727, 739 (2011), the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that Trooper Daly could not testify as to his opinion on whether Mr. Ellington intentionally hit 
V onette Larsen because 
[a}s in Warren, this conclusion was impermissible opinion 
testimony because a juror could have determined whether or not 
he or she thought that Mr. Ellington acted intentionally given the 
evidence presented; that there was a lack of any evidence of 
evasive action, and that Mr. Ellington seemed to be in full control 
of the vehicle. As stated in Warren, this type of opinion "is more 
suited to a closing argument than expert testimony. " Thus, we find 
that Trooper Daly's testimony that there was "not an accident" 
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was clearly inadmissible opinion testimony on Mr. Ellington's state 
of mind that was not helpful to the jury . .. 
!d. quoting State v. Warren, 139 Idaho 599, 606 (2003); State v. 
Turner, 136 Idaho 629, 633 (Ct.App.2001) (citing State v. Parks, 
71 Or.App. 630, 693 P.2d 657, 659-60 (1985) ("I see it as 
analogous to the question in a civil action, 'In your opinion was the 
defendant negligent?' And that's objectionable, not because it's the 
ultimate issue to be determined by the jury, but because the witness 
is not better able than the jury to reach a conclusion on that 
issue.")). 
In this case, Joel Larsen's opinion as to whether Mr. Ellington intended to hit his wife was no 
more helpful to the jury than Trooper Daly's. His testimony was highly prejudicial to Mr. 
Ellington's case in that his opinion was that Mr. Ellington committed murder. Considering that it 
was unhelpful for the jury to hear that an expert believed Mr. Ellington acted intentionally, there is 
no way Mr. Larsen's opinion was of any use whatsoever. Joel Larsen should not be allowed to testify 
as to his opinion that Mr. Ellington intended to hit his wife. 
Therefore, Mr. Ellington's right to a fair trial free from unhelpful opinion evidence 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the State of Idaho and the United States of America would be 
violated to allow such testimony. 
. /) Vlr----
DATED this I t- day of January, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby \ZJY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by. facsimile 
on the . )~ay of January, 2012, addressed to: 0 _ 
. I/ n/ /\ 
Kootemu County Prosecutor 208-446-1833 lKJA J£~ ~} J ~-Ho\V\& ~ili~ /I =i ~ / 
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[]ORIGINAL 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------------------~) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
COMES NOW, Jonathan Ellington, the above named defendant, by and through his 
attorney, Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby submits this Motion to Dismiss and 
Memorandum in Support. 
ISSUE 
1. The charges against Mr. Ellington should be dismissed with prejudice because the 
government's outrageous conduct violates his right to Due Process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution Article I § 13. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On February 28, 2006, Mr. Gary Cushman, Forensic Scientist with Idaho State Police 
Forensic Services attempted to match prints on latent lift cards obtained from Mr. Ellington's 
vehicle, with palm prints obtained from Mrs. Vonette Larsen. (Cushman, Idaho State Police 
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Forensic Services Criminalistic Analysis Report, p. 1-2, Feb. 28, 2006). However, Mr. Cushman 
concluded, "No identification was effected." (Cushman, Idaho State Police Forensic Services 
Criminalistic Analysis Report, p. 2). Mr. Cushman's handwritten notes indicated: the latent print 
1-A-01 was not comparable to ~v1rs. Larsen's palm prints and f11rther prints v;ere needed; \xthile 
latent prints 1-B-01 and 1-C-01 were negative to the Larsen prints. (Cushman, Idaho State 
Police Forensic Services Latent Section Case Notes, p. 1, Feb. 28, 2006). Mr. Cushman spoke 
with Detective Fred Swanson over the telephone about the results on March 9, 2006. (Cushman, 
Idaho State Police Forensic Services Latent Section Case Notes, p. 1, Feb. 28, 2006). 
Detective Swanson forwarded Mrs. Cushman's Criminalistic Analysis Report to the 
prosecutor via fax on or about August 8, 2006. Detective Swanson wrote, "Here is the report I 
have on the fingerprinting of Larsen. It seemed to me that we talked about sending better prints 
of Vonette down, and that we got a match of her prints on the hood. Maybe I am imagining that, 
cause I can't find that report in our file ... " (Idaho State Police fax cover sheet re: Fingerprint 
Report, Aug. 8, 2006). The conclusion of Mr. Cushman's report that Detective Swanson sent to 
the prosecutor indicated, "No identification was effected," and requested additional prints from 
Mrs. Larsen. (Cushman, Idaho State Police Forensic Services Criminalistic Analysis Report, p. 
2, Feb. 28, 2006). 
Defense counsel submitted its Nineteenth Supplemental Request for Discovery on 
January 9, 2012, again requesting any exculpatory information that had come to light since the 
beginning ofthe case in 2006. On January 11, 2012, six days before the start oftrial, the 
prosecutor spoke with defense counsel over the phone. During this conversation, the prosecutor 
indicated that the state would be submitting a forensic report conducted by Gary Cushman, and 
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requested a stipulation as to its admission. Defense counsel told the prosecutor that it would 
object to the admission of the report, and declined to stipulate to its admission. The next day, 
January 12, 2012, the prosecutor notified defense counsel via email that Mr. Cushman's notes 
from the 2006 report (which the prosecution now seeks to admit) indicated that Cusru-nan "had 
excluded Mrs. Larsen's palm prints from two of the latent palm prints" on Mr. Ellington's 
vehicle. (Email from Arthur Verharen to Anne Taylor, January 12, 2012 8:40am). 
ARGUMENT 
1. The State's Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence Violates Mr. Ellington's 
Due Process Rights and Requires Dismissal of the Current Charges 
The State waited six years to disclose a forensic report containing material exculpatory 
evidence, which violates Mr. Ellington's due process rights under the United States and Idaho 
constitutions and demands dismissal of the current charges. "First, a district court may dismiss an 
indictment on the ground of outrageous government conduct if the conduct amounts to a due 
process violation. Second, if the conduct does not rise to the level of a due process violation, the 
court may nonetheless dismiss under its supervisory powers." United States v. Chapman, 524 
F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted). 
"Under Brady, the State violates a defendant's right to due process if it withholds 
evidence that is favorable to the defense and material to the defendant's guilt or punishment." 
State v. Cain, No. 10-8145,2012 WL 43512, * 2 (U.S., Jan. 10, 2012) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In other words, "the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, 
either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching[,] ... that evidence must have been 
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suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently[,] ... and prejudice must have ensued." 
United States v. Kohring, 637 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). 
"Evidence is prejudicial or material 'only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding v,rould have been different.'" 
!d. at 902. "There is a 'reasonable probability' of prejudice when suppression of evidence 
"undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."' Id at 902 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 
U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). 
In this case, in February 2006 Gary Cushman, a Forensic Scientist with the Idaho State 
Police Forensic Services compared the latent prints from the hood of Mr. Ellington's vehicle 
with palm prints of Mrs. Vonette Larsen. However, the latent prints on the hood of Mr. 
Ellington's car did not match those of Mrs. Vonette Larsen, and Mr. Cushman requested 
additional prints from Mrs. Larsen. Such information is favorable to the defense in that it is 
potentially exculpatory and could be used to impeach witnesses because it relates to Mrs. 
Larsen's positioning at the time she made contact with Mr. Ellington's vehicle. Mr. Cushman 
communicated his findings to Detective Fred Swanson as early as March 9, 2006. In addition, 
the prosecutor obtained Mr. Cushman's report from Fred Swanson of the Idaho State Police on 
or about August 8, 2006. 
In the event the State claims they were not aware of this exculpatory report until recently, 
such an argument should fail for two reasons. First, as noted above the state was aware of the 
report in 2006, and was therefore required to determine whether favorable material information 
existed therein, regardless of whether the forensic lab brought it to the state's attention. The 
state's "obligation ... to disclose evidence favorable to the defense turns on the cumulative effect 
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of all such evidence suppressed by the government, and we hold that the prosecutor remains 
responsible for gauging that effect regardless of any failure by the police to bring favorable 
evidence to the prosecutor's attention." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. at 421. "This in tum means 
that the individual prosecutoi has a dut)l to learn of any favorable evidence knovm to the others 
acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police." Id. at 437. Requiring the 
State to disclose evidence (potentially) favorable to the defense, "will serve to justify trust in the 
prosecutor as 'the representative ... of a sovereignty ... whose interest ... in a criminal prosecution 
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."' !d. at 439 (citing Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). Second, the State verbally communicated with defense counsel 
on January 11, 2012, indicating its intention to offer the forensic report as evidence, and 
attempted to obtain a stipulation to admission ofthe report. However, in this conversation, 
defense counsel indicated that it would object to the report's admission and refused to stipulate 
to its admission. It was only after this stated objection and refusal that the State provided notice 
via email the next day (January 12, 2012) that exculpatory evidence existed in the report, 
suggesting the State had prior knowledge of the favorable evidence and failed to properly 
disclose such information. The State's attempt to transfer the responsibility of disclosure onto 
Mr. Cushman is transparent. The State knew, or had a duty to know, about the existence and 
contents of the report as early as February or March, 2006, nearly six years prior to its disclosure 
on January 12, 2012. 
An instructive case is United States v. Chapman, wherein the Ninth Circuit upheld 
dismissal of a superseding indictment with prejudice due to the prosecutor's failure to comply 
with Brady requirements, and the prosecutor's misrepresentation to the court that the state had 
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complied with Brady discovery mandates. 524 F.3d 1073, 1084 (2008). The Chapman court 
recognized that a dismissal of an indictment may not be the appropriate remedy for mere 
negligent or accidental conduct by the prosecutor; however, a prosecutor's "reckless disregard" 
for their constitutional obligations may demonstrate "flagrant misbehavior" so as to justify 
dismissal. !d. at 1085 (internal citation omitted). 
As noted above, the court may dismiss a charging document if the government's 
outrageous conduct amounts to a due process violation, which is present in this case due to the 
Brady violation. Even in the absence of such a violation, "a district court may dismiss the 
indictment when the prosecution's actions rise, as they did here, to the level of flagrant 
prosecutorial misconduct." United States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d at 1086. Thus, the court may 
dismiss the Information based on the Brady violation and/or because the prosecution's flagrant 
misconduct. 
CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons, Mr. Ellington respectfully requests this court to dismiss 
the Information. 
DATED this day of January, 2012. 
D FE : EROFKOO'L N ICO~ Tn.W OFFICE OFn PUBLIC 
A I 4 ll I \ 
BY: ~______...) 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by 
placing a copy of the same as indicated below on the IS day of January, 2012, addressed 
+~· lU. 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 
Via Fax 
Interoffice Mail 
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Anne Taylor 
From: 
Sent: 
To: 
Subject: 
Arthur Verharen 
Thursday, January 12, 2012 8:40AM 
Anne Taylor; Mary Fisher 
ellington 
Gary Cushman told me this morning that his notes reflect that he excluded Mrs. Larsen's palm prints from two of the 
latent palm prints on the blazer. There was also a latent fingerprint on the blazer where no match or exclusion was 
made. He did not write a report about this but is sending me a copy of his notes that state his findings. 
1 
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I r-1 
To: MV- ~nn ~~ 
I 
F2DG 448-1521 
Idaho State Police 
Region i 
Fred Swanson, Deteei:ive 
250 Northw-"-~ Bcuievard, Suite 1 oil 
Coeur d'Alene. Idaho 83814 , 
Phone- (208) 769-1433 
Fax- (208) 769-1482 
; 
From: Fred Swanson 
IPagAS: ~ including cover sheel 
I Jf-~~ -r81f/ August7, 2~~ 0 -i5-{)~ Phone: 1r44Q-1 ~0 \Date: 
Re: Rngerprint Report ( 
~ 
Ourgent [gjFor Review 0 Please Comment 0 Pleas• Reply 0 PleJJSe Recycle 
.Art, 
Here ls the report I have on the fir:gerprinting of Larsen. It seemed 
to me that we talked about sending better prints of Vonette down, 
and that we got a match of her prints on the hood. Maybe 1 am 
imagining that, cause I can•t find that report in our fi&e. I wonder if 
Brad resent those items. I have a call in to him, but for now, this is 
~II I ean find. 
Thanks, 
Fred 
tn · ~ Z911l69LBOZ l :xe.:1 SNO 11 V911S3AN I 
I 
I 
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02128/2006 idaho State Pollee Forensic Services 
P.O. Box 700 Meridian, 10 83680-0700 (208)884-7170 
CL Case No.: 
Agency: 
OR!: 
M20060059 
R101 -ISP-INVESTIGATIONS 
IDCIB0100 
Agency Case No.: K06000001 
Crime Date: Jan 1, 2006 
Crlm!nal!stic _A_.,a!ysis Report • FINGERPRINTS 
Evidence Received lnformatron 
Evidenca Received: 
Add. Crime Date: 
How Received: 
HaL Materials: 
lnv. Officer: 
Delivered By: 
Received By: 
Evidence Received: 
Add. Crime Date: 
How Received: 
Haz. Materials: 
lnv. Officer: 
Delivered By: 
Received By: 
Evidence ReceiVed: 
Add. Crime Date: 
How Received: 
Haz... Materials: 
lnv. Officer: 
Delivered By: 
Received By: 
0110912006 
IN PERSON 
BIOHAZARD/CHEMICAl 
SWANSON ph. (208)769-1433 
SWANSON ph. (208)769-1433 
JUDY PACKER ph. (208)884-7170 
B!OHAZARO/CHEMICft.L 
FRED SWANSON 
ph. (208)769-1410 
02!28/2006 
IN PERSON 
BIOHAZARD/CHEMICAL 
GARY CUSHMAN 
MICKEY HALL·ph. (208)884-7170 
Page 1 
I 
------------------~ ........... ......,. ....... -.......... ....,....~ ......... ~~~ ..... ~ .. -----·---
Victims and Suspects 
Vic/Susp 
Suspect 
VIctim 
.t!2!!!g 
ELLINGTON, JONATHAN WADE 
LARSEN, VONETTE LEE 
EVIDENCE DESCRIPTION: 
12Q.!i Sex 
11/15/1960 
04/2411964 
Item #1 (Agency Exh. #12) - small manila envelope containing: 
Thiee 1aterit lift cards. 
Item #2 - large manila envelope containing: 
Six palm prints bearing the number 06-00027, marked with the initials 
"Bl.{M•t, and dated 01-05-06. 
Evidence was signed and sealed when received. 
EXAMINATION: 
Latent prints were examined for comparable ridge detail. Latent prints of 
value were analyzed and compared to palm prints (item #2) bearing the 
number 06-00027. 
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02/28/2006 
CL Case No.: 
Agency: 
ORi: 
CONCl.USION: 
Idaho State Pollee Forensic Ser.;ices 
P.O. Box 700 Meridian, 10 83680-0700 (208)884-7170 
M20060059 
R101 -ISP-INVESTIGATIONS 
IDC!B0100 
Agency Case No.: K06000001 
Crime Date: Jan 1, 2006 
Cr!mlna!!st!c Aml!ysis Report • FINGERPRINTS 
No identification was effected. 
Page2 
In order to complete the comparison portion of this examination, it is 
requested that a quality set of rolled inked fingerprints be submitted for 
Vonette· Lee Larsen. Item #1 should be resubmitted at that time. 
~9-7 ~ G~. CUshman 
Forensic Scientist II, Latent Prints 
Date: 
~=:n ·~ ZRtr L69LBOZ l :xed SNOI1'11811S3ANI 
I 
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I · ~~212~2006 
I 
Idaho State Pollee Forensic Services 
P.O. Box 700 Meridian, 10 63680-0700 (208)884-7170 
CLCase No.: 
Agency: 
OR!: 
M20060059 
R101 -lSP-INVESTIGATIONS 
1DCIB0100 
Agency Case No.: K06000001 
Crime Date: Jan 1, 2006 
CrimlnallstieAnalysis Report- FINGERPRINTS 
STATE OF IDAHO} 
} 
COUNTY OF ADA } 
A F F I D A V I T 
ss. 
Page3 
Gary D. Cushman, being first duly sworn, deposes and says the following: 
l. That I am a Forensic Scientist II, Latent-Print examiner with Forensic 
Services and am qualified to perform the examination and draw conclusions 
of the type shown on the attached reporti · 
1 2. Tbat Forensic Services is part of the Idaho State Policei 
3. That I conducted a scientific examination of evidence described in the 
attached report in the ordinary course and scope of my duties with Forensic 
Servicesi 
4. That the conclusion(s) expressed in that report is/are correct to the 
best of my knowledgei 
5. That the case identifying information reflected in that report came 
trom-t-he-ev±EI.enee-paekagingr-a--case.report_, ___ or__ano_ther~rs:.lia!:;lle 90lJ.~Ce;_ __ . 
6. That a true and accurate copy of that report is attached to this 
affidavit. 
Ga . . Cushman 
Forensic Scientist II, Latent Prints 
Date: CJ.::Z..- ,2..8- ..zaa;i 
BEFORE ME ;? ?' ~ ~C 
of Idaho 
.Y&~...<?%0 
un "rJ l911 L69L90l L :xe.:1 SNOll\I!:J 11S31\N I 
I 
I 
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 o '17/2012 Page 1 of 19 
Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan 20120117 Motions 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth 
Court Reporter Keri Veare .~ /! PA Barry McHugh PA Art VerHaren cV~ DAAnne Taylor DA John Adams ~'-~ J 
Date 1/17/2012 I Location 111 K-COURTRDprvtf-/ 
/ 
Time jl Speaker I Note I 
08:30:15 AM J Calls case- PA McHugh, PA VerHaren, DA Taylor and DA Adams present with defendant - not in custody 
08:30:58AM DA Taylor We'll put the stipulated motions on the record first - #1 the 
state stipulates (no comment post Miranda) 
08:31:32 AM PA VerHaren Correct - #1 - #6 are stipulated to 
08:31:51 AM J The court has them lined out- so the first 6 are stipulated to? 
I 08:32:11 AM I DA Taylor I'd like to list the names of the motion into the record - #2 - #6 There is one other stipulation 
08:33:35 AM PA VerHaren We stipulate to #7 as well 
I 08:33:48 AM IDA Taylor I Provides examples of inflammatory statements the state is to 
not use 
I 08:34:11 AM PA VerHaren I No objection 
I 08:34:16 AM J The state submitted a number of exhibits that are consistent 
with the stipulation 
08:34:30AM #8- we're asking the state to not have witnesses to speculate 
DA Taylor and the state has indicated they will not illicit that type of 
testimony 
08:35:02 AM PA VerH~ren ,.. '-lVI j CIJL 
08:35:08AM We have filed a motion for 2nd jury view or for all areas that 
DA Taylor constituted all areas of the chase and the state has stipulated 
to this as well 
08:3~6verH ect 
08:35:43 AM The counsel in advance to sit down with the court and outline 
that so we can work out the logistics. The sooner that we can 
II i do it- it doesn't necessariiy have to be done on the record. ! u 
need to work with the bailiff staff and the sheriff's office. On a 
break we can sit down and go over that. 
file://R:\LogNotes- HTML\District\Criminal\Luster\CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan 20... 1117/2012 
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 o '17/2012 Page 2 of 19 
08:36:52 AM That leaves us with 3 motions in limine- fire weapon, remove 
memorial marker from the roadside. #9 - we ask that the state 
not misconstrue the argument between Thomas and Ellington. 
The state portrayed him as a very angry man who left the 
DA Taylor house in a rage. The testimony from Thomas was that it was a 
disagreement as to how she was taking care of her own 
health. The state's misconstruing the testimony showed him as 
~- ~n-- • --- 1&...- .. - ;_ - ... :.,..~,...,... .Jr,.,........,. "'""'~ ~+"ro ~nrl ~hO\l'orl hil"""n CUI i:l I~IY IIIGIII. IIICIC 1;:) Gl VIUCV IIVIII Ulv ;;)LVIv CIIIU ;;)II vvu 111111 
in a happy, relaxed manner. 
08:39:17 AM Exhibit COURTS EXHIBIT #1 -transcript of interview Maskell 
had with Thomas in 2006. What she said at the trial is 
different. I've sat with her now and have played the interview 
PA VerHaren she had with Maskell and had her review the transcript. In the interview she also talked of his state of mind when he got back 
to the house after encountering the Larsen sisters. There is a 
sufficient evidentiary background to inquire of Ms. Thomas and 
it should be admissible. 
08:43:36AM It's not's not an issue that they had a disagreement or an 
DA Taylor argument but the interpretation that he left in a fit of rage. I point the court to the bottom of page 9 (quotes). As long as we 
use Ann Thomas' words that's fine. 
08:44:47~ Continue with #1 0 
03.-r-r.:;:; r ylor 
08:44:58 AM #1 0 goes to the testimony of Joleen Larsen - she testified that 
at the first contact with Def he was out of his car and had 
contact with the window of the Honda and that she he hit the 
window "it almost broke the window". We ask the court to not 
elicit that kind of testimony. She's not an expert in automobile 
witnesses and not qualified to make that kind of opinion - it's 
an over-the-top exaggeration. 
08:46:10 AM At the trial she made that kind of determination. (reads 
PA VerHaren portions of the transcript). The court should take into account transcripts from the defense re: 911 calls and in the call Joleen 
made the statement 
I 08:47:18 AM J She made it a couple of times 
08:47:25 AM PA VerHaren It will come in a couple of times and I don't think there is a basis to exclude it. 
08:47:40AM She's not an expert in the window and if she was she'd know 
DA Taylor the glass doesn't break or bend as she described. The next 
motion is as to Joel Larsen's statements that def was "looking 
at his wife." 
08:48:39AM in the motion- 2nd paragraph (reads portions of transcript). 
PA VerHaren His observations is correct testimony for him to give at trial. His 
opinions as to what his wife intended to do are not things the 
defense or I should ask. It's my hope that this time around the 
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opinions should crop up. 
08:50:02AM DA Taylor 
08:50:05AM I was just asking that you exclude when he goes beyond 
observations. It's those kind of things that we don't want to go 
into the trial. 
08:50:40 AM He can testify what he observed but the conclusion that he 
was looking at his wife or daughters are not admissible. What 
J was observed is appropriate testimony. But what she was 
thinking, who she was looking at or what she intended to do is 
inappropriate. 
08:51:59 AM PA I Understand 
I 
VerHaren/DA 
Taylor 
08:52:23AM IJ I There is a motion for jury view which has been stipulated to -proceed to motion re: memorial 
08:52:45AM We're asking for the Larsen's or the state to remove the 
marker where Ms. Larsen died. We're trying to guard against 
this case being tried on a motion. I have photos- the marker 
DA Taylor was not in place December 19. That marker is now there. I've been out there several times and it was not there until after we 
filed our motion for jury view. It's nothing difficult for the 
Larsen's to remove or cover up. The marker itself does not 
need to be present. I do not have a picture of the memorial. 
08:54:41 AM J These (photos) are all showing the scene but there is no 
memorial. 
08:54:54AM DA Taylor I can get a photo today and bring it back at 1 :30. 
08:55:10 AM PA VerHaren I have not seen it and it would be helpful for me to see it to get 
an objection or no objection. 
I 08:55:28 AM I J The issue last time was that the memorial was on private property and not subject to the right-of-way. 
08:55:56 AM It's on a fence post that is private property but certainly the 
DA Taylor court can direct the Larsen's to remove it. I don't think it 
matters that it's on private property. 
I 08:56:29 AM I PA VerHaren It's my understanding that they contacted the property owners 
and got permission to put it there in 06. 
I 08:56:52 AM I J Proceed 
08:56:54 AM The motion for firing the firearm - we have an expert in 
firearms but words cannot convey the startling, piercing sound 
DA Taylor 
of the firearm. It's important that they hear this - certainly they 
will be ready for it which is different that when it's fired 
unexpectedly. We can tell them it was unexpected but to tell 
them the sound is just not the same. Defendant is entitled to a 
fair trial and the sound of that weapon is very necessary for 
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them to understand it in this case. 
08:59:18 AM J How do you suggest that we accomplish this task. 
08:59:32 AM ul"\ 1"\dams I'd like to have it fired outside-
08:59:52AM You cannot replicate it in the fashion that it was heard by Mr. 
PA VerHaren Ellington. He was in a vehicle and the vehicle was going forward and the engine was loud, full acceleration and the 
window rolled up. 
09:00:55AM That's fair game for argument to the jury. This is appropriate 
DA Taylor that the weapon be fired and we request that the court order 
that. 
09:01:25 AM J Recess Are there other exhibits or photos counsel will review? 
09:01:59 AM DA Taylor There are some that are stipulated to admit and others that are 
not. The state also has some exhibits. 
09:02:18 AM J 
09:26:30AM Back in session - I'll address the 9th motion in limine re 
Thomas testimony. The case involves a charge of 2nd degree 
murder. His state of mind is a critical element the state needs 
to prove. I know that Ms. Thomas and Ms. Ellington had some 
sort of disagreement that was reflected in a phone call to the 
jail and transcripts before the court. The state should be 
J entitled to offer evidence that there was a disagreement and that def left his house on one or both occasions and was upset 
over an argument. I caution the state to not misconstrue what 
that evidence means. If she testifies he was upset that's fine, if 
she testifies that he was in a state of rage that is different. It's 
appropriate for the state to offer the testimony of Cunningham 
and the jury can draw a reasonable inference. The state is 
cautioned to not misconstrue the evidence. 
09:29:24AM DA 
Taylor/PA No questions 
VerHaren 
09:29:34AM The testimony of Ms. Larsen re: almost breaking the window. I 
don't see how a witness can testify that a piece of glass 
"almost broke". If she heard the window or observed it being 
struck with great force and observed that it looked wrinkled 
J then she can testify to that but to conclude that it almost broke is outside her ability to conclude that. In the 911 call she made 
that statement a couple of times and if that call is ultimately 
admitted it might be admissible re: executed utterance. Unless 
she can offer more foundation that at the previous hearing 
she's not to testify that it almost broke. 
09•3_.. "2'7 A 1\A nA =r. at extend to statements of counsel at closing? . I . I T"\IVI IJT"\ I Cl Y lVI 
09:31:40 AM I cannot extend the ruling on that as we may hear additional J 
testimony from experts that might allow the comments. If all we 
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I II have are Ms. Larsen's statements it will not be admissible. I 
09:32:12 AM The roadside flower issues need to be left until after lunch. 
The 44 mag -the court needs to take a number of things into 
account. It's nearly difficult if not impossible to accurately 
reenact to meet all the conditions at the time including the 
location, time of day, weather conditions, cloud ceiling not to 
mention the emotional circumstances that were ongoing. A 44 
Mag is a significant handgun and discharges a loud noise. It's 
loud and you can feel the discharge. The fact that the court 
could not accurately replicate the conditions it might be helpful 
for the jury to understand the weapon h~s a significant sound. 
J The logistics become difficult. I visited with our head bailiff and he has assured me that there is not a pistol range in the area 
that would allow anyone without ear protection which would 
accomplish nothing. The court has some concern about the 
well being of our jurors. To allow the shooting without ear 
protection may cause issues with the jurors. The issues the 
court has are some of the basis for the defense request. At 
this point I'm not comfortable that the court will allow the 
discharge of the firearm. I may reconsider the request but we 
cannot walk the jury outside and discharge this weapon. 
DENY MOTION. DA can present information at a later stage 
and I'll reconsider the request. Proceed to PA's motions. 
09:37:29 AM PA VerHaren Motion to exclude all defendants statements to law 
enforcement. They are hearsay. 
09:37:47 AM DA Taylor I can lay the foundation to the exception to the hearsay rule 
and I ask you reserve ruling. 
09:3o. 1 ::> J I'll ro"'erve ruling 
--
09:38:23 AM PA VerHaren That issue should be taken up outside the presence of the jury 
when the time arises. 
I 09:38:37 AM II J lves 
I 09:39:00 AM ~ DA Taylor II will be with Detective Maskell and other witnesses. and I'll do 
that outside the presence of the jury. 
I 09:39:22 AM II J I Let the court know. 
I 09:39:40 AM II I Motion to exclude reference to this as an "accident" it's not that far off from calling it a "murder" depending on how you look at I . OA \IMU".M i+ Th.o n+h.or •unrrl I ..,..,.!, +h.o "'"'' 1r+ +n ovl"h 1rlo ie> tho \Atnrrl IL. I IIV VLIIVI VVVI U I Q..;;Jf'- LIIV \JVUI L LV V.l'\.,1\.,oi\,AV ,,_, LIIV WW"I u 
"chase". It's a subjective term and a term of argument. Follow 
I,.~ vc" oaoc" 
would be more impartial. 
09:40:45 AM I think I get to use the word "accident" It's nothing more than 
an accident until the jury says so. The word "chase" was the 
II DA Taylor original word used by Joel Larsen and he used that word until 
he changed it with the help of Detective Maskell. It's an 
appropriate term to show what was going on. 
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09:41:50 AM PA VerHaren We're excluding the words "road rage" and I think on the 
opposite spectrum it's fair to exclude the word Accident. 
09:42:23AM DA Taylor The state's witnesses are called "accident reconstructionists" 
and it's appropriate to use the word "accident" 
09:42:52 AM re supreme court ruling as to use of the word "homicide". I 
think the word "accident" would serve to conjure up the exact 
-----:.a.- --...J -u-.... "''"'- ...1--'=---" "'""' ,.... ·~ Up +h.o.ir +h.o.nn, ~nrl I UJJJJU::IIll:: i::tiiU i::tiiUVV Llll:: Ul::ll::ll;:)t:; LV ;:)UIII Lllvll LllvVIJ QIIU I 
think the word should be avoided. The testimony will come out 
with the experts as "accident reconstructionists". Defense 
needs to refrain from using the word "accident scene", etc. I 
J know in argument it will be different. The motion is appropriate. As far as the word "chase" it doesn't go to the ultimate 
question the jury will be asked to decide. If you follow 
someone by staying behind them and travel in the same 
direction - we had speeds of 80-90 MPH and that qualifies by 
any interpretation of the evidence to be a chase and there is 
nothing inappropriate to the use of that term. Motion granted 
re: "accident" but not "chase". 
09:47:08AM PA VerHaren I think the issue of the prior proceeding before the Supreme Court should not be brought up in front of the jury 
09:47:37 AM IDA Adams Ill we're going to argue something as to the supreme court decision it should be outside the presence of the jury. 
09:48:01 AM PA VerHaren The motion is to limit comments as to the Idaho Supreme Court decision State v Ellington 
09:48:23AM IJ II You're asking that the reference be prohibited? I 
09:48:41 AM I PA VerHaren lives I 
09:48:43 AM I think that if we bring up the decision it should be brought up 
DAAdams outside the presence of the jury. Counsel advises me that if 
Fred Rice testifies that's different. 
09:49:23AM I think it will be a separate discussion as to how we'll handle 
jury selection. Neither counsel should make any reference as 
to the Supreme Court decision. There also was an ISP 
investigation re: Rice's conduct in the trial and that would J likewise be inappropriate information to bring to the jury. 
Should either rulings be imperative for this court to make a 
ruling it will be done outside the presence of the jury. Should 
Qi,..o ho l"'.:llllorl tn to~tif" th!:it l"'h!:inno~ tho l!:inrkr~no nf thP 
I 'IVV UV VUII\JU t.V """~1.11~ t.ll"""t. '"'I 1"""1 •::;:J-- ""' •- •-• •-vv-1""'- -• •• o...; 
ruling. 
09:50:58 AM PA 
VerHaren/DA No questions 
Taylor 
09:51:05 AM Motion to exclude asking witnesses if they've ever been shot 
PA VerHaren at or asking witness if Ellington intended to hit the Honda or 
Vonette. 
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09:51:48 AM re: asking if they'd been shot at- the context came in with 
police officers. That's fair game. We didn't ask every single 
witness who testified. We asked Sean Daly. He was used 
heavily as an accident reconstructionist and I think it's a fair 
DA Taylor general question. It has it's place and we should not be 
restricted. The gun fire is a huge element of what happened in 
this case and it's an appropriate element. Experts are allowed 
to testify as to ultimate conclusion in the case. The state's 
expert said they could not conclude that Ellington intended to 
hit the Honda or Vonette. 
09:54:07 AM It seems like Sean Daly got in trouble for this following the first 
PA VerHaren trial. The exclusion should apply to both sides and it's for the 
jury to decide if he intended to strike and run over Ms. Larsen. 
09:55:01 AM The state's expert opinion is a scientific trained opinion and 
DA Taylor exculpatory. The expert is allowed to testify as to the issues- a 
lay witness cannot. 
09:55:41 AM J How does that square with the court's opinion re: Daly's testimony as to what Mr. Ellington's intent was? 
09:56:13 AM His opinion wasn't based on science but I don't think he was 
DA Taylor qualified as an expert. Can I return to this argument this 
afternoon so I can review that I was reviewing last night? 
09:56:47 AM Yes. We'll listen to you further this afternoon. As far as asking 
witnesses if they've ever been shot at - I'll not make a blanket 
prohibition against that. It's inappropriate to ask Ms. Larsen if 
J she's ever been shot at but if we have an expert who testifies 
re: gunfire discharge it might have some relevance. It appears 
that question should be limited to appropriate witness. If the 
question is going to be asked I ask that we have a discussion 
out side the presence of the jury. 
09:59:29 A DAAdams I Does that apply to voir dire as well? I 
09:59:39 AM J That will need to be a little different. Clear the question with the court before you ask it of a witness before the jury. 
10:00:25 AM My last motion is to determine the admissibility of some of my 
exhibits. There are less now as we have stipulated to some of 
PA VerHaren them. Counsel does not object to EX #1 - #6 (photos). As to #7 
they object to the labeling "Ramsey Road." I think they are 
right and I'll fix that and relabeled. 
' 10:01 :31 ~~or No oojection if properly labeled. 
10:01:40 AM PA \h=~rl-l~r~n Defense does not object to #8 
10:01:50 AM DA Taylor I That's fine 
I 10:01 :55 AM They object to #9. They don't object to #1 0 - #20 but do object 
I 
I PA VerHaren 
to #21, no objection to #22- 32- object to #33 and #34. #35-
#44 I understand there is no objection as long as the state 
I 
I crops #35. #45 has the Kahlua bottle that we dealt with a trial 
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Taylor 
10:05:04 AM J 
I 10:05:28 AM II 
PA VerHaren 
10:12:12 AM J 
10:12:47 
10:12:51 AM 
last time and I'll try to crop the bottle out of there. I think that 
the remainder of the photos to #69 will be stipulated to 
Yes 
PA to address each photo as to why you'll be offering and the 
relevance and the defense can state their objection 
I #9 doesn't show the body but does show the blood trail. It 
shows which way the road is elevated as referenced by the 
flow of the blood. #21 - photo of the broken drivers side 
window of the Honda and that's relevant to show the damage 
as to that location. The witness -Sgt Carrington- will testify 
that she saw a smudge on the window which corroborates the 
Larsen girls saying he struck the window- not that the damage 
to the window was caused by him striking the window with his 
hands. #33 and #34 are reproductions of the photos admitted 
at the first trial and necessary - #33 shows the acceleration 
marks the Blazer left going around the Honda to the body of 
Ms. Larsen and not all photos showed the marks as they 
began to dissipate through out the day as it started to rain. It 
showed her position as to the hair found by her feet - you can 
see it in #34- clump of hair and tissue by her right foot. Also 
on #33 is a blood smear and extended 5' to the west of the 
clump of hair and these are important pieces of evidence. I 
think this is evidence that would contradict the evidence that 
she was struck by the drivers side. These pictures are relevant 
and you should let those in. #45- I'll try to crop out #45 re: 
Kahlua bottle. The last trial it was left in unaltered but I'll try to 
get this fixed up. #69 is a photo of Vonette Larsen's drivers 
license. EX #1 at the last trial was a photo of the Larsen 
family. I have removed it but I think #69 is relevant as it shows 
her height and weight. this is an important factor considering 
the defense indication that he didn't see her. It's a photo that 
shows height, weight and face and that's the only photo that 
would show her and should be admissible. 
You gave me exhibits in anticipation of the motions- I take it 
you have originals for trial? 
ct 
#9 photo is cumulative and there is not reason for it. There are 
multiple other photos that show it. Because of the blood trail 
it's inflammatory. If the state absolutely needs it the photo is 
digital and can easily be cropped. We also believe there is 
lacking foundation in #9. #21 is the photo of the broken 
window. I see no relevance. There are many other pictures of 
the side view of the Honda. It's being offered because Sgt 
Carrington saw a smudge on it. This can be testified to by Sgt. 
between the 2 encounters. #33 and #34 - the court 
recalls the issues last time. There was first a magic marker 
that colored her out and now there is a ghost picture. This is 
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cumulative and highly inflammatory. It think it brings out a 
whole other thought process that is inappropriate for this trial. 
At the first trial they were offered to show the marks in the 
roadway. If you review Trooper Robinett's testimony there is 
line after line of description of what was seen on Ms. Larsen 
DA Taylor and the blood trail. If they need them they should be cropped 
so you don't see Ms. Larsen at all. #69 - license. The 
;.,..,:,..,.m""';,...,. : ... h"a'"""""'' an'"' ,.,e nhie,..+ ~c. +n rolo\l~n"o Tho IIIIVI IIClLIVII I~ IIV li:>OY IU YY Vl.IJ \JI. Q~ I.U IVI'-'Y'""' """''"'· 1 ,,...., 
height doesn't change but certainly the weight can change. 
The pathologist would have measured and weighed her and 
this is irrelevant. 
10:18:14 AM PA #70 - DA doesn't object, #71 is the enhanced 911 call. 
10:18:45 AM DA Taylor That's correct 
10:18:53 AM I understand the defense objects to #72 and #73 - that was 
stipulated to at the first trial and at this time I'll not try to offer 
into the record but will notify the court if I intend to offer it. #7 4 
- #82 #7 4 and #75 I'll simply remove. #76 is the diagram 
PA VerHaren showing internal organs and names for those things. We 
intend to introduce through testimony of Dr. Ross to help him 
explain the injuries of Ms. Larsen caused by being struck and 
those from her being run over. I believe the defense contends 
she was not struck but fell over. 
10:22:07 AM DAAdams I don't think it's necessary to send it back to the jury. 
10:22:26 AM I don't know if the state will offer to admit or to use it during 
J testimony - I'll have to wait and see if it's an exhibit that is 
properly admitted. 
10:23:19 AM PA VerHaren #77 and #78 are diagrams of the scene 
10:23:33 AM DA Taylor No objection 
10:23:41 AM PA VerHaren #80 and #81 are the revolver and shells 
110:23:53 AM I DA Taylor No objection 
10:23:58 AM We'll not attempt to introduce the lab results in light of what we 
PA VerHaren discovered last week. We'll not seek to admit Mr. Ellington's 
birth certificate. Nothing else to address 
10:24:53 AM DA Taylor I have received a copy of a phone call 
10:25:02 AM I filed a pleading that I was going to attempt to introduce a 
phone call the date of the arrest. There were a number of parts 
PA VerHaren with issues such as his warrant that I redacted. At this point I'll 
not move to introduce and I'll let counsel and the court know if 
I intend to introduce that. 
10:26:13 AM DA Taylor To let the court know there are other issues surrounding that II phone caii. 
10:27:12 AM J 
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11:24:03 AM J 
11:24:07 AM 
11:25:05 AM 
11:27:28 AM 
11:33:42 
11:33:47 AM 
11:34:56 AM 
DA Taylor 
PA 
===== 
Taylor 
J 
n/\ T ... ulnr 
LJT"l. 1 ay•v• 
J 
Back in session 
We have Exhibits A-MMM. The state objects to some at this 
time. There is a video of the Twin Lakes Trading Post 
depicting defendant with the clerks and some hand drawn 
photos, Motorola cell phone records, etc. 
We object to EX II and NN EX II is autopsy of naked victim and 
NN is the naked backside of her. I'd like time to consider SS. 
As for UU - BBB I'd like to sit down and work out a stipulation 
with DA. There are 4 photos CCC- FFF photos with a tape 
measure. We're not sure who took the photos and until we 
figure this out I object. JJJ - KKK I'd like to wait to object. HHH 
and Ill are notices of Maskell interview with Joleen Larsen and 
I don't object yet but would like to see how things develop. 
ing else on the exhibits today. 
Getting back to the courts exhibits #9, 21, 33, 34, 45 and 69 -
the exhibits will be objected to by the defense. It's always 
important to recognize that the admissibility requires to 
foundation. Relevancy is a discretionary call re: probative 
value/probative nature. The photos that depict the body at the 
scene 9, 33 and 34 can be addressed in a similar fashion. Had 
these been the exhibits at the first trial I doubt they would have 
been considered by the Supreme Court. Overall the 3 exhibits 
depict the accident scene from different perspectives. I don't 
think the prejudicial impact unduly outweigh the probative 
value - I'll not strike the exhibits and 9, 33 and 34 can be 
admitted. EX #45 can be admitted without the Kahlua bottle 
edited out. EX #21 is the only one with concern- showing the 
shattered passenger side window and it's difficult if not 
impossible to locate a smudge mark. The shattered nature of 
the window may serve as undue impact and a juror may come 
to the conclusion that that's the damage from defendant 
striking the window. EXCLUDE EX #21. EX #69 - limited 
probative value re: height and weight. I think it's appropriate to 
show the victim and will be permitted. 
EX #33 and #34 - the stated purpose of #33 was to show tire 
marks on the roadway and #34 to show hair and blood smear 
near Ms. Larsen and I ask that that be the purpose for what it's 
admitted and not draw a lot of inference from what is biotted 
out. We still ask that the state use a photo like ours with the 
blood cropped out. 
I'll not address other issues here except for relevance as I've 
discussed. I have received a copy of the photo showing what 
appears to be more of a Christmas V\ireath and we'il make it 
part of the record. We'll mark these as A-E for the purpose of 
the hearing today with EX F as the highway marker picture. 
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11:36:36 AM It doesn't seem to be a big deal. I'd just as soon leave it to the 
PA VerHaren court's discretion. It's arguable if you have jurisdiction to tell 
someone to remove it. 
11:37:07 AM I think a view of the scene is important but I don't think we 
should have anything at the scene that would cause undue 
impact on our jurors and we don't need to have anything 
present that would unduly prejudice the jury. I have no 
intention of ordering the Larsens or anyone else to do anything 
J with it. I intend to have a bailiff remove any kind of memorial 
that may be present at the scene and return it once the view is 
completed. There will be the issue of jury selection. The 
inquiry of the jurors will have to involve issues not otherwise 
presented to them. It's obvious that it may be important to 
address other issues. Return at 1 :30 PM. 
11·~~·!iR AM 
f'I1·~A~lJ Back in session for DA's motion to dismiss 
01:36:49 PM DAAdams I'll handle this - 2 witnesses and I'd like to hear the testimony -
witnesses are in the hallway 
f'I1·~A·&;:~ 
01:37:17 PM PA McHugh We have 2 witnesses 
01:37:2 J The motion has been briefed - call your witness 
01:37:31 PM Calls #1 - defense submitted the court with e-mail to Taylor 
PA McHugh and Ms. Fisher - I want to make sure that's available to the 
Court 
01:38:02 PM IJ Mark it as an exhibit. 
01:38:10 PM PA McHugh We have Exhibits #2-#5 
01:39:25 PM c Swears #1 
01:39:30 PM Gary Cushman -
I am a forensic scientist with ISP - latent fingerprint scientist -
15 years with ISP next month. Re: duties, training and 
experience. EX #5 the top page is a cover letter sent to PA 
and DA concerning my evidence packet or report re: Ellington 
case. The first page is an e-mail that I authored and sent. 
#1 There is a finalized report, notes, submission form and 
paperwork sent with the submission form. All were sent viae-
mail and relate to my work on the Ellington case. I was asked 
to compare 3 latent print lift cards to palm prints sent in of the 
victim. I compared them in the report. There are also notes 
that support my report. We sent out identification reports and 
I notes were kept in the lab reports prior to this case. To my 
knowledge these had never been sent out before. 
01:44:31 PM PA McHug on to admit #5 
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01:44:58 PM DAAdams I No objection I 
01:45:02 PM J IADMIT EX#5 I 
01:45:15PM There are notes re: phone call from Fred Swanson - I made 
the notes but recall very little of the phone call other than that 
in the notes. I don't know who called who. I asked for more 
note prints to be sent in. He indicated that the only 
#1 identification that mattered was the victim's prints. EX #2 -
copy of analytical method our lab had starting January 2007. 
This could be considered a policy manual I guess. EX #4 
appears to be a copy of the analytical method from print 
section starting 12/01. I briefly compared the 2 and there is 
quite a bit of differences. 
I 01 :48:33 PM joA jtt's not relevant what happened in 2007. 
01:48:43 PM The document dated 2001 was being used until2007. We 
didn't have a method for reporting exclusions and if there was 
no identification it would typically say there was no 
identification reflected. That's what is shown in EX #5. The 
date EX #5 was sent I had a conversation with Mr. VerHaren 
earlier in the morning. He had asked me previously if I could 
#1 find the latent prints or photos of them to see if I could find 
prints. I was calling him back to tell him of my report indicating 
the exclusion of Ms. Larsen - it's called exclusion now but then 
it was called "negative idents" to that person. I don't recall 
having a prior conversation with anyone from KCPA or KCSD 
regarding exclusions on this case or other comments on this 
case that I know of. 
01:52:34 PM I had been sent latent prints marked that they came from the 
vehicle and then prints from the palm of Vonette Larsen and I 
was asked to compare them - I noted that palm prints were not 
made by Vonette Larsen. The 2 palm prints were not matches 
XE#1 by DA to the palm prints provided. They were excluded by the known 
Adams exemplar with the name of Vonette Larsen. I wrote a report. I 
determined that the prints of Vonette were not those. I sent the 
report with those reports to the agency that requested them. 
The communication said that the latent prints were not 
effected. 
" ... ,.... .no n~§l-l• ,,h 
, .VV lVI •••-• Objection 
01:56:12 PM J He's not communicated it the way you're presenting it to the 
court. 
01:56:28 PM PA McHugh Objection 
01:56:44 PM J Sustained 
.I 01:56:47 PM I I beiieve the report was dated 2006. 3/9/06 is the last enti)' -
March 9, 2006- I spoke with Detective Swanson via phone. 
He said he didn't need further identification just compared to 
Vonette Larsen. I don't remember the conversation at all. I only 
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recall it from looking at the notes. Before I spoke with him I 
already decided they were "negative idents". I assumed they 
had my report as I sent the report out 9 days before. My 
conclusion in the report I asked for more prints and he may 
have concluded that there was no need as the only ones that 
were important were the victim's prints. 
1-8-01 says palm negative to the Larsen prints submitted to 
me. 
I may have been subpoenaed August 2006 for trial. I don't 
remember talking to DA Taylor and asking if I needed to come 
up here to testify. I don't remember talking to PA VerHaren. I 
don't remember a trial or that I was subpoenaed or that I was 
to be here for trial in 2006. I just don't remember. I have had 
phone calls from PA VerHaren recently- more than one -2- I 
XE#1 probably put something on sticky notes re: conversations. It 
was about the 1Oth or the 11th. He asked me to pull the latent 
print photos and see if I could determine what part was 
involved. I pulled them out and looked at them and I had the 
case files. I didn't know about it (that they were not Vonette's 
prints) when he first called me. I left a message and I think I 
got a voice mail from Anne when I was talking to VerHaren. 
Both were returning my calls. I did speak with Anne last week 
but don't remember the day. I eventually made contact with 
Anne that day and read a portion of the page to her. I was 
expecting a call from her to set up a date/time for me to testify 
and to sit down with her when she needed me. I had already 
talked to PA VerHaren and was talking to him when DA Taylor 
called me and left a message on my system. 
'vVhen I explained the "non idents" to Anne I assumed she had 
the report- we had not discussed it yet. As part of discovery 
she should have had that 
02:09:22 PM RD by PA I don't think I found DA's voice mail for an hour or so after the 
call with Mr. VerHaren and I probably returned the call right McHugh 
away. 
02:10:21 PM DAAdams ~jection re: policy change 
I 02:10:31 PM IJ ree 
02:10:39 PM She was returning my phone call - rd caiied her first to find out 
what date I was coming down for court. I had left a message 
RX with Mary Fisher - I needed to find out of there was going to be 
a meeting time or what to go over my report. I don't know if I 
told in the message that here there was "something that I 
needed to know about this case". 
02:12:13 PM 
When I made the examination in 2006 there were not many 
conclusions that I could make with exclusions. I can now -
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there have been drastic changes. Prints as a science has 
changed in the last 10-15 years and we've gradually increased 
in our ability to report things. In 2006 I could conclude that 
there was "no identifications effected." Today we have 
J Questions identification, value or not a value, then identifications, 
#1 exclusions, inconclusive determinations and state why inconclusive. In 2006 if Maskell had done a poor job of 
preparing the prints from the known individual my report would 
have said that the prints "lacked detail". I don't recall how we 
reported it then. I don't' remember if I would have said "no 
identifications." 
02:15:53 PM In 2006 I'd been there about 9 years and during those 9 years 
I I had dealt with the KCPA office to come up here and testify. 
i The reports are generated for the submitting agency. I don't 
know if I had ever sent in a previous report to KCPA showing 
RC#1 "no idents". I had probably worked with KCSD before this and 
probably Fred Swanson. I work for Idaho State Police. I don't 
know how they looked at the reports. Prior to the date in 2006 
KCPA cases came to our office from time-to-time. I don't recall 
if I used the term "no identifications were effected." 
·19:59 PM IPA McHugh I Objection 
02:20:12 PM Prior to the report KCPA had put me on the stand to testify and 
as a habit prior to testifying I'd talk to them about the report. I'd 
RC#1 do my best to express to them what the report meant. I'd go 
over the notes as well. When KCPA put me on the stand they 
may have known that I had case notes. 
02:21:55 PM J Excused 
I 02:22:11 PM i PA McHugh I Motion to admit EX #3 and #4 - the testimony lays the 
foundation for the policies. 
I 02:22:45 PM I DAAdams We've not had an opportunity to look at the new and revised policies and I don't think they're relevant.. 
I 02:23:09 PM IJ 1 ~v~vv~ on to the next witness. 
02:23:17 PM c J~3 
02:23:42 PM Alford L. Swanson "Fred" - Lt. with ISP investigations working 
with ISP since 1990. In 2006 I was investigation in ISP. I 
assisted KCSO and I delivered some finger prints to the lab in 
Meridian. I don't recall a phone call with Mr. Cushman. EX #5 -
#2 first page is an e-mail - 2nd page and continuing on is a lab 
report from forensic services - I've seen it before. This is the 
only document that I recall. I don't remember any conversation 
with anyone from the lab regarding the analysis. Up until last 
Friday I didn't know that it (exclusion) had been done. 
02:27:00 PM Report attached to DA's motion in limine - reviews - I don't 
remember sending that. It's signed by Fred - which is common 
how I write it. It's submitting a lab report to PA VerHaren 
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August of 2007. I don't remember sending this FAX. I don't 
remember talking to Mr. Cushman. I looked in the file and I 
don't remember that (re: seems we have a match.). I don't 
recall asking that it be followed up. 
I've worked with Mr. Cushman in the past and had on other 
XE #2 by DA cases prior to 2006. I'd submit items, get a report back and the 
Adams report would go to PA. I don't recall specifically talking to him 
or reports with his name on them. I work for ISP starting with 
them in 1990. I'd seen a lot of reports coming out of the latent 
prints. I've never seen their policy. The reports were all pretty 
uniform. I am familiar with what the words on the report meant. 
If asked by PA what they meant I felt I was capable to telling 
PA what they meant. 
~~ ~pe>e> ~YI"'II~ed. 
02:33:49 PM PA McHugh Are both #2 and #5 admitted? 
02:33:59 PM J I Yes - DA are to review #3 and #4 I 
02:34:10 PM PA McHugh I Nothing further I 
02:34:16 PMlr oA Adams I We have no witnesses I 
02:34:22 PM J There was reference to an exhibit attached to the motion - do you want it marked as an exhibit? 
()?:'U:41 PM DAAdams Yes and I ask that it be admitted 
()?·'lA :50 PM PA McHugh No objection 
()?:'lA:57 PM J Recess 
02:47:1 J Back in session -
02:47:18 PM EX #4 we have no problem with - EX #3 was not even in 
DAAdams existence at the time and is not relevant. It's akin to a 
subsequent remedial measure. 
02:48:01 PM My position is that the detail direction in the later policy is 
PA McHugh relevant to the earlier policy which is not detailed at all. It 
wasn't until later that those directions were provided by the 
department. 
02:48:51 PM J It is appropriate to consider both to the extent that they have 
any value ACCEPT EX #3 AND #4 
02:49:12 PM I think it's clear that the evidence was that the prints were sent 
to Cushman at the lab with the palm prints from the Blazer and 
they didn't match. There is no dispute about that It's also clear 
that the lab report was communicated to PA, KCSD and that 
he had communicated at the time. Swanson said he 
I II understood the reports and could communicate about them. 
The evidence was there, the state knew about it and didn't 
provide it to the defense. PA McHugh indicates the evidence 
was there, it was exculpatory and they didn't provide it. We 
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DAAdams 
~~:54:15 PM lPA McHugh 
02:54:23 PM 
DAAdams 
02:55:38 PM 
J 
[~24 PM DA Adams 
02:56:37 PM J 
02:56:58 PM 
DAAdams 
02:58:24 PM 
J 
I 02:59:08 PM I 
DAAdams 
think it wasn't disclosed not by accident or negligence but a 
due process violation requiring dismissal. EX #2 from PA 
VerHaren to DA Taylor and Mary Fisher- reads into record. 
PA VerHaren in 06 had been a PA for 6 years. He's again 
trying to be misleading. This is real important how he wrote 
this as to whether is is intentional or negligence. He's still 
trying to slip something by here. Our words have to mean 
I 
something and this is an indication of more deception. re: 
Holding in Supreme Court ruling in State vs. Ellington. What 
the Supreme Court found is law in our case. 
I This is inappropriate. 
Then you have the situation where PA says "don't tell me- if 
you do then I have to disclose it" This is real and we're 
responsible for our agents. We have this to indicate where PA 
VerHaren's head is at here but Fred Rice said he was really 
surprised. The palm print were very important pieces of 
evidence. 
Explain that to me - no where in the briefs does it set out the 
significance of the palm prints. There is no dispute that Def 
was operating the vehicle that ran over Ms. Larsen and 
caused her death. It would be a little helpful to know why this 
is so critical. 
The state stipulated that it is exculpatory. 
The presence or absence would add to the case - maybe I've 
forgotten critical aspects of the trial. 
They typically won't reverse for misconduct unless they find it 
a contributing factor to the verdict. The defense theory was 
that he didn't see her up there and it was a true inadvertent 
happenstance. If the jury believes that Ms. Larsen was 
standing in front of the vehicle with arms up and on the hood 
trying to stop it that's a completely different story. 
I don't specifically recall that from the previous trial. I cannot 
recall everything but have not gone through every word of the 
transcript. I'm trying to have my memory refreshed as to why 
this is critical. 
That's why they went to the trouble to get her palm prints and 
those from the Blazer. We know how important the testimony 
was as to if he could see her and react - if she was out there 
and he could see her. This is extremely important to the state 
to corroborate Larsen's story for the state. That's why Fred 
was raising his eyebrows when he saw the report because he 
knows how important this is. Any PA would have called him up 
and told him to find it - to figure it out How could it be any 
other way. We've been in court 30 years and I cannot imagine 
at PA getting the report from Swanson and not doing 
something about it on that critical piece of evidence. The jury 
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didn't hear it because they didn't disclose it. They led the jury 
to believe that there were prints up there but didn't let them 
know that there was a match. He spent 6 years in jail and may 
not have had to had they disclosed the information. re: cases 
cited - they all hold you cannot get out of it by saying oops, it's 
someone else's fault. 
03:02:59 PM The motion raises a procedural quandary - it declined to rule 
on certain areas of misconduct and provided the court with 
guidance but focused on the area of Mr. Rice. Assuming the 
state engaged in the conduct you indicate in 2006 how does 
J that factor into the new trial? It may serve as the basis for a 
new trial but in terms of bringing it into the new case and the 
evidence is provided and will be presented to the jury that 
excludes Ms. Larsen's palm prints from the Blazer how does 
that factor into the Brady violation stemming back to the prior 
case? 
03:04:56 PM We have the exclusions because we want the message to be 
DAAdams that you cannot act like this. The misconduct continues to happen in this county and someone has to say that this should 
not continue to happen. 
03:05:35 PM J The supreme court focused on Rice's testimony and declined to rule on the misconduct. 
03:05:54 PM They did say this case was so close and at some point you 
have to take him out of the chains he's been in for 6 years. 
Judge Marano said your evidence doesn't support it and held 
him on Involuntary manslaughter, the state dismissed and 
brought it before another Judge, etc. This smacks of the liberty 
the state has taken in this case in the facts and in the law. This 
isn't a case about Ms. Larsen - it's a terrible tragedy that she 
DAAdams iost her life. it's a case about Mr. Ellington. If they want to take 
the Larsen case to court they can do it. This isn't about justice 
for Ms. Larsen. They've had 3 shots at him and they continue 
to do it. We have a general policy - you don't make it but you 
should follow it. When this stuff happens you've got to dismiss. 
There is a matter of policy here and a matter of Mr. Ellington's 
life. If you make us go forward in light of this I don't' feel 
prepared and will request a continuance. 
03:08:48 PM 
The focus of the motion and initial briefing was primarily on the 
Chapman case. The court doesn't have the supervisory 
powers the defense is asking you to yield. Reliance on the 
Chapman case is misplaced. You do have to look at the 
PA McHugh question the court presented to DA- what is the prejudice? He 
says it's critical. The focus seemed to be on did defendant 
have the time to see and avoid Ms. Larsen. The issue isn't was 
she there in front of the Blazer. I've not seen any argument-
we have evidence disclosure - how critical the evidence is is 
not the question. He doesn't tell us why. If he says she couldn't 
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03:13:15 PM 
J 
03:18:05 PM 
DAAdams 
be seen is another issues. I can see how this information can 
be used to cross examine witnesses. To say this shouldn't 
have been disclosed is disingenuous. It should have been 
known- that there was an exclusion- when PA discovered it 
he almost immediately disclosed the information. We point out 
to the court when it came to our attention and that we provided 
it to the defense almost immediately. 
Recognizing your office may not have had a full understanding 
of the reflection and meaning in the report re: "no identification 
effected" does the state agree that the report made it clear that 
Ms. Larsen's prints were excluded. It's frustrating and to have 
to address this issue based on a lack of understanding as to 
what we thought it said and what was reflected in the notes -
well it's just that. I guess that Mr. Adams says that the report 
actually tells us what it's supposed to mean. I don't understand 
what the argument is. The argument that Mr. VerHaren's 
conduct was indicative of his not disclosing information look at 
the e-mail. He didn't have the benefit of reading the report and 
notes but the information was based on a phone call and he 
relayed the information as soon as possible. 
The cases talk about if defendant can receive a fair trial. This 
information is available to the defense and an indication from 
counsel that it's critical with no explanation why and a request 
for continuance. Without further information I'd say the court 
doesn't have supervisory powers the defense suggests it has. 
There was language in the report that didn't adequately reflect 
the exclusion. Absence some further information the court 
should conclude that the defendant can receive a fair trial. 
Dismissal may not be for mere negligence, accidental conduct 
however reckless disregard ... could justify dismissal. The 
best case is reckless disregard. If the trial court can't dismiss 
who can? I don't understand. I'm glad to spend the time to find 
you the authority. It's not a well founded argument. 
You had the 2 men testify that they've been doing this for a 
long time and the routine practice in this case is that there is a 
standard way of doing things. It's Cushman's custom and 
practice to review the report with the PA. Swanson indicated 
the same and PA had been put on notice. This was in 2006 
and he stayed in prison for 6 years which he may not have had 
to do had it not been for the reckless disregard. For them to 
say it's not a due process/Brady violation is contrary to the 6th 
amendment. It's the state and the court's obligation to provide 
him with due process and not mine. The evidence is significant 
~- enough that you saw an experienced police officer look at it 
and shoot his eyes off. Significant enough that he wrote a note 
to the PA and the PA ignored it. 
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03:22:33 PM 
03:23:35 PM 
03:23:59 PM 
03:25:18 PM. 
03:25:29 PM 
03:26:19 p 
03:26:29 PM 
03:27:19 p 
03:27:27 PM 
03:28:03 PM 
03:29:06 PM 
03:29:26 PM 
03:29:52 PM 
03:30:01 PM 
03:30:18 PM 
03:30:51 p 
03:31:07 PM 
03:31:07 PM 
J We still have a few other issues that we've not discussed. I do 
want to take up the issues regarding jury selection. 
PA VerHaren I cannot think of anything re: voir dire 
If you do not suppress then I'll ask for a continuance - this is 
new evidence to consider and liberty is at stake. We should to 
DAAdams sequestered voir dire in chambers to find out if a person is 
qualified as a juror. It's inconvenient but you won't taint a 
whole panel that way. 
i PA VerHaren I guess I misunderstood your question. 
This morning we decided we'd not address the supreme court 
ruling. We may have a jury panel who may have some 
J knowledge of the case or reviewing the newspaper articles 
and I brought this up to determine if counsel have any 
suggestions or questions as to how to handle the jury. 
A VerHaren DA Adams suggestion is a good one. 
DAAdams I think it's important to address our witnesses or counsel and 
ask them to say "past proceeding" and not "last trial". 
PA VerHa~~e no objection. 
J 
DAAdams 
J 
DA Taylor 
J 
IDA 
J 
J 
End 
That's a standard that I have in any proceeding. We'll address 
the witness and indicate that they can say "past proceeding" 
and not "prior trial" I agree that's appropriate. 
At a past Federal retrial the PA brought in a stack of papers of 
transcript and a juror indicated it was obvious that it was a 
retrial due to the transcripts. I ask that the transcripts not be 
available. 
The transcript is very small and I suggest the PA keep it close 
and shield. 
I want to discuss the jury instructions- I know the court will 
instruct re: reasonable doubt and I want the court to give the 
one we used in 2006 
We'll use the one the Supreme Court has adopted. 
I'd like to make the objection on the record before that is done. 
I'll see counsel at 8:30 and we may need to line up another 
courtroom for hearing on the motions. I'll be prepared to rule 
on the motion to dismiss in the morning. 
Recess 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www.fortherecord.com 
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Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20120118 Motion 
II====== 
D 
08:26:28 AM 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth 
Court Reporter Kerii Veare 
PA Art VerHaren 
PA Barry McHugh 
DA Anne Taylor 
DA John Adams 
J 
ocation 
Note 
Calls case- counsel present with defendant- not in custody. The 
case is set for jury trial to commence at 9:00am. At the hearing 
yesterday the court took a motion to dismiss under advisement. 
The request is to dismiss for egregious prosecutorial conduct 
citing State vs. Chapman. The due process needs to be reviewed 
under Brady and Chapman. The issue revolves around the very 
late disclosure of evidence which was obtained by the ISP Lab in 
Meridian by Gary Cushman who had been assigned to do a 
fingerprint analysis. The state had removed palm prints from the 
hood of the Blazer and sent them in with known palm prints of the 
deceased which were analyses by Cushman. In his report he 
submitted a conclusion that no identification was effected. This 
was forwarded to the state. The information was submitted to the 
defense and a stipulation sent to the court - trial proceeded and a 
conviction with reversal. 
12 days prior to trial PA discovered that Cushman's report 
included certain notes that had not been disclosed to PA at the 
2007 trial. That information was relayed to Taylor and that 
information is the basis for the motion to dismiss. The palm prints 
were analyzed and the value is not comparable to Ms. Larsen 
also that the palm is negative to the Larsen prints. The court 
conducted a hearing with Cushman and the report that was 
prepared in 2007 and provided prior to trial stated no identification 
was effected which lead DA to indicate it was inconclusive and 
was of very little value. The case report shows it was exclusive of 
Ms. Larsen's palm prints on the vehicle. The issue needs to be 
evaluated under Brady and Chapman. 
Brady- due process exists (relates standard) There seems to be 
a stipulation that the evidence was exculpatory or impeaching. 
The evidence does not corroborate the testimony from the Larsen 
family who viewed the incident. This took place over a period of a 
few seconds. Ms. Larsen was a rather short individual next to the 
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Ellington vehicle. The court acknowledges under Brad 
08:37:07 AM PA Nothing further McHugh 
08:37:15 AM DA You don't have the power? Did I hear you right? Adams 
08:37:27 AM J I analyzed Brady and found a violation but that he now has the information and can use it at the new triai. 
08:37:49 AM I hope I understand what you're saying. Based on your ruling I'll 
ask for a continuance as newly discovered evidence - 6 days - 3 
of which were holidays and the balance of 3 days we've spent 2 
DA with you. We have accident reconstruction people that we have to 
Adams have look at this. We have always believed this to be correct but 
didn't have the evidence to give our experts and now we do. I'd 
like to see if we can get an interlocutory appeal on this. Motion to 
continue - at least 2 weeks. 
08:37:51 AM 
08:39:19 AM We object to the motion. Evidence submitted in the past has 
indicated that Ms. Larsen was standing at the time she was struck 
and there was no contrary evidence. This just supports the 
PA evidence that there is no verifiable print. I don't know that and also 
McHugh the defense experts won't testify for probably a week and there is time for them to digest that. We'll deal with their conclusion as it 
comes. We argue that the theories forwarded so far would not 
justify a different opinion. As to an interlocutory appeal -the trial 
court can take it up at another time. We're here and ready for trial. 
08:41:10 AM DA We have opening statements and cross examination and we can't 
Adams wait 2 weeks for that. 
08:41:28 AM There is no argument that this is late discovery and limited time 
for the defense to digest the information. The court sees it as a 
failure to corroborate the state's theory. The defense disputed the 
theory and now there is evidence that may reinforce that theory 
but doesn't significantly change the landscape of the trial. I don't 
J find sufficient showing to continue the trial. Defendant should be 
in a position to secure a fair trial. An interlocutory appeal would be 
permissive and there is no indication that the supreme court 
would take that up. We should continue to trial. If further defects 
occur then Def can put the evidence together for appeal. We'll 
proceed to jury selection. 
08:43:46 AM PA One motion in limine was a motion to exclude expert testimony re: 
VerHaren defendant intending to hit Ms. Ellington and we'd like a ruling 
08:44:13 AM Rule 704 specifically provides that just because the expert is 
DA giving the opinon and it's a jury's determination doesn't preclude 
Adams him from giving the opinion. We have 2 writings and a verbal -
they both concluded that the evidence doesn't point to him 
intentionally striking Ms. Larsen. We believe that's admissible 
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08:45:54AM J 
08:46:12 AM 
InA T~ .. J 
L..l'rl. I QJIVI 
08:47:20 AM PA 
McHugh 
08:48:21 AM 
I 
J 
08:49:17 AM PA 
McHugh 
08:49:47 AM 
J 
08:50:37 AM PA Taylor 
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evidence and should not be precluded. The rules of evidence 
specifically allow it- it's the state's experts opinion. 
This was left on the table yesterday and I had forgotten about it. 
I'll get you a ruling later. 
I want to go back to the palm print issue - there were 2 prints and 
1 finger print from the Blazer. The palm prints were excluded and 
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let the state talk about the finger print as we have nothing to 
compare it to. We don't have time to get an exclusion. 
If we're talking about not talking about the lifted print as being 
inconclusive 
The issue is clear - we're not going to talk about the finger print at 
all. If the state will offer the print about possibly belonging to Ms. 
Larsen then I'd have to give the defense a continue- the·fair thing 
to do is leave the finger print out of the proceedings. We'll not talk 
about the fingerprint at all. 
We have a couple of photos we've talked about that have 
fingerprint dust- I want to know the scope. We don't have a 
problem with the idea but I want to know the full scope. 
I don't have a problem with photos - finger print dust and the hood 
- but it's the end of the story and we'll not mention the finger print 
and neither will the defense as to why the state didn't take 
fingerprint. I don't think it's alarming that a hood of a vehicle would 
have hand or finger prints on it. 
I want to discuss the instructions before you give them. I don't 
care if we wait to do that. 
I have prepared the instructions including charging instruction we 
used last time. I'll give you copies and we'll discuss before we 
give any instructions to the jury. 
I have 4 requested - reasonable doubt given in 2006. 
Contact the clerk and she can make copies 
I don't want information re: blood alcohol, suspended license or 
bench warrant until we discuss them. 
Fine - I'll sit 3 additional jurors with 39 jurors in the box - 12 
challenges per side. We'll have 15 jurors in this case. 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www .fortherecord .com 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
----------------------------
CASE NUMBER CR-
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL, MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT 
COMES NOW, Jonathan Wade Ellington, by and through his attorney, Anne C. Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and hereby submits this Motion for Mistrial, Motion to Dismiss and 
Memorandum in Support. 
ISSUE 
1. The State's Repeated Flagrant Misconduct Directly Violated This Court's Pre-Trial 
Rulings and Mr. Ellington's Right to a Fair Trial Under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution Article I 
§ 13. 
2. The State's Outrageous Conduct Mandates a Mistrial and Dismissal of the Information. 
FACTS 
At a hearing on Mr. Ellington's pretrial Motion to Dismiss (filed January 13, 2012) on 
January 14, 2012, this court made an oral ruling that prohibited the State from mentioning any 
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"fingerprint" evidence that was obtained from Mr. Ellington's vehicle in January and February of 
2006. In addition, the court heard motions in limine at a hearing on January 14, 2012, wherein 
the court granted Mr. Ellington's motion to prohibit the prosecution from utilizing improper 
questions that appeal to the emotion or inflame the passions of the jurors. 
However, the prosecutor nonetheless violated these pre-trial rulings on several occasions 
during trial on January 21, 2012. On more than six occasions during his direct and redirect 
examination ofMr. Larsen, the prosecutor used versions of the phrase "running over your wife," 
including: "after your wife got run over," "after the Blazer struck your wife," "after your wife 
was run over," "before your wife was struck," "before she was run over," and when your "wife 
was struck." See also State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53,253 P.3d 727 (2011). 
Likewise, the prosecutor violated the court's order when he began redirect examination 
of the witness on the stand, Detective Maskell, by inquiring about what "fingerprint evidence" he 
discovered. Defense counsel's objection to such improper questioning in violation of this court's 
pretrial order was sustained, however, the court denied defense counsel's subsequent motion for 
a mistrial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Prosecutor's Repeated Flagrant Misconduct Violates Mr. Ellington's Due 
Process Rights and Requires a Mistrial. 
The prosecutor has continued to completely disregard this court's pretrial oral rulings, 
prohibiting any questioning involving "fingerprint evidence," the improper questioning that 
uses the inflammatory phraseology of "run over your wife," and the prosecutor has likewise 
disregarded the Idaho Supreme Court's recognition that such commentary constitutes 
prosecutorial misconduct when it evaluated this same prosecutor for the same conduct in 
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State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727, 737 (2011). 1 A "mistrial may be declared 
upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in 
the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the 
defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial." Ellington, 253 P .3d at 7 42 (citing Idaho 
Criminal Rule 29.1(a)). "Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless 
in and of themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial." Ellington, 253 
P.3d at 744 (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 230). The Ellington court noted, "that when ruling on 
a motion for mistrial brought after an instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct, the 
district court should not limit its view of the misconduct to the specific isolated incident, but 
should also take into consideration whether or not the prosecutor is engaging in a pattern of 
misbehavior." Id. at 744-75 (emphasis added). 
Likewise, "[a] prosecutor should not knowingly and for the purpose of bringing 
inadmissible matter to the attention of the judge or jury offer inadmissible evidence, ask 
legally objectionable questions, or make other impermissible comments or arguments in the 
presence ofthejury." State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809,819 n. 4 839 P.2d 1223 (Ct. App. 1992) 
(citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, STANDARD 
3-5 .5(B) (1992) ). In addition: 
Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, and 
that they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more 
1 Not only has this prosecutor violated the court's order, and ignored the Idaho Supreme Court's 
admonishment for using such improper questioning, the prosecutor has violated the Idaho Rules 
of Professional Conduct 3.4(c), which provides that a lawyer shall not "knowingly disobey an 
obligation under the rules of a tribunal." 
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credence to their statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in 
the presence of the jury than they will give to counsel for the accused. It seems that 
they frequently exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon 
the verge of error, and generally in so doing they transgress upon the rights of the 
accused. It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair trial, and 
that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to the jury, and above all things 
he should guard against anything that would prejudice the minds of the jurors, and 
tend to hinder them from considering only the evidence introduced. 
State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 156 P.3d 583 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 
35, 43-44, 71 P. 608 (1903)). 
The prosecutor in current case is the same prosecutor whose conduct was 
admonished in the Ellington opinion. While this fact in and of itself may not be 
grounds for dismissal, the prosecutor has continued to demonstrate reluctance to obey 
court orders and try the case based on the facts instead of the jurors' emotions. The 
Ellington court recognized: 
From a review of the record in this case it seems that the prosecutor was 
attempting to use every opportunity possible to appeal to the passions and 
prejudices of the jurors, including ignoring warnings and admonitions by the 
judge to try the case based on the facts. While the isolated instances of 
misconduct and evidentiary error in this case may not rise to the level of 
reversible error, we implore district courts to take into account all the factors 
surrounding a motion for mistlial, particularly in an emotionally charged trial 
such as this one where there are several indicators that the prosecutor is 
attempting to try the case based on emotion. 
Ellington, 253 P.3d at 745. See also State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 684, 227 P.3d 
933, (Ct. App. 2010). 
In this case, the prosecutor has exhibited a pattern of improper behavior by ignoring the 
court's orders and failing to modify his approach from the last trial. For example, in this trial 
(similar to the last) on approximately six occasions the prosecutor improperly used versions 
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of the phrase "ran over your wife," on direct and redirect examination ofMr. Larsen. As the 
Ellington court recognized, 
the prosecutor could have very easily made the same points and elicited the exact 
same testimony from Mr. Larsen by phrasing the questions in a less inflammatory 
way. Repeatedly reiterating the image of Mr. Ellington "running over" Mr. Larsen's 
"wife" was wholly unnecessary. While a prosecutor "may strike hard blows, he is not 
at liberty to strike foul ones." 
Ellington, 253 P.3d at 737 (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)) (emphasis 
! added). 
Given the examples ofprosecutorial misconduct in the procedural history of this case, 
demonstrated again in trial on January 17, 2012, this "accumulation of irregularities, each of 
which might be harmless in itself, may in the aggregate reveal the absence of a fair trial in 
contravention ofthe defendant's right to due process." Erickson, 148 Idaho at 686. 
Accordingly, even if the prosecutor again attempts to shift any responsibility to another 
party, or claims the questioning was made by mistake, this court must examine the 
prosecutor's actions as a whole and find that such conduct, in aggregate, constitutes 
prosecutorial misconduct such that a mistrial is warranted. 
II. The State Invited Error by Violating the Court's Orders and Goading Mr. 
Ellington to Move for Mistrial, Thus Double Jeopardy Mandates Dismissal of the 
Information. 
Double jeopardy attaches when a jury is sworn under both the Idaho and federal 
Constitutions. State v. Stevens, 126 Idaho 822, 825-26 (1995). Double jeopardy of the 5th 
Amendment of the federal Constitution applies to the States through the 14th Amendment. 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1963). The Idaho Constitution has its own double 
jeopardy clause in Art. 1 § 13. "The double jeopardy clauses in the Idaho and federal 
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constitutions prohibit putting one in jeopardy twice for the same crime. This protection applies 
not only to multiple punishments, but also to multiple prosecutions for the same crimes." State v. 
Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 343 (2005). 
In this case, Mr. Ellington has already been tried and convicted. The current case before 
the Court is a retrial ordered by the Idaho Supreme Court. Therefore, Mr. Ellington is being 
placed in jeopardy a second time for the same charges and the double jeopardy bar should apply 
unless Mr. Ellington waived his right or the reversal of his first trial was the equivalent of 
"[wiping] the slate clean." NC. v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,721 (1969); see also State v. Hansen, 
127 Idaho 675, 679 (Ct.App.1995). 
More importantly, however, pursuant to the double jeopardy clause in the United States 
Constitution there is an exception that applies to the waiver and usual effect of a reversal where 
the state committed misconduct with the intent to cause a mistrial, which is the case here. 
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673 (1982). "[R]etrial is barred where the error that prompted 
the mistrial is intended to provoke a mistrial or is motivated by bad faith or undertaken to harass 
or prejudice the defendant." !d. at 670. 
The Idaho Constitution provides more protection against government malfeasance and 
therefore has a broader exception to waiver and usual effect of a reversal where the prosecutor 
intentionally committed misconduct to avoid an acquittal. See State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 
988 (1992); State v. Sharp, 104 Idaho 691 (1983); see also People v. Batts, 68 P.3d 357, 360 
(Cal. 2003). Mr. Ellington's second trial should be dismissed as violating the bar against double 
jeopardy under both the federal and the Idaho Constitution due to the prosecutorial misconduct 
that occurred in the first trial. 
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"The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: 'Nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy oflife or limb."' Thompkins v. McKune, No. 11-3022,2011 WL 
3555415 at *3 (Kan.2011) quoting Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 727-28 (1998) (quoting 
U.S. Const. amend. V). A double jeopardy bar is a rare remedy for governmental misconduct. 
See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673 (1982). The rarity of the application of double 
jeopardy is due to the fact that the vast majority of cases involving governmental misconduct 
leading to a mistrial are by necessity the product of a motion by the defendant. !d. at 672. Thus, 
when a defendant is confronted by governmental misconduct and moves for a mistrial, the 
motion is interpreted as a waiver of the defendant's right to be tried before that particular 
tribunal. !d. The waiver does not apply, however, "where the prosecutor's actions giving rise to 
the motion for mistrial were done 'in order to goad the [defendant] into requesting a mistrial."'. 
!d. at 673, quoting US. v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976). 
The Supreme Court has never held that, in a case involving government misconduct 
acknowledged by an appellate Court, unless the case was set for new trial on the basis of the 
mistrial motion, the double jeopardy bar cannot apply. The Supreme Court has held that in cases 
of reversal on appeal the "slate [is] wiped clean" and there is no bar to retrial except in the case 
of insufficient evidence. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 442 (1981) quoting N.C. v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 721 (1969), citing Burks v. US., 471 U.S. 1 (1978). Without referencing 
the Bullington line of cases, some Courts have interpreted Kennedy to imply a successful mistrial 
motion is a requirement for a Kennedy double jeopardy bar. In US. v. McAleer, 138 F.3d 852, 
856 (1Oth Cir. 1998) quoting Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673, the Court held that 
[t]he Kennedy prosecutorial misconduct exception is a narrow one, designed to 
protect the defendant's right to "have his trial completed before the first jury 
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empaneled [sic} to try him. " Without this exception a prosecutor could 
intentionally provoke a defendant into requesting a mistrial and the defendant 
would then be prevented from later invoking a double jeopardy bar to his retrial. 
Such a result would render a defendant's "valued right to complete his trial 
before the first jury" a "hollow shell. " Id. Defendants, however, do not require 
such protection because without the declaration of a mistrial, they were not 
deprived of their "valued right" to have their case submitted to the first jury, and 
perhaps have the dispute end with an acquittal. For these reasons, we conclude 
that the mistrial exception for prosecutorial misconduct set forth in Kennedy 
simply does not apply to Defendants. 
A number of Courts have followed this reasoning in rejecting double jeopardy claims. See Walls 
v. Hemmingway, 27 Fed.Appx. 553 at *3 (6th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Elmardoudi, 611 F.Supp.2d 864, 
870 (N.D.Iowa 2007); State v. Dumars, 154 P.3d 1120, 1128 (Kan.App. 2007). 
McAleer's reasoning, however, has not gone unchallenged. In U.S. v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 
(2d Cir.1992), the Second Circuit stated that under the narrow circumstances that a prosecutor set out 
specifically to avoid an acquittal, double jeopardy may be implicated regardless of whether there was 
a successful motion for mistrial. 
If any extension a/Kennedy beyond the mistrial context is warranted, it 
would be a bar to retrial only where the misconduct of the prosecutor is 
undertaken, not simply to prevent an acquittal, but to prevent an acquittal that 
the prosecutor believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of his 
misconduct. If jeopardy bars a retrial where a prosecutor commits an act of 
misconduct with the intention of provoking a mistrial motion by the defendant, 
there is a plausible argument that the same result should obtain where he does so 
with the intent to avoid an acquittal he then believes is likely. The prosecutor 
who acts with the intention of goading the defendant into making a mistrial 
motion presumably does so because he believes that completion of the trial will 
likely result in an acquittal. That aspect of the Kennedy rationale suggests 
precluding retrial where a prosecutor apprehends an acquittal and, instead of 
provoking a mistrial, avoids the acquittal by an act of deliberate misconduct. 
Indeed, ifKennedy is not extended to this limited degree, a prosecutor 
apprehending an acquittal encounters the jeopardy bar to retrial when he 
engages in misconduct of sufficient visibility to precipitate a mistrial motion, but 
not when he fends off the anticipated acquittal by misconduct of which the 
defendant is unaware until after the verdict. There is no justification for that 
distinction. 
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I d. 
To be sure, McAleer's insistence on a successful mistrial does not seem to be in line with the spirit of 
the Kennedy exception. No explanation is given why prosecutorial misconduct aimed at causing a 
mistrial but ignored by a Court and allowed to successfully, though improperly, convict a defendant, 
should not be a bar to retrial when that conviction is eventually overturned. If the purpose of the Kennedy 
exception is to protect the double jeopardy protection from becoming a hollow shell due to prosecutor 
misconduct designed to violate it, that conduct should bar retrial whether or not it successfully 
accomplishes a mistrial or worse convicts a defendant in a manner repugnant to the rule of law. Indeed, 
Wallach has been accepted by the First Circuit as well as many States. People v. Batts, 68 P.3d 357, 380 
n.26 (Cal. 2003) (accepting the Wallach approach for California). 
The 5th Amendment bar for double jeopardy in cases of prosecutorial misconduct applies to Mr. 
Ellington. McAleer's strictly narrow interpretation of Kennedy does not serve either the best interests of 
Americans or the spirit of the Constitution. Wallach is the correct application of the law because it takes 
into account the possibility of prosecutorial misconduct intended to cause a mistrial but allowed instead to 
cause a conviction. In such cases, of which Mr. Ellington's is one, stubborn insistence on McAleer's 
narrow rule would vitiate the protections of the Constitution against the very thing the Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights were written and intended to combat- Government Malfeasance. Wallach is therefore 
the only possible way to interpret Kennedy and the Constitution, and Mr. Ellington's case is one to which 
the Kennedy rule applies. 
In addition, the Idaho Constitution bars double jeopardy separately from the United States 
Constitution. Idaho Const. Art. 1 § 13 ("No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense .. 
. "). Idaho Courts take a broad view of when Kennedy's mistrial exception comes into play. In State v. 
Hansen, 127 Idaho 675, 679 (Ct.App.1995), the Court of Appeals held that there was "no logical 
distinction ... in reference to their import for double jeopardy purposes, between seeking a mistrial and 
requesting that a jury be stricken and the case dismissed." However, Idaho has never stated whether Art. 
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1 § 13 does or does not bar retrial in a case of reversal. See State v. Byington, 139 Idaho 516, 518 n.1 
(Ct.App.2003). Nor has Idaho ever considered the question of whether a case where the Idaho Supreme 
Court found willful prosecutorial misconduct but overturned on other grounds implicates the double 
jeopardy bar in the Idaho Constitution. 
In State v. Sharp, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled on the applicability of Kennedy to a case where 
the defendant's request for a mistrial was denied and in fact the trial had merely been continued and no 
acquittal or conviction of any kind been entered. 104 Idaho 691 (1983) (overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884 (1984)). While the decision in Sharp has been criticized for its failure to 
recognize the procedural posture of the case by Justice Bistline in his dissenting opinions in Sharp and 
Alanis, the continuing implication of the holding in Sharp is that in Idaho a request for a mistrial will 
receive review under Kennedy. See Alanis, 109 Idaho at 898 (J. Bistline dissenting); Sharp, 104 Idaho at 
695 (1983). 
The Supreme Court's holding in Sharp is supported by the decisions of other states. In State v. 
Jorgenson, 10 P.3d 1177, 1179 (Az.2000), the Supreme Court of Arizona rejected the "plurality rule" of 
Kennedy. The Arizona Supreme Court stated 
Application of double jeopardy is not only doctrinally correct when 
egregious and intentional prosecutorial misconduct has prevented 
acquittal, it is also required as a matter of pragmatic necessity. Any 
other result would be an invitation to the occasional unscrupulous or 
overzealous prosecutor to try any tactic, no matter how improper, 
knowing that there is little to lose if he or she can talk an indulgent trial 
judge out of a mistrial. The worst that could then happen is reversal for a 
new trial and another shot at a conviction. This, of course, is exactly the 
type of governmental abuse at which the double jeopardy clause was 
aimed. 
!d. at 1180. Jorgenson cited the decisions of various other states supporting its decision. 
!d. at 1179 citing State v. Rogan, 984 P.2d 1231, 1250 (Hi.1999); State v. Breit, 930 P.2d 
792, 806-7 (N.M. 1996); State v. Colton, 663 A.2d 339, 347 (Ct. 1995); Commonwealth 
v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 322-23 (Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v. Murchinson, 465 N.E.2d 
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256, 258 (Mass. 1984); Collier v. State, 747 P.2d 225 (Nev. 1987); State v. Cochran, 751 
P.2d 1194 (Wash.App.1988). 
Idaho should continue the precedent set by Sharp and follow Jorgenson and the other states 
holding that in cases involving prosecutorial misconduct, review can be made on double jeopardy grounds 
regardless of whether the defendant's motion for mistrial was successful. This broader protection for 
Idaho citizens is not only a pragmatic shield necessary to ward off governmental misconduct, but best 
interprets Art. 1 § 13 of the Idaho Constitution and values for which it stands. Certainly, the same Idaho 
Constitution which demanded better protection for its citizens as regards police misconduct, even in good 
faith, in following a warrant, cannot possibly be said to afford those same citizens no protection from the 
costs and anxieties of retrial where the prosecution and government have acted in bad faith to undermine 
their rights. It is particularly difficult to see how a contrary decision would maintain judicial integrity 
where the appellate court has stated in its opinion that a prosecutorial pattern of misbehavior exists on the 
record. Therefore, Mr. Ellington is afforded the protection of Art. 1 § 13 against his retrial which is the 
result of prosecutorial misconduct. 
The United States Supreme Court held in Kennedy that where a prosecutor has by misconduct 
forced a defendant to ask for a mistrial in order to prevent an acquittal, retrial is barred by double 
jeopardy. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673. Courts applying Kennedy often look to the strength of the 
prosecution's case. See U.S v. Pavloyianis, 996 F.2d 1467, 1474 (2d. Cir. 1993); Wallach, 979 F.2d at 
916. Courts also look to see if the prosecution's actions were "malevolent." !d. at 917. 
For example, in Pavloyianis, the 2nd Circuit held there was no intent by the prosecution to force a 
mistrial. Pavloyianis, 996 F.2d at 1474. In that case, the prosecution used a witness who peijured 
testimony on a collateral issue of the extent ofthe defendant's involvement in a drug ring. !d. The Court 
found that the prosecution had a strong case regardless and that there was no indication that the 
prosecution was concerned. !d. In State v. Pugsley, 128 Idaho 168, 173-74 (Ct.App. 1995), the Appeals 
Court held that under the Kennedy rule, the defendant had not proved intentional misconduct because the 
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district court found that the police had accidentally misplaced a videotape and therefore neither the police 
nor the prosecution had the requisite intent. 
Many other states have rejected the Kennedy rule. The California Supreme Court commented in 
People v. Batts, 68 P.3d 357, 360 (Cal. 2003) 
the standard adopted by the federal high court in Kennedy has been 
widely viewed as unduly narrow and as not fully protective of the interest 
that the double jeopardy clause was intended to safeguard, and in the 
two decades since Kennedy was decided a number of state courts have 
interpreted the double jeopardy guarantee of their own state 
constitutions as embodying a broader protection. 
The California Supreme Court went on to hold that 
the state double jeopardy clause also may bar retrial when the 
prosecution, believing (in view of events that occurred during trial) that 
a defendant is likely to secure an acquittal at that trial, knowingly and 
intentionally commits misconduct in order to thwart such an acquittal. 
!d. at 360-61. 
The California Supreme Court cited support in part from a wide range of academic papers calling 
the Kennedy rule "inadequate because it protects only a very narrow range of a defendant's legitimate 
double jeopardy interests." !d. at 375-6. The California Supreme Court also found that as of 2003, 
several other states had adopted broader tests. !d. at 376 (citing State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 
1316, 1326 (1983) (Kennedy II); Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 677 P.2d 261, 271-272 (1984); 
Com. v. Smith, 532 Pa. 177, 615 A.2d 321, 325 (1992); State v. Breit, 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792, 803 
(1996)). In addition, some state appellate courts have rejected Kennedy. See People v. Dawson, 397 
N.W.2d 277 (Mich. App. 1986); State v. White, 354 S.E.2d 324 (N.C. App. 1987). 
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The California Supreme Court developed its own test because the tests of other states failed to 
adequately support their rules with the interests that double jeopardy seeks to protect. The Court held that 
the interest at issue had to be a defendant's right to be tried by that particular tribunal, now violated by an 
overbearing prosecutor. The Court found that in Batts, the prosecution had set out to prevent an acquittal 
but had not intended a mistrial when it engaged in misconduct. The Court then wrote: 
The federal test's application to the facts of this case . .. illustrates the 
narrow scope and limitations of that test. Had the prosecutors 
intentionally committed their misconduct not to cause a mistrial, but 
instead to improperly prejudice the jury to convict in order to avoid a 
likely acquittal, the prosecutors' misconduct clearly would implicate 
defendants' double jeopardy interests, which, as we have seen, include a 
defendant's " ' "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular 
tribunal. " ' "And yet that aspect of a defendant's double jeopardy 
interests lies outside the high court's narrow test, and is unprotected by 
it. Because the state double jeopardy clause is implicated when a 
prosecutor, believing that a particular jury is likely to return an 
acquittal, intentionally commits misconduct in order to improperly 
prejudice the jury and obtain a conviction-and because the majority's 
narrow test in Kennedy fails to protect that aspect of a defendant's 
double jeopardy interests-we conclude that the federal test, standing 
alone, is insufficient to protect interests that our state Constitution's 
double jeopardy clause is intended to safeguard. 
!d. at 376 (internal citation omitted). See also Government Overreaching, 69 Cornell L. 
Rev. 76, 81. 
The Californian bar to double jeopardy is similar, if slightly weaker than, the Idaho bar. The 
California Constitution Art. I. § 15 states "Persons may not twice be put in jeopardy for the same 
offense .... " cf. Idaho Canst. Art. 1 § 13 ("No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense .. 
. ").The Idaho Supreme Court has also held that double jeopardy protects a person's "valued right to have 
the trial completed by a particular jury ... " State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 344 (2005). Considering the 
similarity of the Idaho and California Constitutions, the test developed by the California Supreme Court 
in Batts is also the proper test under Idaho Const. Art. 1 § 13. 
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Moreover, the Idaho Constitution is a bulwark against improper police actions even where made 
in good faith. See Guzman. It would be manifestly absurd for that same Constitution to now tum a blind 
eye to intentional governmental misconduct designed to rob a citizen of a "valued right." Therefore, Mr. 
Ellington's case may not be retried because the prosecution in this trial engaged in misconduct designed 
to prevent an acquittal, regardless of whether it was designed to cause a mistrial. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ellington respectfully requests that this court grant his Motion for Mistrial and 
Motion to Dismiss the Information. 
Interoffice Mail 
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL, MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
BY: 
THE LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC 
OF KOOTENAI COUNTY 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CASE NO. CR- 06-1497 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ORDER RE: MONUMENT I 
MEMORIAL REMOVAL 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
Barry McHugh and Arthur W. Verharen, Kootenai County Prosecuting 
Attorney's Office, for Plaintiff State of Idaho. 
John Adams and Anne C. Taylor, Law Office of the Kootenai County 
Public Defender, for Defendant Jonathan Wade Ellington. 
BASED on the information provided by the Defendant in support of his motion for 
jury view and second motion in jury view, and the agreement of the parties: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Kootenai County Court Security Officers 
appointed to this case as acting bailiffs shall remove from W Scarcella Road, and the 
adjacent properties, any monument or memorial. Removal must occur on January 26, 
2012, before the jury in this matter arrives to view the locations designated by this 
Court. 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that after the jury in this matter has viewed the 
locations designated by this Court, the Kootenai County Court Security Officers 
appointed to this case as acting bailiffs shall replace any monument or memorial 
removed as directed above. Replacement of any monument or memorial must occur by 
January 26, 2012, by 5:00 p.m. 
'""""' DATED this 2.~ day of January 2012. 
~~ Dc:t:Jd...X::: 
John Patrick Luster 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER RE: 
MONUMENT I MEMORIAL REMOVAL was sent by U.~~· postage prepaid, sent by 
facsimile transmission, or sent by interoffice mail on th day of January, 2012, to 
the following: 
KOOTENAI COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
Barry McHugh and Arthur Verharen 
Hand Delivery 
LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER OF KOOTENAI COUNTY 
Anne C. Taylor and John Adams 
Hand Delivery 
COURT SECURITY OFFICER 
Pete Barns 
Hand Delivery 
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Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20120118 Jury Trial Day 1 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth )J Court Reporter Keri Veare PA Art VerHaren 7\ J D.O. R.:~~rn1 l\.llr-k111nh 
I I' LJ'UIIJ IYIUI 1\ ... ~11 I \ L .. · I 
DAAnne Taylor ~ \W c DA John Adams J \l ' 
Date 1/18/20121 Location 111 K-COUR~QC>r\[t/ 
' 
Time I Speaker II Note I 
08: 11 : 11 AM I 
09:08:17 AM ID Calls case - PA McHugh, PA VerHaren, DA Taylor, DA Adams 
present for trial 
09:08:33 AM PA Ready VerHaren 
09:08:37 AM DA Taylor I Ready 
09:11:31 AM J I Comments to jurors re: jury duty responsibility 
09:14:10 AM c I Swears jurors for voir dire 
09:27:37 AM Draws #53 Montanez, #7 4 Smith #12 Carney #17 Davis #36 
I 
Jones #28 Hallsted #14 Chaney #85 Weiss #13 Carver #70 
' Scarborough #29 Halterman #20 Donoian #76 Spyker #90 
c Wooten #67 Rickert #19 Detienne #57 Paciotti-Habour #8 Bowser #11 Campney #48 Mclaughlin #83 Temple #31 Hess #5 Becker 
#24 Gibbons #25 Greer #1 Ad ira #51 Miller #6 Boise #2 Anderson 
#89 Wood #32 Hindberg #37 Kirking #60 Pederson #21 Edwrds 
#78 Stout #1 0 Brown #39 Lariccia #82 Taylor #52 Mize 
09:30:18 AM PA Introduces self and lists witnesses VerHaren 
09:31:52 AM DAAnne Introduces self, co-counsel, defendant and defense team and lists 
Taylor witnesses 
09:34:08 AM j Bailiff to attend to those jurors who failed to appear. General Voir 
Dire Excuses juror #67 Rickert for cause 
:51 AM c Draws #80 Swearingen 
09:46:14 AM J nues voir dire 
09:51:34 AM PA Voir Dire Challenge #57 Paciotti-Harbour for cause VerHaren 
09:58:38 AM J #57 Paciotti-Harbour 
I 
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09:58:59 AM DA Questions #57 - object to challenge Adams 
10:01:09 AM J II Questions #57 - EXCUSED FOR CAUSE 
10:03:38 A:JI C J~ws #84 Ward 
0:03:47 A J Voir Dire #84 Ward - EXCUSED FOR CAUSE 
0:04:22 A~ C Draws #9 Briggs 
I 10:05:09 AM J Voir Dire #9 Briggs - no affirmative response 
10:05:24 AM PA Voir Dire continues 
10:17:23 AM Voir Dire jurors re: knowledge of case. PA can proceed - it's 
J important to have the perspective jurors - we'll at 10:30 and we'll 
take a recess- I'll visit with counsel before we return. RECESS 
10:18:49 AM 
10:46:15 AM Back in session - the case involved has some notoriety and has 
been in the newspapers and possibly television. We need jurors 
who can set aside information that they have and listen to_ the 
evidence and apply the law to the facts that they determine. This 
is a case where defendant is charged with 2nd degree murder 
and 2 counts of aggravated battery occurring New Years Day 
2006 on the Rathdrum Prairie Highway 49 and Scarcella Road. 
The 2 Larsen girls were operating their Honda and had contact 
with def. They called law enforcement and they followed the 
defendant for some time. Their parents also arrived and ultimately 
there was a situation where Ellington vehicle turned around, had 
contact with one then the other Larsen vehicles and as he drove 
away Ms. Larsen the mother was in the road and she was struck 
and ultimately died of the injuries. It's up to the state to prove the 
I charges to you beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant is entitled 
.J to a fair trial solely on the evidence in court and not on any thing 
you've read in the papers. You'll be instructed to not read papers, 
watch TV discuss with your family or with each other about this 
case. You can't help the fact that you may know something about 
the case by reading it in the newspapers. We've had several 
hands raised. I don't want anyone discussing what you know or 
think you know about the case in front of the other jurors - of 
those of you who raised your hand when asked if you know about 
the case - regardless of the source of your information who feels 
that they don't feel they can be fair or have some reservations if 
they could be fair or set that aside and not let that impact their 
ability to be fair and impartial. 3 hands raised. I assume that the 
rest of you haven't read much or don't believe or will put it out of 
your mind and only consider what you hear in this case. We'll visit 
with juror who raised hands separately in chambers. RECESS 
·~J *'ck in chambers Juror #85 Weiss Excused . .v£ 
6: c __,__,_,.. 1::).,.\/ 
- - ··- • ·-7 
II 
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111:47:04 AM IIJ I #25 Greer Excused 
111:47:17 AM lie I Draws #44 Lund 
111:47:22 AM I J Juror #52 Mize excused 
11:47:38 AM c Draws #15 Corbett 
11:47:45 AM J Voir Dire #64 Ray 
11:49:35 AM PA Continues Voir Dire Challenge #15 Corbett for cause 
12:06:34 PM J Questions #15 Corbett- deny challenge. RECESS RETURN AT 1 :30 Admonishes jury 
01:26:02 PM J Back in session 
01:26:06 PM Bailiff We're missing jurors 
01:26:14 PM J Recess 
. 01 :26:23 PM J Back in session PA to continue voir dire 
01:32:27 PM PAArt Continues voir dire Challenge #83 Temple for cause VerHaren 
01:37:47 PM IJ I Voir Dire #83 Temple 
01:40:11 PM DAJohn Voire Dire #83 Temple - I don't think that will be a problem for us. Adams 
01:40:41 PM IJ I Approach bench - side bar -
01:42:01 PM IJ I Voir Dire #83 Temple- deny challenge continue voir dire 
01:47:44 PM PAArt Continues voir dire VerHaren 
02:05:50 PM D Voir Dire #60 Pederson - PA Art VerHaren to continue and when you pass the jury it can be done absent Mr. Pederson and we'll talk to him in chambers. Proceed 
02:06:58 PM PAArt Continues voir dire - pass for cause with the exclusion of Mr. 
VerHaren Pederson 
02:09:37 PM DAJohn Voir Dire - ask juror #7 4 Smith be excused Adams 
·1 .. r-n PMlrJ 
• >.}, Jt:. Voir Dire #7 4 Smith EXCUSED FOR CAUSE 
02:17:34 PM c Draws #56 Nachtwey 
02:17:41 PM I Voir Dire #56 Nachtwey 
"' 
02:22:34 PM DAJohn Continues voir dire Challenge #1 0 Brown for cause Adams 
02:26:55 PM J Voir Dires #1 0 Brown - EXCUSED FOR CAUSE 
02:35:54 p In-..... ·~ #34 Johnson-Stafford 
02:36:28 PM DA John Challenge #53 Montanez for cause Adams 
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02:36:38 PM J !Excused I 
~J2:37:04 PM c Draw #41 Leuer 
J2·37·1n nu J Voir Dire #41 Leuer • • IV lVI. 
02:38:07 PM DAJohn Continues Voir Dire Adams 
0?:57:38 PM PAArt Objection to the line of questioning VerHaren 
:57:46 PM J J~rect your line of questioning 
02:57:55 PM DA John Continues voir dire Adams 
03:03:49 PM PAArt Objection VerHaren 
03:03:55 p • ~' ,.,+..,ined 
03:03:59 PM DA John Continues voir dire Adams 
03:22:20 J I Voir Dire juror Hess - Excuses juror Hess - reset to another ti•••c 11 
03:2J.£"t c ~-~~,_.hi Tr"- I I , ... Jg 
~·26:10 J re #37 Hess - no affirmative response. RECESS 
:26:..: J j~on 
03:58:56 p Draws #71 Schau (for #8 Bowser excused in chambers) 
03:59:39 PM J General Voir Dire with #71 Schau - EXCUSED FOR CAUSE 
04:01:21 PM c Draws #42 Lindblom 
04:01:34 PM J Voir Dire #42 Lindblom - no affirmative response 
04:01:44 PM DA John Continues voir dire - PASS FOR CAUSE Adams 
04:13:01 PM PAArt Voire Dire jurors not previously voir dire - PASS FOR CAUSE VerHaren 
04:14:26 PM J Thanks and excuses jurors not called- don't call in- your service has now been completed. Recess to chambers for challenges. 
04:18:05 PM Back in session - the jury selected is as follows: #41 Leuer #56 
Nachtwey #12 Carney #17 Davis #70 Scarborough #76 Spyker 
#80 Swearingen #48 Mclaughlin #6 Boise #89 Wood #32 
J Hindberg #60 Pederson #78 Stout #34 Johnson-Stafford #82 
Taylor. Thanks and excuses jurors not selected. Explains jury 
procedure to jurors. Admonishes jury. Return tomorrow at 8:30 
am 
05:13:53 PM 
05:13:54 p 
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CR 2006-1497 
STATE OF IDAHO VS. JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON 
PA BARRY MC HUGH\ PA ART VERHAREN 
1""\A Al\11\lr Tl\\/11"'\n \ nA 11""\11._1 AnA&/1~ 
LIM Mill fill: I M I LUI\ \ UM JUnlll MU/-\IVI~ 
Clerk Kathy Booth 
Court Reporter Keri Veare 
DISCUSSION WITH JURORS IN CHAMBERS 
J We are in session in chambers with Juror #36 Jones 
January 18, 2012 
) ) 
I / i 
/V/ 
XE by J I think I can be fair. I had some men working for me in my construction company and 
they discussed this a lot- that the family ganged up on him. They turned out to not be reliable workers 
and I let them go. I didn't read the newspaper today. My family is kind of wild so I watch it. 
XE by PA The workers were not credible and I let them go. I had a hard time keeping them on 
task. I got it in my mind that they guy got ganged up on but whatever evidence is evidence. Alii know is 
that I heard them talk about it. I can put it aside. I have a little trouble with my attention span as I have 
leg problems but I can do it. 
XE by DA They didn't seem credible to me. I had some problems with them. I can get over it. I 
personally know no one in this case. I have a brother-in-law who ran over a lady and drugs and alcohol 
were involved. He got off scott free. I can be fair and can set aside what I've heard. 
XE by J If I sat on this jury I'd know more about the case than the work crew. 
J Excuse juror #36 Jones- proceed to #85 Weiss 
XE by J Juror #85 Weiss -I have an opinion. When I first read on a blog site about this -I 
believe in the 2"d amendment right. The person with the hand gun really screwed up. He paid dearly for 
that mistake. I intentionally searched for more information. I didn't want to hurt Mr. Larsen with what I 
have to say. 
XE by PA I don't think you're going to change my mind. I've made up my mind. I wonder if the 
way I think would put me in the same situation. I'd have had the kids come home and not go looking for 
trouble. I could not be a good juror. 
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XE by DA I'd like to think I can follow the instructions but I think I've already decided. I don't 
think I can overlook what he did- don't think I can ignore what I know and only go by the court's 
instructions. 
PA I believe the challenge is appropriate. 
#85 Weiss How could it go so far to get to that point? 
J Juror #85 Excused- Proceed with Juror Halterman 
XE by J I followed the case and read the paper and formed my own opinion. If I were involved . 
Know of the gun and shot and fear you can feel when threatened with a gun. I'm concerned about 
making an impartial decision. The circumstances give me concern. It escalated more than sit should 
have- with a gun people have a right to fear for their life. I've read enough of that this case would be 
difficult for me. 
XE by PA I watched TV but that was 5 years ago. It would be difficult to set that aside. I'd be 
better on another case due to my opinion. 
XE by DA I think I can set aside my feelings but not 100% sure. If it came down to 50-50 with the 
jury I might go with my preconceived ideas. 
XE by J The timing of the gun use would have a great deal of how I'd see it. That might change 
how I see it. I can make that determination. I'd listen to the evidence. I own firearms and believe in 
use for protection. I have a concealed weapons permit and if threatened I'd probably use it. 
XE byJ I'd follow the rules and can decide after hearing the evidence. 
J Excused 
PA I'd like to talk to Juror Greer #25 
XE by J #25 Greer -I had a drug charge and I plead and completed programs and have no probation but 
diversion. I'm not on probation. My Dad is on his death bed. He lives in Seattle and I plan to see him 
next \•Jeek. There is a strong possibility that I can't focus. 
J Juror Excused 
XE J #39 Mize -I was on probation for one year after I failed probation. I'm not on probation any 
longer. This was in Kootenai County and you were the Judge. 
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XE by PA 
probation. 
XE by DA 
I did 90 days in jail when I broke my probation then I was back out and I got done with 
The charge was drugs. I'll sit through trial but won't vote. 
XE by J It's my decision and it's between me and my creator. I have kids but didn't have 
custody so I didn't really punish them. It's out of my hands and I won't vote. !'!! pay attention just won't 
vote. I've serve but not decide. 
J Juror Mize excused 
XE by J Justin Edwards -I believe I'm off probation. The charges were a burglary in CDA. I can't 
remember the Judge. It was unsupervised probation 
XE by PA I was 17 and now 19-20 next month. I went to court in this building but don't 
remember the Judge. I was sentenced in the fall of '09. This was a juv. Charge and not an adult felony. 
J Return to the courtroom. 
3:40pm 
J In session in chambers with juror #60 Pederson 
XE by J When this occurred there was notoriety and I saw the TV. My wife worked for the court 
as a paralegal. Marion Daniel- she worked in the PA's office and is now at the Forest Service. 
PA VerHaren I think she was at the PA's office during this time. 
XE by J I'm familiar with this case due to the news and I began piecing things together. I've not 
thought about this for a number of years. I'm not against guns but am against gun worshipers. I'm 
aware of anti-government philosophy here and I'm a government employee. 
I don't know if I can be fair. A lot of irresponsible people have guns and there use is not 
a good thing. I think I can do this and set aside what I've read or heard. 
XE by PA I just knew she worked for PA. She didn't give me inside information. ! don't remember 
if she said she worked on this case. 
XE by DA I feel no pressure to decide one way or the other. I feel no pressure to support her 
former employer and I could be impartial. 
J Return to the courtroom -let's visit with juror #8 Bowser 
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XE byJ 
PA/DA 
J 
J 
PA/DA 
J 
Comments e: medical issues and scheduling. I need time to schedule procedures. 
No objection to excusing juror #8 Bowser 
Juror Excused- RETURN TO COURTROOM 
We're in chambers for the challenges. Explains challenge procedure to counsel 
1. #15 Corbett 2. #37 Haight 
5. #51 Miller 6. #64 Ray 
9. #44 Lund 10. #28 Hallsted 
13. #83 Tample 14. #2 Anderson 
17. #29 Halterman 18. #42 Lindblom 
21. # 39 Lariccia 22. # 5 Becker 
Stipulate to the jury as seated. 
Return to the courtroom 
3. #21 Edwards 4. #13 Carver 
7. #1 Adira 8. #14 Chaney 
11. #24 Gibbons 12. #20 Donoian 
15. #90 Wooten 16. #9 Briggs 
19. #37 Kirking 20 #19 Detienne 
23. #36 Jones 24. #11 Campney 
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Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20120119 Jury Trial Day 2 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Emily Hamilton (until 8:50 am) /Kathy Booth I~ ) Court Reporter Keri Veare PA Art VerHaren Da R~rn1 1\lll'l-l••nn 
I I ~ ._,..._II 1 IYI"'I ''""::::JII I ()?(~~y' DA Anne Taylor DA John Adams 
~012 Location 111 K-CObRfROOM 1 \ .___, ~ 
Time ~-~l . -.... Note 
08:41:57 AM Judge Day 2 Jury Trial, DEF is present, Not in custody, Luster 
08:42:21 AM Anne Ask for reasonable doubt instruction, mark as 1A Taylor 
08:43:31 AM Barry Object to the instruction--confusing to the jury McHugh 
08:44:12 AM Anne Gives 1 a instruction to court Taylor 
08:44:45AM Judge Reviews instruction 1A aloud--we will use instruction 103 with 
Luster insertation of Mr. Ellington's name 
II 08:45:29 ... , ''- nhi .... ,.4-; .... ,.. .,;4-1-, ...... .,.,.. .... ,.t tO instrUCtiOn 1 a 
- ·- - --J--··-
08:45:44AM Barry 
McHugh 
08:45:57 AM Judge Opening statements, counsel will not be providing any statement 
Luster to jury regarding what intent Mr. Ellington had 
08:46:58AM I did change some language regarding the Information--Each 
charge is a accusation or charge against the defendant 
08:47:28AM So I changed the word Information to the word Charge. 
08:47:43AM Barry No objection McHugh 
08:47:50AM John We ask the court read the Information to the Jury Adams 
08:50:15 AM 
GC'.G0:26AM CLERK CHANGE TO KATHY BOOTH 
08:50:34AM J I'll not be reading part 1 to the jury - return the jury -jury present 
and in place 
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I 08:53:27 AM I Juror Unfortunately I found out I'm acquainted with this part (indicates 
Nachtwey state) 
08:54:13 AM J Jury to exit courtroom -juror Nachtwey remains in courtroom 
08:54:33 AM When I got home I realized I was acquainted with the case and 
my wife's girlfriend was dating the gentleman who lost his wife. 
Juror We have a pretty close relationship. I have not received any 
Nachtwey information other than it started coming back to me throughout the 
night. I was pretty close to the lady that was going out with this 
man. Her name is Jan. Jan is a family friend. She's not discussed 
the case with me. 
08:56:52AM XE by PA She began dating him after the incident. I'm not sure if they're still 
VerHaren dating. It was going on for a long time. It could cause me to be 
unfair. I didn't want to go through this to be honest. 
08:57:46AM I've not discussed it with anybody. Jan spends time with us from 
XEby time-to-time and did at the time. I don't know if she currently dates 
Anne Mr. Larsen or not. Things came back to me last night and it's fair 
Taylor to say things may come back to me throughout the trial. I don't 
think I can be a fair juror to defendant. 
08:58:47 AM I could have met Mr. Larsen- I've had a stroke and sometimes 
XE byJ things don't come back to me right away. My relationship with Jan 
causes me to look at him in a different light than I would another 
individual 
08:59:32 AM DAAnne We request this juror be excused for cause Taylor 
08:59:45 AM PA No objection VerHaren 
08:59:49 AM IJ I Juror Excused Return the 14 jurors-
09:01:42 AM c Swears jurors for try cause 
09:02:26AM J Instructs jury 
09:15:24 AM PAArt I'm going to use an exhibit during my opening and I don't believe 
VerHaren counsel has any objection 
09:15:46 AM DA John That's correct Adams 
09:15:54 AM PAArt Opening statement Verharen 
09:41:11 AM DAJohn Opening statement Adams 
10:0"·"'1:' • .L oJ J II PA to call first witness 
II 10:09:43 AM PAArt Caiis #1 Verharen 
10:09:53 AM c Swears 
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10:09:57 AM DAJohn Motion to exclude witnesses Adams 
10:11:21 AM PAArt No objection Verharen 
10:11:26 J : ::::.A~.~.~.~des witnesses 
10:11:37 AM Joleen Ray Larsen - 24. I live in Athol with my father. We live on 
11 treed acres with outbuildings. We moved there in 1998. Jovon 
is my older sister and I have a younger sister Jamie. My Dad 
works at Bakers Commodies and has worked there before I was 
born. My mom was Vonette and I lived with her. She was 
employed at Sally Beauty Supply and at an assisted living. I work 
at US Bank as a vault teller. 
January 1, 2006 - I lived at home and I had just turned 18. I was 
still in school - Sr. at Timberlake High School. Living at the home 
were me, my younger sister and Mom and Dad. My older sister 
lived in Hayden with her son Zack. Decembmer 31 2006 Jovon 
and I had gone out for New Years. Her son was with my parents. 
#1 January 1, 2006 - we'd spent the night before at her house. We got up about 10:30 - 11 :00 am. We went to Super 1 and were 
headed home. We were driving my sisters white Honda Accord. 
Jovon was driving and I as in the front passenger seat. I had a 
cell phone. 
We stopped at Super 11 and got doughnuts, juice and a 
newspaper. We continued to Athol and were on Ramsey before 
Brunner. I turned around and looked because my sister asked if it 
was our neighbor behind us. When I turned around I saw a grill of 
an SUV - it was within feet of us. I turned back around. Within 
seconds of noticing it the vehicle passed and cut us off. It then 
slammed on its brakes. This was just before the stop sign. PL EX 
#2 - satellite photo with names of roads - they appear to be 
accurate. 
10:18:57 AM PAArt Motion to Admit EX #2 Verharen 
:59 AM 
10:19:08 AM DA John I No objection I Adams 
0:19:19 AM IJ EX #2 ADMITTED 
10:19:25 AM The vehicle stopped (blazer) and the driver got out and walked 
back to the drivers side of the car. The blazer was parked in the 
lane- no cars in front of it or in back of my sisters car. He came 
II back to the drivers side window. He was throwing his hands up in 
the air and telling us to get the fuck out and to get out and take 
care of the problem. My sister locked the door and we didn't get 
out. He was making statements and throwing his arms and he 
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punched the drivers side window. He then turned around and 
went back to his vehicle and go inside. I called 911 as soon as he 
turned and walked back to his vehicle. I was able to talk to a 911 
operator. He took off and took a right at the split. The expression 
on his face was made, angry- identifies defendant in the 
courtroom. 
U.,....,.,. nr"'""'"',.l,...,,.l "'""~'"' ,........, D ... ·---.. I 'a•-- -'-'1- .,._ --- ....... _ 1.-..--1, --...J -.f I lv jJI V\JvCUvU CQ.:IL VII Ul UIIIICI. I VVQ.:I QUIC LV .:lvv Lllv UQ\J" viiU VI 
the vehicle and it had no plates. We decided to follow. We did 
follow. It took a left onto Wier but before this the blazer stopped 
on Brunner headed east. He was in front of us and he stopped in 
the road. There was no vehicle in front of him when he stopped-
no car or dog or anything obstructing him. We also stopped and 
#1 he put it into reverse and came back at us - fast. He stopped 
within feet of our front bumper. He then went forward again and 
we also went forward. AT Wier he turned left and we followed. 
The next turn was right onto Seasons. We were still on the phone 
with 911. At seasons he turned right and we followed. There was 
a snowy patch of road he hit and went out of control. He 
recovered. He went up and pulled in to turn around. He then went 
west on Seasons. We were in our lane in the car and he came 
back at us in our lane head on. My sister stopped her vehicle. 
About 10 - 15' before he got to us he went back into his own lane 
and as he went by us he was flipping us off. My sister turned 
around and followed him again. He went back to Wier and went 
left. He went up to Brunner and turned right. At Brunner we could 
not see his vehicle. 
~fJ Recess - admonishes jury. lVI J Back in session -
10:38:14 AM PAArt I have a motion first - there a phone records and I'll ask that they 
Verharen be excluded as the defense can't lay the foundation 
10:38:14 AM DAJohn If I can't lay the foundation I'm sure you'll let me know. I haven't 
Adams decided if I will or will not. 
10:38:14 AM PAArt If he attempts I ask that it be done outside the presence of the 
Verharen jury 
10:38:14 AM I'd be happy to do that. I ask the state to not walk past the back of 
DA John us and look at our stuff. The exhibit they referenced was just 
Adams laying out here. There are 2 exhibits I want to address in the pack 
and i can do that after lunch. I object to the leading questions 
"after he got done punching your vehicle what happened next?" 
10:38:14 AM J PA has postured a few leading questions but they've been pretty innocuous at this point 
10:38:14 AM DA John I didn't object to those but there were statements he made in 
Adams opening statements. 
10:38:14 AM 
Hopefully Mr. VerHaren is cognizant of that- it should be clear. 
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You are free to move about the well - I am concerned about 
J approaching the witness and leaning over the witness without 
court permission. Return the witness and the jury. 
10:38:14 AM We reached the speed of about 80 when following him. He was in 
front of us and he kept getting further and further. He was a ways 
away. On Brunner, Wier and Seasons we were definitely further 
away. We could see our parents behind us. At Scarcella Road the 
vehicle took a right and so did we. We followed the blazer on 
Scarcella Rd. We saw the blazer turn off on what looks to be a 
driveway. We couldn't see his blazer when he went ahead of us 
when he went around a curve in the road. There was a hill as 
well. When we came around we saw the blazer in a snow bank. It 
started to go backward and he was going backwards turning 
around. Mom and Dad were behind us. My sister and I stopped-
our parents came around beside us on the east bound lane. They 
then went in front of us. We were in the west bound lane. Mom & 
Dad went just in front of us - kitty corner from us. Ellington was in 
the same Y location. Next Mom's Subaru was struck by the blazer 
#1 - the front driver Subaru was hit by the driver side door. The blazer continued to go. I couldn't tell if Mom's Subaru was moving 
on impact. After impact the blazer went back the way we came 
from. We were struck by the Blazer. The front of the blazer struck 
the front of my sister's car. We were in the best bound lane. I 
remember hearing acceleration by the blazer. The air bags went 
off. I got hit in the face. We got pushed- I couldn't see due to the 
powder of the airbags in the car. I was able to get out of the 
vehicle and was in the ditch. I got out the passenger side. The 
Honda was not moving when I got out. I couldn't see the blazer. I 
got out of the vehicle because the Blazer was hitting the driver 
door. I told my sister to get out- the blazer was hitting the driver 
side door of the Honda. I didn't hear a change in the noise of the 
blazer - loud acceleration. My sister got out of the Honda when I 
told her to. I was in a ditch when I got out - it was about 1 0'. I was 
within touching distance of the Honda door- holding the door. I 
could s 
10:38:14 AM PAArt Motion to admit ! Verharen i 
10:3'8:14 AM DAJohn No objection if that's all that is on there Adams 
10:38:14 AM J ADMIT EX#70 
10:38:14 AM PAArt Publishes EX #70 Verharen 
10:38:14 AM J There is no reason for the court reporter to transcribe it. 
II 10:38:14 AM PAArt I 
Verharen No objection 
10:38:14 AM DAJohn 
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I II Adams II No objection I 
110:38:14 AM II II EX #70 PLAYED I 
10:38:14 AM I said to my dad "Dad, give me that." I was referring to the pistol. 
At he hill and curve when we lost site of him we were back in here 
(indicates on EX #2) The recordings were from CO's provided to 
me. I also had a transcript to compare to. I made changes that 
... e~~ ~~4- ~~~~~ ... + ~~ +h,.. ,.. .. ;,..;..,..,! +r""'"'"'"rin+ I=Y #7Qll :il:7nR ::lnrl vv I C' IIVL \,VII CUI. VII LIIV VIJ~IIIQI 1.1 QII.;;J\JI .,., ... ~,, I I ,, .. • -- -· ·-
#70C - #70A I signed and dated it. 11 pages - I crossed off words 
that were not heard in the recordings. #70B- I signed and dated it 
- my writing is on it because what is said on the recording is not 
what is typed and I made corrections as to what was actually said. 
#1 EX #70C - 8 pages and they have the same handwriting and 
changes. I reviewed this after listening to the COs and it appears 
accurate. 
EX #79A - I've seen this before - drawing of the incident on 
Scarcella Road. Marks on exhibit the location where Mom was 
struck - initials. 
I wrote things down on the statement and wrote things about what 
happened before the incident- 5-10 lines maybe. We stayed at 
Ramsey and Brunner because 911 told us to stay there. 
11:51:26 AM J Recess for lunch - return at 1:15 admonishes jury. I'll meet with 
counsel in about 30 minutes. 
I 01:12:33 PM J Back in session 
01:12:45 PM I was just provided a copy of a 911 transcript - I don't recollect it 
being provided before but it may have. I understand that Mr. 
PAArt Adams will go over this with Joleen and she immediately saw 
Verharen some problems - I'd like her to have the opportunity to go over it 
before he talks to her about it. This is different than what she 
reviewed before. 
01:14:18 PM There is no law that I have to provide her with information that I'm 
DA John going to XE her on. This is Charlotte Crouch's certified transcript. I 
Adams don't mind if she reads it first. This is a transcript of the CD we 
already heard. 
01:15:12 PM Page 2 starts the transcript and there are portions of the transcript 
PAArt attributed to Joleen that she didn't make and he's going to try and 
\h:::orh::lr~n I ....... -..... I ~:~:~~~ ~~~~~~~~~e~~~~::~t.didn't make and I'd like her to 
01:15:58 PM DA John I don't know how to answer that. Adams 
01:16:07 PM This is much like a preliminary hearing transcript listening to the 
II I 
.... recording and trying to determine who made the statements - !s I 
that it? 
01:16:42 PM DAJohn 
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I Adams lives I 
01:17:01 PM D The problem I'm having is that if there is a statement that the transcriber attributes to her 
01:17:31 PM DA John That's the jury's call- I only heard her on the recording. Adams 
01:17:47 PM I I There is a lot of background noise and it would be difficult to 
u determine who said what at what time. I don't have a problem with you using that but we need to be careful saying it is a true and accurate transcript. 
01:18:52 PM DAJohn We have other transcripts we've put up there - numbered 1-5 Adams 
01:19:17 PM D We need to be cautious to not lead the jury that she's attributable to a statement in a blind transcript. 
01:19:51 PM PAArt I'd like to have it marked as an exhibit #700 Verharen 
01:20:32 PM D My clerk asked PA to prepare an exhibit list and I'll ask DA to do so including the items that were stipulated to. 
01:22:05 PM PAArt I Page 2 lines #1 - 20 I move to exclude I Verharen 
01:22:52 PM DA John I'm not offering it as an exhibit -you mean I shouldn't ask her if it's 
Adams her statement? 
01:23:16 PM PAArt That's what I mean Verharen 
01:23:27 PM ARGUMENT RE: EX #70 D 
01:23:51 PM I'll allow the examination - the defense is entitled to cross examine 
on leading questions - the implication is that the words or 
J statements are gospel and that's just not the case here. The jury 
can make the determination. I have concerns re: authenticity of 
the document. 
01:25:10 PM DA John Fine then the next time I want to do that you'll have to type up the 
Adams 911 tape (indicates to Court reporter) 
I 01 :25:43 PM II J 11 don't recall Ms. Crouch being the reporter in this case. 
I 01 :25:56 PM II DA John I No, we had Charlotte review the tape and had her do a transcript. jjAdams I I 01:26:18 PM ID You're free to cross examine the witness on that. -Return the jury 
and Ms. Larsen - both present and in place. I 01:28:04 PM Ill I went to a party the night before and got back to my sisters house 
II II about 3:00 am. I see the transcripts in front of me #1- #5. 
Transcript #2 page 2 - with Maskell at the Rathdrum PD on 
January 4, 2006. You can't forget it. Page 2 line 24 question (read 
by DA) I said 3:30, 4:00. Not true that we drank so much we didn't 
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feel we could drive home from the party. Transcript #5 - page 402 
lines 20-22. I said that a really good friend of ours who had not 
been drinking took us home. He took us there so he brought us 
back home. I said that my sister had some beers but still had 
been drinking and our friend had not. Transcript #2 page 3 lines 
8-9- I said that we did not wake up until about 10:00- 10:30. I'm 
not sure of the time we received phone calls. I talked to my 
boyfriend once. I didn't ans'vver my boy'friends calls. My parents 
called once. We did not have 6 straight hours of sleep. We 
stopped at the Super 1 to get juice and food. We first noticed the 
XE #1 by truck behind us on Ramsey road and my sister asked if it was our 
DAJohn neighbor. Transcript #2 page 5 lines 13-17 - re: neighbor's driving 
Adams -I thought it was our neighbor, yes. I don't have a problem with the neighbor. We didn't give him the finger and pull out to the 
middle of the road. I can't say I never flipped anyone off but not in 
this case. He was tailgating. Transcript #3 page 195. I answered 
no, there was no other problem with his driving. My sister said 
that this, the neighbor. And I answered that there we no other 
problems. The issue we had with his driving was that he came 
close around us and cut us off- and the tail-gating. I don't recall if 
I saw him when he passed or a dog in the car. At that exact time I 
didn't get a good look in the blazer. Transcript #2 page 7 line 13 
and 14 I said he stopped pretty much at the stop sign and in the 
right lane of travel when he stopped. 
01:42:36 PM PAArt Objection Verharen 
01~rJ Overruled - she answered yes 
01:43:03 PM It surprised me that he would get out of his car. He wasn't 
casually walking. I was surprised when he walked to the car and 
#1 made the statements. I was surprised because I didn't feel that I 
contributed to this at all and that he was a crazy man. I don't 
believe I worded it to my Dad that a crazy man was attacking us, 
swearing at us and pounding on the car. 
01:44:54 PM 
Transcript #4 page 234 line 13 I said he was at our window 
between 15 and half a minute - 15 is 15 seconds. We were both 
scared. He got back into his Chevy and left. He didn't smack the 
window. He left and turned on Brunner road. Transcript #3 page 
201 line 9 -We took a right on Brunner and followed right after 
him and did nit wait a minute. We took maybe a coupie of seconds 
but not very much to follow him- I wouldn't use the word "chase". 
01:50:17 PM PAArt Objection to the word "chase" Verharen 
.I 01 :50:24 PM I J , Sust~inerl 
I 01 :50:29 PM I #1 XE by I was about 5 minutes from my house. We didn't go home but 
DAJohn went after Mr. Ellington. At that point I got on the phone and 
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Adams called 911. I read a transcript of the 911 call given to me by DA 
just a few minutes ago. Page 2 line 3 
01:55:40 PM PAArt Object - that statement is not on the 911 call Verharen 
01:55:59 PM DA John That's for the jury to decide Adams 
01:56:06 PM I don't recall this portion especially a male voice. I don't remember 
telling my sister to go around him. Def stopped in his own lane of 
travel and we stopped behind him. I could have gone around him 
and go home but I didn't. He stopped quickly but I didn't see any 
smoke coming up or hear screeching of brakes. We came to a 
stop quickly. I'm unsure if our car screeched or make skid marks. I 
don't recall if I was wearing my seat belt. Transcript 3 page 205 I 
said I did not have my seat belt on. I don't believe I put my hands 
on the dash to keep from hitting it and my knees didn't hit the 
dash. I don't remember telling my sister that we needed to get 
closer or her saying "we can't". I don't remember this part at all. 
He turned onto the gravel road and then a right on Seasons. I 
don't' know how fast he was driving. If we'd just kept going 
#1 straight on Weir I could have been home in 5 minutes. He was 
away from us- hit a patch of snow and he lost control. Transcript 
#2 page 14 - I said "all over you know - that thing was probably 
riding on two wheels. Most of the time on two wheels I'm sure." It 
wasn't driving straight down the road on two wheels no. We were 
keeping up the speed with him. Transcript #3 page 213- Line 8- I 
said the greatest speed the Honda did was 60 and that we stayed 
pretty much staying right with him- pacing him. When he turned 
around and headed back toward us he was in our lane. He was 
there for a little bit and he turned back in the correct lane right 
before he got to us. I don't recall telling Dad he tried to run us off 
the road. We followed him some more. We could have turned 
toward our home but turned the other way. We could have kept 
going but we went back like the 911 operator asked us and 
waited. 
I 02:10:14 PM II DA II Objection - motion to strike not responsive I I 02:10:26 PM IIJ II Granted - stricken I I 02:10:33PM Ill We turned around and went back because 911 told us to. 
Reviews transcript - we told her that "we've apparently lost sight 
of him" and I remember saying that. We could have gone around 
the corner to our house and she told me to go to Ramsey and 
Brunner because that's where they were sending the police car. 
After I hung up with 911 I called my Dad. I believe I spoke to both 
of them. I did speak to my Dad when I was parked and waiting 
I II I and toid him \AJhat happened. Transcript #3 page 225- I said I 
was trying to communicate to my Dad that a violent angry man 
came up to the car and punched the car. We were not hurt. Page 
227 line 18 - Dad asked if we were OK and we said "yeah" We 
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were not hurt and the car was not damaged. We sat there for 15-
20 minutes doing nothing and our parents got there before the 
officer. Our parents could see that the car was OK and we were 
OK. I told Dad what happened. He left us there. I can't speak for 
what exactly my Dad was doing. They left us at the corner and 
they went to where we thought he was. I could see them but I'm 
not sure they were going up and down driveways 
It was another 15 minutes before Deputy came. My parents were 
up in that area. I know of no other reason why my parents were 
#1 there. I talked to the deputy for a few minutes and he gave us 
some witness statements to fill out. I thought I'd filled out 5 maybe 
10 lines. Reviews form - There are about 6 lines filled out - what's 
on there is my name, address and phone number. I don't believe 
we were giggling when talking to the deputy. The deputy left and 
went toward the curved part of Ramsey. Our parents came back 
and Dad asked who they went left. I'm not sure Dad's feelings on 
it. My father didn't have facial expressions like he did. My parents 
left us alone again and went back. I'm not going to say they were 
hunting. They could see that the cops were there and that the left 
and were gone. I saw defendant come from a driveway and turn 
and go back on Ramsey again. He cut he corner- didn't t 
02:41:25 p J Recess - admonishes jury. 
02:41:37 PM J Back in session 
03:01:18 PM DA John I ask that you admonish witnesses - the family's out there - it's my 
Adams fault 
03:01:25 PM J I will admonish when they're done. Return the jury -jury present 
and in place. 
03:02:..:: IISIDE BAR 
03:04:29 PM Driving on Scarcella going about 90 mph talking to 911 operator. I 
don't believe she told us to pull over. Reviews transcript - it 
refreshes my memory that she told us to pull over. EX #2 doesn't 
XE #1 by show what the road conditions were on that day - the snow and 
DA John snow banks, etc. 
I Adams Within a matter of seconds - 30 seconds maybe - the attempt to 
I turn around and collision occurred. Reviews Maskell transcript ' 
page 29- We were watching him- it was really fast, so he came 
around. When he came around the Subaru was in front of us. 
03:10:35 PM PAArt Objection -incorrect drawing Verharen 
03:10:44 PM J All you're trying to depict is which side of the Subaru the blazer 
II traveled - is that correct? 
03:11:11 PM DA John I Absolutely I Adams 
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I 03:11:15 PM IIJ II Overruled I 
03:11:19 PM The blazer came around the ditch side of the Subaru. Then they 
hit the front part of the Honda. I could no longer see the Subaru at 
that point. From that time on I didn't see Dad again until the 
Blazer left the area. When the Honda and Blazer came to impact I 
couldn't see where my mom was because of the powder. I got out 
of the car and put my hand down. When we got out we were 
down in the ditch. I didn't get out of the Honda but putting my 
hand on the ground and rolling out. Reviews Maskell transcript - I 
was down and could not see the other side of the car. The first 
time I saw my Mom she was coming across the road. Transcript 
#3 page 259- Mom was probably right in the middle (of the road). 
From the time I saw her in the middle of the road until she was 
XE #1 by impacted by the blazer was a matter of seconds. I don't believe I 
DA John tried to call out to her. Page 260 line 6 I said it was a matter of 
Adams seconds after seeing Mom before the blazer hit her. My response 
was inaudible. I as standing outside the Honda. Transcript #5 
page 224 line 8 - I didn't see my Dad until after everything was 
done. I believe I heard a gun shot at the end. Maskell transcript 
page 34 I heard a gun shot but didn't know who did the shooting. I 
couldn't say it crossed my mind or not that it might have been 
Ellington shooting. Reviews transcript- I didn't know if it was him 
towards us and it came into my head that it was Dad towards him. 
I couldn't see my Dad nor could I see .. I didn't know where the 
gun fire was coming from. I told my Dad to hand it (the gun) to 
me. He just put it away. I didn't go to the car and look. I didn't see 
a holster. My Dad has multiple trucks. Transcript #3 page 262 top 
- I said Dad had a truck that we say is Dad's truck. 
03:26:29 PM RD #1 by 
PAArt Page 29 Maskell interview - line 12 - 19 
Verharen 
03:27:27 PM DAJohn Objection - that's outside the scope - she testified to the first word 
Adams on page 19 and that's where it stopped 
II 03:27:59 P Sustain the objection 
03:28:03 PM RD #1 by I gave a more elaborate answer than the reading. Dad had 3 or 
PAArt probably 4 trucks- a Toyota, Ford pickup with flatbed, he has a 
Verharen new Dodge 
03:29:17 PM DAJohn Objection -beyond the scope Adams 
03:29:24 PM J Sustained 
03:29:44 PM Transcript #3 page 259 - line 6 - when I said that Mom was 
RD #1 by probably right in the middle - I meant the road and my Mother. It 
I PAArt asks where I first seen her at and that \rvas right in the middle. She 
Verharen was just to the north of the double yellow when she was struck. 
My Dad leaves guns in vehicles on a daily basis- he has a lot of 
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03:34:04 PM DAJohn 
Adams 
03:34:07 PM J 
03:35:31 PM 
RD#1 
03:40:08 PM DAJohn 
Adams 
03:40:12 PM J 
03:40:20 PM 
RD #1 by 
PAArt 
Verharen 
03:49:09 PM RX#1 by 
DA John 
Adams 
03:50:54 PM J 
03:52:27 PM 
03:52:28 PM jEnd I 
I guns. EX #87 is my statement form - same condition 
I No objection 
I ADMIT EX #87 
After Mom and Dad got in front of us they got hit by the SUV. The 
car was moving slowly forward. #3 page 225 reads line 8 - 11. I 
wanted him to know that we weren't going to be home when he 
thought we would be. Hearing #5 transcript page 348 
Object 
jsustained 
I said I had 4 or 5 beers. Page 347 Hearing #5 I said we got home 
about 3:30 or so- this was in the morning. Page 403 hearing #5 I 
said I woke up between 10:30 and 11 :00 -this was in the 
morning. Page 351 line 7- When I turned around I saw the grill of 
an SUV and it was within feet. 
Transcript #1 page 3 line #1 - when we called them we were 
calling - unintelligible - reads. Transcript #2 page 18 line #11 -
Since we were just waiting I calmed down and I said I'm going to 
call Mom and Dad, you know, so they would know. Hearing #4 
page 205 line #11 -I called and let my parents know what was 
going on. I told my parents where I was. 
Maskell's report page 19 - line 1 0 - I called home and my sister 
answered the phone. I asked to talk to Mom or Dad - she said 
Dad was washing his hands and she didn't know where Mom was 
and I said let me talk to Dad and he came on the phone. 
Excused - you need to remain available - admonishes 1,-.;itness. 
Recess - return at 830 am tomorrow -admonishes jury. 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www.fortherecord.com 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20120120 Jury Trial Day 3 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth ~ ! 
Court Reporter Keri Veare 
PA Art VerHaren 
I 
~; !~~"~ ~~~~~h 
. DA John Adams 
Datejj112012012j Location II1K-COUR~~ 
Time Speaker 
08:27:45 AM J 
I 
08:27:57 AM I PA Barry 
. . McHugh 
08:28:45 AM DA Anne 
Taylor 
08:28:53 AM J 
Note 
Calls case - counsel are all present - defendant is present - for 
trial (day 3) 
#1-8 10-32 35-69 any that I have skipped there is not a stipulation 
- motion to exclude all others 
That's our understanding 
ADMIT #1-8, 10-32 AND 35-69 Return the jury- jury present and 
in place. 
08
:
30
:
38 AM ~~r~Zren Motion to admit #2 -#8- shows counsel 
#2-8 10-32 except 21 are fine and that's as far as we've gotten so 
far. 
#35-69 motion to admit per stipulation 
#44A and #448 are not part of the stipulation - I don't know if I 
have a problem with those. 
There is just a #44 as well 
No objection to #44A and #44b we now stipulate to #45 we'd like 
to discuss #46A outside the presence of the jury. There is now a 
#49A and we have no objection to it. We did have an objection o 
#69 
So we're clear there is a stip to 1-8, 10-20 22-32 35 - 68 including 
the exhibits with alphabet except #46A 
correct 
xhibits stipulated to are ADMITTED 
Calls #2 
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VerHaren 
08:39:04 A c C". ___ rs 
08:39:07 AM Joel Larsen- 48 years old. I live in Athol, ID and have lived in my 
residence for close to 15 years. Joleen and I live there. I have 2 
other daughters Jamie and Jovon. Vonette is their mother. We'd 
be married 27 years now. We moved to Athol in November of 
'I nno I ..... ,... ......... .,:,.....,.,.,....,..1 t..a,i+h .f.h,... ""'..,...""'~"''' frni"Y'\ pnr+l"'.:tinrl f"'\ronnn nl'!:lnt 
I '1.:/V, I Ll Clll;:)lt:;ll t:;U VVILII Lilt:; \JVIIItJCll IY II VI I I VI LICll IU '-'lv~'VII fo'l<AIIL 
of Bakers Commodities. My wife was both self employed and 
worked part time for a hair salon in CDA. We have 11 acres and a 
log house between Spirit Lake and Athol. 
January 1, 2006. We got up about 6:00 am. Jamie and my 
grandson Zack and Vonette were there. Joleen was in town at my 
oldest daughters house. I talked to Joleen on the phone for less 
than 5 minutes and then Vonette and I went to try and find where 
the girls were at. We took the maroon Subaru. I guess we'd had 
the car for about 5 years. I think it was a 98. Vonette was driving. I 
had torn my left biceps off and had it reattached. I was falling at 
work and grabbed with my left hand and it ripped off. I had 
#2 surgery to have it reattached. My arm was in a sling and immobilized. I was off work for close to 9 months as my job has 
no light duty. I could drive a car with a stick shift. 
Vonette and I went to where the girls were parked on Ramsey 
and Brunner. It took us less than 10 minutes to get there. We 
talked to the girls for less than 5 minutes. On the way there we'd 
seen people looking at donkeys or mules and we went back to 
talk to them. 
Shows on EX #2 where we contacted daughters and where we 
contacted the people. There were 2 people - a man and wife. I 
asked them if they'd seen a gold and white blazer. Vonette had 
parked in the driveway and I walked up to the people. My arm 
was still in the sling. I had nothing in my right hand. There was a 
44 magnum Smith and Wesson silver and black gun with 8 3/8' 
barrel in the car. I've probably had the gun for 20 years now. I had 
and do have a concealed weapons permit and have for about 20 
years. I had been hiking the day before and had it under the sea 
I 08:55:26 AM II I When the blazer got to Brunner it went West down Brunner and it 
passed by us. I was trying to get a front license place as the 
daughter told me there was no rear plate. There was no front 
plate. I saw the occupant of the blazer - one occupant - male. The 
blazer went down to Ramsey and turned left on Ramsey going to 
the girls. The wife pulled into the driveway he pulled out of and 
backed out - 2 times and then proceeded in that direction. ! was 
able to see my daughters turn their vehicles - when he went past 
them they turned around and went after him. The daughters were 
way in front of us as we were still on Brunner. My wife turned left 
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#2 
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on Brunner. The daughters Honda was in front of us and the gold 
Blazer was in front of them. Vonette and I didn't have cell phones 
then and had no way to communicate with them. 
I estimate our speed as about 60. We may have gotten up to 80 
and the girls were still ahead of me and the blazer ahead of them. 
At points we'd lose sight of the daughters. At Scarcella they 
turned right - it only goes to the right there. The blazer turned right 
first, then the daughters and when we got there we turned right. 
On Scarcella there is a right and a curve at the same time. As we 
came over the rise I seen brake lights as both the daughter and 
the blazer put brake lights on. The daughters were in the west 
bound lane. We went by the daughters in the east bound lane -
passed them. We pulled partly in partially to the west bound lane 
and then back into the east bound lane. When we were coming 
up to the girls he was turning around. After it turned around it 
started to head east bound and struck the front of our vehicle. The 
blazer front driver side fender by the door struck the front of the 
Subaru passenger side. We were still moving - all but stopped 
though. The blazer turned left and went around behind us toward 
the girls. The east bound lane of Scarcella was wide open. The 
blazer went straight at the girls and impacted them. The blazer 
was very loud and had full throttle. It crawled right up on top of the 
daughters car and I could see daylight and a tire on the daughters 
hood. The motor never let up and kept pushing my kids. I was 
watching the whole time. My wife was screaming hysterically. 
After we seen this happen out the back window and what he was 
doing I reached under the seat and grabbed the pistol and 
opened the door. My wife got out also and we both ran back 
straight toward the vehicle. I was running straight to the drivers 
side of the blazer. It looked to me like she was trying to run to the 
back side of the Honda toward the other side. I saw her going 
toward the back side of the Honda. I intended to go to the driver 
side of the blazer but before I got there it was put into reverse and 
came back which cut off my straight line to the Subaru door. 
When I got out of the car the blazer was still pushing my kids. 
When the blazer backed off the Honda the back passenger side 
of the bronco - I slapped it with my hand- the same one with the 
pistol and I rolled around the corner and I was running around the 
side of the blazer. I started toward the front of the vehicle 
I could not see into the blazer- the window was tinted. At the side 
I could see the dash and a hand come up onto the gear shift and 
pull it straight down at the same time the motor was racing again. 
I was coming up on the door and was probably right at the door 
when I saw the hand coming down and I could see him inside the 
vehicle and at the same time it was coming down the gas came 
back on. There was no passenger but there was a dog between 
the seats. I was able to see the person and I recognized him as 
the same person I saw come out of the driveway on Brunner. 
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Identifies defendant in the courtroom. Neither side windows were 
tinted. I could see clear through and see the roof of the daughters 
Honda. I could see Vonette as she was running just past the 
center line in the west bound lane crossing the road. She was 
running north and the daughters were facing northwest. The 
#2 vehicle at that time was completely west bound pushed off the 
road facing northwest. At that time I had the gun pointed at him- I 
couidn't shoot because my daughters were right there and my 
wife over there so I split the difference and shot at the motor 
hoping to hit something and shut it off. I was hoping that shooting 
the blazer would stop the blazer. 
09:13:21 AM DAJohn Object- ask the court to instruct the jury to disregard. Adams 
09:13:33 AM Overruled- it will stand. Excuse me I'll strike it because it seemed 
J to indicate what Mr. Ellington's intent was - instructs jury to 
disregard. 
09:14:09 AM My shot to the motor area of the blazer did not work. The blazer 
continued east bound and to the north turning left. I had not shot 
the gun before. The blazer continued full throttle and continued to 
the left. My wife was just crossing the center line crossing north. I 
seen the blazer go toward the wife Vonette and then I seen her 
stop and reverse her direction to go the other way and then the 
vehicle struck her. It looked like it struck her right dead center in 
the front of the vehicle. Her head was visible above the hood - I 
could see her shoulders, neck and head. I could see the top of 
her shoulder. The blazer was turning left and he was traveling 
west bound lane when he struck her. 
It shot her out in front and she disappeared and the next thing I 
seen was her laying on the double yellow line and it went over the 
top of her head and neck - the passenger front tire went over her. 
#2 I could see daylight over the blazer when it went over her. Her feet were to the north. When the back wheels got to her I seen 'it 
go over her again and it spit her out, swung her out the opposite 
way and she rolled. Now the total reverse direction of where her 
head and feet were. At final rest her head was north and her feet 
south. With the tires spinning it flung her out because it was at full 
throttle and it shot her out and spun her he other way and she 
rolled over. I emptied the other shots at the blazer - 4 shots. I 
t,..,,..,., 4-h ... 4o ,.....,,... ... ;...t,.. h .... ,..t, """"'"'"'8'"''"'"'r "'"''"''"'8"+orl I rlnn'+ +hinLr rnu 
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third shot - I believe I hit one other time with one of my last 2 - I 
heard it hit- it smacked something. 
After it ran over the wife it proceeded into a half-circle and came 
I back into the east bound lane and went over the hill. It came back ' 
into the east lane in about 30' or so. The acceleration never let 
up. 
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09:21:54AM IJ I Recess - admonishes jury 
09:23:11 AM DAJohn We stipulated to the 911 tape and it had the first couple of 
Adams minutes cut off- I'd like to see every picture before they show it so this doesn't happen again. 
09:23:51 AM PAArt To my knowledge that is the full 911 tape and it was provided in a 
VerHaren notice to them a couple of weeks ago. 
0~·?4:21 AM J We're not talking about the 911 tape now. 
09:24:39AM PAArt I'm trying to make a complete record. Counsel is fully aware of the 
VerHaren photographs as provided to the court and counsel yesterday in a binder. 
09:25:15 AM DAJohn There are only a couple of photos we have a problem with Adams 
~25:30AM J Recess. 
:47:58AM J Back in session 
09:48:03AM PA Barry DA Taylor will sit behind me and review the slides before we put 
McHugh them up. 
nO·A9:00 ~1\JI J R.c:::Lu''' Lhe jury -jury present and in place. 
09:49:54AM EX #25 - the purple colored car is the Subaru - white Honda is 
Jovon's - Vonette is under the yellow tarp. Shows on diagram how 
we passed the Honda. Shows how the blazer went around and 
made contact with the Subaru and then toward the Honda. #26 
DX#2 by shows the snowbank where he came to a stop and shows where 
PAArt brake lights would have been- then he backed up. #29 My 
VerHaren daughters car on impact was in the west bound lane. We were 
continues still in the Subaru. I ran up to the back of the blazer. Shows where 
the back of blazer was (EX #30). I then ran to the passenger side 
of the blazer- shows iocation shot was fired. Looking thmugh the 
window I saw the roof of the Honda. When I saw Mr. Ellington he 
didn't look at me. 
09:56:54 AM DA John Objection Adams 
09:56:58 AM J Disregard 
09:57:11 AM 
At this time he was positioned in the drivers seat facing forward 
pointed east. His head was facing out the front window- straight. 
His head never rotated in my direction. EX #38 photo of the blazer 
he was driving. Shows on blazer where the impact was with the 
#2 
Subaru. EX #41 shows passenger side of the blazer showing hole 
in the front side of the blazer. This is where I shot it. I was to the 
left of the hole when I shot. I would have been standing looking by 
I the door looking right straight through. The end of my gun was 3' 
from the fender when I shot. 
EX #43 shows back passenger side window - before I shot to the 
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I front fender I did not shoot at the vehicle. I 
10:01:57 AM DA John I Objection I Adams 
10:02:00 AM J !sustained I 
10:02:10 AM EX #79D -diagram of the scene- Marks with X where I remember 
Vonette was struck. Adds initials. Law enforcement arrived less 
than 5 minutes later. I walked back and put the gun under the 
seat before law enforcement came. I told the officer where the 
gun was. Deputy Klinkefus was the first to arrive. I told him I 
discharged the gun and where it was eventually. I couldn't for 
sure say I saw anyone retrieve the gun. We were on scene for 
about 45 minutes. They separated the 3 of us and we were taken 
to Rathdrum PD and we were interviewed separately. A couple 
days later I was interviewed by Detective Maskell at KCSD. I have 
testified on 3 occasions. 
When I shot my wife was about 20' from the blazer. There was 
nothing in front of the Blazer in the east bound lane. In the west 
bound lane was my wife and the back end of the Honda. I felt 
#2 bitter toward Deputy Klinkefus and at some time I went to a 
lawyer and had him file a torte claim because I felt we were 
abandoned by Klinkefus. I ultimately dismissed this because it's 
not the county or tax payers fault. 
I did not attempt to aid my wife- it was obvious she was dead. 
When the blazer struck my wife she went to the ground. I never 
saw the blazer drag her. I saw her head and neck above then she 
disappeared and I saw her again when he went over the top of 
her. I never saw him drag her or see the driver side go over her. I 
was 20' from the blazer and there was nothing in my way. I never 
saw her slip or fall before she was run over. 
She had a red plaid flannel shirt on but I'm not sure on the pants. 
She may well have had camo pants but I know she had a red and 
black checkered flannel shirt. 
10:14:18 AM When driving down Scarcella I told my wife to block him from 
hitting the girls - not block him in. Reviews transcript #1 Interview 
with Deputy Stewart- page 8 lines 20-21. I told the wife to block 
him from hitting the girls not to "block him in" My wife drove 
XE #2 by around the Honda into the wrong lane of travel where Ellington 
DA John was trying to go and the Subaru and blazer made contact. If he'd 
Adams have gone around the passenger side of the Subaru he'd have gone directly toward the Honda. He went on the driver side and 
not the passenger side of the Subaru. When he went around the 
I L_j' Subaru he impacted with the Honda. The Honda was about 3 car 
lengths from the end of the Subaru. He made impacted with the 
Subaru. 
I II I 
file://R:\LogNotes- HTML\District\Criminal\Luster\CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan W... 1/20/2012 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 354 of 848
Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 o '10/2012 Page 7 of 18 
10:23:24 AM DAA Motion to strike - instruct jury 
10:23:33 A J c ..... + ... i ... e:! -jury to disregard 
10:23:43 AM I waited and watched for a second or two after the vehicles 
impacted before I got out. I took the pistol with me. I had it in my 
right hand - couldn't use my left hand. The blazer was already 
backing away from the Honda. Everything happened so quick. 
I ran up to the blazer and hit the back of with the hand that I had 
the gun. I didn't fire the gun at he back of the blazer at that time. 
Reviews Maskell transcript page 71 line 25- my first shot was 
after I touched the back of his car. The hole in the window of the 
blazer is not where I shot it. When I was back there I could not 
see him. I pushed off and he didn't run me over as he was 
backing up. I was holding, pushing off from going underneath. 
Transcript #4 page 388 lines 10-14 I said the gun was so loud 
#2 they would probably jump or flinch. I went down the side of the 
blazer and I was looking inside the side window at Mr. Ellington 
and I fired the blazer. At that time the blazer lurched forward and 
struck the Honda. This all happened before Ms. Larsen ended up 
underneath the blazer. Once I started shooting I kept shooting 
until I ran out of bullets. I intended to hit him. There were 4 shots 
after he ran her over. Reviews Maskell interview page 77- that's 
not what happened. It's a terrible mistake because that's when I 
shot. I told both officers that I didn't know that both girls had 
gotten out of the Honda - I could only see the roof. 
Before the police arrived I got in the Subaru, started it up and I 
moved it maybe a foot. I could have previously said 2' and the 
police told me I couldn't move it and to get out. 
10:34:58 AM 
Joleen called the house and Jamie answered the phone and gave 
it to me. Joleen told me what had happened. She said Ellington 
tried to run them off the road and that they were on the phone 
with 911 and that they had followed him. I told Detective Stewart 
that Joleen said the cops told her to start to follow him. 
•' 
i. New Years Eve day and night we were home and drank about a 6 I 
I pack of beer. That's not excessive . Joleen was pretty upset when I' she called. She said they'd been yelled at by a man and he'd hit #2 their car with his hand or fist. She didn't sav she thouaht it was a 
-- - - " -
Mexican on crack. I may have told Detective Stewart that I 
thought it was someone high on meth. Joleen save me a 
description of the gold and white blazer, older. We got into the 
Subaru with Vonette driving and went to find our daughters. My 
left arm was in a sling. My right shoulder had been hurt at work 
and i caught myself with my left. I had previously injured it at 
work. The wife drove the car to Brunner. We were looking as we 
were driving but when we saw them we went right to the girls. By 
Joleen's directions I wasn't exactly sure where they were at. 
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When we saw them we talked for a few minutes and then went 
down toward Weir and talked to the people who were out with 
their animals. After I was done talking with those people I looked 
over and saw the officer with the girls. When I got there the 
deputy was turning around and left. I was angry with him turning 
the wrong way. I went back to Weir road and continued to look for 
the blazer. The girls were instructed to stay there. I wasn't there 
... L..-- .a.L..- -U:-- .. .a.-11.~-...J .a.- .a.k-- I """""~ ... +h" hl,.,..,~r +"'l,inn nff I rlnn 1+ Wllt:::ll lilt:: Ulllvt:::l li:111\t:::U LU LIICIII. I ;:)QVV U IC IJIQLCI LQI"\.111~ VII. I \.A VII • 
believe I got an adrenaline rush out of seeing it. Reviews 
transcript #5 page 806 line 18 & 19 I said Oh, yea, I got excited. 
10:45:26 AM PAArt Objection - motion to strike VerHaren 
10:45:34 AM J Sustained - the question is not an answer 
10:45:42 AM They asked me if I got an adrenaline rush and I answered "there 
he is" and I ran back to the Subaru. He drove right by me. I could 
see his face. We startled him because he was not looking our 
#2 way. Vonette turned the car around and followed him. Reviews 
transcript of Stewart interview - The transcript says " ... we went 
past our kids blah blah blah they are there. We went past where 
the kids were and they were in front of us. 
10:50:34 AM PAArt Objection VerHaren 
11 IG ... 0:38 A J c ........... ; ... ,..d '"' ........... , , ..... 
10:50:40 AM At this time both the Subaru and Honda were following the blazer 
and I believe he knew we were following him. I felt the speeds 
were fine and I told Ms. Larsen to drive faster. It was apparent he 
was trying to get away. He was going, yes. 
Scarcella road scene - When I looked out the back of the Subaru I 
could see the passenger side of the blazer. When it went on top 
of the Subaru I could see the driver side tire. I could see the back 
tire - front tire. 
When I got out of the Subaru I saw Ms. Larsen peripherally 
#2 through the whole thing. I was fixed on the Honda. I got out and 
was running toward the front of the blazer and saw him use his 
hand to shift. I saw Ms. Larsen out the side and she was crossing 
the center line. I was looking profile at defendant at 90 degrees. I 
had the gun pointed right at his head. Had I taken 1 step further 
the gun would have gone through the window - at this point my 
wife was still alive. I could not see the other side. I was 1 - 2' 
away from the passenger window when I fired. My wife was 
running and would have been into the west bound lane. 
II I 
Transcript #3 page 412 lines 11 - 22 I said that I didn't know if she 
was running. The impact with my wife was real quick. After he 
went by me I couldn't see where he was looking. 
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My wife had her hands up and I saw her put her palms on the 
blazer. 
~~ Recess- admonishes jury Back in session - return the jury -jury present and in place. 
11:17:21 AM RD #2 by I told the 2 detectives that my wife put her hands on the hood of 
PAArt the blazer when she was hit. Reviews transcript #2 page 77 line 3 
VerHaren -Reads 
11:20:37 AM DAJohn I object - I'd be glad to approach the court and show you what 
Adams he's going to attempt to have him read. 
11:20:57 AM J Please- SIDE BAR 
11:22:35 AM RD #2 by 
reads portion "she's like this- hands up". I didn't say she had her PAArt 
VerHaren hands on the hood. She had her hands up. 
11:23:2 J gesture made by witness 
11:23:33 AM RD #2 by 
PAArt Page 91ine 21 
VerHaren 
11:27:13 .:>IUt: l:)f\R 
11:28:46 AM Reviews page 9 line 21 +. I was describing to Det. Maskell what 
happened the moment my wife was struck and I never told him 
she put her hands on the front of the blazer. Transcript #3 page 
RD #2 by 412 line 15 - reviews - I couldn't ... I don't think she was running . 
PAArt . I just. I just seen her out the side of my eyes right here. I knew 
VerHaren where she was. I seen her cause when I shot I seen her and I 
split the interference between her and the kids. I meant the angle 
of my shot wouid have been between the giris and my wife. 
Transcript #1 Stewart interview page 7- I further elaborated on 
the positions of the cars at Brunner and Ramsey. Reads. 
11:35:39 AM DA John Objection - outside the scope 
' Adams ' 
! 
11:3.5:47 AM J Overruled 
11j5:53 AM #2 
11:35:54 AM I could see the roof of my daughters car over the shoulders of Mr. 
RD #2 by Ellington. I never said I got an adrenaline rush. Explains injuries to 
PAArt both arms -work injuries. 
VerHaren 
Page 77 Detective Maskell's interview line 3 to page 78 line 14 
"" :A0:29 AM SIDE BAR 
11:44:17 AM Reviews transcript with Maskell interview re: how wife was hit and 
RD #2 by shooting the balance of rounds of the gun. this was after he struck 
PAArt my wife. I recall DA Adams questions regarding the first shot 
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I llverHaren llwhen I was at the back of the blazer- reviews transcript page 71 I 
111 :49:40 AM II llsiDE BAR I 
11:59:25 AM RD #2 by Page 71 Maskell interview- reads Question and answers with PA PAArt 
VerHaren re: position of vehicles and first shooting 
112:03:49 PM I Page 77 Maskell interview line 6- I'm describing what I saw" ... I 
seen her hands hit the hood." Page 78 line 18 "I seen her hands 
like this and then bam, her head on top of the hood." Transcript 
#3 page 414 line 22 "Her head would have hit the center of the 
blazer hood." "her hands were up ... and went down on the hood 
RX2by when she was struck." Transcript #4 page #320 "square center on 
DA John the hood where she had her hands up like this and when he hit 
Adams her I seen her head smack the hood of the blazer." Line 13 
"maybe .. a little bit -- she was like this and once-the closer he 
got her hands went down and she had them on the hood at --
right at the impact." 
I talked to Deputy Klinkefus when I first shot the gun. I didn't tell 
him I didn't start shooting until she'd been struck. 
12:10:37 PM IIJ Excused today but not from the trial. Admonishes witness 
12:10:55 PM 11#2 I understand 
12:10:59 PM IIJ Recess for lunch - return at 1 :30 Admonishes jury. 
01:27:21 PM IIJ Back in session 
01:27:27 PM I'd like to take something outside the presence of the jury- DEF 
PAArt JJJ - letters - it's my understanding the defense will attempt to 
VerHaren admit them through Brad Maskell who will testify this afternoon. 
Motion to exclude as hearsay. 
01:28:49 PM DA John He's subpoenaed in our case and we'll take it up at a later time. I'll 
Adams let the court know so we can take it up outside the presence of the jury. 
:," PMlrJ Fine 
01:30:28 PM DAAnne I'll have motions before we reconvene on Monday. Taylor 
01:30:39 PM J We'll have the jury come in a 9 on Monday - return the jury -jury present and in place 
01:31:50 PM PAArt Calls #3 VerHaren 
01:31:56 c ~ ................. 
II -
01:31:59 PM 
I Lisa Lund Carrington - KCSD 22 years. I got to the area of 
#3 Scarcella probably 12:45 PM. I took a position at Scarcella and 
Ramsey Road. I took a position to block and I stayed there 5-6 
minutes and went up Scarcella to the incident location. I arrived 
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I and blocked the immediate access. I 
01:34:43 PM DAAnne Objection Taylor 
01:34:46 PM J Sustained 
01:34:52 PM I saw an ambulance parked in the east bound lane of travel, body 
in the west bound lane, white car partially in west bound ditch and 
a red car pointed west in the east bound lane of travel. Deputy 
Klinkefus and another jail deputy were on scene. I was the 
immediate supervisor at that time and took steps to block the area 
off. I was establishing a parameter. I believe I asked Spirit Lake 
#3 PD to maintain a parameter lookout at Seasons and 41. I 
requested a deputy to respond and the detectives and my 
supervisor took steps to have the witnesses transported to 
Rathdrum PD. The witnesses were the 3 Larsen family members. 
I borrowed Trooper Robinett (ISP) camera. I took photos of the 
scene itself and close ups of the vehicles and the body on the 
roadway. It was cold and damp, overcast. It was January 1st. 
Detective Maskell, Stewart, March and_. 
01:39:18 PM I came north on Ramsey to Scarcello. Scarcello is a rural road - 2 
XE #3 by lanes with not much shoulder in places. When I arrived there was 
DAAnne an ambulance there in the east lane and that lane was full. 
Taylor Several people arrived. The body was laying perpendicular-
across he lane of travel. 
lr==DT41:02 J Excused 
01:41:14 PM PAArt Calls #4 VerHaren 
01:41:18 PM c Swears 
01:41:36 PM Brad Maskell- KCSD Major Crimes Investigator 22 years. Re: 
prior experience. I have been assigned to major crimes for about 
15 years. 
January 1, 2006 was a day off for me and I was called in to work 
shortly after 1:00PM. The call was in regards to going to 
; Scarcella road. It took me some time to get there. Around 2:10-
' 
2:15pm I began down Scarcello road. I went to a residence on 
i Scarcella- 2322 E. Scarcello Road. I had been advised that the 
#4 individual involved had been located at that location. It's a 
residence, a home, the Cunningham home on Scarcella Road. On 
arrival I met with 3 officers on scene. I met with AI March. I pulled 
into the driveway and pulled in behind his - March directed my 
attention to a vehicle behind a shed on the Cunningham property 
- gold blazer with white top. 
' ' 
EX #36 photo taken at the Cunningham home. There is a full size 
mobile home further up and another which is pretty run down. I 
contacted Ron Cunningham and I believe he was staying at the 
file://R:\LogNotes- HTML\District\Criminal\Luster\CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan W... 1120/2012 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 359 of 848
Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 o· ''W/2012 Page 12 of 18 
travel trailer. Carol Cunningham was staying in the newer mobile 
home. From the home to the road is approximately 75 yrds. 
EX 36 Cunningham with a little closer view showing the blazer. 
#37 shows closer view of the blazer at the rear of the vehicle. The 
blazer had no plates or temporary stickers. EX #38 photo of the 
drivers side of the blazer. I'm 56 years of age and have been 
around cars my whole life. I've seen cars with dents - ones that 
occurred a long time ago and ones that occurred recently- both in 
private and professional life. Along the drivers side you can see 
damage of denting and recent paint transfer there. #39 photo of 
front of drivers side fender and grill of the blazer. There was some 
recent damage to the front bumper and paint transfer. EX #40 
close up of the twisted bumper guard. I directed the photo 
because of the large white paint chip on the bumper. EX #41 mid 
to front portion of the same blazer. Shows bullet hole in the front 
right fender. EX #42 photo of the same ve 
01:59:04 PM I went down Scarcello road 3/4 mile to the west and went to the 
incident location. There were several officers there- lists officers. 
Medical had left and the body of Vonette Larsen was still there. I 
had asked Lisa Carrington to take pictures right away and when I 
arrived I took photos as did Trooper Robinett. I later got photos 
from a helicopter and used Google Earth. It was some days after 
the incident that I took photos from the helicopter. 
#4 EX #3 is a photo taken from the helicopter looking to the west. 
The incident to the Cunningham home is 3/4 mile. EX #4 is photo 
taken from the helicopter. #5 is another photo directly over the 
location where this incident occurred. EX #6 is overhead photo of 
the Cunningham home. Looking up the drive you could see the 
rear and rear left portion of the blazer. EX #7 GPS photo which 
indicates distance. EX #8 Another satellite image showing 
western extension of Scarcello. There is a nearby convenience 
store across 41 at Twin Lakes 
02:09:20 PM PAArt PI EX#9 VerHaren 
02:09:25 PM DAAnne This is one we have an objection to. i Taylor I 
02:09:35 PM 1#4 II_ ~~C:~~n!ze this.e~hi~i~_as ~ p~o~~-~f-~he incident scene from the 
I 1 eastm tne west aep1ctmg me mc1aem 
02:10:06 PM DAAnne Objection Taylor 
~~~ The state is entitled to lay their foundation. 
02:10:28 PM #4 The picture shows Scarcel!o road, Vonette Larsen body, medical paraphernalia on the road, vehicles, and debris in the roadway. 
02:11:05 PM DAAnne Objection - we need to discuss this outside the presence of the 
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Taylor jury 
02:11:18 PM J Excuses and admonishes jury 
02:12:01 PM The words "crime scene" were subject to a motion in limine. 
DAAnne Based on that statement and the 6 prior statements during Joel 
Taylor Larsen's testimony re: "wife was run over" I move for mistrial. 
These were subject to the decision by the Idaho Supreme Court 
02:13:15 PM PAArt I did nothing to inflame the emotions of the jury. I have not had 
VerHaren this witness refer to the area as a crime scene. 
02:14:04 PM DAAnne He's dancing all around the court's pretrial order. The supreme 
Taylor court didn't just mean the two words "got done." There were 6 
I statements about the wife "got run over." 
02:1 J Comments- at this time I'm not inclined to grant a mistrial. 
02:17:00 PM DAAnne Let's figure out what we're going to do about the exhibit first Taylor 
02:17:17 PM Comments - I've noted that the objection will not be a problem 
J and can be admitted but I note that the state has not laid a 
foundation. 
02:18:22 PM I intend to ask him about his training re: blood spheres and blood 
flow and if there is a place blood will typically go if the surface is 
PAArt not level and I anticipate him to say to the lowest level. There is 
VerHaren another photo the court indicated it would decline to admit - there 
is a blood smear leading up to hair and tissue. I intend to ask this 
officer his training re: blood smears. 
02:20:11 PM DAAnne As long as our prior objections are in the record and as far as the 
Taylor blood smear I hope there is a good foundation laid. 
02:20:50 PM I don't think it takes a lot of training or expertise to determine that 
J a liquid would flow downhill and that hair on the pavement might have come from someone's head. Return the jury- jury present 
and in place. 
02:23:28 PM Re: investigating crime scene training. EX #9 -there's a lot of 
#4 information in the photo and it has the tarp over body of Vonette Larsen and shows the blood flow. It also depicts evidence of 
medical intervention and debris. 
02:25:03 PM PAArt Motion to admit VerHaren 
02:25:10 PM Voir Dire 
#4 by DA Blood flows down hill Anne 
Taylor 
II 02:25:36 PM DAAnne No obj Taylor 
02:26:15 p J ADMIT EX#9 
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02:26:29 PM PAArt It looks like we need another hearing outside the presence of the 
VerHaren jury 
02:26:52 PM DAAnne The objections have already been noted to #33 and the other is to 
Taylor #33A and it needs to be heard outside the presence of the jury, 
II 02:27:24 PM1f J 1'''"' ov,..~--:-hed -~• 1 _,__ IVIII~I 
02:28:06 PM DAAnne The problem with #33A is that it is now labeled with information. 
Taylor You don't need an exhibit where the testimony is written right on the exhibit. 
02:28:39 PM PAArt I'll also offer EX #33 EX #33A is basically 33 - the difference is the 
VerHaren labeling of 3 things. We believe you've already admitted I and I intend to admit EX #33A first 
02:29:17 PM I could admit EX #33 after the officer lays the foundation then he 
could be asked by either counsel to make a mark as to where he 
J located any item he located. All the state has done is to do this in 
advance OVERRULE THE OBJECTION conditional on the deputy 
providing the appropriate testimony. I'm not sure why we need 
both #33 and #33A. Is there a reason you feel 2 are necessary? 
02:32:18 PM PAArt No VerHaren 
02:32:20 PM J Take your pick- 33A- we'll work with that #33A and #34 are ADMITTED Return the jury -jury present and in place. 
02:33:57 PM #33A is a photo taken at the scene image from the south 
depicting the rear portion of the white Honda and in the fore 
ground shows a redacted image of the body. #34 is a closer 
image of the redacted body and some of the blood stain evidence 
close by. I noticed blood stains and specifically a blood/tissue 
#4 transfer that contained a hair mass that was located just to the 
west of the decedent- a couple of feet west of her right foot. 
There was a heavier mass at the eastern end of the transfer. I 
added where the head was positioned and where the hair/tissue 
transfer was and the area of the smear pattern. EX #34 there is 
the redaction to the body itself. #34 is a close up of what can be 
sen in #33A 
02:38:30 PM PAArt Motion to admit #33A and #34 VerHaren 
02:38:39 PM DAAnne Objection Tayior 
02:38:42 PM J Overruled ADMIT #33A AND #34 
02:40:11 PM EX #9 photo taken on Scarcella road EX #1 0 image from the 
north to the east side of the Honda showing passenger side of the 
vehicle. #11 is a closer view #12 - picture of the passenger side 
door area with 2 witness statements that had fallen from the 
vehicle #13 Shows passenger side frontal are. Dirt is covering a 
portion of the wheel (front) with roadway ravel covering the right 
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rear tire portion. EX #14, #15 photos of the Honda the driver rear 
tire is slightly off the roadway. #16 shows left rear of the Honda 
and some tire marks. #17 photo taken of the Honda from the west 
facing east. #18 photo of the Honda facing east #19 is a little 
closer image, #20, #22 close up of the driver side of the 1996 
Honda. The rear view mirror is on the ground and the tire is 
deflated. #23 photo shows tire markings on the north side of 
8"'- ... "'-11- ... -"'"""....1 .,. __ _.. .. ·=-··· -: ...... -... •--k: .... ,.. ,4,..., .. 1...., Ther~ i~ nnrtinn nf 
ve11 vt::l V I VC1U I t::C11 Vlt::VV I IIIII VI IVV"IIIl:::f UVV II. I II I Ci I;;) tJV LIVII VI 
the front bumper on the ground. EX #24 is another photo of the 
scene oriented from the west facing east #25 photo of incident 
scene facing northeast taken from the intersection. EX #26 photo 
#4 taken from the roadway toward the southwest #27 photo of the intersection showing tire markings. #28 closer view of the Subaru 
in the east lane of travel at the scene. #29 image of incident 
scene taken just off the drivers side of the Subaru. EX #30-
closer image showing some debris and tire markings and drivers 
side of the Honda. EX #31 photo east from west showing debris in 
the road, driver side of the Honda and deceased in the roadway. 
#32 photo of the incident scene angled slightly behind the 
Subaru, #33A image taken at the scene showing the Honda as it 
relates to the deceased - the body has been redacted and to 
show depiction of body, blood smear and head tissue. #34 is a 
closer depiction and you can seethe hair and tissue imbedded 
into the pavement. 
02:57:42 PM J - admonishes jury 
02:57:52 PM J in session - return the jury -jury present and in place. 
03:21:08 PM 
I had an opportunity to view the body of Vonette Larsen and the 
hair on the roadway. The hair in the tissue match was the same 
color and type of hair that was on the head of the decedent. 
Vonette was wearing pair of mossy oak style camo pants, black 
and white shoes, sweat shirt that said CDA and red and black 
plaid shirt. 
Looking at the front part of the blazer at the Cunningham property 
DX#3 I noted that the blazer had no front plate. 
continues I instructed to have the vehicle sealed and put on a roll bed and 
brought to the KCSD for processing. I met with one of the ISP 
officers who were participating in the scene, George Phillips, and I 
made sure he had the vehicles collected in a similar fashion and 
bring them to the SO. That was done. I did not collect evidence 
myself. PL EX #88- I've seen this. It's the original copy of one of 
the two victim statements- this is of Jovon. I did not collect it 
II myseif - it appears to be in the same condition as when ! 
photographed it that day. 
On notification of the incident - within minutes of notification I 
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made a phone call to the 911 dispatch center and I instructed 
them to preserve all 911 calls relating to this incident. I first 
received cassette tape recordings and I went to the supervisor 
and requested source copies from the recording device at the 
center and received digital copies. There were no other 911 calls 
than those we listened to with Joleen. 
I took steps to have 911 recordings analyzed to see how many 
gun shots were audible and where they existed. I first contacted 
the Motorola corporation - manufacturer of the cell phone Joleen 
was using and I tried to get information re: capabilities of the 
phone. I then contacted the FBI thinking I could get services of 
their lab and they said it would take at least 6 months to get the 
information back. I then contacted the REM company who put me 
in touch with their audio/visual analyst in Phoenix and I sent the 
recordings to him. 
I was there on numerous occasions when the vehicles were 
exami 
03:36:50 PM #4 I Scarcella road is in Kootenai County, Idaho. I 
03:37:11 PM REM only does work for police departments to the best of my 
knowledge. Carl Berg used to work for the CDA PD. 
XE #4 by When I arrived someone had already briefed me and as I was 
DAAnne going to the scene I listened to radio traffic. I'm not sure I know of 
Taylor 3 vehicles via radio traffic. I did know someone was deceased out 
of a vehicle. At the Cunningham house I saw 2 police officers 
engaged in a conversation and I spoke with them. I met defendant 
and didn't have to drag him out of a house. 
03:39:07 PM PAArt !Objection VerHaren I 
03:39:11 PM J I overruled I 
03:39:15 PM 
I didn't tell him that he had killed someone. I don't know if ISP told 
him. I did look at the blazer. On that day I didn't know that it had a 
temporary sticker on it. I do know that now. 
I noticed the vehicle was dirty and had damage (lists damage) 
and two bullet ho!es one in the front passenger side and one in 
the rear window. The bullet direction was back to front. I wrote a 
report. The back passenger window bullet hole was an oblique 
angle. My report is to document important things. I directed the 
photos be done. 
I January 1 i had an opportunity to see him face-to-face and see I 
his demeanor. He was cooperative and reasonably articulate. 
After I left the Cunningham residence I went to the incident area. 
Photos had been taken and officers had been walking around . 
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There are two driveways in the area. In relation to the driveways-
the incident location was at the one driveway. My work focused 
on the driveway and just beyond the driveway. 
I directed hair to be collected. The hair was about 2' from the feet 
of Ms. Larsen. Detective Stewart assisted me and interviewed the 
Larsens and communicated to me what they told him. The gun is 
a Smith and \AJesson, stainless. ! have seen the gun and he!d it. 
I've shot one like it - it's a loud powerful gun - not one that law 
enforcement uses that I'm aware of. I don't know why law 
XE #4 by enforcement doesn't use that type. 
DAAnne I interviewed the Larsens one at a time. After that I directed that Taylor palm prints be lifted off the blazer. After that conversation I went 
to the funeral home and took 6 palm prints from Ms. Larsen - 3 
from each hand and I submitted all the evidence to the lab. I 
attended the autopsy and discussed the case with the pathologist. 
The autopsy was the day before my interview with the Larsens 
but I was aware of their versions and passed that information on 
to the pathologist. 
After my interviews with the Larsen girls I learned of a little red car 
that had been behind him when he turned around. We made 
attempts, I quired people i 
03:48:12 PM RD #4 by 
PAArt I'm aware the palm prints were sent to the state. 
VerHaren 
03:49:07 PM DAAnne Objection Taylor 
'"' "' .. .,.. . J II H~ can answer yes or no. ,~.£."'t lVI 
03:49:32 PM I recently became aware that the prints are not that of Vonette 
Larsen. 
To my knowledge a gun like the 44 is used for hunting and target 
RD #4 by shooting- typically used for hunting. 
PAArt 
VerHaren The rear window projectile damage oblique angle - is very close 
to the plane that it strikes - explains - inside of 1 0 degrees. That 
didn't go into the blazer but ricocheted off. I only saw a picture of 
the temporary registration- don't know if it was vaiid. it was not 
visible from anywhere outside the vehicle. 
03:52:31 PM RX#4 by When I say it wasn't visible I mean by myself some time after the DAAnne 
Taylor incident. The window was dropped down. 
03:53:27 PM J Excused - you are still under the defense subpoena. 
03:53:45 PM J Recess for the weekend- admonishes jury Return at 9:00am 
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03:55:19 PM 
03:55:19 PM End 
I Monday. Counsel to return at 8:30am Monday. 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www .fortherecord .com 
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Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20120123 Motions 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth 
Court Reporter Keri Veare 
PA Art VerHaren 
PA Barry McHugh 
DAAnne Taylor 
DA John Adams 
)\ 
~\ 11 
Date 1/23/2012 Location 111 K-COURTROQM~ 
\ 
Time Speaker Note 
08:30:56 AM J In session - courtroom #2 - atthe conclusion of the last hearing I 
understood DA Taylor may have had some motions 
I 08:31:20 AM II DA Taylor I Submits motion for mistrial and dismiss- sorry for the delay 
I 08:31:30 AM IIJ I Recess 
I 08:44:56 AM II J I Back in session 
08:45:01 AM 
DA Taylor 
We're here on a motion for mistrial and then a motion for dismissal 
of the case entirely. It's important to revisit the entirety of what 
happened and not just a single instance. I want to go back and 
consider when this case came back from the Supreme Court -
they were quite clear what statements were prosecutorial 
misconduct. That happened in this case by the same prosecutor 
in the same way and that in itself is prosecutorial misconduct. Our 
motion was brought before trial started and the state stipulated to 
it. On the first day of trial 6 separate occasions the statements 
were used. The state has completely disregarded the supreroe 
court and this court's rulings. 
Shortly before trial information came to the defense that 
information was left out re: finger prints. We moved to dismiss re 
Brady. The court ruled that we could go forward with limitations. 
Friday afternoon A VerHaren made comments 2 times re: 
fingerprints. The palm prints become important and when they are 
exclude Vonettes it is very important for the defense and they 
become important. Julie Morgan lifted the prints from the Blazer 
and she's no longer with ISP. We didn't have to worry about this 
because the court excluded them. This violates the defendants 
due process right. That's just not happened here. The state has 
chosen to ignore the supreme court's admonishment, his own 
agreement and this court's ruling. This is the very reason we took 
, the precaution to fi!e motions in !imine. Def cannot receive a fair 
trial due to what PA VerHaren has done. 
Motion to dismiss - it was a lot of thought and work before we 
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came in today to do this but we have to do this. PA VerHaren and 
the state has chosen to do this and defendant cannot receive a 
fair trial. You'll see how important the palm prints become. Review 
Cushman's testimony and he indicates that PA VerHaren 
contacted him to see what part of the palm prints Cushman 
analyzed. When the state found out we would not stipulate to the 
reports that's when we found out about the 
08:53:30 AM Your order was ciear and i did vioiate your order. i simpiy used 
the word fingerprint when I shouldn't have. The jury didn't hear 
any evidence that there were fingerprints taken from the blazer. I 
was not mad at Ms. Taylor. I tried to make it abundantly clear that 
the prints taken from the blazer were not that of Ms. Larsen. I 
! don't think that is grounds for a mistrial. 
I purposely di~n't attempt to use language in questioning Mr. 
Larsen that would appeal to the emotion of the jury. In terms of 
that phrase I didn't use any of the words the supreme court 
PA objected to and there were no objections from the defense and I 
VerHaren thought I was successful in keeping away from the objectionable 
statements. I wasn't tracking when the court first sustained the 
objection - I hadn't realized what I had done until the court 
sustained the 2nd objection. The jury didn't get any information 
that was specifically ordered to not get before the jury and I think I 
was successful in keeping it from the jury and there is no basis for 
granting a mistrial. 
The other issue is that the state is willing to stipulate, if further 
evidence is needed, that the palm prints and the fingerprint, if the 
court is left with the impression that it's her, that the print is not 
hers as well. 
08:57:11 ,a,M I! 'Nanted to c!ear the record up re: 14th amendment and due 
process that applies to defendant. After a while all the 
inadvertence - I don't think it matters who said fingerprints but it 
was PA and he said it twice. State vs. Guzman- after a while you 
DA Taylor should look at the mistakes -you should grant a mistrial and 
dismiss the case. Here we are in the same case with the same PA 
in the same courtroom and the same things are going on. He's 
violating the motions in limine again. The appropriate ruling is to 
08:59:36 AMlf J 
grant the motion for mistrial and dismiss the case. 
!Recess 
L..____ 
09:06:34 AM I Back in session - I had anticipated this motion at the conclusion of 
court on Friday and my court repotier furnished me a rough draft 
of the proceedings and of Detective Maskell's XE on Friday. I had 
a degree of frustration and anticipated that this issue would come 
II ho.fr..ro tho 1"'1"\llrt tl"\rl!:~\1 Tho mictri!:~l ic 1"'1"\mhino.rl \Mith tho. 11co 1"\f IIUVI\JIV Lll'-' VV\AIL I.V"-""""J• Ill"' IIII....,LII"""I ,....., .....,.._,111....,111'-'- WWit.ll Lll- --- ....,. 
J the term "run over" during the course of examination of witnesses 
in vioiation of the court's directive last week. The court has a 
I degree of frustration over what happened last week. The court 
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made it clear that if the state wanted to discuss prints of Ms. 
Larsen then the court would grant a continuance for the defense 
to get a report and the court made it clear that there was to be no 
evidence was to the finger print. Apparently Mr. VerHaren made a 
mistake. I'll accept the statement that he made a mistake. He's 
very aware of the directives of the supreme court and this court 
that he has a habit of violating the court's directive. He cannot 
afford to do this. Ms. Taylor has danced around the term. PA 
VerHaren brought the term out. This has now been offered in 
conjunction with the motion for mistrial in the use of the term 
"struck Ms. Larsen". The reality of the situation is that Ms. Larsen 
J was run over by a motor vehicle and the term cannot be avoided 
during this case. What the supreme court and this court are 
concerned about is that it not be used in the inflammatory way it 
was in the last trial. The court needs to make it clear that when the 
last ruling came out I was particularly disturbed that they ruled that 
an ISP officer committed perjury and they noted there were a 
number of prosecutoria! misconduct It's my job and responsibility 
that Mr. Ellington get a fair trial. I make it clear to the elected PA 
that if there is more prosecutorial misconduct that I will dismiss the 
·case and you will have to get permission from the Supreme Court 
it file again. At this point I don't think he's been denied a fair trial. 
I'm not satisfied that I can grant a motion for mistria 
DA Taylor No questions 
PA 
End 
No questions 
L_ 
Produced by FTR GoldTM 
www. fortherecord. com 
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Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 2012013 Jury Trial Day 4 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth 
Court Reporter Keri Veare ) / 
PA Art VerHaren 
PI\ B""r'"'' ~JI,..uu,.,h n a 'Y • ,...,,, l:::l'' 
( ! A DA Anne Taylor - ~/ ,.~ 
DA John Adams 
Date 1/23/2012 Location 111 K-COURTROOM1 ~ 
Time ~Is case Note .£"+. 4 AM 
09:25:02 AM DAAnne Our accident reconstructionist is in the courtroom and I ask that 
Taylor he be allowed to remain - he's our exert 
09:25:25 AM PA Barry I object to him sitting in for the audio expert but not the accident 
McHugh reconstruction 
I 09:25:49 AM J I'll grant the request Return the jury -jury present and in place .. 
I 09:28:45 AM I PA Calls #5 
09:29:10 AM c Swears 
09:29:13 AM Brewster Rolland-Keith -
Phoenix AZ with Rocky Mountain Information Network. We are a 
federally funded program to assist law enforcement agencies. I 
have worked there for 2 1/2 years. I'm the audio-video forensic 
analyst there. I've given both audio and visual and asked to 
enhance or make clear the audio or visual. Re: education, training 
and experience. This year I've worked approximately 65 cases 
and the 2 years before that about 30 cases. I'd say half of my 
cases are audio related. 90% or more of my cases are to enhance 
#5 the audio and make it clear. I testified once before in Maricopa 
i County in 2009 as an expert - that was an audio case as well. I 
have presented to our audio forensic association in Arizona in 
2009. I have written 3 articles and have been published in our 
Rocky Mountain Information Network bulletin. 
I became involved in this investigation last year- 2011 having 
been contacted by Brad Maskell. I was asked to review the 911 
recordings and enhance one of the recordings. I only work for law 
enforcement agencies and they must submit a request to us and 
, the crime must be relating to a felony crime. 
09:37:47 AM loA I Objection 
09:37:50 AM IJ I Sustained 
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09:37:53 AM I do not charge for what I do when asked to work on a case. 
I was provided a police report and CD with the audio recordings. I 
have a computer built specially for forensic audio/video and the 
program is called adobe audition. This allows you to enhance 
#5 audio through the use of filters. I have used this program for at least 6 years. I copy the disc to my computer and make sure the 2 
n"'l~+ch I nl~u i+ ~""d Ina" ~· hnme +he a••dio UJa'"'" fnr lonLrs I IIIQL II. I ... IIQJ IL Clll IV n. QL I lVII L I U I Y V'"' lVI I Vn . . I 
remove background noise if possible and clean it up. EX #71 - CD 
that I created. Explains procedure to clean up the recording. You'll 
find the enhanced audio file I found and the viewer software to 
look at it. 
09:42:28 AM PA Barry Motion to Admit EX #71 McHugh 
09:42:34AM DAAnne No objection Taylor 
09:42:39AM J EX #71 ADMITTED 
09:43:09AM PA Barry I'd like him to project it from our computer McHugh 
09:43:32AM DAAnne No objection if in question and answer type examination Taylor 
09:44:07 J Correct 
09:44:28AM Explains display graph of audio- I'm zooming up on a portion of 
time - a certain sliver of time. It looks to be roughly 30 seconds on 
the screen. Plays portion and I now have 8 or 9 seconds on the 
#5 screen. Plays the sequence. I have isolated 1 minute 45 to about 1 minute 46 bracketed. The time frame I isolated was .82 
seconds. Identifies delay in this area. There are not a lot of clean 
lines - the bottom half shows a general uniform volume and the 
volume is not changing too fast. 
09:55:21 AM DAAnne Objection Taylor 
09:55:25 AM J Sustained 
09:55:45 AM #5 I reviewed the police report and that is the area where the two 
vehicles collided and where the firearm was discharged. 
09:56:15 AM DA.Anne Objection Taylor 
I 09:56:18 AM IIJ I Overruled I 09:56:25 AM Ill Th1s aud1o 1s consistent w1th two vehicles colhd1ng. I have worked 
11 11 11 other audios where 2 vehicles collide and they sounded very 
consistent to this. The next area is 1 minute 51 -plays from 1 
minute 40 to 1 minute 51. The total length of sound effect at 1 
minute 51 was close to 1 second- shows where it occurred. The 
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sound is covering more of its audio spectrum unlike section #1. It 
starts out wit ha giant peak and decreases very quickly. 
I have had the opportunity to examine other cases where there 
wee gunshots that I could confirm. The consistencies with a 
gunshot are the peak - in this section there is a little bit of voice 
that could be covering up. After that first peak high volume sound 
#5 you can still hear some of the gunshot then there is an echo -
shows portion of display of echo. This is different from the first 
event - there is a difference where it is louder then softer. Plays 
the 3rd event- the time is roughly about a second. The noise is 
stretched over the entire spectrum both high and low pitches with 
voices overlapping the gunshot. This is consistent with gunshot. 
The gunshot itself lasted about 1/2 a second. At 1 minute 45 I 
didn't find any sounds consistent with an auto accident. 
10:06:36 AM XE by DA The first event I do not believe is a gunshot but the 2nd two I 
Anne believe are. Voices are covering up the gunshot in portions. The 
Taylor second event is the first gunshot when I hear someone say "get 
out". I detected 2 gunshots and am aware there were 5. 
10:08:29 AM jJ I Excused. 
10:09:27 AM jPA j Calls #6 
10:09:31 AM c Swears 
10:09:34 AM 
Charles Robnett- ISP Trooper since July 22, 1998. I am a patrol 
trooper. No prior law enforcement experience. Re: training. I am 
POST certified. January 1, 2006 I was on duty and traveled to 
Scarcella east of Hwy 41. I was asked to respond to set up a 
parameter and I was sent to Ramsey and Brunner. Eventually I 
went to the incident scene just after 1:00pm. I was asked to go 
there by Tim Johnson or Wayne Longo. I was involved in taking 
measurements. I take measurements to make a scene diagram. 
Post academy we are trained on scene investigations and I've 
taken other training as part of crash investigation. EX #89 -
measurements taken that day with the assistance of Dustin 
#6 Kralik. I laid a straight line on the outside of each side of the incident. In this case I stretched a 300' tape measure on the 
scene. A base line is always a straight line. I set the base line. I 
don't remember if anyone was on the other side holding it or if I 
put something heavy on it. We start at zero and take 
measurements north or south of the base line. The 
measurements east and west were made off the tape measure. 
This day the tape measure was the base line. I did have a 
measuring device I used. Trooper Kralek wrote the 
measurements down. I told him what to write down. I used a 
II II range finder- ! parked my car on the east side and I shot back to I 
the license plate to get the base line. On close measurements we 
used a 25' tape. EX #89 shows diagrams, roadway 
measurements, vehicles. Trooper Kralik drew all the diagrams 
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and placed the measurements on the re ports. I do see my 
handwriting re: notes. The measurements accurately depict the 
measurements taken that day. On Scarcella road- the incident is 
between Ramsey and Hwy 41. EX #28 - photo. I am familiar with 
this photo as a vehicle that was on scene that day. This is the 
scene that the measurements were taken from that day. Explains 
"scrub mark" a tire mark made by a tire that was pushed. I don't 
recall if there were scrub marks at or near the location of 
10:24:07 AM PA Barry Motion to admit McHugh 
10:24:45 A J ADMIT EX#89 
10:24:52 AM DAAnne Recess? Taylor 
10:2 . J tc:. ~VI"IIC:.~c:. ~nrl ~rlmf'\ni<>ho<> jury ,, __ 
10:25:57 AM DAAnne I asked for pier reviews and I have not reviewed an answer from 
Taylor the state - I know he wrote a report 
10:26:16 AM #6 There was no pier review process at that time- it started 2 1/2 years ago. This report was not pier reviewed. 
10:26:43 J o ......................... 
10:26:53 J j~ in session - return the jury -jury present and in place. 
10:43:53 AM I've been a trooper for 13 1/2 years. When I went to the incident I 
had a specific job as accident reconstructionist. I received special 
training and part of that was taking measurements. I diagramed 
and took measurements for the report. I used a 300' tape 
measure. The scene was smaller than 300'. Reviews EX #89- the 
scene appears to be 220 - 227 is the longest measurement we 
XE#6 have. I'd need to see the diagram that I drew to see where that 
measurements was. The diagram is not in this packet. I 
documented body measurements. I noted hair debris. I did not 
note blood path or blood pattern. (reviews diagram)- this shows 
it's a 200' baseline so the scene is contained in 200'. The front of 
the Subaru to the body is 97' from the measurements I took as 
trained. 97' from the Subaru to the door of the Honda. The body 
was 30' from the Honda. 
10:49:55 AM J \1\litn~c:.c:. excused 
10:50:08AM PA R~rn1 I#' --••J Calls #6 McHugh 
110:50:17 AM lie II swears I 
110:50:54 AM II Dustin Kralik- ISP 1/1/06 I was on duty and responded to provide 
II I I assistance and I contacted Cprl. Robinett. I assisted him by " 
#6 writing down what he told me to do and writing down what he told 
me. He asked me to record measurements that he told me. EX 
#89 is field sketches and measurements taken that day - indicates 
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portions written by self- all on first, second, third, 4th, 5th and all 
the measurements. I wrote down the measurements accurately as 
provided to me by Robinett. There are drawings on the document. 
I drew the roadway- I did not draw the dark marks. I drew this to 
the best of my ability. 
10:55:00 AM XE by PA My job was to assist Trooper Robinett. There were lots of people 
Anne at the scene walking around and on the roadway. The roadway 
Taylor was wet and later began to rain and it got dark before we got finished. 
10:55:58 AM RD by PA 
Barry All the measurements were taken before it got too dark. 
McHugh 
10:56:19 J Excused 
10:56:21 AM PA Barry Calls #7 McHugh 
10:56:27 AM: c !swears I 
10:56:34 AM Charles S. Greear- Detective ISP since October 2011. Prior to 
that I was a patrol officer since June 1999. Re: prior law 
enforcement experience. I had involvement preparing exhibits in 
this case. Most of the information was notes taken from officers. 
EX #89 - I've seen this before. This is a photocopy of the original 
document. I located the original in our case file for this incident. 
January 1, 2006 I was not on duty and did not go to the scene 
that day. I have been there since. I am familiar with the area. EX 
#78 - I've seen it before -1 generated this exhibit. I used a 
computer and program called crash zone which is a computer 
generated program. I first began using it in 2001 with Crash Zone 
5. I've been using it to generate scaie diagrams since then and in 
2006 I attended a course put on by the parent company - the CAD 
#7 
Zone -that helped me refine my techniques. I personally owned 
the program since 2004. I've used this program hundreds of 
times. It's a computer aided drawing program where you input 
coordinates. It generates a scale diagram with measurements 
obtained at the scene. I plotted the measurements taken into a 
crash zone diagram into a program and it generates a point on 
the program. August 23, 2011 I went to the scene and took more 
measurements of the scene using the equipment that surveyors 
use that tell elevation, distance and direction from a known point. I 
extended the scene 200' to the west and to the east of the original 
measurements that were taken January 1, 2006. I also measured 
the shoulders of the road, fence line off the roadway. There were 
2 culverts below the roadway and I took measurements of them 
II 
' • as well by measuring the ends of the culverts. ! measured the II 
shoulders and roadway. I put that information into the program 
and generated EX #78 which is a combination of the two 
diagrams. The initial measurements listed location of tires re: 
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11:12:03AM PABarry 
11:12:40 AM 
McHugh 
DAAnne 
Taylor 
Voir Dire 
#7 
1
11:15:11 AM I DAAnne 
_ . Taylor 
11:16: 
11:17: 
11:17:13 AM 
#7 
11:28:31 AM PA Barry 
McHugh 
vehicle placement. I had points from the original measurements 
and I compared it to vehicle statistics. EX #78 ace 
Motion to admit EX #78 
January 1, 2006 I was not at the scene. I added the culverts and 
fence line and they were not listed by Robinett. The elevation of 
the ditch is not reflected on EX #78. EX #27 - The ditch and slope 
of that is depicted on the photo. On my diagram the tire marks go 
on the shoulder- the ditch is not one that you drive through. 
As long as we're clear that the tire marks don't depict going 
through the ditch then we have no objection. 
hat testimony is clear- ADMIT EX #78 
·s the same with no measurements 
long as we're clear re: tire marks not in ditch 
MIT#77 
#79 I examined all the photos of the scene and I found that in 5 
photos taken by Carrington that there was enough data available 
to analyses them using a program referred to as photogramagry -
the program is" I witness". Explains use of program. I use the 
program at least 2 or 3 times per month. It takes digital photos. 
There are certain things that has to be present. It can reference 
photos using common points in photos and can generate a 3 
dimensional diagram. These are all2 dimensional. The photos 
have to have the metadata still attached to them. That is the 
information that is stored with each photo by your camera. It lists 
shutter speed, what he camera was, etc. It can be done without a 
digital photo but it does need to have the data. 
The 5 photos were digital. The biggest criteria is angle. There has 
to be enough angle. There have to be at least 9 points in common 
between the 2 photographs. You manually reference the same 
point in photo #1 with that in Photo 2 and from the 9 points the 
program gets enough information for camera orientation as to 
where the camera was. You are limited to what you can see. It's 
possible to create a full length even though the full length of a line 
is not depicted in all the photos. You need to have a known 
distance in there. For instance, wheel base is known to be 98'. I 
used the wheel base of the Honda and it sets the scale. 
Motion to Admit EX #79 
11:28:42 AM 
DA Anne The program has not been accepted. It's currently being used by ~~r~~ire KCSO and other agencies throughout the state. i used the 
program not approved by ISP. EX #31 The mark leading up to 
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I Ms. Larsen is what I'm referencing in my diagram I 
11:30:18 AM DAAnne No objection Taylor 
11:30:26 AM J EX #79 is ADMITTED 
11:32:50 AM #SOA-P the same diagram I just described the difference is that 
there are vehicles that have been placed on the marks - marks 
#7DX measured by Robinett 1/1/06 and in 3 or 4 of them the marks that 
cont. I took. There is a sequence based on the chronologically 
sequence of events that took place. #80 C shows a vehicle not on 
a mark and that is based on the most likely .. 
11:35:39 AM DAAnne Sounds like it's an opinion and I object Taylor 
111:35:51 AM IIJ II Sustained I 
11:36:19 AM I used the statements in the case file re: vehicle actions and the 
existence of the marks and placed the vehicle consistent with the 
statements of people who were there. I know John Daily who is 
an instructor and have known him for about 5 years. I got 
information from him - the information on #SOA-P is essentially the 
same as that on #78 and #79. The program crash zone has, in 
addition to the data base information, also provides a number of 
symbols showing a generic vehicle. In this case there were 3 
#7 dimensional for Honda, Subaru and Blazer so I used the data base to scale the images. #81A- X 3 dimensional rendering of the 
same depiction that I just testified to- instead of a 2 dimensional 
plot. It's as if you are looking at photos as it as occurring. EX #80 
it's directly above and #81 is as if through a camera looking at the 
scene. The slope of the roadway is included in #81, the 
shoulders, texture of road, the vehicles are depicted in 3 
LJ dimensions, fence line visible, gravel and grass depicted. I made personal observations at the scene re: gravel and grass and took measurements at the scene. 
111:43:32 AM I DAAnne Objection Taylor 
111:43:41 AM I PA Barry It's just 3-D instead of 2-D McHugh 
111 :44:01 AM II 
II used the same exhibits in preparation. E #82A-82L they are 
essentially continuation of EX #81 -from a different camera 
perspective. Depicts the blazer's movements on the roadway near 
the center line facing east. The 2 vehicles involved are the Honda 
#7 and blazer. #82 H, I, J, K are facing east on Scarcella road near 
the junction of the driveway and the road itself showing all 3 
II I II vehicles. #82L shows the same 3 vehicles depicted from the I 
perspective of the drivers position in the Chevy blazer. 
I've been to the incident site. The roadway is chip sealed asphalt 
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11:48:36 AM DAAnne 
Taylor 
J 
#7 
J 
J 
01:14:48 PM DAAnne 
Taylor 
01:14:59 PM DAJohn 
Adams 
01:17:18 PM DA Anne 
Taylor 
01:17:24 PM PA Barry 
McHugh 
01:18:01 PM 
#6 XE by 
DAAnne 
Taylor 
01:21:40 PM DA Anne 
Taylor 
01:21:50 PM 
#7 
I II 
I 01 :24:46 PM II DA Anne 
2 lane road. The center line is a painted double yellow line. 
Objection - I want to be quite clear as to the time frame. 
ained 
I drive that roadway fairly regularly. Prior to January 1, 2006 and 
after, I traveled that roadway hundreds of times and probably 
within a month of 1/1/06 I traveled it. 
Recess for lunch - admonishes jury - return at 1:15 pm 
Back in session 
Ready for XE 
I gave the court and PA a copy a copy of the motion that didn't 
have page numbers or footers and I have provided the clerk with 
an original with them to substitute 
Fine - return the jury -jury present and in place. 
I have exhibits that were previously stipulated to 
· a portion of an exhibit I prepared. 
Motion to Admit W 
No objection 
DMITEXW 
I used the information provided by Robinett. When I did my work I 
used Trooper Robinett's work. I used his measurements not his 
initial analysis. I used things in the report to put things on the 
diagram that were not in Trooper Robinett's diagrams. the only 
time I put a vehicle on a mark or on a diagram not corroborated 
by the roadway marks was in the one exhibit .. 
Let's try again 
I put vehicles on the diagrams based on case file of ISP. I used 
statements of Joel Larsen to place vehicles not on the diagram. I 
don't think I used statements to Officer Stewart. I don't think I 
used statements of Joleen Larsen. I did review statements of 
Joleen and Jovon. I did not place the Honda completely in the 
west bound lane- but did in others- in case file. I used the 
'j existing evidence. If there was evidence avaiiabie i used the 
_ evidence rather than a verbal statement. 
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Taylor Motion to Admit DEF EX 0 
01:24:54 PM PA Barry No objection McHugh 
~4:56PM J J~ITDEFO 
5:07PM #7 I see the tracks and the embankment · 
01:25:22 PM DAAnne Motion to admit DEF EX N Taylor 
01:25:36 PM PA Barry No objection McHugh 
01:25:40 PM J EX N is ADMITTED 
01:2~:48 PM #7 The line on EX N - tire marks - can be seen on the photo. 
01:26:41 PM PA Barry Objection McHugh 
01:27:01 PM EX #78 the tire marks are also shown on W and they are on EX 
N and are a curved mark. Because of the nature of the mark - it 
#7 comes off the road and comes back on. If a person drove straight 
it could have continued straight and then continued on the 
roadway. 
01:28:20 PM DAAnne Motion to strike Taylor 
01:28:30 J Sustained- stricken 
01:28:35 PM PA Barry Objection McHugh 
01:29:04 PM J Overruled 
01:29:07 PM !'m a detective and have been since 2011 and prior to that I was a 
Trooper and held that position 1/1/06. I am no longer part of the 
accident reconstruction team. I have a career wide history of law 
#7 enforcement and attended a lot of accident reconstruction 
training. I am members of an international organization for 
collision reconstruction. If my information were inaccurate then my 
results would be inaccurate 
01:31~~ You may step down 
01:31:28 PM PA Barry Not excused yet McHugh 
I 01:31:34 PM J Step down subject to recall 
I 01:31:44 PM PA Barry Calls #8 McHugh 
.I Q1·31·40 Prv'i "' ,..... _______ I .. . .., • I I \..; \:)Wear::; 
I 01:31 :52 PM John G. Daily- Jackson, Wyoming. I own Jackson Hole Scientific 
Investigation - I'm co-owner with my wife. We've been in business 
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for quite a few years and first incorporated in 1980 or 1982. Re: 
#8 training. There is a lot of mathematics involved. Physics is a large part of it. I have a masters degree from the University of 
Wyoming. Most of my training now is going to conferences. 
01:36:58 p SIDE BAR 
01:40:50 PM EX #80 - specialized training in accident reconstruction with the 
2nd portion teaching experience and next publications and 
awards. This list is about me and is accurate. 
I started working in accident reconstruction in 1977 when I first 
began in law enforcement with my first course in 1979 in 
Wyoming. I didn't reconstruct every crash I worked but did a 
number of them for the sheriff's office and other agencies. 
Explains the difference between accident reconstruction ruction 
; and investigation. I worked for the sheriff's office 25 years and 7 
months. If a crash happened and needed reconstruction I did it. I 
have testified 50 - 1 00 times as an expert accident 
reconstructionist with the first time in 1981 or 1982. This is a 
business that I have. I charge $150 per hour for travel, $200 per 
hour for analysis and $300 per hour for court and 50 cents per 
hour if I drive and any other charges $ for $. So far in this case 
$4,500 and it will be more than that when done but I don't know 
DX#8 how much more. I've taught all over the US and several foreign 
countries. I teach anything that is involved in accident 
reconstruction. I travel- often times the classes are in other 
places. We do a fair amount of full scale crash testing. I belong to 
professional societies - lists. I've written 3 text books in the field -
one by myself and 2 others with co-authors. 
I received some material from PA's office which included facts 
and circumstances fmm Det. Maskell and the DVD's which 
included lots of photos. Diagrams of ISP Trooper Robinett, a 
report by another expert in the field prepared in 2006. I have to 
have something to begin work. That information tells me what I 
need to do to interpret the evidence. I set out to try and determine 
how I could best document the evidence. I would want to look at 
vehicle motions. I needed a good scale diagram. I had a lot of 
assistance from ISP Detective Charles Greear. He took the 
information from the field notes and went to the crash site and 
surveyed it with survey e 
02:04:50 PM DAAnne Objection - foundation Taylor 
02:05:1 J 1vu••1inue 
02:05:19 PM PA Barry Motion to admit EX #80A I McHugh 
02:05:33 PM DAAnne Objection Taylor 
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I 02:05:37 PM J II Sustained I I 02:05:50 PM DAAnne Object to testimony as o what's in an exhibit that hasn't been 
Taylor admitted 
I 02:06:12 PM J II Overruled I 
I 02:06:16 PM #B II Indicates on #77 what portion #BOA reflects. I 
02:06:45 PM DAAnne I object- it's not his knowledge of what happened. Taylor 
I 02:07:14 PM II#B lilt accurately depicts the scene I 
I 02:07:23 PM I PA Barry I Motion to Admtt I McHugh 
I 02:07:31 PM I DAAnne Objection - this is generated based on a variety of different 
Taylor statements and not by this witness 
02:07:4B PM J It appears to be his opinion incorporated into the drawing -Overruled ADMIT EX #BOA 
02:0B:47 PM Describes what is reflected on EX #BOA - reviews EX #BOB -
#B #BOP - Generally it shows the path of the blazer coming into it's 
first stop position. It generally describes the path of the blazer 
02:10:14 PM DAAnne Objection Taylor 
02:10:1B PM J I Sustained 
02:10:20 PM DAAnne Objection Taylor 
02:10:24 PM J I Overruled 
I 02:10:27 PM jlt shows the path of the blazer and interaction with the other 
vehicles and the pedestrian. The information is consistent with 
#B other information. I discussed the movement of the vehicle with 
Detective Greear as we were putting the project together. The 
placement of the vehicle was at my direction. 
02:12:00 PM DAAnne Objection Taylor 
02:12:0B PM J There has been no offer - the state can continue 
I 02:12:20 PM I I based my conclusions on my conversations with Greear, my 
own observations that the marks look reasonable as to their #B placement especially with respect to the culvert, it's consistent 
with the tire marks that we see. 
02:13:09 PM PA Barry Motion to admit EX #BOB - #BOP McHugh 
02: 13:22 PM !' I 
I'm aware that the information came from the ISP file which I DAAnne contained statements of various people. I'm not aware that 
Taylor Robnett's opinion changed from the first testimony to the last. If 
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Voir Dire the exhibits that have drawings not tied to a measurement and 
#8 tied on statements and the statements are not correct- if I'm 
given bad information and I rely on that bad information then my 
findings can be correct. 
02:15:55 PM DAAnne I object to EX #BOB - #BOP - these are based on various witness 
Taylor statements. 
02:16:19 PM That piObably goes more to the weight of the evidence. Detective 
J Greear has assisted him. Overruled as to the admissibility of the 
evidence #SOB- #SOP 
02:f7:17 p Describes what is shown on EX #SOB - #SOC 
02:19:15 PM DAAnne It would be less confusing to see what he's talking about in photos 
Taylor and not drawings. 
02:20:02 p J #800 is the blazer and Subaru in contact and marks 
02:20:29 PM DAAnne I objection to talking about the marks without the actual photos Taylor 
02:20:42 PM J Overruled 
02:20:50 PM It is a photographed and measured mark so we know that it 
exists. #25 shows the tire marks and the Subaru - shows the 
marks of the blazer leaving the location. There is a little damage 
to the Subaru. Scrub marks will happen during a collision when 
one vehicle is displaced by another. If one is displaced the other 
#8 is displaced- moved- it's motion is changed. I don't' see any 
scrub marks from impact. I see acceleration marks but no side 
scrubs from an impact. 
EX #82 - photo showing drivers side of the Subaru. I see very 
minor contact damage so no induced damage - or away from the 
contact damage area. 
02:25:18 PM DAAnne Objection Taylor 
02:25:23 PM J I ()verruled 
02:25:27 PM If we had greater force we'd see more damage depending on how 
I 
hard the hit was. #83 shows damage to side of Subaru - still no 
structural damage. Examples of structural damage would be 
#8 cross members, etc. This is a uni-body construction. This is 
cosmetic and not serious damage at all. It's minor damage - you 
wouldn't want it to happen to your car but it would not make it not 
run. It's not a high energy collision. 
02:28:53 PM PA Barry Request recess McHugh 
02:29:01 PM I j Recess - admonishes jury. 
02:46:35 PM J Back in session - return the jury -jury present and in place 
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02:47:48 PM EX #33 - damage to the blazer - by the Subaru would be to this 
area (indicates on photo) caused by non-penetrating side swipe. 
The impact would be about the center of the door - EX #44 -
draws line up showing impact. Center mass is important - if a 
vehicle is going to rotate because of a collision we need to know 
where the force goes to in respect to the center of the vehicle. 
#8 The damage is so slight that I would not have expected the 
direction of the vehicle to change due of the impact. The Blazer is 
heavier than the Subaru. EX #45 driver side door seal and rocker 
panel area. This is a low energy side swipe like if you were 4-
wheeling and ran into a stump or something with the side of your 
vehicle. EX #81A-#81 E 3-dimensional view of the crash scene-
generated from the same drawing input just a 3-D drawing now. 
02:55:37 PM PA Barry Motion to admit EX #81A- #81-E McHugh 
02:55:51 PM DAAnne Objection - they are not accurate of the scene January 1, 2006. Taylor 
02:56:20 PM Overruled- ADMIT #81A- #81E-
Witness # 8 - describes exhibit. I calculated how much speed it 
would take for the direction to have changed the blazer. To get 
the kind of rotation - if the Subaru caused the rotation of 45 
degrees it would need a speed of the Subaru of about 42 miles 
per hour and the damage would be extensive. I can see the 
J marks coming away from the Subaru and they are consistent with 
acceleration and turning scuff at the same time - similar to what 
you'd do if you want to turn doughnuts in a parking lot. #BOG - I 
show interaction Subaru through Honda in 2-D - describes what 
the series of photos indicate- shows a scrub mark right on the 
center line which is post impact (by Honda) and shows impact of 
Honda and blazer in a head on configuration. EX #80F shows 
after impact moving the Honda over to the shoulder of the road. If 
the blazer had not been under power then the impact with the 
Honda 
03:06:08 PM DAAnne Objection Taylor 
03:06:12 PM J Sustained 
03:06:16 PM They would move off in this direction (indicates on photo). The 
collision would tend to cause the rotation a bit but also steering. 
EX #BOG shows the Honda now well off the shoulder of the road 
#8 and the blazer has accelerated around and there are some scuffs. 
The heading of the blazer changed a little probably due to the 
II 
I 
acceleration scuffs. EX #SOH the Honda has accelerated around 
I and probably started to pick up the rear tire 
I 03:07:52 PM I 
DAAnne Objection 
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I !!Taylor II 
I 03:07:57 PM II J !!sustained I 
03:08:01 PM EX # ? we see the tire marks here and around and coming 
together here. The tire marks coming together indicate that if the 
vehicle is kicked out and you straighten out the tire marks tend to 
come together because the vehicle is going straight. EX #30 I see 
#8 a tire scrub tire line and extending up toward the fence. This 
would be from the left front of the Honda and the impact flattened 
the Honda tire. The Honda is lower on the front than the blazer so 
the blazer would tend to override and the Honda to under ride. 
The forces were probably so great that it unseeded the bead and 
let the air out of the tire. 
03:11:47 PM DAAnne Objection Taylor 
03:11:53 PM J Move on to another question 
03:11:59 PM In my mind the debris field is not very important because you 
have a lot of scattering. It's widely scattered. I can recognize 
#8 another tire mark (indicates). Photo #31 show tire marks indicating acceleration. It would have required full throttle 
acceleration to push the Honda. Let's assume the Honda was 
stopped the collision. 
I 03:13:57 PM I DAAnne Objection Taylor 
I 03:14:06 PM IIJ I Sustained 
03:14:10 PM n With the Honda and Blazer I looked at the damage to each. While the Honda damage looks bad it doesn't involve a lot of structure. Hoods are designed to bend. We don't have major damage to the stmng part of the bumper area ~ some damage to the radiator 
#8 support on the left side which all indicate that the speed change of 
the Honda and blazer isn't terribly great. I think the speed change 
was between 7 and 9 mph. The speed change is a result on how 
hard the hit is. This is not a grinder collision. If I use that speed 
change - let's say 1 0 mph 
03:16:40 PM DAAnne Objection Taylor 
03•16• H" ....... 
. ."'tv 'lVI J Overruled 
03:16:48 PM 
If I know the speed change of one I know the speed change of the 
other and it would make the speed change of the Honda a little 
over 13 mph. If there is no power being applied they would move 
off at the combined speed of the Honda and the Blazer or 11 1/2 
II II ~~to 12' with the speed change of the blazer 10 mph. EX #13 shows, 
a very large soil Bern built up on right front and rear tire. As a 
vehicle goes into the soil it takes more and more force to move it. 
This is about 48' or 49' from the impact. #16 - the Honda is sitting 
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at an angle headed down to the borrow ditch and is not being 
supported here (driver rear tire) because it's not on a flat surface 
anymore. #19 shows left front tire flat. We some bended sheet 
metal and tire scuff extending from the door to rocker panel - it's 
pretty much straight up and down - contact with the blazer would 
have caused this. 
Looking at the blazer we see damage down low - displaced 
bumper guard twisted under and the fender is bent back towards 
the tire. We don't see damage to the passenger side. EX E? 
shows tire scrub to the door of the Honda. The striations are 
essentially vertical- if it were the side wall we'd see circular 
#8 motions marks. This (mark) is a spinning tire in contact with the 
door. Photo of tire - if we had sidewall scrub we'd see striations 
along the sidewall - if that's what made the marks. The mark on 
the Honda can be made with tread contact. The tire would have 
been turned to the left so it could access the door. Turning to the 
right would have just turned into the Honda a little more. - if you're 
trying to turn straight out of it. Photo of Honda #? shows Honda 
with bumper in front - I see the crack and ding on the bumper 
cover which is consistent with the (inaudible) on the driver side. 
We can see where areas (of damage) match and the Hood 
damage is consistent with the bumper guard on the blazer that is 
bent. The damage to the passenger side is consistent with the 
offset. Damage to the Honda driver side is more severe than t 
03:44:10 PM EX #81 F -X are 3-D photos the Blazer moving around the Honda. 
#8 The pictures accurately depict how the accident occurred and are 
consistent with Exhibits 80 and are 3-D depictions. 
03:46:25 PM DAAnne Objection Taylor 
03:46:36PM1i SIDE BAR 
03:48:36 PM J I note that the defense has the same objection - there is one 
clarification that I insist upon. PA to continue 
03:49:06 PM #8 EX #81X- there is a body on that exhibit which depicts the final 
resting place of Vonette Larsen. 
I 03:50:03 PM I J?'s In all the exhibits there is a depiction of a body on the roadway 
and that is my understanding of the resting place of the body 
I 03:50:30 PI\.~ I J ADMIT EX #81F- #81X 
03:51:19 PM Describes what EX #81 F - X show - the marks by the blazer on G 
indicate acceleration to the maximum - this is 4 X 4. H shows the 
Honda offering more resistance and the blazer is disengaged 
#8 from the override/under ride situation and will begin to move on 
LJ down the side and push the Honda off. Next is where we reach maximum engagement and cannot go any further - then another II view of the same thing. Backing the blazer up disengaging the Honda, turning to the right to go around the Honda 
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03:54:39 PM DA Anne 
Taylor Objection 
03:54:52 PM 
#8 
03:59:54 PM PA Barry 
McHugh 
04:00:10 PM DAAnne 
Taylor 
J 
04:00:47 PM DAAnne 
Taylor 
04:01:14 PM J 
04:01:56 PM 
#8 
04:03:51 PM DAAnne 
Taylor 
I don't' see any obstruction in the east bound lane. I have no 
indication there is an obstruction over here. #81-0 - the next few 
photos are based on tire marks coming around the Honda. 
(photos are shown) EX Q shows acceleration scuff. EX 81 R is a 
different perspective showing the resting place of the deceased. 
EX #81A- #82L- I've seen these before. These 3-D show the 
Honda and Blazer after the blazer backed off the Honda and was 
accelerating - from looking at the back end of the blazer and 
others from the back end of the Subaru. 
Motion to Admit EX #82-A - #82L 
Objection 
The potential for misuse or misrepresentation is great. 
The foundation is based on this witness testimony and that of 
Detective Greear - OVERRULED 
Shows what #82A - #82J depict. #82H starts the perspective from 
outside the Subaru. EX #82L shows blazer view coming around 
the Subaru 
He's attempting to indicate what Mr. Ellington saw and that's a 
danger. 
The Marks in the photo are made by he right side of the blazer 
front and back. 
? 
Recess for the afternoon - return tomorrow at 8:30 am 
Admonishes jury 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www.fortherecord.com 
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Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20120124 Jury Trial Day 5 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth 
Court Reporter Keri Veare 
~ I J PA Art VerHaren PA Barry McHugh f 
rAJ ~ -~ DA Anne Taylor (--- \ / DA John Adams / _,/ 
D 012 11 • --ation II1K-~ROO~t- ~ II ---· 
\ 
Time~ker Note 
08:27:47 A J Calls case - counsel and defendant present for day 5 
08:28:19 AM PA Barry We may want to take up argument re: experts McHugh 
08:28:30 AM Rule 702 governs expert testimony - I think that it becomes a 
situation that introduces on the province of the jury when an 
J expert testifies what Mr. Ellington's intent was. For an expert to 
come forward and give the opinion as to the ultimate issue 
invades the province of the jury. The court will not permit any 
expert as to the opinion of what Mr. Ellington intended to do. 
08:30:52 AM PA Barry No question McHugh 
08:30:58 AM DAAnne Page 8 of the state's expert pinion- he says he cannot state 
Taylor with a reasonable doubt of certainty .. that he intended to run 
-· ·-- \ 1---u- I _.,. ___ II 
UVt::l V Ullt::Llt:: L..CII l:ICI 1. 
08:31:41 AM That's not an opinion but the exact opposite but I caution 
J counsel. If that is the opinion that they cannot reach a 
conclusion I don't observe that to be an opinion on the ultimate 
issue but the lack thereof. 
08:32:15 AM To say you opine or can't opine- to say that and allowing one 
to say that they cannot make an opinion is the flip side of the 
PA Barry same coin. It's our position that it would be getting into what 
McHugh the court said is inappropriate. I ask that if we're going to go 
through that at aii that we do so outside the presence of the 
jury. 
08:33:41 AM I understand the state's opinion but this is similar as to XE a 
J witness who was present and saying that you were not there 
and cannot say what actually happened. We can make that 
inquir; outside the presence of the jury. I 
08:34:48 AM DAAnne I think I can read the sentence and ask the witness if that's a 
Taylor sentence he wrote in his report. 
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08:35:05 AM J The witness is here in the courtroom - come forward and have 
a seat in the witness stand. You are still under oath. 
08:35:33AM XE by DA I wrote a report in this matter- Page 8 (read by DA) the line is 
Anne Taylor correct. 
08:36:01 AM XE by PA 
Barry I can't get into his mind and don't know what he was thinking. 
McHugh 
08:36:29 AM We're just talking about what he looked at and it's very difficult 
PAM to make clear all the information that he doesn't have in order 
to draw that conclusion. 
08:36:51 AM I appreciate the state's concern. This ruling will likewise be 
J applicable to Dr. Hayes for the same reason that I stated. 
Objection noted. 
08:38:13 AM DAAnne I want to make sure I can do what I just did in front of the jury. Taylor 
I 08:38:28 AM IJ ~~d ~11 r. McHugh's inquiry was likewise appropriate. 
08:38:40 AM DAAnne There were photos yesterday that were shown to the jury and 
Taylor they were not admitted. That didn't happen the day before and I want to make sure that didn't happen 
08:39:20 AM PA Barry The photo was one that was stipulated to and the other is one 
McHugh that we intend to use and we'll try not to have this happen 
again. 
I 08:39:53 AM I J Return the Jury -jury present and in place. 
08:42:16 AM John Daily - the blazer is a flat front vehicle. In a forward 
projection the pedestrian is struck toward the center mass and 
are projected forward. The wrap projection they are struck 
iower and foid. in this case I would say it was pmbably a 
forward projection in this case. A pedestrian will probably 
come down before the vehicle and if a vehicle isn't braking it 
will come over the pedestrian in many cases. Injuries that you 
#8 might see are bruises and contusions or fractures depending 
on how fast the vehicle was going. After impact with the 
Honda I didn't see any evidence of change (of acceleration). I 
just saw acceleration - not change - as it went around the 
Honda. I have been to the location. The shoulder of the road 
brakes a bit and then as you go further on it dips a bit. I didn't 
see anything that would prevent controlled operation of the 
vehicle near the tire. 
08:47:58 AM 
Exhibits #80 #81 and #82 series - reviews - none of the photos 
have Joel Larsen standing outside the vehicle, the 44 mag or 
II 
II joei Larsen pointing the \Aieapon at rv1r. Ellington. I knovv there II 
was an incident that happened and that there was an 
altercation taking place of some sort. I know it was a high 
speed situation but not that it was specifically 90 mph. I 
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understand there was some movement of the Subaru by Joel 
after the incident. I'm not aware that the Honda was moving at 
the impact. 
XE#8 by DA 
Anne Taylor EX #48 and #51- The bullet holes have nothing to do with the 
collision of the Subaru and as far as structure they are minor 
damage. They certainly would have nothing to do with the 
direction of the blazer. 
08:55:25AM PA Barry Objection McHugh 
08:55:31 A J~ 
08:55:51 AM I wrote a report and it's truthful. #7 - I wrote there was no 
XE #8 by DA physical evidence placing Vonette in the roadway prior to the 
Anne Taylor accident and page #8 I wrote that I cannot say with a 
reasonable certainty that he intentionally ran over Vonette. 
08:56:48 AM I use the word pursuit but I don't do it anymore. In my case 
pursuit was always to bring someone into custody. If the 
RD #8 by PA Honda were moving forward we would still see the same kind 
Barry of damage at the same closing speed. We might see slightly 
McHugh different scuff if it were moving. I cannot say for sure that it 
was stopped. I cannot get into Mr. Ellington's mind- I don't 
know what he was thinking. 
08:58:58AM J ess excused 
09:04:13 AM PA Barry Calls #9 McHugh 
09:04:19 A c ~,A,~l:lrs 
09:04:38 AM Marco Ross 
Memphis, Tennessee - Deputy Chief Medical Examiner. I was 
employed in Spokane 2002 - 2007 at the Spokane County 
Medical Examiner's office as a medical examiner. Describes 
#9 what a medical examiner is. Re: training, education and 
I experience. We initially receive a report of a death and then 
i information regarding circumstances. We examine the body 
i externally and in many cases an autopsy. 
I II 
EX #76 diagram showing the internal organs of the head, I neck, chest and abdomen. 
I 09:08:28 AM I PA Barry Motion to admit- demonstrative purposes McHugh 
I 09:08:43 AM II DA John I No objection A ,.,I,......,~ II r"UCIIII~ I I 09:08:48 AM IIJ I ADMIT EX #76 
I 09:08:57 AM II I Explains autopsy - we want to document any diseases, 
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evidence of disease and any injures. I probably somewhere 
between 2500 and 3000 autopsies I've done since I started. 
Part of what I do is to come and testify in court. It's been 
#9 dozens and dozens of times. 
I did an autopsy of Vonette Larsen at Holy Family Hospital in 
Spokane. Assistant Jim Utkey was present 
09:11:51 AM DAJohn It appears he's reading from something and I ask that PA 
Adams make a record of what he's doing 
II 09:12:19 A 9 jlt's a copy of the autopsy I 
09:12:27 AM Voir Dire by II need to use it to refresh my memory I 
DA John 
Adams 
09:12:42 AM Officer Maskell was also present. As I recall this was 
presented as a person who was hit and run over by a motor 
vehicle. This helps us ascertain if the injuries are consistent or 
inconsistent. Sometimes we get very sketchy information and 
sometimes the cause is very apparent but the mechanism is 
not apparent. The external examination is first - clothing and 
then removing the clothing and looking at the body and 
documenting. 
Ms. Larsen had multiple injuries of her head and neck, back, 
extremities, torso. On her back she had a scrape mark. On the 
upper back bruising, shoulder and scapula bruising, scrape on 
right buttock. I could feel fracture on her skull. On her left side 
of forehead toward the left ear was a laceration and an area of 
bruising around her left eye. There was an area on the back 
left part of scalp abrasion and another in front of the left ear. 
#9 
Most of her left ear had extensive bruising and on the right 
side of forehead and head was an area of scrape and bruising 
and on the right cheek bone and temple area abrasion and 
right side of jaw to chin was yet another abrasion. From the 
I 
corner of mouth to left cheek scrape mark. I could feel 
evidence of fracture in her jaw and cheek bones area. There 
I was on her right ear some areas of scrape marks and bruising. 
I On the right side of her upper neck and just behind the right ear were 2 circular abrasions. On her torso she had an area of 
bruises and scrape marks upper chest wall down to upper 
abdomen area. On the right of abdomen to right flank was a 
cluster of multiple scrape marks and bruises. On her 
extremities she had an abrasion or tearing at the tip of her 
right ring finger and abrasion on right index finger and 
abrasions on the back of her right hand, knuckle area to wrist 
I I 
' area. She had an abrasion to upper right shoulder and 
bruising on inside left upper arm. On the inside part of her left 
forearm and outside left wrist were scrape marks and back of 
her left wrist to hand and knuckles were several scrape mark 
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I II II and palm of le I 
09:23:08 AM Voir Dire #9 The position in this exhibit is if you're looking at the front of the 
by DA John person - the rib injuries were in the back. This is a 3 
Adams dimensional view. 
09:24:00AM Shows on EX #76 the location of ribs that were fractured. On 
the left side of her body 8th and 9th rib toward the bottom. On 
the right side of her body 3-5 and 8,9 ribs. The fractures took 
place on the posterior part of the ribs. She had some bleeding 
in the muscular tissues of her right mid to lower chest. Inside 
#9 her left chest she had 1000 ml of blood. She had a tear in the 
i tissue that surrounds the heart and a tear in the left atrium 
I 
appendage which is part of the heart. She had many 
contusions on her lungs. She had a laceration near the top of 
her liver. She had fractures of her collar bones. These are all 
the result of what we call blunt force impact. 
I 09:29:25 AM I DA John !Objection I Adams 
I 09:29:34 AM IIJ II Sustained I 
09:29:37 AM The atrium tear was a significant injury since it was the cause 
of a large amount of blood into her chest cavity. 
The head examination is continued by making an incision on 
the top part of the scalp and peeling it back to expose the skull 
and then portions of the skull are removed to examine the 
brain itself and then remove the brain itself. There were 
multiple fractures present in her skull particularly the front 
basal part of the skull - the part over her eyes and extending 
back over her ears. There were also fractures extending to the 
#9 base and into the base in the back of the head. There were fractures from front to back extending on the right side as well 
as on the left side and a fracture extending over the top part of 
her head. This is a blunt type of force that would have caused 
these injuries. The particular distribution of the fracture pattern 
in the skull is very suggestive of a compression - the head 
probably got squeezed at some time to cause the injury. There 
are a lot of very fine fracturing to the front of her skull. This 
suggests impact on both the left and right- side-to-side 
pressure. 
I The injuries to the torso I 
09:34:23 AM DA John Objection Adams 
09:34:29 AM PA Barry II!'!! be more specific II II McHugh I I I 
I 09:34:39 AM II I The injuries to the ribs are more consistent with impact to the 
back of body - here is bleeding to the side. It's possible that 
file://R:\LogNotes- HTML\District\Criminal\Luster\CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan W... 1124/2012 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 390 of 848
Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 c '24/2012 Page 6 of22 
there was a single impact may have extended back and 
caused the fracture of the ribs - not on the left side as that was 
probably due to another impact. The injuries are consistent in 
the head with a single blunt trauma. I cannot entirely exclude 
multiple trauma. 
#9 The examination of the brain showed multiple tears of the 
lower and frontal part of her brain. That's consistent with a 
more extensive crushing fracture patterns that was seen in the 
skull. The brain injury was another very serious injury and was 
sufficient to in itself be a cause of death. Death occurred 
probably within a matter of minutes. The injuries to the brain -
09:38:16AM DA John Objection Adams 
09:38:21 AM J "&;;ained 
09:39:29AM EX #76C photo of the front of the chest area mostly showing 
#9 the inner part of the left breast area and over the breast bone 
area. It shows injuries I saw on that day. It's indicative of 
impact to the chest area that caused the injuries internal. 
09:40:56AM PA Barry Motion to admit McHugh 
09:41:02 AM DAJohn No objection Adams 
I 09:41:06 AM I J \d~:t EX #76C 
I 09:41:13AM 11#9 I #768 - photo shows chest to knee - this accurately depicts 
external injuries 
I 09:41:54 AM II PA Barry 
McHugh I Motion to admit #76B 
09:42:01 AM DA John No objection Adams 
09:42:06AM J ADMIT EX #76B 
09:42:13 AM 11#9 I #76A photo is mostly centered around the knee 
09:42:28 AM I PA Barry Motion to admit EX #76A McHugh 
nQ-A'J·'lA AM II oa lnhn I 
Vv.-rr-.v-r 1 1 II Ad~;;~", 1 No objection 
09:42:42 AM IIJ IIADMIT#76A I 
09:43:16 AM I PA Barry I publishes photos I McHugh 
09:43:25AM I EX #76A - abrasions or scrape marks on the right knee. EX 
#76B shows the right leg - knee to him and abrasions on the 
knuckles of the right hand. EX #76C- mid front to chest area-
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you can see the nipple of left breast is toward the bottom of 
the photo - that could be the right or left nipple and the head 
could be to the right or the left. There are scattered abrasions 
and bruising. There is a circular type abrasion mark and 
anything circular could cause this. 
I've conducted autopsies on persons struck by an automobile. 
#9 The injuries to her chest, wrist, heart and liver lacerations are 
consistent with being struck by a motor vehicle. The head 
injuries are consistent with being run over by a vehicle. A 
dragging of the body would have caused much more long 
abrasions of the body and I didn't see anything consistent with 
dragging. Most of the injuries are consistent with an impact or 
hitting the ground after being impacted by the vehicle. 
09:49:38 AM It's my opinion she died because she was run over by a 
vehicle. I don't know what number of times I'd done autopsies 
XE #9 by DA on persons run over by a motor vehicle at the time I'd done 
John Adams this one. It was a relatively small number at the time I last 
testified and I'm not changing my testimony. EX #47- I don't 
know how high off the ground the front bumper is. 
09:52:57 AM PA Barry !objection I McHugh 
09:53:02 AM IJ II Sustained I 
09:53:07 AM I have an abrasion of the knee at 19 3/4 inches off the ground. 
The legs were not broken nor knee caps. The sternum is not 
broken, teeth not knocked out or chipped but the jaw is 
broken. EX #47. I cannot say how high the differential front 
and back of the blazer are off the ground without a ruler. I 
cannot say what injuries were caused by the differentials. 
XE #9 by DA I found a couple of impact points that would cause the broken John Adams 
ribs in the back. 
i 
Assuming the top of blazer hood ins 48" - Ms. Larsen 66 " and 
160 - 161 lbs - so the position of her body above the hood was 
I about 1 1/2'. The injuries to her collar bones and head are all 
I 
above the hood. The fractures on the back are below the 
' leading edge of the hood. 
09:58:09 AM RD #9 by PA On occasion a blunt force may cause a penetrating force. Barry Most blunt force injuries we describe are non sharp injury. McHugh 
10:00:59 AM EX #47- it would depend on how high the differential is from 
I the ground and the height of her body the differential may I 
have caused a scrape on her body. Because the body is 
contoured and the knee is up you may get a scrape on the 
knee and not another on her body. The wounds on her body 
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were not consistent with what I could expect from the 
differential. There would have been a more continuous scrape 
mark continuing on the body. 
#9 In 2006 I was probably in the vicinity of 1 00 - 1500 autopsies 
at that time. 
EX #46 There is nothing inconsistent that I see with Ms. 
Larsen being hit by this vehicle. 
10:05:52 AM Reads prior testimony re: prior autopsies- very small 
RX#9 by percentage of 1200 - 1500 autopsies. I'm not trying to tell the 
John Adams jury that she wasn't hit by the differentials. I can't say if she 
was standing or moving when she was struck. 
:07:03AM J Witness Excused. Recess - admonishes jury 
:07:31AM J Back in session 
10:31:49 AM PAArt I'd like to make an offer of proof outside the presence of the 
VerHaren jury with Fred Swanson re: EX #46A -I want to get some 
answers to make sure this doesn't violate the court's ruling. 
10:32:28 AM J That might be advisable - is he here? 
10:32:37 AM PAArt Yes VerHaren 
10:32:56 AM c Swears 
10:32:59 AM Alford Swanson - prints were lifted off the blazer from the left 
front side of the hood. We photographed it. EX #46A is a 
photo of the front of the hood with the powder. Prints were 
#10 taken -2 palm prints from the darker area. The 2 palm prints 
were transported to the bureau of forensics print section. The 
I I ~~~0c~~~~~nt~~~~~~~t~~is:~ prints were excluded from 
10:34:32 AM PAArt This is the offer of proof as to the testimony I'll elicit from this 
VerHaren witness regarding that issue 
10:34:55 AM DAAnne As long as the testimony is just exactly as it was it's fine -
Taylor dangerous but fine. 
~10AM J Advises witness re: ruling - no testimony re: finger print 
:26AM #10 OK 
10:35:29 AM PAArt After this witness I expect Tim Johnson to testify and I will ask 
VerHaren him if he detected any odor and I expect him to say yes, 
alcoholic beverage. 
10:35:59 AM DA John 404(b) evidence and I've not been given any evidence. What's 
•1Adams tho rolo\/l:lnt"'o? I Ll '"" I""'"" w ....... •-- • I 
10:36:31 AM ~ I don't believe it's 404(b) evidence and it was brought out at : the first trial. Ron Cunningham will testify that def had 4 or 5 
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VerHaren beers at his residence and it will also be indicative of his 
demeanor. 
10:37:09 AM Any demeanor evidence has not been disclosed. He's said he 
DA John was cooperative and articulate. The state cannot change his to 
1 Adams a vehicular manslaughter based on a DUI. This doesn't help 
L us solve the issue of intent. This is just 404(b). 
10:38:16 AM I don't know that the fact that he had an odor of alcohol about 
I him had much probative value. I don't know what the defense ., 
... J evidence will be. I don't see the probative value of the offer. I 
I don't look at this as 404(b) evidence but strictly of value. ! 
Objection sustained 
10:39:33 AM PAArt I expect the same witness to say on search he found a cell 
VerHaren phone, Chevy GMC keys and cash. I want to make sure the 
court deems this permissible. 
10:40:06 AM Last time the officer wanted to read out the screen saver and 
DAAnne there is no reason to do that. It's also important that no one 
Taylor knew if the phone was working or he had service that day. As 
log as those two things are clear there's no problem. 
10:41:00 AM I don't think the particular offer is inappropriate. If the defense 
J wants to show that certain tests on the phone were not taken. I 
have no problem with that. 
10:41:31 AM PAArt The statements to Trooper Johnson- defense things they can 
VerHaren get them through exception to hearsay and I don't think they 
can. 
10:42:01 AM DAAnne The statement I'd like to put before the jury is def asking why 
Taylor he was being arrested for being shot at. The exceptions let me get that question before the jury 
10:42:30 AM PAArt This is self serving VerHaren 
10:45:59 AM It may qualify of his existing state of mind. It may be an 
J exception under 803(3) provided the exception can be laid. I 
don't think it's an excited utterance. 
10:47:02 AM DA We'd like to make an offer - the arrest itself is the exciting 
event 
10:47:21 J ' 1 •nrlorc.tand that i"- ·---
10:47:27 AM In anticipation of testimony I talked to Dr. Ross and he testified 
PA Barry consistent that the head injury was more likely sustained by 
one traumatic event rather than 2- I disclosed that to the McHugh defense and I wanted to make a record that it was provided 
prior to Dr. Ross testifying. 
I 
10:48:30 AM J Return the jury - we'll have the oath administered again in the I presence of the jury - return jury -jury present and in place. 
10:49:51 AM PA Calls #10 
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10:50:10 AM lc II swears I 
10:50:13 AM Alford L. Swanson -ISP Investigator. I've been with ISP for 21 
years. Re: duties, training and experience. January 4, 2006 at 
the Sheriff's office evidence storage room processing area in 
CDA I was with Sean Daly, Julie Morgan and 2 forensic 
persons Anne Nord and Stewart Jacobsen. I had to take the 
vehicle from one place to another and I saw the vehicle before 
I did that. The vehicle had been inside and sealed with 
evidence tape. The vehicle was the white over gold Chevy 
blazer. We took the vehicle to the county maintenance shop 
on the county grounds. I drove the vehicle there -
i 
approximately 150 yards. I found the key, in the ignition. It was 
I cold blooded and took several pumps on the gas to get it started. It was operational. I tested the steering wheel for 
I 
tightness- it was tight. I applied the brakes and they worked. I 
stopped. I used the gas pedal and the acceleration on pushing 
the gas pedal accelerated the vehicle. 
#10 Under the blazer - front part - left front leaf spring was a small 
amount of what appeared to be cloth material. I was aware of 
the type of jacket or shirt Ms. Larsen was wearing and that 
was consistent. Further at the differential there were some· 
hairs and other flaky materials. I'd guess I found 5-6 hairs. On 
the front U-joint I also found more hairs. I don't recall finding 
anything else. The left front tire had a glass shard on it in the 
tread. 
I've had ballistics training - explains. I have had a focus on 
trajectories - or determining the path it traveled from the 
firearm to the stopping point. We would use a rod similar in 
size to the projectile hole. This can help determine the location 
of where the firearm was fired. A protractor can help determine 
the angle. It's best to have a hole to align the 2 holes. You 
need some sort of indentation. There was a hole in the right 
front fender and the right rear window.l use this with a CAD 
drafting program. I've used the program hundreds of times. I 
measured the length and angles of the projectile hole. 
111'03:20 AM I DAAnne No objection Taylor 
I "'"' -n'l-'11: 1\M I I I.Vv.L.v r"\ J EX # 83 AND #84 ADMITTED 
11:03:45 AM I processed palm prints from the hood of the blazer. EX #46A 
#10 is a photo I took after the print powder was applied. This is an 
accurate photo 
11:04:23 AM DAAnne 1\ln nhiQI"'tinn I Taylor I ._...., "'..,J""''-'"1""' I I 
11 :04.22 AMlr J EX# 46A IS ADMITTED 
II 
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11:04:35 AM #10 EX #69 is a photo of Vonette Larsen's drivers license I found in the Subaru. 
11:05:18 AM DAAnne We object Taylor 
11:05:22 J ted and overruled EX #69 is ADMITTED 
11:06:21 AM EX #46A the palm prints were sent to forensics and Vonette 
was excluded from the palm prints. EX #69 is the photo of 
Vonette Larsen's drivers license. EX #45 shows inside of 
blazer and it appears there are extensions to lift the seat up. 
#48 is the hole of the projectile hole in the right front quarter 
' panel and there is a measuring device or scale. The hole is : 
consistent with that of a 45. EX #49 is a photo showing the 
trajectory or the angle the bullet struck the blazer. EX #49A is 
a different angle showing it protruding from the quarter panel. 
EX #50 shows the rod lined up that went through the wheel 
well into the engine area. The projectile appeared to have 
struck a portion of the frame and I couldn't find it any where 
from there. I found no evidence that it struck the motor. Ex #51 
shows the glass showing where the projectile hit the rubber 
around the glass- explains use of the protractor- the best that 
I could get was that it was less than 10 degrees. #83 shows 
the blazer in map view and line A is the side of the blazer - line 
#10 B depicts out 10 degrees. The space between A and B is the 
angle- the person shooting had to be between A and B- the 
projectile came in between this area. Line C depicts the path 
striking the right front quarter panel based on the 
measurements I took that day. 
Stippling is the gunshot residue deposited on an object. The 
residue is disolaced on an obiect in a certain ranQe when 
- -. <I ~ 
discharged from a firearm. Generally stippling will occur within 
3- 5 feet. Beyond that you would not expect to find it. Stippling 
is something that you can see with your eye. I found no 
evidence of stippling which suggests it was fired outside the 3-
5' range- at either area. I saw no stippling at the right rear of 
the blazer at all. I saw none around either area EX #8 is the 
drawing I made 3-D front looking down the side of the blazer 
showing the trajectory of the front quarter panel - that person 
had to have been to the right of the blazer almost 
...,.,... ....... ,... ..... ri:l""\1 .l,..r +n +ho. rin jJt:::l jJt:::IJUI\JUJQI LV Ll lv lll::f 
11:20:24 AM EX #83 - the area between line A and B - that's where the 
bullet had to come from- the gun had to be slightly to the right 
XE #10 by and behind the blazer. Stippling if it's close enough disrupts 
DAAnne the paint. The window bullet hole first struck the molding and 
I then the giass. Gunshot residue can be tested for and can be II Taylor 
tested for 3 days after the gunshot- we didn't do it. 
EX #47 is the underside of the blazer where I found the red 
fiber- driver side front area. It might have been the right front. 
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11:25:38 AM 
RD #10 by 
PAArt 
VerHaren 
111:26:55 AM IIJ 
11:27:19AM PAArt 
! VerHaren 
j11:27:38 AM lie 
11:27:40 AM 
#11 
I 11:33:15 AM I PAArt 
VerHaren 
I 11:33:22 AM I DA Anne 
Taylor 
111:33:30 AM IIJ 
1 11:33:41AM I 
#11 
A A .,.,~.C::O A ft.Ai ! ! ,,);:J,;:JO !"\IV! I 
I'd need to look. Reviews report- My memory is refreshed. I 
was right the first time - the fiber was located driver side front. 
Shows on exhibit where the differential is. 
Shows where the differential was and where the red fiber was 
located. 
The back window - I cannot tell how far away the person was 
who shot - or the front hole. 
I Excused 
Calls #11 
I Swears 
Tim Burke Johnson - ISP Patrol St. Re: duties, training and 
experience. January 1, 2006 I sent to Scarcella Road at 
approximately 12:40 PM. I arrived about 1:05PM. I saw a 
white vehicle with damage and a female body in the road, 
Subaru. I don't believe medical was there. I left the scene 
about 1:40 or 1:47. I went to look for a suspect vehicle and I 
was successful. I left the area and about 1:47 I located the 
vehicle at 2322 W Scarcella Road. I was in a marked vehicle 
and in uniform. I saw the vehicle at 2322 W. Scarcella Road. I 
knew the Cunning hams lived there. The vehicle matched the 
description of the suspect vehicle. I stopped and drove into the 
driveway. I exited my patrol car and saw a female in the back 
yard and I announced my presence. The female was identified 
as Carol Cunningham. A male dark hair and mustache 
approached my location. Identifies defendant as that male. I 
searched his pockets - all pockets. I found a key ring with 3 
I 
GM keys; keys for Kenworth truck, cash, fingernail clippers 
and cell phone. I took a photo of him. EX #1 is the photo taken 
of him that day. 
Motion to Admit EX #1 
No objection 
I EX #1 IS ADMITTED 
There were tracks leading to the vehicle and damage to the 
vehicle itself. EX #43 - photo I took of a vehicle parked at the 
residence. There is an old windshield and tire track across it 
and it led to the Chevy. The damage to the windshield is the 
tire width- it broke the windshield. 
' My role was to find the vehicie and i saw it from Scarceilo 
road. I called out to Ms. Cunningham and he approached me. I 
noticed that the vehicle was dirty - pretty muddy on the 
outside. When he was in my police car I was standing inside 
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11~'9:06 AM I 
XE #11 by 
DA Taylor 
11:~ 0:33AM RD #11 by 
PAArt 
I VerHaren 
11:41:02 AM XE #11 by 
DAAnne 
Taylor 
. <+2:16AM J 
11:42:41 AM PAArt 
VerHaren 
11:43:05 AM lc 
11:43:08 AM 
#12 
my patrol car door and I had my radio traffic going to hear 
what was going on. Right after I arrived and he came out I put 
hand cuffs on him. I don't recall his facial expression. I told him 
I was arresting him and what for. I looked at him when I told 
him that. He appeared - he didn't have any facial that drew my 
attention to him. He gave me an emotional response - I 
believe he said they were shooting at him. 
II siDE BAR I 
The vehicle was dirty - I walked around it and didn't see any 
visible license plate. 
The rear window right side was up all the way - I don't recall 
the drivers side down part way. I don't recall a temporary 
sticker in the window. EX #37 depicts the back of the blazer 
and window not all the way to the top. Shows jury . 
Witness excused 
Calls #12 
Swears 
Daniel R. Gregg -KCSO jail- 24 years. 1/1/2006 I was on 
Scarcella road with my wife and daughter. I was off duty with 
my wife and daughter going to Post Falls to have lunch with 
friends. I was driving a tan suburban diesel traveling west on 
Scarcella. There was a sheriffs deputy vehicle with lights 
going and a person laying in the roadway and Deputy 
Klinkefus laying over the person. At that time it was just him. 
There were people standing off to his left and I didn't know 
who they were. He was looking up at them and I asked him if 
there was anything I could do for him. We know each other 
and work for the same person. I assisted him. I tried to start 
first aid, tried to find a pulse -very basic first aid on that 
person at that time. I was not successful. There was a white 
Honda car over to my right. There was kind of a metal grinding 
and burning smell that caught my attention. There was either 
steam or smoke coming from the engine compartment mainly. 
The noise sounded like it was coming from underneath. The 
smell was coming from the car. There was no one in the car 
and the closest group of people were far away. I believe the 
doors were shut. I put the vehicle in park and took the keys out 
and put them on the front seat. The vehicle was running when 
I got in. I think the vehicle was in the vicinity of first or drive. I 
put the keys on the drivers seat. There was another vehicle 
'more west of where the person was laying - across the lane of , 
travel - kind of brownish 80's. I noticed that someone got into 
the car and appeared to be leaving and I approached him and 
said he couldn't leave until he talked to Klinkefus. He seemed 
file://R:\LogNotes- HTML\District\Criminal\Luster\CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan W... 1124/2012 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 398 of 848
Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 c 24/2012 Page 14 of22 
to hesitate and then got out. The door to the Subaru was open 
and I don't recall if it was moving or running when I came up. 
He got out of the vehicle and went over with his family or 
supporters or who ever. EX #28 - photo showing the car I was 
speaking of. The car appears to be consistent with the position 
when I saw Joel Larsen in it. 
111:~129 AM I DAAnne Objection Taylor 
111:~1:33 AM IIJ !I sustained I 
11:51:36 AM EJ At one time I saw Deputy Klinkefus carrying a weapon not his I own. It was later determined that the weapon was in the Subaru. 
11:52:20 AM I didn't know that Joel Larsen said he moved the Subaru. I 
XE #12 by didn't know there was a gun in it. I found that out later. I wrote 
DAAnne a report - reviewing it will refresh my memory - reviews report 
Taylor page 2 - The Honda was in gear. When I first arrived and 
approached Ms. Larsen - I don't remember her shoes were on 
her feet. The red car was blocking the road lane. 
11:54:10 AM J Witness excused - Recess for lunch - admonishes jury - return 
at 1:15pm. 
11:54:34 A J Back in session 
01:21:19PM Per stipulation we'd like to read the transcript of Carol 
PAArt Cunningham's testimony into the record. I understand DA has 
VerHaren an objection to portions and perhaps we can put that on the 
record and redact our transcripts. 
J Recess- I'll get my law clerk to work on the instruction. 
01:41:40 PM Back in session - one of the concerns raised in chambers is 
that there may be individual or two related to one of our jurors 
-that's appropriate- but I admonished the jurors to not discuss 
the case with others. It makes us concerned about someone 
related to a juror to listens. Asks audience to consider this. I 
J do this out of an abundance of caution. 
We do have a request to present the testimony of Ms. 
Cunningham- reviews instruction with counsel- there is no 
indication of a prior proceeding or trial. If this is acceptable 
V\'"'11 I,,..,.,. i+ 1"\r \AIO l"ar"\ rnnrlif\1 Yt:; II U"C U. VI VVV V II IIIVUIIJ 
01:44:30 PM PAArt 
VerHaren/DA It makes no difference 
Anne Taylor 
I 01 :44:56 PM I J • Fine - let's address the objections in the transcript 
I 
I 01:45:40 PM I DAAnne Lines 10-15 page 151 we ask that it not be read. Taylor 
I I 
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01:46:20 PM J I Those lines will not be read to the jury. I 
01:46:31 PM DAAnne I Page 10541ine 19-21 I Taylor 
01:47:02 PM IJ II Those lines will not be read to the jury I 
01:47:17 PM DAAnne The same page reference to first preliminary hearing Taylor 
01:47:33 PM PAArt I comments I VerHaren 
01:47:47 PM IJ I Use the words "from a prior hearing" 
01:47:55 PM DAAnne lines 24 & 25 page 1057 lines 1 and 2. Same page line 8 
Taylor should be modified as previously modified. Same page lines 21 -25 and next page line 1 
01:49:07 PM PAArt I think you can do those lines and all of page 158 VerHaren 
01:49:25 PM DAAnne Correct until line 24 Taylor 
II 01 :49:45 PM IJ I Re: redaction of transcript. 
01:50:03 PM DAAnne page 1 059 line 12 needs to be changed to "a prior" Taylor 
01:50:19 PM Yes- at some point I'd like another advance ruling- Ron 
PAArt Cunningham said Mr. Ellington had, I think, 4 beers at his 
VerHaren house. I think it's relevant to his actions that day. I intend to 
ask Cunningham how many beers Ellington had at his house. 
I 01:51:34 PM I DAAnne We've already discussed this and the court ruled and we 
Taylor should go by that unless I open the door. 
I 01 :52:00 PM I J He may have to be available 
01:52:40 PM He's confined to a wheel chair and we had difficulty getting 
PA him here today. This is directly relevant to his conduct at Scarcella Road. Witnesses testify that he bought alcohol at the 
store. 
01:53:23 PM J Let me review your transcript and we'll establish this before he testifies. 
01:53:42 PM DAAnne I'll want to be heard further before you make a ruling on his 
Taylor testimony. 
01:53:57 PM IJ Alright. Return the jury -jury present and in place. 
I 01:55:39 PM I PAArt Calls Carol Cunningham through Nancy Lee VerHaren 
I 01 :55:50 PM I j Instructs Jury 
I 01 :55:53 PM I c Swears Nancy Lee to read transcript of Carol Cunningham 
I I 
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01:56:30 PM Nancy Lee reads testimony of Carol Cunningham - 2322 W. 
Scarcella Road. I've lived there over 15 years. It's five acres 
and sits right on Scarcella Road. There is a small trailer and a 
small camper right now. There will be a house built on it soon. 
I live there with my ex-husband and children. Ron 
Cunningham is my ex-husband. I live in the trailer next to the 
camper where Ron stays. There used to be 2 other larger 
trailers but we removed those - it's been quite a while. EX #7 -
that's where I live and that's where Ron lives- it's gone now. 
The single wide is gone now. The structure covered with black 
plastic is a kind of pump house. It's just a shed. There is a 
driveway off Scarcella. Cars generally park in front of the 
trailers. 
I know John Ellington - he's a friend of Ron's but I have seen 
him. Identifies defendant. 1/1/06 when I came back from the 
store I went to Ron's and John was there. This was about 
#13 noon some where. We have an intercom system and I can talk 
to Ron without going over there. I didn't talk to Ron about John 
being there. I remember speaking to someone - I was in the 
back yard. The person was a police officer. When I turned on 
to Scarcella I had to stop and a young girl came out and said 
something awful happened and I'd have to turn around . This 
happened about 1/2 way into Scarcella. I took Highway 41 and 
then right onto Scarcella. I think the road was blocked - had to 
have been. I couldn't see if there were police there. I talked to 
one of the Larsen daughters, I think. I don't know which one it 
was. She said something awful happened and I'd have to turn 
around. The road was kind of curved and I couldn't see down 
the road. I went back down the highway and cut across a side 
road and down Ramsey and was stopped by a police officer 
just when I tumed on to Scarcella. I told him ! just !ived down 
the road so he let me go. I didn't talk to him about what was 
going on. I wasn't able to see further down the road. I 
unloaded groceries and went to Ron's cam 
02:12:26 PM XE #13 by 
DAAnne 
Taylor 
02:12:39 PM 
I 
I' recall reading- probably about 1/2 hour to 45 minutes before 
the police showed up. Mr. Ellington is Ron's friend but he 
would usually greet me. it was unusuai when he didn't on this 
day. I couldn't say if the pump house is a good place to hid if 
you're trying to get away from someone trying to shoot at you. 
Ron has physical difficulties including arthritis and old age. 
02:14:31 PM RD #13 by In prior testimony I said that I knew John was there earlier in 
Art VerHaren ' the morning. This does not refresh my memory. 
:15:40 p Excused 
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02:15:44 PM PAArt Calls #14 VerHaren 
02:15:54 PMlt C ll"'. ~ ........ rs 
02:15:58 PM Ann Margaret Cunningham - in 2006 I went by Thomas. I got 
married to Mr. Cunningham. I know Jonathan Ellington -
identifies him in the courtroom. January 1, 2006 we were 
engaged and living together at 333 W. Brunner Road at the 
Boson property. I think there is 5 acres and it's right on 
Brunner Road. Jake and Janice Boson are friends of Johns 
and mine. There is a house, wood shop and mechanics shop. 
We lived behind the mechanics shop in the RV. The RV was 
probably about 150' - 200' from the house. We lived there with 
my 3 year old son. EX #2- identifies Bronson property- next 
to it was an empty lot and Candy has a house at the end with 
donkeys. Judge west of that was an empty parcel and next to 
that was the Bronson property. January 1 , 2006 we owned a 
#14 Chevy K-5 blazer. He was purchasing it through his work. It 
was an older blazer and I think it was beige or yellow. We both 
used the blazer. I don't believe it was 4 X 4 but I can't 
remember. 
He had a cell phone through work and carried it most of the 
time. EX #44 - photo of the blazer we owned. It didn't have 
plates but had a sticker in the back window. I don't think it had 
braking or acceleration problems. No problems with steering. 
It's been a long time but I don't recall any problems with the 
steering. 
New Years Eve there was a small gathering at the Bronson 
place and we were part of that gathering. 
02:23:51 PM DAAnne Objection Taylor 
02:23:57 PM J 10vt:::~ruled 
02:23:59 PM 
There were a few people drinking but I don't drink myself so I 
didn't pay attention to who was drinking. John left early in the 
morning but I don't remember what time. I recall talking to 
Officer Maskell. I know it was in the early morning hours. 
Review the the transcript of the interview would help refresh 
my memory. I recognize the transcript. PA showed it to me last 
#14 time I met with you. My initial are on it. Reviews transcript- he 
left at 6:30 am in the blazer. Before he left we were arguing 
about my medical health. I wasn't taking care of myself. The 
argument lasted about 15 - 20 minutes and started about 2:00 
' 
I 
"- 300 am. From that time until he !eft at 6:30 am we pretty I 
much ignored each other. It was forever and a day ago. I know 
it wasn't a screaming match it was just that he was concerned 
about my health. Reviews transcript- it says it lasted until he 
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left the house- we weren't really talking then. That same 
morning he returned about 11 :00 - 11 :30. I was at the Bronson 
house. I went in and spoke with him, into the RV. This was 
about maybe 11:15 AM. He was rambling on about almost 
being run off the road by a few girls. I didn't give him a chance 
to finish and cut him off. He was upset, fidgety, a little agitated. 
He really wasn't angry he was upset. I don't believe I ever told 
anyone he was angry. He was rambling and I didn't want to 
hear it and walked out. I was not really able to understand him 
because he was rambling. 
I need a break 
I 02:31:31 PM IJ Recess- admonishes jury. 
02:38:54 PM J Back in session - before we bring Ms. Cunningham back let's 
review the discussion re: Mr. Cunningham testimony 
02:39:23 PM DAAnne If you have to revisit it it should be after Dr. Hayes. I don't think 
Taylor you should reverse your correct ruling. I'll alert the state the 
minute I determine if I'll call Mr. Cunningham 
02:40:16 PM PAArt I think it's relevant that he'd been drinking - it's evidence of his 
VerHaren condition at the time and you should let it in. 
02:40:42 PM It needs to have some probative value of the crimes charged. 
His state of mind is relevant as to the 2nd degree murder-
intoxication is not relevant. There is no evidence he was 
intoxicated at the time. Evidence of alcohol consumption may 
be relevant should defendant testify and have some 
J impairment as to his ability to recall. I don't see how offering that he had alcohol is anything other than prejudice to show 
he'd been drinking beer at 11:00 am and casting a bad light 
and not adding anything in terms of the jury's determination. 
Sustain objection to inquiry of Cunningham and if Ellington 
had been consuming alcohol that morning. The state can 
represent it later as things progress. 
02:43:34 PM PAArt 
VerHaren/DA No questions 
Anne Taylor 
I 02:43:48 PM I J Let's see if we have Ms. Cunningham available. 
I 02:45:08 PM I #14 I'm sorry- I have extremely high blood pressure and the stress is bad. 
I 02:45:49 PM I J No problem. Return the jury -jury present and in place. 
I 02:46:43 PM I John was frustrated with me for not listening to him. I don't 
remember if I ever said he got angry with me. Reviews 
transcript- Yes, he got angry with me- because I could not 
understand him. I couldn't understand him because he was 
rambling on. I went to the Bronson residence because I didn't 
want to stay and hear him ramble on - I wanted to give him his 
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space. I saw him pull out of the drive in the blazer around 
11 :30. Review transcript- it was around 12:00. He didn't call 
me on his cell phone - I didn't have one at that time. 
#14 He was a professional truck driver at that time driving semi's. EX #44 - It looks like a CB cord hanging down. For a CB radio. 
I don't remember if thee was a device attached to it. I can't 
really recall the vehicle. There is an antennae but I don't know 
if it's technically a CB Antennae. I don't recall either of us 
using the CB radio. 
02:52:37 PM XE #14 by New Years Eve at the Bronson home- we went back to our home about 8:30pm. Reviews transcript of Maskell interview-DAAnne 
Taylor pages 9 - 10 - I said he was irritated. I got bits and pieces of 
what he was trying to tell me - reviews transcript page 1 0 -
I 
02:54:56 PM SIDE BAR 
02:56:14 PM I saw a car pull into the Bronson property and I thought they 
were pulling in to park - there are people always coming over 
XE #14 by to visit. Reviews transcript page 1173 and 117 4. I saw a 
DAAnne burgundy Subaru follow him out as he was leaving. I caught a 
Taylor glance as I looked out. 
We were having a disagreement over my health. I had issues 
and he was worried and I wasn't taking care of it. 
02:59:22 PM RD #14 by It as a disagreement- I told Maskell that it was an argument. I 
PAArt told him that more than once. I said he got angry at me 
VerHaren because I couldn't understand what he said. This was just a few days after the incident. 
03:00:31 PM J Witness excused. 
03:00:36 pmr PA Caiis #15 
I 03:00:55 PM lc Swears 
03:00:58 PM William Klinkefus - KCSD re: duties, training and experience. 
In 2006 I was a regular patrol deputy. I wore a uniform but 
back then it was brown. January 1, 2006 I sent to the corner of 
Brunner and Ramsey arriving about 12:20. It took me about 20 
minutes to get there as I came from the state line area. I 
contacted Jovone and Joleen Larsen. They were outside the 
car at that time. I spoke to them together and no one else was 
#15 there. The car was a white Honda. We spoke for about 5 - 7 
minutes. I gave them witness statements to fill out and gave 
them instructions. I had them get back in their vehicle and 
made sure they had pens. I asked them to stay where they 
were at and I'd check the area. I went North of Ramsey to 
'LJ Brunner then 'Nest on Brunner and it basically changes back to, Ramsey. I started checking Lone Mountain Road. EX #2-indicates contact point and direction of travel - I checked driveways for the vehicle. 
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03:06:14 PM SIDE BAR 
03:07:04 PM I had a chance to examine the driver side window of the 
Honda. I could see a smudge on the window. I got another call 
from dispatch about 5 minutes or so from when I left them. I 
started heading back to where they were located. I activated 
my siren and lights for a short period of time. I did turn off he 
lights and siren and continued to the location - I didn't think I 
had enough to run code with lights and siren. The only 
information I had was that they had seen him on Ramsey 
road. I was getting information from dispatch. I reactivated 
lights and siren when dispatch advised that the mother had 
been struck and was injured .. I believe I was on Ramsey road-
it may have been Scarcella. I gave direction through dispatch 
that the Larsen girls were to stop following. It then took me 
#15 DX by less than 2 minutes to get there. I saw the white car parked on 
PAArt the North side of Scarcella road smoking or steaming and had 
VerHaren been in some sort of accident. I also saw a red Subaru parked 
off to the south side of the road near a driveway and 
numerous people in the area and a female laying on the 
roadway. There was a male with his arm in a sling and a 
female a little further down. I saw 2 additional people in the 
immediate area - Jovon and Joel Larsen. Joleen was further 
west where cars started to accumulate and was very 
distraught. The first course of action was to go and access that 
person. When I approached I was watching the male - I didn't 
know who he was. He didn't appear to be attacking anyone but 
was just upset. He was yelling at everyone including myself. 
He was just yelling - he told me a couple of times that she was 
dead and I just needed to leave and find the guy who did this. 
Jovone was there as well. No one else was initially there. 
03:13:53 PM nl\ Anno LJ T"'\ T"'\1 11 lv I Objection - relevance I Taylor 
03:14:00 PM J I He's already answered I 
03:14:05 PM I sized everything up and then decided it was safe enough for 
me to go to Vonette Larsen -just a very few seconds. Less 
than a minute later Deputy Gregg arrived on scene and we 
attempted to help Ms. Larsen and there was no success. The 
smoke was coming from the front engine area of the Honda. 
We were the only officers there for a while. I made sure that 
#15 DX medical arrived- they arrived about 5-8 minutes after I arrived. 
continue They left and Ms. Larsen was left there. 
I retrieved a gun from the Subaru- under the passenger front 
seat. Joel Larsen told me there was a gun there. I went down 
I +,.. ,.,..,....,,...,..+ hi,.... nr ..,.,...,,.,.,...,. +n no+ infnrrn~tinn frnrn tn finrl th~ I tV \.lVI 1'-QVI, IIIII I VI CIIIJVIIV LV ~VL IIIIVIIIIU.t.l""ll 11 "'Ill '-""' 111 •- ..,. ·-
person responsible. He told me about the firearm. I spoke to 
him within 8 - 10 minutes of arriving. He had not calmed down. 
He was very distraught and upset. He told me of the gun in the 
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Subaru and I retrieved it from under neath the passenger seat. 
I was able to retrieve it by opening the door. It was by itself. 
EX #7 4 is a cardboard box with the pistol that I recovered that 
day- same condition. I have taken steps to make it safe. 
03:18:32 PM PAArt I Motion to admit EX #7 4 I VerHaren 
03:18:40 PM DAAnne I No objection I Taylor 
03:18:45 PM J ADMITEX#74 I 
03:19:04 PM #15 There were 5 empty cases in it. EX #75 - evidence envelope 
containing the 5 spent cartridges. 
03:19:47 PM PAArt Motion to admit EX #75 I VerHaren 
03:20:00 PM DAAnne 
reviews exhibit I Taylor 
03:20:11 PM SIDE BAR I 
I 03:20:43 PM !J EX #75 is admitted - the clerk shall remove the paperwork 
included in it before it's published to the jury 
I 03:21:10 PM IDAAnne 
Taylor Publishes EX #74 to the jury I 
03:23:16 PM EX #24 shows the vehicle I removed the weapon from. When I 
first had contact with the 2 girls they were outside the car and I 
asked them to get back into the car. I felt the girls were excited 
-they were kind of giggly. I didn't test the smudge with a knife. 
I had a good description of the blazer and felt I could find it. 
There are not a whole lot of them around. I was investigating a 
disturbing the peace at that time. I didn't kno\v there were 2 
more Larsen's in the area and that Dad had his 44 mag. pistol. 
I told the girls to wait there and didn't say to give chase. I told 
XE #15 by them to call 911 if they saw him again. Running code is driving 
DAAnne at high speeds and is dangerous. Ramsey road there is a 
Taylor country road - 2 narrow lanes. There is a portion going down hill and curvey as is Scarcella and the shoulder there is not 
good. 1/1/06 the road was wet and snow on the edges of the 
road. 
When I got to the scene the Subaru was biocking portions of 
the roadway. The gun as I saw it had every round used. If a 
person used the west bound lane there was room to get 
around the Subaru. Mr. Larsen said they attempted to block 
him in so he couldn't leave. I issued the command for them to 
!::.tnn fnllnwinn Mr I ~rsen 
-·-.- ·-··-·····o:~ ·-·-· --------· 
03:29:48 p J Excused. 
03:29:54 PM PAArt 
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VerHaren 
03:30:0 c 
03:31:38 PM 
#16 
I 
! 
I 
I 
I Q'l·44·5" 0 ", I I .J. • v IIVI I J 
I 03:46:55 PM I 
03:46:55 PM End 
Calls #16 
Swears 
Ron Cunningham - I live in the Heritage Addition in Rathdrum. 
In 2006 I was living in a trailer on the property with my ex-wife 
and step son and his family. I had an intercom and could talk 
to others. I know John Ellington and have for a good 20 years 
- it was 15 or 16 years then . Identifies defendant in the 
courtroom January 1, 2006 he visited me about 6:00. He drove 
his Chevy blazer. I'd seen him drive that before. EX #44 is a 
photo of that vehicle. He'd had that vehicle for a while. He 
came in and visited and was there for about 4-5 hours. He 
said he was going to leave and go home and go to bed. This 
was about noon. There was never a time between that he left 
and came back. He left in the same vehicle. We had very little 
conversation. He didn't talk very much at all he just said he 
and his girlfriend were having a little trouble. He didn't say 
what the trouble was. We just watched football. He wasn't 
angry or anything. He's good when he comes over to my 
place- no vulgar language or anything - we get along great. I 
recall testifying in 2006. 
He left about noonish and came back about 1 - 1 1/2 hours 
later. He didn't say anything just sat down. He parked over by 
the pump house and I know that because of where he came 
in. I can't get out and about- I couldn't see where he parked. 
He usually parked in the driveway and not usually behind the 
pump house. He came in my place and was there for probably 
about 1/2 hour or 45 minutes. He said very little when he came 
back. He didn't say anything that meant anything - didn't tell 
me what happened. There was an officer that came in and told 
me what happened after he v.;as arrested. I don't kno\"1 of any 
injuries that he had. I didn't have a phone in my camp trailer. 
Transcript page 107 4 - I said yes, I had a phone. There was 
one next door but not in my trailer. In the transcript I said it 
was there when Mr. Ellington was there. 
Carol was home and inside her house when he was there. I 
don't remember her coming into my trailer when Jo 
VVitness excused. Recess for the day - admonishes jury -
return tomorrow at 8:30. 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www .fortherecord. com 
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Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20120125 Jury Trial Day 5 
II======= 
D 
Tirne 
08:33: 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth 
Court Reporter Keri Veare 
PA Art VerHaren 
PA Barry McHugh 
DAAnne Taylor 
DA John Adams 
Location 
ker Note 
In session - counsel and defendant are present 
;j 
08:34:04 AM PA Barry 
McHugh 
08:34:11 AM DA Anne 
Taylor 
I've explained to Mr .Ellington and he's aware that it's a critical st 
age and he waives his right to be present at the view. 
08:34:33 AM 
08:38:21 AM 
•
1 08:39:50 AM ! 
PA Barry 
McHugh 
DAAnne 
Taylor 
We'll call Charlie Greear - provides exhibits to the court- EX #30 
is a photo that was taken and the other one that was taken this 
week. Greear will testify that he was able to determine where the 
scrub mark would be on the roadway. The purpose of that 
diagram is to be able to observe by lining up the fence post and 
the monument is whited out and the purpose is to give it an 
accurate location. It's an important aspect of the case. The 
following 2 pictures were originally prepared by their expert and 
Charlie compares the two to see if they are accurate and he 
believes they are. He's able to compare the actual height of the 
vehicle Mr. Ellington was driving to the one on the program- it's a 
little bit higher. He'll also explain the difference in height from the 
standard GM blazer and the one Mr. Ellington was driving and he 
believed it to be the after market tires. He'll explain this in relation 
to where Ms. Larsen was struck. 
We object to Charlie Greear testifying again - the first photo 
seems to be a testimony booster. They can't anticipate what our 
expert is going to say before he says it. Our expert saw the actual 
biazer and measured it. I don't think this information is appropriate 
at this stage of the proceedings. This is just another run at what 
they believe is the truth. When we get to rebuttal that may be 
another case. He can't lay the foundation for the computer 
generated one - it comes from our work. 
One of the things you don't know is that we got them late -we got 
them just late last week and that's why we decided to wait until 
PA Barry now to bring them. Part of his testimony will be that he confirmed 
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McHugh what is one here. We don't even need to mention their expert. It's 
just another way to prove to this jury where the scrub marks came 
from. It's important and should be allowed. 
08:41:22 AM What exactly does the right hand photo add that the left hand 
J photo doesn't? Relates what can be seen in the photo. Is the offer 
to give some perspective without the vehicle being in the way? 
08:42:13 AM No, because the vehicle doesn't really block anything. It just gives 
PA Barry them a different perspective when they go out there this 
afternoon. In order for Mr. Greear to determine where the mark McHugh 
was he'd testify as to his relation to the culvert that we've seen in 
! some photos and it will give the jury a different perspective. 
08:43:42AM The 2 photos - there are numerous photos of the actual scrub 
DAAnne mark, roadway and fence. Those were taken at the time of the 
Taylor incident and they don't need something else to compare them to. I don't see how Charlie Greear can lay the foundation for the other 
two exhibits. 
08:44:45 AM EX #91 doesn't add much to the process and I'm not sure that its 
anything that might lead to anything else but confusion. EX #85 
and #86 - if Greear has an independent basis to lay the 
foundation as to the height of the blazer and Ms. Larsen's weight 
J and height the state is entitled to invite some kind of depiction 
from their witness that provides some kind of visual description. I 
agree that laying the foundation from evidence that the defendant 
has not offered is not appropriate. I can exercise discretion and 
allow Greear to testify. 
I 08:47:06 AM DAAnne We should have argument as to the hand and arm placement 
Taylor outside the presence of the jury. 
I 08:47:24 AM J I Let's have Detective Greear testify. 
I 08:47:54 AM c I Swears #7 
08:48:17 AM Charles Greear 
EX #85 is a 3-d image of a vehicle with a depiction of a body 
:.,1 
standing in front of it. I used a Crash Zone diagram provided and 
verified that the same year, make and model of the auto was 
used. I received it from the PA and confirmed with the Crash Zone 
program. I received a crash zone diagram titled Blazer with 
#7 
Vonette standing. !twas an e-mail sent to me by Mr. VerHaren in 
documents sent to them by defense - sent in electronic format. I 
opened it and examined and confirmed that the image of the 
person is representative of a female of average weight who is 5'6" 
tall. The program allows you to chose male or female. There are 3 
depictions of weight -thin, average and heavy and you input the 
I 
'height and it inputs a 3-D of that person. You can position the I 
arms and legs in what ever position you wish. It appears to be 
average body weight. The information that I gathered from the 
drivers license listed her height and weight. I compared it against 
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the data I gleaned and used on the renderings that I had done. I 
didn't alter the arms in any way but just used the information 
provided. The measured height of the blazer was 48" at the 
leading edge of the hood. I inserted an imaginary plane on the 
diagram at 48" on the ground and placed that on the top of the 
hood of the blazer and partially into the image or representation of 
the person standing in front of the blazer. The stock blazer was 
not provided with 31 type 50/50 blazers. The blazer had been 
modified with slightly larger tires. 
EX #86- this is the same diagram that was used in this- indicates 
I - it's just from rna different perspective. This goes for the vehicle 
\ and black plane as well. I used information provided in the report i 
generated by the defense to reflect the approximate height of the 
drivers eyes which was reported as 66" from the ground. This 
relates to Mr. Ellington. 
08:57:45AM I got this from the prosecutor and not independently received from 
the defense. I've also reviewed it on a thumb drive that PA 
VerHaren and Mr. Rochford told me. I have no independent 
XE #7 by knowledge except what someone told me. The only manipulation I 
DAAnne made was to insert the plane and the view point on EX #86. I 
Taylor didn't manipulate the drawing just changed the perspective. I didn't prepare these myself and I have a program that I could. I 
didn't see the blazer in person - I relied on the reports. I didn't 
assign a weight for the person - I used the image provided. The 
arm placement can be manipulated. 
I 09:00:23 AM I DAAnne 
Taylor We object to this coming in at this point. 
09:00:39 AM 
1#7 XE bv I The programs allows input of certain data. I didn't do the initial entry or alter her body shape - I just used what was provided to 
t:_j me. The weight difference- I don't know that I would have changed the body configuration much if at all. 
I 09:02:17 AM I DAAnne We object we don't' want hearsay coming in. Any reference to 
where he got it is hearsay. Taylor 
09:02:52 AM The defense has no obligation to put on any evidence. It seems 
that this should be in the realm of rebuttal and then Detective 
J Greear can come forward and insert the plane. SUSTAIN 
OBJECTION AT THIS POINT. Witness can step down. Return the 
jwy -jury present and in place. 
I 09:05:57 AM I PAArt 
. VerHaren Calls #17 
09:06:07 AM c ears 
na-nA·'JR b.I\Ji vv.vv.&..v 1 uvr 1 jovon Larsen - 27 yrs of age. In 2006 I was 21. I live in Spirit Lake 
and work in a Dentist office and have for almost 4 years. I have 2 
boys 10 and 18 months. My sisters are Jamie and Joleen. 
Parents are Joel and Vonette. In 2006 I lived in a 4-plex in 
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Hayden and I worked at Super 1 in the video department. I lived 
with my son who was 3. 
January 1, 2006 my sister and I left the house about 10:00. My 
sister spent the night at my house and my son was at my parents 
house. My sister and I had gone to a New Years Eve party. We 
took my 1996 Honda Accord. I was driving and my sister was in 
the front passenger seat. We stopped at Super 1 and I got a 
doughnut and newspaper. We were northbound on Ramsey road 
and all of a sudden there was a vehicle right behind me. I saw it in 
my rearview mirror. I could see the grill in my mirror. Eventually 
he passed me- this was just about the stop sign at Brunner and 
Ramsey. He moved back over to the northbound lane. I had to hit 
my brakes in order for him to get order before we got to the stop 
#17 sign. We stopped at the stop sign and he got out of the vehicle. There were no vehicles behind him and none behind me. He 
j· came back to my driver side door. He got out of a blazer. I didn't 
I. see anyone else in the blazer. He walked towards my car. He 
' started yelling at us and punched my window. I don't recall what 
he was saying. He was angry. I don't know what hand he used to 
hit my window. He hit it hard. I told my sister to call 911. We 
locked the doors to the Honda when he was headed toward my 
car. My sister called 911 when he was standing outside my car. 
She used the cell phone and it was in her hand. He was probably 
5' away from my sister. There was no visual obstruction. I got a 
look at his face - identifies defendant. He got back in his car and 
left. I didn't see any license plate. We also turned left on Brunner -
right. We turned that way to see where he was going. He stopped 
in he middle of the road -there was nothing in front of him. I b 
09:22:06 AM DAJohn Objection - hearsay Adams 
09:22:1 : ... ..;!~in objection as to what 911 knew or didn't knmAJ. 
09:22:29 AM 
We waited there approximately 1/2 hour and Deputy Klinkefus 
arrived. We talked to him and he gave me a statement for to fill 
out. He left headed west on Brunner. My sister called our parents 
right after she hung up with 911. Our parents arrived in mom's 
Subaru. Dad was in the passenger side front seat. They asked 
where the officer was. Our conversation lasted maybe a couple 
minutes. They went to the area where I assumed the blazer was. 
#17 The deputy came back and then our parents came back. Mom and Dad then went east on Brunner. They ended up in the area 
that I thought he was at. I then saw the blazer again. The vehicle 
was right in the area that I thought it was. He came out and went 
west then turned south on Ramsey. We were on the corner of 
I 
Brunner and Ramsey. He passed by my sister and I. He cut the 
corner right ln front of !!!Y cai and flipped us off again and 
continued on Brunner. I saw no license plates. I turned my car 
around and went south on Ramsey. After we turned around my 
sister called 911. My parents were behind me. We couldn't talk to 
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them because my parents didn't have a cell phone. We followed 
him to see where he was going. We reached speeds of about 80 
mph. He turned right on Scarcella and so did I. At one point on 
Scarcella I lost sight of him due to rise and curve. I then saw him 
again. His vehicle was going off the side of the road into a snow 
bank. I stopped in my lane. I saw my Mom and Dad as they 
stopped beside me. The blazer continued to turn around. I was in 
the west lane and my parents in the east bound lane. They 
continued in the east bound lane - then the blazer hit the front of 
my Mom's car. I don't exactly remember how he made it from 
Mom's car to mine but then he hit me. I saw the front of his blazer 
where the hood of my car should have been. My air bags went off. 
i My knees hit the dash. I looked to my right to see if my sister was I 
I 
OK. I sat there as my car was moving backwards - I could see the 
trees moving behind my sister. I don't really have a 
09:41:11 AM DAJohn Objection Adams 
r\1"\ II A A,_ J I~ ........ .,inl:ld U\:1."'t . IU 
09:41:19 AM I listened to the 911 tapes and reviewed the transcripts- as I 
#17 listened I made changes to the 911 transcripts - things that didn't 
make sense or that's not what I heard. I marked things out. The 
transcripts are accurate as to what I heard. 
09:42:13 AM DA John Objection- that's for the jury to decide. Adams 
· 2:22AM IJ j~d 
09:42:25 AM I had to seek medical care - I hurt my back. My knee was bruised 
black and I hurt my back. I had surgery on my back, I had two torn 
#17 discs and a bulged disc. Those were repaired. 
EX #88 is the statement that I started to fill out. 
09:45:12 AM PAArt Motion to admit VerHaren 
09:45:27 AM DA John No objection Adams 
09:45:37 AM J ADMIT EX#88 
09:46:17 AM I don't believe I was scratching off lottery tickets when filling out 
this statement. My sister may have. My cell phone didn't work in 
that area- I had a broken antenna. I don't know if I told Klinkefus 
that Ellington stopped at a particular residence. I didn't see Mom 
get hit. I didn't see her get out of the blazer. I first saw her when 
she rolled out from under the blazer. This happened behind my 
I 
--P __ .,.., .,. __ .... I ,... •• i"'l., 
vel! Cll !U ! !;;;CUI y •.p.m."'"· 
We had been to a New Years Eve party and got back about 4:00 
am. Joleen got pretty drunk and I had something to drink. We 
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both had too much to drink to drive. Our friend Mallory Twidt 
drove us home. We got up about 9:30 -10:00 and went to Super 
1. I believe we got something to drink. 
When we first saw the blazer coming up behind us I thought it 
was a neighbor who liked to drive fast. I don't recall telling my 
sister that he was a jerk. Reviews Maskell transcript - I thought to 
myself that he was a jerk but didn't say it to my sister. There was 
other traffic coming and he had to wait to pass me. My sister 
wasn't flipping him off in the back window. I wasn't swerving to 
keep him from passing. I don't' know if I saw a German shepherd 
XE #17 by in the blazer. I didn't see a license plate any where on the back of 
DA the car. He stopped at the stop sign and got out of his car and 
Adams came back to my car and yelled at me and struck my vehicle. My 
car wasn't damaged and my sister and I were not hurt. I told the 
deputy that I thought he was a "crack head Mexican". I didn't hear 
my sister tell Dad this. 
He got back into his car and drove down the road. He stopped in 
front of a house- it was pretty close to the road. He backed up 
toward my car but didn't hit my car. I suppose I could have 
passed him. I could have one to Weir and gone to our house. I 
followed him and I was going up Wier road but no fast up Wier 
road. Reviews transcript #4 page 138. He turned right on 
Seasons and I was about 5 minutes from my parents house -
that's where I was going. Instead of going there I 
10:05:24 AM DAJohn !objection I Adams 
10:05:29 AM J I Sustained -jury to disregard I 
10:05:35 AM 
My sister called Mom and Dad and they came to the area where 
we were parked. We talked and then they went to look for 
Ellington and we now had 2 cars in the area. I saw Dad in the 
area where the animals are at the corner. Deputy Klinkefus came 
and talked to us and Mom drove the car with Dad to where we 
were. They left again and went to look for him. I saw the blazer 
come out of the driveway . I don't remember if I paid attention to 
XE #17 by what my Mom was doing at that time. He cut the corner right next to my car. He didn't try to hurt me in any way. My sister didn't give DA John him the finger and neither did I. My car was facing toward home. I Adams turned around and followed him. I don't think I was going 90. I 
thought I was going 80 mph. Transcript #2- I said that he was 
"booking it away from me." I don't recall my exact words with 
detective Maskell. 
I On Scarcei!o I saw him try to tum amund and come back. Mom 
passed me and went into the wrong lane. Reviews last transcript -
the Subaru was angled a little bit toward the driveway. She angled 
in at the blazer that was trying to turn around in the driveway. My 
file://R:\LogNotes- HTML\District\Criminal\Luster\CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan W... 1/25/2012 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 413 of 848
Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 c /'25/2012 Page 7 of9 
car was in one lane and the Subaru was in the other and the 
blazer was blocked by the two cars that had been chasing. I saw 
the Subaru crash with the blazer. I don't believe the Subaru was 
still moving when they crashed. Reviews transcript- I said I didn't 
know if I was moving forward. I think that the first person on the 
scene went and turned my car off. I wasn't still moving forward or 
angled in the same direction of the Subaru when the contact with 
the blazer was made. I told Detective Stewart that the blazer was 
pushing my car backward. My airbags went off and I couldn't see 
anything. I didn't see my parents get out of the Subaru. I only 
heard 2 shots from the gun. My Dad tapes a gun with him when 
he goes out. I don't know if he takes a knife. After this Dad got 
back into the Subaru and started to leave in the Subaru. 
10:15:59 AM This was similar to playing chicken when he drove at me in my 
RD#17 lane on Seasons. Reads portion of transcripts - the car was 
by PA Art coming right up on my tail and I thought "jerk". (transcript) He 
VerHaren drove at me in the wrong lane until he as right about at my car 
then he swerved over to what should be his lane - the other lane. 
10:21:23 AM1rJ 1Witness excused. Recess- admonishes jury 
10:56:23 AM J Back in session 
10:56:28 AM PAArt Motion to Admit #79A and #79B VerHaren 
10:56:38 AM DAAnne No objection Taylor 
10:56:41 A J j~IT EX #79a AND /#79B 
10:56:51 AM PAArt We intend to rest VerHaren 
110:57:01 AM I I_- .. 1 We have 2 witnesses and then we'll not be ready until tomorrow UA Jonn 
Adams morning 
10:57:23 AM We have been advised that the roadway in the area of Scarcella 
Road are extremely icy and it would not be safe for the jury view. I 
believe we've canceled that for today and we'll try tomorrow at 
J 1:00 or possibly Friday at 1 :00. I'm not particularly concerned that 
the defense won't have witnesses to call this afternoon. 
Return the jury -jury present and in place. 
110:59:36 AM I PAArt The state rests VerHaren 
110:59:43 AM I DAAnne !calls #4 I Taylor 
I -t-t.l'\1'\.1'\~ AU Ill" U <::!u,.::.~rc:. I ! I.VU.UV !"'\lVI V I '-'YYVU.I""' 
11:00:10 AM 
#4 Brad Maskell - I collected photos and kept track of the photos. 
DEF EX 0 EX P is a blown up section of DEF EX 0 - south side 
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of Scarcella at the driveway. 
11:01:54 AM DAAnne Motion to admit EX P Taylor 
11:02:19 AM Voir Dire EX P appears distorted. It's a digital image that has been 
! by PAArt expanded out that pixalates the image. Explains "pixalates" - it's 
i VerHaren not an accurate photo of the roadway on that day. I 
I 
11:Q3:20 AM PAArt Objection i VerHaren 
11:Q3:33 AM #4 I can see the tire tracks and this is just a closer up of the tire I marks. 
11 :(JJ:59 AM Voir Dire 
by PAArt The distortion is in the tire marks themselves. 
VerHaren 
11:05:18 AM IIJ foundation stems from the admission of EX 0 -ADMIT EX P 
11:05:59 AM #4 Shows EX P to jury. DEF EX CC - image depicting the front of the blazer taken at the Cunningham home. 
11:06:28 AM DAAnne Motion to Admit DEF EX CC Taylor 
11:06:37 AM PAArt No objection VerHaren 
11:06:43 AM J riTEXCC 
.11:06:55 A R is an isolated image of CC 
11:07:36 AM Voir Dire This is another blown up image that is pixalated. It's distorted. 
by PAArt Other photos would more accurately display the front of the 
VerHaren blazer. 
11:08:45 AM PAArt Objection VerHaren 
11:08:52 AM DA :Eothing to add 
111:09:22 AM I J The foundation comes in under CC -ADMIT EX R 
111:10:12 AM I #4 Def A - depicts the scene 
11:10:21 AM PAArt 
VerHaren No objection 
lA I 
111:10:25 AM IIJ jADMITEXA 
111:10:33 AM 11#4 j EXAA photo 
11:10:45 AM PAArt No Objection \/Qrl-ll::uQn 
. ..., .. ·-·-·· 
11:10:49 A J ADMIT AA 
11:10:59 AM DEF EX C, Z, Y, V, U, T, TT, RR,QQ, W, 8, D, C, F, H., G, K,E, 
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1#4 
11:11:39AM J 
11:23:12AM #4 
11 :23:57 AM DA Anne 
Taylor 
M,S,Q,PP,OO,FF,DD 
ADMIT EX C, Z, Y, V, U, T, TT, RR, QQ, W,B, D, C, F, H, G, K, E, 
M, S, Q, PP, 00, FF, DD 
EEE, DOD, CCC, FFF - these were taken at impound - I believe I 
was present when they were taken. 
I Motion to Admit EEE, DDD, FFF and CCC 
11 :24:20 AM Voir Dire by PA Art The pictures are familiar- I don't recall if I was present or not- it 
VerHaren appears accurate 
11:25:20 AM PA Art 
VerHaren No objection 
11:26:19 AM DA Anne 
Taylor 
11:26:35 AM 
J 
End 
ADMIT ODD, EEE, CCC, FFF 
I'm not ready to call my next witness. 
Advises jury of scene view - we've been advised the roadway is 
extremely treacherous. The view won't happen today. We'll return 
tomorrow morning to continue testimony. Return tomorrow at 1:30 
-ADMONISHES JURY. 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www.fortherecord.com 
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CR 2006-1497 STATE OF IDAHO VS. JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth 
Court Reporter Keri Veare 
PA Art VerHaren 
PA Barry McHugh 
January 25, 2012, 
DA Anne Taylor 
DA John Adams 
J We are in session in chambers. Advises defendant of sth Amendment right to not testify. I'll 
give the instruction your attorney has provided. You have the right to testify if you wish. It's up to you 
to make that decision. 
Def I understand. 
PA Barry McHugh I ask that the court that if he's not going to testify that the court make a record that 
it's his choice. Not now but just before the close of defendant's case. 
J I'll note your request. Off record 
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Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20120126 Jury Trial Day 7 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth 
Court Reporter Keri Veare 
PA Art VerHaren 
PA Barry McHugh 
DAAnne Taylor 
DA John Adams 
Date 1/26/20 
Note 
ion - day 7 - counsel and defendant are present 
08:46:10 AM DAAnne 
Taylor Our second witness is delayed due to the roads -
08:46:32AM 
08:48:32 AM 
08:48:53 A 
I've discussed with our bailiff and he's view the roadway and he 
said the roads were bare with slushy snow on top - the barrow 
J pit has snow in it and may not accurately reflect the condition 
as it was that day. The map of the route to be driven with the 
jurors is with the bailiff and will be marked as Court's exhibit. 
:;~ ~~~~~h/ We have stipulated to the map exhibit 
08:49:03 AM PA 
McHugh/DA No questions 
Taylor 
08:49:19 AM Bailiff 
Hartman Questions as to what point I get off 95 onto Ramsey 
ISCUSSION RE: MAP 
Hwy53 
08:50:46 AM 1 Directs baiiiff of direction of travei. i don't want the baiiiff to give 1 
any directions. I want him to know where the view begins. I only 
want the bailiff to say "your observation begins now". There will 
be no other explanation. The view is not evidence just an 
J examination of the area to help them interpret the evidence. 
The court will be orovidina a brief explanation to them that there 'LJ are 2 views -1 in. the vehicle to view.the route of travel until the 
bus stops for the 2nd view which will be the location of the 
evidence. 
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08:55:13 AM DAAnne We've all agreed that we'll wait at the second view for the 
Taylor jurors. 
08:55:37 AM PA Barry Do you want someone to go view the Wier/Seasons road? McHugh 
08:56: J 
08:56:09 AM We're going to be calling Johnny Longest - the state previously 
wanted to impeach him with prior felonies and we'd like to 
DAAnne discuss that now. The state previously questioned him re: 
Taylor alcohol purchase and habits and we'd like the court to stay 
consistent with that ruling and not allow the state to go into that 
area. He's the convenience store clerk. 
08:57:20AM PAArt I don't intend to ask him if defendant bought alcohol there on 
VerHaren prior occasions. 
08:57:38 A:MlfDA We'd like to extend no mention of alcohol to smell as well. 
08:58:06 AM J Odor or consumption of alcohol has no probative value and PA 
understands? 
08:58:32 AM PAArt I'd like a hearing outside the presence of the jury with Mr. 
VerHaren Longest as to his prior criminal history. His criminal history is 
extensive and it's difficult for me to determine. 
08:59:21 AM DA John He's driving down from Priest Lake Adams 
08:59:32 AM DAAnne He should be here any minute - he's our 2nd witness. Taylor 
08:59:48 AM PAArt I understand they will call Suzie Cooley - re: prior testimony -
VerHaren she seems to be testifying about his state of mind and that 
should be excluded. 
09:01:05 AM DAJohn This is common testimony and her perception of how he acted. Adams 
09:01:21 AM If they want to describe his manner it would be appropriate but 
J the conclusion "looked like he didn't believe us" calls for a 
specific state of mind. 
09:02:16 AM PAArt Their 911 report expert will testify and he'll testify as to our 
: VerHaren expert Mr. Hartman and I don't think the foundation can be laid 
i and Mr. Hartman has not been called. 
09:02:55 AM DAAnne I agree. Taylor 
09:03:27 AM II J Return the jury -jury present and in place 
09:04:33 AM II DA John 
iiAdams Calls #18 
09:04:41 AM lie Swears 
09:04:44 AM II II Suzie Gooley-Denney- CDA, ID I 
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I've lived here for 5 years. January 2006 I lived in Boise, I D. I'm 
a paralegal with the office of Attorney General and have been 
for 20 years. I was in this area January 2006 to visit my then 
fiance, Mike Denney, for Christmas and New Years. About 
noon e were at Candy Allen's house on Brunner and Wier in 
#18 Athol. We had purchased some donkeys and she was boarding them for us. \lVe were tending to our donkeys. My husband 
Mike and son Cameron (then 12) were there with me. We saw 
a car approach. We'd just gotten out of the vehicle and a car 
abruptly stopped in front of the driveway. 4-door maroon 
colored Subaru and a gentleman got out. His left arm was in a 
cast and a sling. He exited very quickly and slammed the door 
and came up to us. I said something to Mike, "what is this." 
I 09:08:29 AM I PAArt !objection I VerHaren 
09:08:42 AM J !Answer I 
09:08:46AM #18 11 said to Mike "What the heck" or "What is this?" I 
09:09:00 AM PAArt !objection I VerHaren 
na·na. J Sustained 
09:09:09 AM #18 He was very antsy, angry, aggressive, agitated. Mike said 
something to me. 
09:09:40 AM PAArt !objection I VerHaren 
I 09:09:43 AM II J II Sustained I 
I 09:09:46 AM II ll1n response to what Mike said I got behind Mike and got my I 
son behind him as well. I wanted to protect my son. He seemed 
aggressive and agitated. The man was there 3 minutes at the 
#18 most. Mike was moving side to side at that time. The gentleman 
1: 
was asking if we'd seen a blazer and Mike said no and the man 
j kept moving about. As he moved about Mike moved front side 
!i to side to keep us from the an 
09:H1:01 AM PAArt !objection I VerHaren 
09:11:04 AM J ~ust::~inerl 
09:11:07 AM #18 Mike was moving to the same side with the gentleman. At some point he left. About 30 minutes later we heard sirens. 
09:11:44 AM 
My husband is an area manager for the Idaho Department of 
I II Lands and he's a person that I respect. He's a level headed I 
person. The man got out and slammed the door. I remember an 
interview with Det. Maskell. I told him what happened. i don't 
remember if I told him the man slammed the door. I may have 
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left it out. His left arm was in a sling. His right arm was not in a 
sling and I don't think he was holding anything. I would think I 
would see if he had a gun in that hand. I was 2' - 3' from Mike 
and about 4' from Mr. Larsen - this was during the whole feet 
XE #18 by from Mr. Larsen. It's not possible that I was standing 30 - 40' 
PAArt from Mr. Larsen. I never saw a gun at all or any weapon on his 
VerHaren person. He didn't look like he intended to hurt one of us. I may have told Maskell that he didn't look like he intended to hurt 
anyone. Mr. Larsen was not yelling or swearing at us. His wife 
was in the car and she's the one who drove. I didn't see her 
; with a weapon. She stayed in the car and her hands were at 10 
09:16:3~rJ 
and 2 and she was staring west down Brunner. 
Jeed -jury to exit the courtroom - admonishes jury. 
09:17:47 AM DAAnne Calls #19 Taylor 
09:18:28 AM c Swears 
09:18:31 AM J We have a few preliminary questions for you. 
09:18:44 AM Johnny Leroy Longest II. 
I've been convicted of numerous felonies throughout the years. 
From 2006 to now I was in prison for 2 1/2- 3 years. I got out in 
#19 May 2011. I got out in 2008 and back in in 2008 on a parole 
violation. I'm on parole now. I'm on parole for 3 felonies. 
Manufacturing, trafficking and attempting to trafficking by 
manufacturing and possession. I have lots of felonies for theft 
charges. I was on probation or parole for those. It starts back in 
'81. 
I 09:21:05 AM ~~~~.~~ne 
IC::IYIUI 
I ~~b~::~~-~~~~~:~ecific felonies qualify and there is no reason to 
~U UC::ll.il\. LU I \:10 I . 
09:21:29 AM J Other than the drug charges have you had a felony conviction 
of any kind in the last 10 years. 
09:21:45 AM #19 Nothing but drug charges in the last 10 years. 
09:22:00AM PAArt Reviews ICR - It's relevant to go beyond 10 years. VerHaren 
i 09:22:3 That's fair- I was just ruling on the 1981 discussion 
09:22:52 AM I had a forgery and in 1997 or 1996 and burglary, possession, 
manufacturing - there were a lot. I didn't get any in the 2000's 
other than the ones I just told you about. The late 90's forgery 
and attempted burglary were in WA. There were a lot of 3 and 6 
#19 mos in the county jails and 19 month prison sentence - I served 
that at the end of 1997 and got out in 1999. Probation just 
II l'~'=;~~~~~~~~~~hf~r it~~~;~~:;::~~~~~,,~~~~~=~~ I was ' 
I on probation or parole in 2006. 
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09:25:39 AM lxE #19 I'" the last 10 years I've not been incarcerated in WA on those charges. 
09:26:05 AM PAArt Based on that I'll not ask him about his prior criminal history. VerHaren 
09:26:37 AM DAJohn !Recess? I Adams 
09:26:42AM IJ II Yes - Recess I 
09:~7:30 AM IJ I Back in session - return the jury -jury present and in place. 
09:39:43 AM DAAnne Calls #19 I Taylor I 
II ()_9:_39:51 AM lc I Swears 
09:39:53 AM Johnny Longest II -
January 2006 I was working for Twin Lakes Trading Post 
Convenience store. They had video cameras. The cameras 
#19 took videos of inside, outside, highway. 1/1/06 I was working. I 
have viewed videos of that date. The store is on Highway 41 
right across the street from Scarcella Road. I reviewed the 
video today and it reflects events of January 1, 2006. EX ZZZ -
this is the video I reviewed. 
09:43:29AM DAAnne Motion to Admit EX ZZZ Taylor 
09:43:44 AM Voir Dire by I worked the opening shift - a shift is 8 or 9 hours. This video is PAArt 
about 8:00 or 9:00am VerHaren 
09:44:04 AM PAArt No objection to the video VerHaren 
09:44:25AM J ADMITEXZZZ 
09:45:10 AM #19 Video played - shows Mr. Ellington. In the back window of the I blazer it looks like a temporary license plate. 
09:53:38 AM EX #8 overhead view of Scarcella Rd. Twin Lakes area- I've 
been down Scarcella before and the area that says incident . 
XE #19 By I've driven that before. The area from Twin Lakes store to incident is about 1/2 mile maybe a little more- it would take a PAArt 
VerHaren couple minters to get there. In the video I was the guy in the hat behind the counter. I knew Mr. Ellington - we had a customer 
relationship - I try to make them all friendly. If he were in trouble 
I wouldn't have helped him. 
09:58:40 AM DAAnne Objection Taylor 
=fxE#19By 
Sustained 
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I I PAArt . VerHaren 
I 09:59:18 AM I DAAnne 
Taylor 
09:59:28AM 
XE #19 By 
PAArt 
VerHaren 
110:01:17 AM I 
10:02:40 AM J 
10:02:51 AM PA 
110:03:28 AM I DAAnne 
Taylor 
110:03:49 AM PAArt 
VerHaren 
110:04:15 AM J 
110:04:32 AM J 
10:35:13 AM 
J 
110:40:09 AM II 
11 i0:40:09 AM jjEnd 
No one told me what time the video was . 
Objection - the time's on the video 
I maybe somewhat remember testifying before. A transcript of 
my testimony would help. Reviews transcript page 1331 line 1 -
I said it would have to have been early morning I'd say 
sevenish. Our video is set at Boise time so I'd say it was 8:00 
or 9:00. No one told me to say that today. 
SIDE BAR 
I Excused 
I'd like to keep him under subpoena - provide Sgt. Maskell with 
your phone number and if we need you we'll call you. 
With the exception of the jury view the defense rests 
Recess? 
II Recess - admonishes jury. 
II Back in session - return the jury -jury present and in place 
I 
I 
I 
Advises jury of trial schedule - we are on track to complete 
tomorrow. We'll next do the jury view. Instructs jury re: site 
view. The bus will be here at 1:00 to pick you up. Recess -
admonishes jury. Counsel to return at 11:15 to chambers. Court 
in session until 8:30 tomorrow morning 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www .fortherecord .com 
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II 
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CR 2006-1497 STATE OF IDAHO VS. JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth 
Court Reporter Keri Veare 
PA Art VerHaren 
PA Barry McHugh 
January 26, 2012 In session in chambers 
DA Anne Taylor 
DA John Adams 
)~ ) 
We are in session in chambers. The defense has rested and defendant has decided not to 
testify. I previously advised you as to his right to testify or not and you acknowledged that you 
understood. Is this your decision to not testify? 
Def Yes. 
I'd also like to note the conference at the bench. Mr. VerHaren asked if he could inquire of the 
witness what was purchased at the store. I understand the answer would be a Zima, an alcoholic 
beverage. I felt that it was in appropriate and the question was never asked. I'd like to have this noted 
for the record. 
PA Barry McHugh The plan is to have one rebuttal witness who is not here. I'd like to recess for 
the jury view and tomorrow will be short and we can instruct the jury, argue and get the case to the jury 
tomorrow. 
Discussion re; time frame. This will not effectively be delayed by recessing now. 
DA John Adams I'm told the witness will be Mike Denney- the husband of Ms. Denney. The testimony 
will be what he told Officer Maskell about what Mr. Larsen said. I'd like to clear that up now. 
Re: Ms. Cooley-Denney's testimony 
PA Art VerHaren The testimony will be about the temperament of Joel Larsen. We believe he'll 
say th~tSuzi was 30- 40' away. He had a different view of Joel Larsen and how things occurred. There 
will be: no statements re: Joel Larsen at this point. 
DA John Adams We have nothing further 
I 
We'll go back and I'll explain to the jury regarding the jury view. I have directed the bailiff that 
he can have communication with the jury during the drive but not about the case. We'il excuse the jury 
and come back for preliminary instruction conference. 
DA Anne Taylor Mr. Ellington has waived the right to be present for the view. After we're done 
in court this morning can he leave until tomorrow morning? 
Yes, untii 8:30am tomorrow. Return to the courtroom. 
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Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20120127 Jury Instruction 
Conference 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth 
Court Reporter Keri Veare 
PA Art VerHaren 
PA Barry McHugh 
DA Anne Taylor 
DA John Adams 
I Date I 1/27/2012 Location 111 K-COU~TROOM2 
Time s~l Note 
08:37:24 AM Back in session - the court spent last night and early this morning 
going over the instructions. There is the addition of 4A the malice 
instruction that has been modified. I don't intend to proceed on a 
lengthy jury conference re: instructions. It's ultimately up to the 
court to properly instruct the jury. I want to have brief argument 
re: one instruction. 
Las time the case was presented the court instructed as to self 
defense on 2nd degree murder and aggravated battery. I intend 
to give the self defense instruction to all three charges and any 
included charges. I further intend to include voluntary 
J manslaughter, vehicular manslaughter with and without gross 
negligence. I recognized that when instructing the jury as to a 
defense of the crimes the statute makes reference as to 
homicide. The last time I didn't instruct as to a definition of 
homicide and this time I will. I utilized the definition per the 
supreme court in State vs. Ellington. The court noted that the 
instruction battery refers to the term of wilful or wilfully and I think 
that should be modified that it only refers to the battery charges. 
I'll put the instructions together as discussed and modified. The 
defense has requested modified instructions that need to be 
taken up. The state's instructions parrot the instructions 
previously given with a few exceptions. 
08:42:48 AM PAArt That's correct VerHaren 
08:42:54AM The defense provided instructions and I want to entertain 
J argument briefly before we take up the rest of the evidence before the jury. I'll be preparing a final packet of instructions and provide 
them to counsel and I can take up any further objections later. 
1 08:44:15AM In 2 issues to address - #1 proposed instruction parrots the language from the instruction - they've had that information for 6 
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years- they said it was wilful and intentional and committed with 
express malice. We have professional lawyers and they've had 6 
years to draft the documents. People's lives depend on these 
words and when they put words in the information they have to be 
responsible for that. The court should instruct the jury that they 
DAJohn need to find these elements. We've given you case law. They 
Adams need to be held responsible - it can't be that it's just a mistake or inadvertence or that they just write the words but don't have to 
prove it. 
They have charged and argued this as express malice case. We 
have defended it as an express malice case and now they want to 
change it to implied malice case. Hold them responsible. 
08:47:10 AM The information doesn't charge express or implied malice just 
malice aforethought. It's in a position that either position should 
be available to the state. The state still has to show deliberation 
PAArt with either express or implied malice. He's correct that the word 
VerHaren deliberately is in the charging document. I think that when you go further in the instruction ... it shows that there must be roof of 
deliberation with either express or implied malice. The state didn't 
lend itself to the position that they could only prove implied 
malice. J 
08:49:48 AM I understand the legitimacy to the challenge to the information. It 
does contain language that would appear to be surplus language 
and would lend the interpretation that the state has charged only 
with one fashion. 
The information doesn't make specific reference to express 
malice. Defendant was charged with 2nd degree murder and an 
acquittal for that charge or included offense and jeopardy 
...,+f...,,..h8S The .-.1"\nl"'orn is th-::.t tho nofond-::.nt h.o in a nr.c:::itir.n tr. QllCI\.111 • I II \JVIIVVI II I Ll IUL 11..1 n...., U'--'1'"'1 I """I L ...._,._ 1 1 ,.,--• .. •-• 1 """-
properly defend the allegations. The state has always argued it 
was a deliberate act. The court is mindful that this has been 
pending for 6 years. It was prosecuted under both implied and 
J express malice. The court previously find there was no evidence to send the implied malice to the jury. He has been well aware 
that the state has tried him on the allegation of implied malice. 
This is not a situation where the crime can be committed in a 
number of ways. 2nd degree murder is the unlawful killing of 
another with malice aforethought. Malice is defined 2 separate 
ways - impiied and express. The court is cognizant of the fact that 
the court is to not make reference to deliberate, intentional but 
rather tl1at there was an act that included malice and that malice 
is either implied or express. The court is not satisfied that this 
charging modem has boxed the state in to limit their proof in 
, terms of malice. It needs to be either implied or expressed. The 
I 
court will nate the defense requested jury instruction on this point 
- !'!! instruct the jury consistent with the instruction in the past 
I II I 
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I 08:56:15 AM I DA John 
Adams 
08:56:36 A~f 
08:56:48 A 
08:56:48 AM lEnd I 
Defendant's position is that by denying out motion you are 
denying his right to a fair trial. 
Noted. Return to courtroom #1 
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Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20120127 Jury Trial Day 8 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth 
Court Reporter Keri Veare 
' PA Art VerHaren PI\ c ........ , ,. .. ,.u.,,..h 
,-,. UCIII Y IVIvl IUl::Jll 
7/ aU DA Anne Taylor ( ! DA John Adams 
I D~l2f27/2012 Location EOURTROO~---- ~./ 
Time Speaker Note 
09:0_5:59 AM In session- counsel and defendant are present- the bailiff 
J has advised that they have a rebuttal witness- return the jury 
-jury present and in place. 
09:07:32 AM PA Calls #20 
09:07:38~[c Swears 
09:07:40AM Michael R. Denney- married to Suzi Gooley-Denney for just 
over 5 years. I work for the state of Idaho, Department of 
Lands. Re: duties. I've been doing this approaching 30 years. 
#20 January 1, 2006, I was at Candy Allen's place with my fiance 
Suzi and her son Cameron. We were approached by a man 
with his arm in a sling. I spoke to him. He seemed anxious 
and concerned. I didn't feel threatened by him. 
09:09:43 AM Suzi made statements to me about what she was feeling at 
XE#20 that time. She was emotionaL She said she thought he was 
hunting. 
09:10:21 AM PA Objection ArtVerHaren 
09:10:28 AM IIJ rruled- the answer will stand. 
nn .fn,,..,,... "a • J ess excused. \. • I\. • -.J.._ "'lVI 
09:10:55 AM PAArt No additional evidence. VerHaren 
09:11:07 AM J The evidence is concluded. It will take us a little while to get the instructions together. Admonishes jury. Recess 
10:08:19 AM J Back in session - I want to make a record before we start. Addresses the bailiff as to jury view instructions yesterday 
'110:08:43 AM I Bailiff I followed the court's instructions and there were no problems Hartman 
110:08:55 AM II I The map will be retained as a court's exhibit. Are there any 
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IJ II objections to instructions I 
10·09:51 AM PA I Instruction #19 has a typo re: manslaughter - I 
10:10:15 AM IJ I There is_ a typo that will be corrected as it appears undue emphasis 
10:10:28 AM DAJohn Instruction #20- I ask that you add "unlawful" killing- my 
Adams objections as to not giving def ex #1 #2, #4A, #6 
10:11:51 AM J #6 was given in a modified form 
10:11:57 AM DAJohn #and #7A, #8 Adams 
10:12:23 AM J Objections noted for the record- return the jury- jury present 
and in place. 
10:13:41 AM J Instructs jury 
110:37:59 AM I PAArt Closing argument VerHaren 
11:06:18 AM DAJohn Objection Adams 
11:06:23 AM J The jury is reminded it's up to the jury to determine what the 
evidence is. 
11:06:38 AM PAArt Continues closing argument. VerHaren 
111:23:50 AM IIJ I Recess admonishes jury 
, .. 11:50:28 AM IIJ Return the jury -jury present and in place 
11:51:11 AM DAJohn Closing argument Adams 
112:09:20 PM I PAArt Rebuttal VerHaren 
12:17:44 PM Now it's time to turn the case over to the jury to decide the 
J case. You've been instructed and the instructions will go into 
the jury room with you. 
112:18:48 PM I c I Swears bailiff for deliberation - atternate jurors drawn #6 
Boise, #76 Spyker 
112:19:56 PM J I ~xplain~ altern_a!e j~r~~ pro~edure - admonishes alternate 
I ii Jurors -JUry oui mr aeuoeraiion 
112:21:58 PM J I Counsel and defendant to remain within 20 minutes call of the 
court. 
112:22:36 PM 
II 
I Back in session - counsel are present - Mr. Ellington is not 
11 present - he's entitled to be present. The jury has not reached 
J a verdict and have requested that they go home for the 
weekend returning Monday. The law doesn't allow me to 
force them to deliberate beyond 5:00. They've been in 
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04:45:14 PM PA Barry 
McHugh -/DA 
Anne Taylor 
04:45:39 PM 
J 
04:47:10 PM Presiding 
Officer Taylor 
,.. 
·-:A'l oorJ 
~0:12PM 
0:12PM II End 
deliberation since about 12:115 
No questions 
Return the jury -jury present and in place - the court was 
advised by the bailiff that there is a request to recess for the 
evening. VVe could come back tomorrow or Monday if you 
wish- not Sunday. 
We want to come back Monday 
Return Monday, January 30, 2012, 9:00am Admonishes jury 
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Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20120130 Jury Trial Day 9 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth j Court Reporter Julie Foland 
PA Art VerHaren // PA Barry McHugh )~ DAAnne Taylor - -., ', DA John Adams / 
Da 1/30/20 I"' Location EeuRTROb¥1 "--.._./ IL 
Time ru Speaker Note 
09:00:02 AM 
09:00:11 A J ion - PA McHugh, DA Taylor, DA Adams presv •• L 
09:00:25 AM DAAnne 
Taylor 
09:00:49AM J 
09:02:20AM J 
09:02:58 AM 
09:02:58 AM J 
03:47:40 PM Bailiff 
Hartman 
7:~tJ 
03:48:06 PM Bailiff 
Hartman 
03:48:14 PM 
J 
03:49:21 P& Jury 
03:49:24 PM J 
03:50:12 PM 
I 03:50:12 PM II End II - II I 
Defendant has elected to not be present this morning for this 
brief hearing 
Fine - return the jury -jury present and in palace. Jury is to 
continue with deliberations. Jury is out of the courtroom 
Advises counsel that one of the jurors requested of the bailiff to 
consult a dictionary. Recess 
Back in session - the bailiff advised the court about 20 minutes 
ago that the jury wants to recess until tomorrow. 
That's correct 
The jury has been in deliberation since 9:00 this morning. 
They have not left the jury room. 
Return them into court and we'll excuse them for the evening. 
Return the jury -jury present and in place. The bailiff advised 
me that you'd like to quit for the day and come back tomorrow. 
All agree 
I'll respect your wishes- Recess to tomorrow. Admonishes jury. 
Return at 9:00 tomorrow morning. 
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Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20120131 Jury Trial Day 10 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth 
Court Reporter Julie Foland 
PA Art VerHaren 
PA Barry McHugh 
DAAnne Taylor 
DA John Adams 
Date 11/31/2012 II Location 111 K-COURTROOM1 I 
Tim a 
-
Speaker Note 
09:10:10 AM 
1 09:10:21 AMlrJ J~- PA VerHaren, DA Adams and defendant present 
09:10:34 AM Bailiff The jury is all present Hartman 
09:10:41 AM J Return the jury -jury present and in place. Instructs jury to 
continue deliberation. Recess 
09:11:53 AM The Court has summons parties here - the jury presented us with 
a question- reads the question. The court pondered the inquiry 
and Instruction #18 given to the jury giving the distinction 
J between malice uses the terms deliberate and intentional and 
goes on. Obvious their instruction is critical re: definition of 
malice. The court has contemplated instruction #47- reads 
instruction into the record. 
12:28:53 PM I think what you're doing is going into an area that basically puts 
PAArt the state to going into an area of having to prove a higher 
VerHaren burden. You should tell the jury that they have been instructed 
and that the answer is in their jury instructions. In order to 
differentiate you should add "but not premeditation". 
12:30:29 PM DAJohn We request that you instruct re: proposed instruction #2 as 
Adams setforth in Idaho Supreme Court decision. 
12:30:52 PM There is always a dilemma at hand when there are instructions 
after the iurv has been in deliberation. It simolv defines the terms 
.I " I .# 
J used in instruction #18. The court notes the objection and I'll proceed to give the instruction #47. Bailiff to return the jury- jury 
i is present and in place. Reads instruction No. 47 to jury. Jury to 
! return to deliberation. Recess 
03:00:17 PM In session- the parties are present and I've been advised that 
J the jury has reached a verdict. Comments to audience to act 
appropriately. Return the jury -jury present and in place. 
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03:03:26 PM c 
03:03:37 PM PAArt 
VerHaren 
03:03:45 PM DAJohn 
Adams 
03:03:54 PM 
j 
lro3:o7~~ 
03:07:56 PM PAArt 
VerHaren 
03:08:19 PM DA John 
Adams 
:08:29 ~ivi J 
03:21:48 PM 
J 
03:22:44 PM PA Barry 
McHugh 
03:23:00 PM DA Taylor 
03:23:24 PM PA Barry 
McHugh 
03:?3:31 PM 
DAAnne 
Taylor 
03: 4:11 PM 
{· 
~' J 
i 
l 
' 
I I I 03:25:22 PM I Def 
I 03:25:48 PM I 
03:25:48 PM End 
I 
Reads verdict -GUlL TY ALL 3 CHARGES 
No poll 
Absolutely 
Polls jurors - all indicate agreement with the verdict -jurors to 
return to the jury room. Sentencing scheduled MARCH 26, 2012 
3:00PM OBTAIN PSI 
111.1,..,.. ,.. ...... :,.._ 
! I 'IV '1·· .. """'"'-'11 ... 
There is a matter of Part II 
I'm not sure - need a moment. 
ic,.. .... ,.. ... s I',.....,..,.....,..,, 
Back in session - Part II is use of a deadly weapon and we'd 
typically proceed to trial on Part II. As a matter of law the court 
could conclude that on the 2 counts of aggravated battery the 
use of a deadly weapon has been established- Counts II and Ill 
- does the state wish the determination on Count I 
We move to dismiss Part II on Counts I 
No objection to dismissal of Part II however we do object to no 
jury finding on Counts II and Ill 
We ask that he be remanded 
VVe ask that you exercise discretion and allovv' him to remain out. 
He's abided by the conditions of bond set - he's returned 
promptly and there is no reason to suspect he'll not return for 
sentencing. 
It is a discretionary matter and things have changed now that 
there is a jury finding. He did turn himself in after the prison 
released him - he's made all court appearances and is entitled to 
a sentencing hearing with new information from I DOC and all 
others that he sees fit and the court will allow him to remain out 
on bail. Sentencing March 26, 2012, 3:00 pm Contact P&P 
tomorrow by 5 pm. Maintain attorney contact. 
I understand 
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BARRY McHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way/Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Telephone: (208) 446-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 446-1833 
ASSIGNED ATTORNEY 
ARTHUR VERHAREN 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATEOFIDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. F06-1497 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
The Plaintiff herein respectfully submits the following jury instructions in addition to the 
Court's general instructions on the law. 
DATED this z(, day of -:::f -t-.V111.'}/l-'t( '2012. 
BARRY McHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney for 
Kootenai County, Idaho 
~r~~ 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO._\_ 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, is 
charged in Count I, with the crime of MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE alleged to have been 
committed as follows: That the defendant, JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, on or about the 1st 
day of January, 2006, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did willfully, unlawfully, 
deliberately, and with malice aforethought, but without premeditation, kill and murder Vonette L. 
Larsen, a human being, by striking and driving over V onette L. Larsen with a vehicle inflicting 
injuries from which she died. To this charge, the defendant has pled not guilty. 
Citation: I.C. 18-4001,02,03 
Given: 
------
Refused: ____ _ 
Modified: 
·-----
Covered: 
-----
JUDGE 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. V 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, is 
charged in Count II with the crime of Aggravated Battery, allegedly committed as follows: That the 
defendant, JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, on or about the 1st day of January, 2006, in the 
County of Kootenai, State ofldaho, did commit a battery upon Jolene Larsen by means of a deadly 
weapon and/or instrument, to-wit: a vehicle. To this charge the defendant has pled not guilty. 
Idaho Code Section 18-903,18-907 
Given: 
Refused: 
Modified: 
Covered: 
JUDGE 
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INSTRUCTION NO.~ 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, is 
charged, in Count III with the crime of Aggravated Battery, allegedly committed as follows: That the 
defendant, JONATP..AN WADE ELLINGTON, on or about the 1st day of January, 2006, in the 
County of Kootenai, State ofldaho, did commit a battery upon Jovon Larsen by means of a deadly 
weapon and/or instrument, to-wit: a vehicle. To this charge the defendant has pled not guilty. 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Murder in the Second Degree, as charged in Count I, 
the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about the 1st day of January, 2006; 
2. in the state ofldaho; 
3. the defendant, JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, engaged in conduct which caused the 
death ofVonette L. Larsen; 
4. the defendant acted without justification or excuse, and; 
5. with malice aforethought. 
If you find that the state has failed to prove any of the above, then you must fmd the defendant 
not guilty of Murder. If you fmd that all of the above have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt then 
you must find the defendant guilty of murder. 
Citation: I.C. ICJI 704 
Given: 
------
Refused: 
-----
Modified: 
-----
Covered: 
-----
JUDGE 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
/ 
INSTRUCTION NO. ) 
Murder is the killing of a human being with malice aforethought. 
Citation: I.C. ICll 701 
Given: 
------
Refused: 
-----
Modified: 
-----
Covered: 
-----
JUDGE 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that malice may be express or implied. Malice is express when 
there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to kill a human being. Malice is implied when: 
1. The killing resulted from an intentional act 
2. The natural consequences ofthe act are dangerous to human life, and 
3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious 
disregard for, human life. 
When it is shown that a killing resulted from the intentional doing of an act with express or 
implied malice, no other mental state need be shown to establish the mental state of malice 
aforethought. The mental state constituting malice aforethought does not necessarily require any ill 
will or hatred of the person killed. 
The word "aforethought" does not imply deliberation or the lapse of time. It only means that 
the malice must precede rather than follow the act. 
Citation: I.CJ.I 703 
Given: 
------
Refused:. ____ _ 
Modified: 
-----
Covered: 
-----
JUDGE 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. _:j_ 
The distinction between murder and manslaughter is that murder requires malice aforethought, 
while manslaughter does not. 
Malice aforethought would not have existed if the defendant acted with adequate provocation 
while in the heat of passion or a sudden quarrel, even if the defendant intended to kill the deceased. 
The provocation would have been adequate if it would have caused a reasonable person, in the same 
circumstances, to lose self control and act on impulse and without reflection. 
Heat of passion may be provoked by fear, rage, anger, terror, revenge or other emotion. 
Adequate provocation does not exist, however, when a person acts from choice and malice 
aforethought even though experiencing any number of emotions. 
The defendant would not be acting in heat of passion or sudden quarrel if sufficient time 
elapsed after the provocation for a reasonable person in the same circumstances to have regained self 
control and for reason to have returned. 
Citation: I.C.J.I. 707 
Given: 
------
Refused: 
-----
Modified: ____ _ 
Covered: 
-----
IDDGE 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO.£_ 
If your unanimous verdict is that the defendant is not guilty of MURDER, you must acquit the 
defendant of that charge. In that event, you must next consider the included offense ofV OLUNT AR Y 
MANSLAUGHTER. 
Citation: I.C.J.I. 225 
Given: 
------
Refused: 
-----
Modified: 
-----
Covered: 
-----
illDGE 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. _if_ 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter, the state must prove each 
of the following: 
1. On or about the 1st day of January, 2006; 
2. in the state ofldaho 
3. the defendant JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON engaged in conduct which caused the 
death ofVonette L. Larsen, and 
4. the defendant acted unlawfully upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion and without 
malice aforethought in causing such death. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter. 
Citation: I.C. ICll 708 
Given: 
------
Refused: 
-----
Modified: 
-----
Covered: 
-----
JUDGE 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION N0.1..!:!_ 
In order for the defendant to be guilty, in Count II, of Aggravated Battery, the state must 
prove each of the following: 
1. On or about the 1st day of January, 2006, 
2. in the state ofldaho; 
3. the defendant, JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, committed a battery upon Jolene 
Larsen; 
4. by means of a deadly weapon and/or instrument. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must fmd 
the defendant guilty. 
ICJI 1207 
Given: 
Refused: 
Modified: 
Covered: 
JUDGE 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. l' 
In order for the defendant to be guilty, in Count Ill, of Aggravated Battery, the state must 
prove each of the following: 
1. On or about the 1st day of January, 2006, 
2. in the state of Idaho; 
3. the defendant, JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, committed a battery upon Jovon 
Larsen; 
4. by means of a deadly weapon and/or instrument. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find 
the defendant guilty. 
ICJI 1207 
Given: 
Refused: 
Modified: 
Covered: 
JUDGE 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. ll'l./" 
A "battery" is committed when a person: 
(1) willfully and unlawfully used force or violence upon the person of another; or 
(2) unlawfully and intentionally causes bodily harm to an individual. 
CITATION: ICJI 1203 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
WITHDRAWN 
JUDGE 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 446 of 848
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. (j 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that a "deadly weapon or instrument" is one likely to produce death 
or great bodily injury. It also includes any other object that is capable of being used in a deadly or 
dangerous manner if the person intends to use it as a weapon. 
CITATION: ICJI 1206 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
WITHDRAWN 
JUDGE 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO.li_ 
Having found the defendant guilty of aggravated battery and/or murder or manslaughter , you 
must next consider whether the defendant displayed, used, threatened or attempted to use a deadly 
weapon in the commission of the crime. 
A deadly weapon is any object, instrument or weapon which is capable of producing, and likely 
to produce, death or great bodily injury. 
If you unanimously fmd beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used, displayed, threatened 
with or attempted to use a deadly weapon in the commission of the above crime, then you must so 
indicate on the verdict form submitted to you. If, on the other hand, you cannot make such a fmding, 
then you must make that indication on the verdict form. 
Comment 
The court may consider whether to give this instruction along with instructions on the case in chief, or 
to allow the jury to deliberate on the case in cbief first, a..11d on the frrea..rm enhancement second, 
depending on the case. See State v. Stedtfeld, 108 Idaho 695, 698, 701 P.2d 315 (Ct.App. 1985). 
Special verdict form ICJI 222 or 224 may be used. 
Citation: I.CJ.I. 1602 
Given: 
------
Refused: 
-----
Modified: 
-----
Covered: 
-----
JlJDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the U day of~ ttN~A..yv(, 2012, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was caused to be sent to defense counsel. 
PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE, FAXED 
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[JORIGINAL 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender ofKootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
_____________________________ ) 
Fel 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
COMES NOW, the above named Jonathan Wade Ellington, by and through his attorney, 
Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and respectfully submits the Defendant's Requested Jury 
Instructions No. 1 through 23, in addition to the Court's general instructions on the law. 
"}l~v 
DATED this ~I day of January, 2012. 
BY: 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 1-kuJk(Ltr_ 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copx.q_fthe foregoing was personally served byplaeing- · ~ · 
~py of the same as indicated below on the ?] day ofJanuary, 2012, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 ~ftA~jL 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 450 of 848
ICJI 705 (MODIFIED) SECOND DEGREE MURDER 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO: 1 
Before you may find Mr. Ellington guilty of Murder in the Second Degree as charged 
in Count I, the State must prove to you each of the following facts beyond a reasonable 
doubt: 
1. on or about the first day of January, 2006 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. Jonathan Wade Ellington willfully, unlawfully, and deliberately caused the death 
ofVonette L. Larsen 
4. Mr. Ellington acted without justification or excuse, and 
5. Mr. Ellington acted with malice aforethought, but without premeditation. 
If you find the State has failed to prove any of the above beyond a reasonable doubt, 
then you must find the Mr. Ellington not guilty of murder. If you find that each and 
every one of the factual allegations set forth above have been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you may find Mr. Ellington guilty of murder. 
Comment 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that jury instructions should mirror the 
allegations in the charging document: 
In particular, the instructions should be tailored to fit the 
allegations in the complaint, information or indictment. Failure to 
do so may cause a fatal variance between the instructions and the 
charging document, which could deprive the defendant of the right 
to fair notice of the charges or leave the defendant open to the risk 
of double jeopardy. See, State v. Tiffany, 139 Idaho 909, 918-19, 
88 P.3d 737-38 (2004); State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 417-18, 
716 P.2d 1182, 1189-90 (1985). A statute will often provide that a 
particular crime can be committed in different ways. The jury 
should be instructed only on the particular manner of committing 
the crime that is alleged in the charging document. In addition, the 
instructions should not allow the jury to convict a defendant on the 
basis of acts or injuries other than those alleged in the charging 
document. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DIRECTIONS FOR USE, available at 
http://www.isc.idaho.gov/idaho _courts_ e.htm. 
Jury instructions must "include every element of the charged offense that the State 
is obligated to prove." State v. Halbesleben, 139 Idaho 165, 169, 75 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 
2003). "Jury instructions that omit an element of the crime lighten the prosecution's 
burden of proof and are impermissible." !d. See also McKay v. State 
148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010). Jury instructions that fail to require the state to 
prove every element of the offense violate due process and, thus, rise to the level of 
fundamental error. State v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 442, 224 P.3d 509 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing 
Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004); State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743,749, 
170 P.3d 886 (2997)). The jury instruction must "fairly and accurately reflect the 
applicable law." State v. Payne, 134 Idaho 423, 425, 3 P.3d 1251 (2000). Ifthe 
instructions misled the jury or prejudiced the defendant, the reviewing court must reverse 
the judgment or conviction. Halbesleben, 139 Idaho at 169. 
"A trial judge should remain vigilant in observing the duty set forth in Idaho Code 
§ 19-2132: 'In charging the jury, the court must state to them all matters of law necessary 
for their information."' SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DIRECTIONS FOR USE, available at 
http://www.isc.idaho.gov/idaho_courts_e.htm. But see State v. Adamcik, No. 34639, 2011 
WL 5923063, *24 (Idaho, Nov. 29, 2011) (noting, "Where the language ofthe indictment 
or information goes beyond alleging elements of the crime, it is mere surplusage that 
need not be proved. However, the inclusion of surplusage must not be allowed to 
prejudice a defendant in the context ofhis case" (internal citation omitted)); State v. 
Hoffman, 37 Idaho 897, 901, 55 P.3d 890 (Ct. App. 2002) ("a variance between a 
charging instrument and a jury instruction necessitates reversal only when it deprives the 
defendant of his right to fair notice or leaves him open to the risk of double jeopardy." 
(internal citation omitted)); State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 261 P.3d 853, 866 (2011) 
(finding trial court did not err for not instructing jury on definitions of willful and 
deliberate, because the defendant was attempting to insert legal definitions where the 
common definition [was] the appropriate one). 
In this case, the Information charges that Mr. Ellington" ... did willfully, 
unlawfully, deliberately, and with malice aforethought, but without premeditation, kill 
and murder Mrs. Larsen ... " Accordingly, the terms "willfully, unlawfully, deliberately, 
and with malice aforethought," are alleged as elements of the crime in the Information 
(not mere surplusage), which the state is obligated to prove 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO: 2 
Before you may find Mr. Ellington guilty of Murder in the Second Degree as 
charged in Count I, the State must prove to you that Mr. Ellington willfully, unlawfully 
and deliberately caused the death of Vonette L. Larsen. 
Deliberately, as charged by the State in Count I of the Information is defined as: 
an intent to kill executed in a cool state of blood, not in sudden passion 
engendered by lawful or some just cause or provocation; 1 
done with reflection;2 
a dispassionate weighing process and consideration of consequences 
before acting. 3 
Unlawfully, as charged by the State in Count I of the Information, is defined as 
acting without legal justification or excuse. 
Willfully, as charged by the State in Count I of the Information, means a purpose 
or willingness to commit the act charged in the Information.4 
1 See State v. Dong Sing, 35 Idaho 616, 208 P. 860 (1922); State v. Koho, 91 Idaho 450, 
423, P.2d 1004 (1967). 
2 See Sheahan v. Smith, No. 1:08-CV-00444-EJL, 2011 WL 1219681, *9 (D. Idaho, 
March 28, 2011) (slip copy). 
3 See Polk v. Sandoval, 503 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2007); Elliot v. Williams, No. 2:08-
cv-00829-GMN, 2011 WL 4436648 (D. Nev., Sep. 23, 2011) (citing Chambers v. 
McDaniel, 549 F.3d 1191, 1201 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
4 See ICJI 340 comment; State v. Halbesleben, 139 Idaho 165, 170, 75 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 
2011) (finding instruction on definition of"wilfull" based upon I.C. § 18-101(1) was 
error "because, as in Young, the instruction did not correctly describe the state of mind 
element of the offense and may have led the jury to believe that the defendants would be 
guilty even if they did not intentionally or knowingly endanger their child." (citing State 
v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 64 P.3d 296 (2002)). Cf State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 690 
P.2d 293 (1984) (willfully means that there was manifested a clear intent to take life, 
defined in context of first degree murder, as contrasted with definition of malice); State v. 
Draper, 151 Idaho 576,261 P.3d 853 (2011) (distinguishing Aragon: "There, the 
..J' • • 1 1' ..1 '11£. 1 :1 1 ., 1' 1 . 1 1 . (¥ 
uistmctwn was oetween malice anu Wl!uumess a.11a, unnKe mance, wmcn nas a specn1c 
legal definition, the common definition ofwillfulness is applicable[,]" thus the trial court 
did not err by omitting the definition of willful and deliberate). 
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Comment 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that jury instructions should mirror the 
allegations in the charging document: 
In particular, the instructions should be tailored to fit the 
allegations in the complaint, information or indictment. Failure to 
do so may cause a fatal variance between the instructions and the 
charging document, which could deprive the defendant of the right 
to fair notice of the charges or leave the defendant open to the risk 
of double jeopardy. See, State v. Tiffany, 139 Idaho 909, 918-19, 
88 P.3d 737-38 (2004); State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 417-18, 
716 P.2d 1182, 1189-90 (1985). A statute will often provide that a 
particular crime can be committed in different ways. The jury 
should be instructed only on the particular manner of committing 
the crime that is alleged in the charging document. In addition, the 
instructions should not allow the jury to convict a defendant on the 
basis of acts or injuries other than those alleged in the charging 
document. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DIRECTIONS FOR USE, available at 
http://www.isc.idaho.gov/idaho _courts_ e.htm. 
Jury instructions must "include every element of the charged offense that the State 
is obligated to prove." State v. Halbesleben, 139 Idaho 165, 169, 75 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 
2003). "Jury instructions that omit an element of the crime lighten the prosecution's 
burden of proof and are impermissible." !d. See also McKay v. State 
148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010). Jury instructions that fail to require the state to 
prove every element of the offense violate due process and, thus, rise to the level of 
fundamental error. State v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 442, 224 P.3d 509 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing 
Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004); State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743,749, 
170 P.3d 886 (2997)). The jury instruction must "fairly and accurately reflect the 
applicable law." State v. Payne, 134 Idaho 423, 425, 3 P.3d 1251 (2000). Ifthe 
instructions misled the jury or prejudiced the defendant, the reviewing court must reverse 
the judgment or conviction. Halbesleben, 139 Idaho at 169. 
"A trial judge should remain vigilant in observing the duty set forth in Idaho Code 
§ 19-2132: 'In charging the jury, the court must state to them all matters of law necessary 
for their information."' SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DIRECTIONS FOR USE, available at 
http://www.isc.idaho.gov/idaho_courts_e.htm. But see State v. Adamcik, No. 34639, 
2011 WL 5923063, *24(Idaho, Nov. 29, 2011) (noting, "Where the language ofthe 
indictment or information goes beyond alleging elements of the crime, it is mere 
surplusage that need not be proved. However, the inclusion of surplusage must not be 
allowed to prejudice a defendant in the context of his case" (internal citation omitted)); 
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State v. Hoffman, 37 Idaho 897, 901, 55 P.3d 890 (Ct. App. 2002) ("a variance between a 
charging instrument and a jury instruction necessitates reversal only when it deprives the 
defendant of his right to fair notice or leaves him open to the risk of double jeopardy." 
(internal citation omitted)); State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 261 P.3d 853, 866 (2011) 
(finding trial court did not err for not instructing jury on definitions ofwillful and 
deliberate, because the defendant was attempting to insert legal definitions where the 
common definition [was] the appropriate one). 
In this case, the Information charges that Mr. Ellington" ... did willfully, 
unlawfully, deliberately, and with malice aforethought, but without premeditation, kill 
and murder Mrs. Larsen ... " Accordingly, the terms "willfully, unlawfully, deliberately, 
and with malice aforethought," are alleged as elements of the crime in the Information 
(and not mere surplusage) which the state is obligated to prove. As such, Mr. Ellington 
is entitled to give instructions to the jury regarding the definitions of "willfully," 
"unlawfully," and "deliberately," in Count I. See, e.g., State v. Lilly, which discussed 
State v. Young: 
... [T]he Idaho Supreme Court addressed the use ofthe I.C. § 18-101(1) general 
definition of"willfully" in the context of the charge of felony injury to a child, 
I.C. § 18-1501(1). The Young Court reached the same conclusion as that reached 
by this Court in Sohm; that the district court erred in giving the general definition 
of willfully because it directly conflicted with the use of the term in the substantive 
statute. 
State v. Lilly, 142 Idaho 70, 73, 122 P.3d 1170 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Young, 
138 Idaho 370, 64 P.3d 296 (2002) (emphasis added)). This suggests that terms used in 
criminal statutes are not always identical to the general definitions used in a dictionary; 
demonstrating that the court has the authority to give instructions about the definitions of 
terms used in the context in which the term is used in the substantive statute. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
rrnn:ro Pn 
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ICJI 701 MURDER DEFINED 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION N0.3 
Murder is the killing of a human being without legal justification or excuse and 
with malice aforethought 
The killing of a human being is legally justified or excused when done in self-
defense. You will be instructed later on the elements of legal justification and excuse. 
Comment 
For legal justification see I.C. § 18-4009. For further instruction on legal justification see 
ICJI 1514 and ICJI 1515. Excusable homicide is defined in I.C. § 18-4012. For 
instructions on excusable homicide and self-defense see ICJI 1516 to ICJI 1521. 
The elements of murder by torture are discussed in State v. Tribe, 123 Idaho 721, 852 
P.2d 87 (1993). 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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ICJI 702 MALICE- DEFINED 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4(A) 
Malice may be express. 
Malice is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to 
kill a human being. 
When it is shown that a killing resulted from the intentional doing of an act with 
express, no other mental state need be shown to establish the mental state of malice 
aforethought. The mental state constituting malice aforethought does not necessarily 
require any ill will or hatred of the person killed. 
The word "aforethought" does not imply deliberation or the lapse of time. It only 
means that the malice must precede rather than follow the act. 
Comment 
I.C. § 18-4002. 
Do not use this instruction if the only murder charge is felony murder or murder by the 
intentional application of torture because these crimes do not require proof of malice 
aforethought. Idaho Code§ 18-4001; State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 594, 873 P.2d 848 (1994); 
State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 781 P.2d 197 (1989). 
There is no legal distinction between malice and malice aforethought. State v. Dunlap, 
125 Idaho 530, 873 P.2d 784 (1993). 
When the charge is attempted second degree murder, this instruction must be amended to 
delete any reference to implied malice. The intent to kill is required for attempted second 
degree murder. State v. Buckley, 131 Idaho 164, 953 P .2d 604 (1998). 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
To assist you in understanding the lawful exercise of the right of self-defense, you 
are instructed that it is lawful for a person who is being assaulted to defend himself from 
attack if, as a reasonable person, he has grounds for believing and does believe that 
bodily injury is about to be inflicted upon him. In doing so, he may use all force and 
means which he believes to be reasonably necessary and which would appear to a 
reasonable person, in the same or similar circumstances, to be necessary to prevent the 
injury which appears to be imminent. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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ICJI 1516 EXCUSABLE HOMICIDE DEFENSE 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
Jonathan Wade Ellington contends as a defense in this case that the killing of the 
decedent was an excusable homicide. 
Homicide is excusable: 
when committed by accident and misfortune in doing any lawful act by 
lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution, and without any unlawful 
intent; 
or 
when committed by accident and misfortune, in the heat of passion, upon 
any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat when no 
undue advantage is taken nor any dangerous weapon used, and when the 
killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner. 
The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
homicide was not excusable. Ifthere is a reasonable doubt whether the homicide was 
excusable, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
Comment 
I.C. §§ 18-4012 & 18-4013. 
The committee recommends that rather than instruct in the specific language of I. C. § 
18-4012, the court should instruct the jury in language tailored to the facts of the case, 
assuming this defense applies to the case. 
Idaho statutory and case law previously cast the burden upon a homicide defendant to 
prove that the defendant's actions were excusable, as in self-defense. However, in that 
particular circumstance, the underlying statute, I.C. § 19-2112, was repealed in 1977 
(1977 Session Law Chapter 154 Section 6). Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228,94 L.Ed.2d 
267, 108 S.Ct. 1098 (1987), suggests that Idaho is among 48 states which no longer place 
such a burden on the defendant, although they would be constitutionally permitted to do 
so. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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ICJI 1512 NECESSITY DEFENSE 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
Jonathan Wade Ellington cannot be guilty of Aggravated Battery if Jonathan Wade 
Ellington acted because of necessity. Conduct which violates the law is justified by 
necessity if: 
1. there is a specific threat of immediate harm to Jonathan Wade Ellington, 
2. Jonathan Wade Ellington did not bring about the circumstances which created the 
threat of immediate harm, 
3. Jonathan Wade Ellington could not have prevented the threatened harm by any less 
offensive alternative, and 
4. the harm caused by violating the law was less than the threatened harm. 
The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act because 
of necessity. If you have a reasonable doubt on that issue, you must find the defendant 
not guilty. 
Comment 
State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 801 P.2d 563 (1990). 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JlJDGE 
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ICJI 1514 (MODIFIED) JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE DEFENSE 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
Jonathan Wade Ellington contends as a defense in this case that the killing was 
justifiable because Jonathan Wade Ellington was acting in self defense. 
Under the law, homicide is justifiable if 
committed while resisting an attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or 
to do some great bodily injury upon any person; or 
committed in the lawful defense of the defendant, or when there is reasonable grounds 
to apprehend a design to do some great bodily injury and imminent danger of such design 
being accomplished; but such person must really and in good faith have endeavored to 
decline any further struggle before the homicide was committed. However, the bare fear 
of such acts is not sufficient unless the circumstances are sufficient to create such a fear 
in a reasonable person and the defendant acted under the influence of such fears alone; or 
The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
homicide was not justifiable. If there is a reasonable doubt whether the homicide was 
justifiable, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
Comment 
I.C. §§ 18-4009, 18-4013, & 18-4010. 
The committee recommends that rather than instruct in the specific language of IC s 
18-4009, the court should instruct the jury in language tailored to the facts of the case, 
assuming a defense under IC s 18-4009 applies. 
Idaho statutory and case law previously cast the burden upon a homicide defendant to 
prove the defendant acted justifiably, as in self-defense. However, in that particular 
circumstance, the underlying statute, I.C. s 19-2112, was repealed in 1977 (1977 Session 
Law Chapter 154 Section 6). Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 94 L.Ed. 2d 267, 108 S.Ct. 
1098 (1987), suggests that Idaho is among 48 states which no longer place such a burden 
on the defendant, although they would be constitutionally permitted to do so. 
The law of self-defense does not require a defendant to wait until he or she ascertains 
whether the danger is apparent or real. A person confronted with great danger, or what 
would appear to a reasonable person as great danger, has a clear right to act upon 
appearances such as would influence the action of a reasonable person. Also, the 
defendant is not required to retreat or to do everything in his or her power to avoid the 
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necessity of acting in self-defense. The defendant is only expected to act as a reasonably 
prudent person would act under similar circumstances and surroundings. State v. 
McGreevey, 17 Idaho 453, 105 P. 1047 (1909). 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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ICJI 1517 (MODIFIED) SELF-DEFENSE (HOMICIDE) 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
A homicide is justifiable if Jonathan Wade Ellington was acting in self-defense. 
In order to find that Jonathan Wade Ellington acted in self-defense, all of the 
following conditions must be found to have been in existence at the time of the killing: 
1. Jonathan Wade Ellington must have believed that Jonathan Wade Ellington was in 
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. 
2. In addition to that belief, Jonathan Wade Ellington must have believed that the 
action Jonathan Wade Ellington took was necessary to save Jonathan Wade Ellington 
from the danger presented. 
3. The circumstances must have been such that a reasonable person, under similar 
circumstances, would have believed that Jonathan Wade Ellington was in imminent 
danger of death or great bodily injury and believed that the action taken was necessary. 
4. Jonathan Wade Ellington must have acted only in response to that danger and not 
for some other motivation. 
In deciding upon the reasonableness of Jonathan Wade Ellington's beliefs, you should 
determine what an ordinary and reasonable person might have concluded from all the 
facts and circumstances which the evidence shows existed at that time, and not with the 
benefit of hindsight. 
The danger must have been present and imminent, or must have so appeared to a 
reasonable person under the circumstances. A bare fear of death or great bodily injury is 
not sufficient to justify a homicide. The defendant must have acted under the influence 
of fears that only a reasonable person would have had in a similar position. 
The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
homicide was not justifiable. If there is a reasonable doubt whether the homicide was 
justifiable, you must find Jonathan Wade Ellington not guilty. 
Comment 
I.C. §§ 18-4009, 18-4010 & 18-4013. State v. Baker, 103 Idaho 43, 644 P.2d 365(Ct. 
App. 1982); State v. Wilson, 41 Idaho 616, 243 P.2d 359 (1925). 
This instruction may be modified by the appropriate selection of bracketed language for 
use in cases involving defense of others as well as for use in either homicide or battery 
cases. 
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Use number 5 only where "abatement" appears from the evidence. 
Idaho statutory and case law previously cast the burden upon a homicide defendant to 
prove that the defendant's actions were excusable, as in self-defense. However, in that 
particular circumstance, the underlying statute, I.C. s 19-2112, was repealed in 1977 
(1977 Session Law Chapter 154 Section 6). Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 94 L.Ed. 2d 
267, 108 S.Ct. 1098 (1987), suggests that Idaho is among 48 states which no longer place 
such a burden on the defendant, although they would be constitutionally permitted to do 
so. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
YUDGE 
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ICJI 1518 SELF-DEFENSE-- REASONABLE FORCE 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
The kind and degree of force which a person may lawfully use in self-defense are 
limited by what a reasonable person in the same situation as such person, seeing what that 
person sees and knowing what the person knows, then would believe to be necessary. 
Any use of force beyond that is regarded by the law as excessive. Although a person may 
believe that the person is acting, and may act, in self-defense, the person is not justified in 
using a degree of force clearly in excess of that apparently and reasonably necessary 
under the existing facts and circumstances. 
Comment 
State v. Scroggins, 91 Idaho 847, 433 P.2d 117 (1967). 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 465 of 848
ICJI 1519 SELFDEFENSE-DUTYTORETREAT 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
In the exercise of the right of self defense, one need not retreat. One may stand one's 
ground and defend oneself by the use of all force and means which would appear to be 
necessary to a reasonable person in a similar situation and with similar knowledge; and a 
person may pursue the attacker until the person has been secured from danger if that 
course likewise appears reasonably necessary. This law applies even though the person 
being attacked might more easily have gained safety by flight or by withdrawing from the 
scene. 
Comment 
State v. McGreevey, 17 Idaho 453, 466, 105 Pac. 1047 (1909); State v. Dunlap, 40 Idaho 
630, 637, 235 Pac. 432 (1925). 
This instruction may be used with homicide or with battery. The committee suggests that 
the bracketed language at the end of the second sentence only be used where the facts 
indicate that the defendant pursued his attacker. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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ICJI 1203 BATTERY DEFINED 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION N0.12 
A "battery" is committed when a person: 
(1) willfully and unlawfully uses force or violence upon the person of another; or 
(2) actually, intentionally and unlawfully touches or strikes another person against 
the will of the other; or 
(3) unlawfully and intentionally causes bodily harm to an individual. 
Comment 
I.C. § 18-903. This instruction should be used when the commission of a battery is an 
element of another crime, e.g., IC § 18-911. The definition should be tailored to fit the 
allegations in the charging document. State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 327, 33 P.3d 218 (Ct. 
App. 2001); State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 56, 951 P.2d 1283 (Ct. App. 1998). 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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ICJI 1207 (MODIFIED) AGGRAVATED BATTERY 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Aggravated Battery, the state must prove 
each of the following: 
1. On or about January 1, 2006 
2. in the state ofldaho 
3. Jonathan Wade Ellington committed a battery upon Joleen Larsen, 
4. by means of a deadly weapon or instrument, to wit: a vehicle. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you must find the defendant guilty. 
Comment 
I.C. § 18-907. State v. Clark, 115 Idaho 1056, 772 P.2d 263 (Ct. App. 1989). The 
committee recommends that the phrase "great bodily injury" not be defined. "The 
irresistible impulse to define words of ordinary English is unfortunately pervasive. It 
should be curbed." People v. Kimbrel, 174 Cal.Rptr. 816, 819 (Ct. App. Cal. 1981). 
Use of a deadly weapon to intimidate the victim to endure physical contact which she 
otherwise would have resisted or attempted to evade fits the definition of "use of a deadly 
weapon". State v. Cates, 117 Idaho 90, 785 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1989). 
The charging document apprises the defendant in general terms of the manner in which he is 
alleged to have committed the crime charged. If there is evidence of other uncharged 
conduct by the defendant which could also fit within the statutory definition of the crime 
charged and if the jury is merely instructed regarding the statutory definition of the crime, 
the defendant may be denied due process by being convicted for a crime different from that 
charged. State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 56, 951 P.2d 1283 (Ct. App. 1998). Therefore, in that 
circumstance the jury instruction should include, in general terms, the description of the 
conduct alleged in the charging document to constitute the crime charged. 
For a definition of"battery", see ICJI 1203. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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ICJI 1517 (MODIFIED) SELF-DEFENSE (BATTERY) 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
A battery is justifiable if Jonathan Wade Ellington was acting in self-defense. 
In order to find that Jonathan Wade Ellington acted in self-defense, all of the 
following conditions must be found to have been in existence at the time of the striking: 
1. Jonathan Wade Ellington must have believed that Jonathan Wade Ellington was in 
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. 
2. In addition to that belief, Jonathan Wade Ellington must have believed that the 
action Jonathan Wade Ellington took was necessary to save Jonathan Wade Ellington 
from the danger presented. 
3. The circumstances must have been such that a reasonable person, under similar 
circumstances, would have believed that Jonathan Wade Ellington was in imminent 
danger of great bodily injury and believed that the action taken was necessary. 
4. Jonathan Wade Ellington must have acted only in response to that danger and not 
for some other motivation. 
In deciding upon the reasonableness of Jonathan Wade Ellington's beliefs, you should 
determine what an ordinary and reasonable person might have concluded from all the 
facts and circumstances which the evidence shows existed at that time, and not with the 
benefit ofhindsight. 
The danger must have been present and imminent, or must have so appeared to a 
reasonable person under the circumstances. A bare fear of bodily injury is not sufficient 
to justify a battery. The defendant must have acted under the influence of fears that only 
a reasonable person would have had in a similar position. 
The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
homicide was not justifiable. If there is a reasonable doubt whether the battery was 
justifiable, you must find Jonathan Wade Ellington not guilty. 
Comment 
I.C. §§ 18-4009, 18-4010 & 18-4013. State v. Baker, 103 Idaho 43, 644 P.2d 365(Ct. 
App. 1982); State v. Wilson, 41 Idaho 616, 243 P.2d 359 (1925). 
This instmction may be modified by the appropriate selection of bracketed language for 
use in cases involving defense of others as well as for use in either homicide or battery 
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cases. 
Use number 5 only where "abatement" appears from the evidence. 
Idaho statutory and case law previously cast the burden upon a homicide defendant to 
prove that the defendant's actions were excusable, as in self-defense. However, in that 
particular circumstance, the underlying statute, I.C. s 19-2112, was repealed in 1977 
(1977 Session Law Chapter 154 Section 6). Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 94 L.Ed. 2d 
267, 108 S.Ct. 1098 (1987), suggests that Idaho is among 48 states which no longer place 
such a burden on the defendant, although they would be constitutionally permitted to do 
so. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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ICJI 225 INCLUDED OFFENSES -TRANSITION 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
If your unanimous verdict is that Jonathan Wade Ellington is not guilty of aggravated 
battery in Count III, you must acquit him of that charge. In that event, you must next 
consider the included offense of disturbing the peace. 
Comment 
I.C. § 19-2132. 
This instruction is intended to be inserted at the beginning of the instruction on the 
elements of an included offense. 
The Committee used the phrase "included offense" rather than "lesser included offense" 
because an included offense is not always lesser in terms of punishment. State v. Gilman, 
105 Idaho 891, 673 P.2d 1085 (Ct. App. 1983). 
A trial court does not have a duty to instruct sua sponte on an included offense. A trial 
court is required to instruct the jury on included offenses only if: (1) one of the parties 
requests the instruction, and (2) a reasonable view of the evidence would support a 
finding that the defendant committed the included offense but did not commit the greater 
offense. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 948 P.2d 127 (1997); I.C. s 19-2132. 
An offense is an included offense if it meets the requirements of either the "statutory 
theory" or the "pleading theory." 
(1) The statutory theory focuses solely upon the statutory definitions of the two 
offenses. An offense is an included offense if, considering only the statutory definitions 
of both crimes, you could not commit the charged offense without also committing the 
included offense. This would occur in either of two situations: 
(a) All of the statutory elements of the included offense are statutory elements of 
the charged offense. For example, voluntary manslaughter is an included offense of 
second degree murder because second degree murder contains all of the elements of 
manslaughter pius the additional element of malice. State v. Atwood, 105 Idaho 315, 
669 P.2d 204 (Ct. App. 1983). Conversely, under the statutory theory robbery would 
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not be an included offense of felony murder even where the murder was committed 
during the course of a robbery because the statutory definition of felony murder does 
not always require the commission of a robbery. There are other felonies upon which 
felony murder can be based. Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 731 P.2d 192 (1986). 
(b) The charged offense could not be committed without committing the included 
offense, even though all of the elements ofthe included offense are not elements of the 
charged offense. For example, if the victim is under sixteen years of age, lewd and 
lascivious conduct is an included offense of statutory rape because the defendant's 
conduct leading up to the rape would constitute the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct 
as well. State v. Petty, 73 Idaho 136, 248 P.2d 218 (1952); State v. Gilman, 105 Idaho 
891, 673 P.2d 1085 (Ct. App. 1983). None ofthe elements ofthe two offenses are 
identical, however. 
(2) The pleading theory focuses upon the charging language in the complaint, 
indictment, or information. Under the pleading theory, an offense is an included offense 
if: 
(a) The offense is alleged in the complaint, indictment, or information as being 
the manner or means by which the charged offense was committed. For example, in 
State v. Anderson, 82 Idaho 293, 352 P.2d 972 (1960), driving while under the 
influence and reckless driving were included offenses in the charge of negligent 
homicide because the information charging the defendant with negligent homicide 
alleged that he committed such offense by driving while under the influence of alcohol 
and in a reckless manner. 
(b) The offense is alleged in the complaint, indictment, or information as being an 
element of the charged offense. For example, under the pleading theory robbery would 
be an included offense of felony murder if it was alleged in the indictment or information 
that the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery. Sivak v. State, supra. 
The Idaho Appellate Courts had previously recognized a third category of included 
offenses in which the evidence at trial showed the commission of a lesser similar offense. 
State v. Boyenger, 95 Idaho 396, 509 P.2d 1317 (1973) (the crime of receiving money or 
property by false pretenses was held to be an included offense of the crime of false or 
fraudulent use of a credit card); State v. Mason, 111 Idaho 660, 726 P.2d 772 (Ct. App. 
1986) (exhibiting a deadly weapon was held to be an included offense of the crime of 
aggravated assault). This third category of included offenses has since been rejected. 
State v. Rosencrantz, 130 Idaho 666, 946 P.2d 628 (1997) (eluding and reckless driving 
were not included offenses of aggravated DUI); State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 522, 944 P.2d 
119 (1997) (inattentive driving is not an included offense ofDUI). 
There can be more than one included offense. State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 674 P.2d 
734 (1982) (trial court correctly instructed the jury regarding six offenses included in the 
charged offense). 
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The charged offense gives the defendant presumptive notice of any included offense. 
State v. Padilla, 101 Idaho 713, 620 P.2d 286 (1980); State v. Gilman, supra. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
You are instructed that V onette L. Larsen's prints were not found on the hood of the 
Blazer. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
If your unanimous verdict is that Jonathan Wade Ellington is not guilty of murder in the 
second degree, you must acquit him of that charge. In that event, you must next consider 
the included offense of vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence. 
Pursuant to I. C. 18-4006(3)( c), manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being 
without malice in which the operation of a motor vehicle is a significant cause 
contributing to the death because of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to 
a felony, without gross negligence. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
If your unanimous verdict is that Jonathan Wade Ellington is not guilty of aggravated 
battery, you must acquit him of that charge. In that event, you must next consider the 
include offense of disturbing the peace. 
Disturbing the peace pursuant to I. C. 18-6409: 
(1) Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the peace or quiet of any 
neighborhood, family or person, by loud or unusual noise, or by tumultuous or 
offensive conduct, or by threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to a fight 
or fighting, or fires any gun or pistol, or uses any vulgar, profane or indecent 
language within the presence or hearing of children, in a loud and boisterous 
manner, is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
(2) Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the dignity or reverential 
nature of any funeral, memorial service, funeral procession, burial ceremony or 
viewing of a deceased person is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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ICJI 305 UNION OF ACT AND INTENT 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act and 
intent. 
Comment 
I.C. s 18-114. The word "intent" does not mean an intent to commit a crime but merely 
the intent to knowingly perform the interdicted act, or by criminal negligence the failure 
to perform the required act. State v. Parish, 79 Idaho 75, 310 P.2d 1082 (1957); State v. 
Booton, 85 Idaho 51,375 P.2d 536 (1962). The term "criminal negligence", means gross 
negligence, such as amounts to reckless disregard of consequences and the rights of 
others. State v. McMahan, 57 Idaho 240, 65 P.2d 156 (1937) (construing former I.C. s 
17-114 which was identical to s 18-114). 
This instruction is unnecessary when the crime charged requires a specific mental 
element and the jury is properly instructed regarding that mental element. State v. 
Hoffman, 137 Idaho 897, 55 P.3d 890 (Ct. App. 2002). 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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ICJI 103 REASONABLE DOUBT 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE-REASONABLE DOUBT 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
Under our law and system of justice, the Jonathan Wade Ellington is presumed to 
be innocent. The presumption of innocence means two things. 
First, the state has the burden of proving the defendant guilty. The state has that 
burden throughout the trial. Jonathan Wade Ellington is never required to prove his 
innocence, nor does Jonathan Wade Ellington ever have to produce any evidence at all. 
Second, the state must prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A 
reasonable doubt is not a mere possible or imaginary doubt. It is a doubt based on reason 
and common sense. It may arise from a careful and impartial consideration of all the 
evidence, or from lack of evidence. If after considering all the evidence you have a 
reasonable doubt about Jonathan Wade Ellington's guilt, you must find Jonathan Wade 
Ellington not guilty. 
Comment 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the jury be 
instructed on the presumption of innocence. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1977). 
Although technically not a "presumption", the presumption of innocence is a way of 
describing the prosecution's duty both to produce evidence of guilt and to convince the 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 
"The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the 
Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires 
them to do so as a matter of course. Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the 
necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution 
does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the 
government's burden of proof. Rather, 'taken as a whole, the instructions [must] 
correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury."' Victor v. Nebraska, 511 
U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (citations omitted). 
The above instruction reflects the view that it is preferable to instruct the jury on the 
meaning ofproofbeyond a reasonable doubt. This instruction defines that term concisely 
while avoiding the pitfalls arising from some other attempts to define this concept. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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ICJI 110 CONSIDER EACH COUNT SEPARATELY 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO._ll 
Each count charges a separate and distinct offense. You must decide each count 
separately on the evidence and the law that applies to it, uninfluenced by your decision as 
to any other count. Jonathan Wade Ellington may be found guilty or not guilty on either 
or both of the offenses charged. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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ICJI 202 DETERMINING FACTS FROM THE EVIDENCE AND DISREGARDING 
NON-EVIDENCE 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
As members of the jury it is your duty to decide what the facts are and to apply those 
facts to the law that I have given you. You are to decide the facts from all the evidence 
presented in the case. 
The evidence you are to consider consists of: 
1. sworn testimony of witnesses; 
2. exhibits which have been admitted into evidence; and 
3. any facts to which the parties have stipulated. 
Certain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including: 
1. arguments and statements by lawyers. The lawyers are not witnesses. What they say 
in their opening statements, closing arguments and at other times is included to help 
you interpret the evidence, but is not evidence. If the facts as you remember them 
differ from the way the lawyers have stated them, follow your memory; 
2. testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or which you have been instructed to 
disregard; 
3. anything you may have seen or heard vvhen the court was not in session. 
Comment 
If no exhibits were admitted into evidence, or if there were no stipulated facts, this 
instruction should be modified accordingly to avoid confusing the jury. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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ICJI 301 EFFECT OF DEFENDANT'S ELECTION NOT TO TESTIFY 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
In a criminal trial a person has a constitutional right not to be compelled to testify. 
The decision whether to testify is left to the Jonathan Wade Ellington, acting with the 
advice and assistance of Jonathan Wade Ellington's lawyer. You must not draw any 
inference of guilt from the fact that Jonathan Wade Ellington does not testify, nor should 
this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any way. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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ICJI 103 REASONABLE DOUBT 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ _ 
A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent. This presumption places 
upon the state the burden of proving Jonathan Wade Ellington guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Thus, Jonathan Wade Ellington, although accused, begins the trial with a clean slate with no 
evidence against Jonathan Wade Ellington. If, after considering all the evidence and my 
instructions on the law, you have a reasonable doubt as to the Jonathan Wade Ellington's guilt, 
you must return a verdict of not guilty. 
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not mere possible doubt, because everything 
relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or 
imaginary doubt. It is the state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration 
of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel 
an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. 
Comment 
This is the standard "reasonable doubt" instruction that has been approved by the 
Supreme Court for use in Idaho. See State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 82, 822 P.2d 960, 979 
(1991); State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577, 602 P.2d 71, 75 (1979). An alternative, proposed by 
the ICJI Committee but not approved as to form or content by case-law decision of the Supreme 
Court, appears as ICJI 1 03A. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
---
A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent. This presumption places 
upon the state the burden of proving Jonathan Wade Ellington guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Thus, Jonathan Wade Ellington, although accused, begins the trial with a clean slate with no 
evidence against Jonathan Wade Ellington. If, after considering all the evidence and my 
instructions on the law, you have a reasonable doubt as to the Jonathan Wade Ellington's guilt, 
you must return a verdict of not guilty. 
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not mere possible doubt, because everything 
relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or 
imaginary doubt. It is the state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration 
of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel 
an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. 
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ICJI 103 REASONABLE DOUBT 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE-REASONABLE DOUBT 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Under our law and system of justice, the defendant is 
presumed to be innocent. The presumption of innocence means 
two things. 
First, the state has the burden of proving the 
defendant guilty. The state has that burden throughout the 
trial. The defendant is never required to prove [his] [her] 
innocence, nor does the defendant ever have to produce any 
evidence at all. 
Second, the state must prove the alleged crime beyond 
a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is not a mere 
possible or imaginary doubt. It is a doubt based on reason 
and common sense. It may arise from a careful and impartial 
consideration of all the evidence, or from lack of 
evidence. If after considering all the evidence you have a 
reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt, you must find 
the defendant not guilty. 
Comment 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
that the jury be instructed on the presumption of 
innocence. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1977). 
Although technically not a ;;presumption", the presumption 
of innocence is a way of describing the prosecution's duty 
both to produce evidence of guilt and to convince the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 
"The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of 
due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial 
courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to 
do so as a matter of course. Indeed, so long as the court 
instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's 
guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution 
does not require that any particular form of words be used 
in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof. 
Rather, 'taken as a whole, the instructions [must] 
correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the 
jury.· .. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 
(citations omitted). 
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The above instruction reflects the view that it is 
preferable to instruct the jury on the meaning of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This instruction defines that 
term concisely while avoiding the pitfalls arising from 
some other attempts to define this concept. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR 2006-1497 
JURY 
INSTRUCTION (GIVEN) 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _L 
Now that you have been sworn as jurors to try this case, I want to go over with you 
what will be happening. I will describe how the trial will be conducted and what we will be 
doing. At the end of the trial, I will give you more detailed guidance on how you are to 
reach your decision. 
Because the state has the burden of proof, it goes first. After the state's opening 
statement, the defense may make an opening statement, or may wait until the state has 
presented its case. 
The state will offer evidence that it says will support the charge(s) against the 
defendant. The defense may then present evidence, but is not required to do so. If the 
defense does present evidence, the state may then present rebuttal evidence. This is 
evidence offered to answer the defense's evidence. 
After you have heard all the evidence, I will give you additional instructions on the 
law. After you have heard the instructions, the state and the defense will each be given 
time for closing arguments. In their closing arguments, they will summarize the evidence to 
help you understand how it relates to the law. Just as the opening statements are not 
evidence, neither are the closing arguments. After the closing arguments, you will leave 
the courtroom together to make your decision. During your deliberations, you will have 
with you my instructions, the exhibits admitted into evidence and any notes taken by you in 
court. 
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INSTRUCTION NO.~ 
Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in my instructions to 
those facts, and in this way to decide the case. In so doing, you must follow my 
instructions regardless of your own opinion of what the law is or should be, or what either 
side may state the law to be. You must consider them as a whole, not picking out one and 
disregarding others. The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to 
their relative importance. The law requires that your decision be made solely upon the 
evidence before you. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence you in your 
deliberations. Faithful performance by you of these duties is vital to the administration of 
justice. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. 
This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered and received, 
and any stipulated or admitted facts. The production of evidence in court is governed by 
rules of law. At times during the trial, an objection may be made to a question asked a 
witness, or to a witness' answer, or to an exhibit. This simply means that I am being asked 
to decide a particular rule of law. Arguments on the admissibility of evidence are designed 
to aid the Court and are not to be considered by you nor affect your deliberations. If I 
sustain an objection to a question or to an exhibit, the witness may not answer the question 
or the exhibit may not be considered. Do not attempt to guess what the answer might have 
been or what the exhibit might have shown. Similarly, if I tell you not to consider a 
particular statement or exhibit you should put it out of your mind, and not refer to it or rely 
on it in your later deliberations. 
During the trial I may have to talk with the parties about the rules of law which 
should apply in this case. Sometimes we will talk here at the bench. At other times I will 
excuse you from the courtroom so that you can be comfortable while we work out any 
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problems. You are not to speculate about any such discussions. They are necessary from 
time to time and help the trial run more smoothly. 
Some of you have probably heard the terms "circumstantial evidence," "direct 
evidence" and "hearsay evidence." Do not be concerned with these terms. You are to 
consider all the evidence admitted in this trial. 
However, the law does not require you to believe all the evidence. As the sole 
judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what weight you 
attach to it. 
There is no magical formula by which one may evaluate testimony. You bring with 
you to this courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. In your everyday 
affairs you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe, and how much 
weight you attach to what you are told. The same considerations that you use in your 
everyday dealings in making these decisions are the considerations which you should 
apply in your deliberations. 
In deciding what you believe, do not make your decision simply because more 
witnesses may have testified one way than the other. Your role is to think about the 
testimony of each witness you heard and decide how much you believe of what the witness 
had to say. 
., 
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INSTRUCTION N0._2_ 
If during the trial I may say or do anything which suggests to you that I am inclined 
to favor the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by 
any such suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, nor will I intend to intimate, 
any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief; what facts are or are not 
established; or what inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of 
mine seems to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to 
disregard it. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _A:_ 
Do not concern yourself with the subject of penalty or punishment. That subject 
must not in any way affect your verdict. If you find the defendant guilty, it will be my duty to 
determine the appropriate penalty or punishment. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _5_ 
If you wish, you may take notes to help you remember what witnesses said. If you 
do take notes, please keep them to yourself until you and your fellow jurors go to the jury 
room to decide the case. You should not let note-taking distract you so that you do not hear 
other answers by witnesses. When you leave at night, please leave your notes in the jury 
room. 
If you do not take notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was said and 
not be overly influenced by the notes of other jurors. In addition, you cannot assign to one 
person the duty of taking notes for all of you. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
It is important that as jurors and officers of this court you obey the following 
instructions at any time you leave the jury box, whether it be for recesses of the court 
during the day or when you leave the courtroom to go home at night. 
First, do not talk about this case either among yourselves or with anyone else during 
the course of the trial. You should keep an open mind throughout the trial and not form or 
express an opinion about the case. You should only reach your decision after you have 
heard all the evidence, after you have heard my final instruction and after the final 
arguments. You may discuss this case with the other members of the jury only after it is 
submitted to you for your decision. All such discussion should take place in the jury room. 
Second, do not let any person talk about this case in your presence. If anyone does 
talk about it, tell them you are a juror on the case. If they won't stop talking, report that to 
the bailiff as soon as you are able to do so. You should not tell any of your fellow jurors 
about what has happened. 
Third, during this trial do not talk with any of the parties, their lawyers or any 
witnesses. By this, I mean not only do not talk about the case, but do not talk at all, even to 
pass the time of day. In no other way can all parties be assured of the fairness they are 
entitled to expect from you as jurors. 
Fourth, during this trial do not make any investigation of this case or inquiry outside 
of the courtroom on your own. Do not go any place mentioned in the testimony without an 
explicit order from me to do so. You must not consult any books, dictionaries, 
encyclopedias or any other source of information unless I specifically authorize you to do 
so. 
Fifth, do not read about the case in the newspapers. Do not listen to radio or 
television broadcasts about the trial. You must base your verdict solely on what is 
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presented in court and not upon any newspaper, radio, television or other account of what 
may have happened. 
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INSTRUCTION NO._ 7_ 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, is 
charged in Count I, with the crime of MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE alleged to have been 
committed as follows: That the defendant, JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, on or about the 1st 
day of January, 2006, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did willfully, unlawfully, 
deliberately, and with malice aforethought, but without premeditation, kill and murder Vonette L. 
Larsen, a human being, by striking and driving over Vonette L. Larsen with a vehicle inflicting 
injuries from which she died. To this charge, the defendant has pled not guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _g> _ 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, is 
charged, in Count II with the crime of Aggravated Battery, allegedly committed as follows: That the 
defendant, JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, on or about the 1st day of January, 2006, in the 
County of Kootenai, State ofldab.o, did commit a battery upon Jolene Larsen by means of a deadly 
weapon and/or instrument, to-wit: a vehicle. To this charge the defendant has pled not guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _{L__ 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, is 
charged, in Count III with the crime of Aggravated Battery, allegedly committed as follows: That the 
defendant, JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, on or about the 1st day of January, 2006, in the 
County of Kootenai, State ofidaho, did commit a battery upon J ovon Larsen by means of a deadly 
weapon and/or instrument, to-wit: a vehicle. To this charge the defendant has pled not guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. I 0 
Each charge in this case is of itself a mere accusation or charge against the 
defendant and does not of itself constitute any evidence of the defendant's guilt; you are 
not to be prejudiced or influenced to any extent against the defendant because a 
criminal charge has been made. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ll_ 
Each count charges a separate and distinct offense. You must decide each count separately on 
the evidence and the law that applies to it, uninfluenced by your decision as to any other count. 
Jonathan Wade Ellington may be found guilty or not guilty on either or both of the offenses 
charged. 
,, 
~f.U~~. 
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INSTRUCTION NO.~ 
Under our law and system of justice, the Jonathan Wade Ellington is presumed to be 
innocent. The presumption of innocence means two things. 
First, the state has the burden of proving the defendant guilty. The state has that burden 
throughout the trial. Jonathan Wade Ellington is never required to prove his innocence, nor does 
Jonathan Wade Ellington ever have to produce any evidence at all. 
Second, the state must prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable 
doubt is not a mere possible or imaginary doubt. It is a doubt based on reason and common 
sense. It may arise from a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence, or from lack of 
evidence. If after considering all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt about Jonathan Wade 
Ellington's guilt, you must find Jonathan Wade Ellington not guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. I '3 
Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by deposition. A deposition is testimony 
taken under oath before the trial and preserved in writing. This evidence is entitled to neither 
more nor less consideration than you would give the same testimony had the witnesses testified 
here from the witness stand. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~ i...l 
It may be helpful for you to see the place involved in this case. I have appointed a bailff to 
take you there. While at that place, you are not to make any measurements, conduct any tests or 
make any demonstrations. 
Your observations during this view ofthe place involved are not evidence in this case, and 
you are not to take such observations into consideration in arriving at your verdict. 
This view is only for the purpose of assisting you in understanding the evidence presented in 
court. 
l'\. ,, 
[j.~ \j_~~LV~ 
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INSTRUCTION NO. L5 
You have now heard all the evidence in the case. My duty is to instruct you as to 
the law. 
You must follow all the rules as I explain them to you. You may not follow some and 
ignore others. Even if you disagree or don't understand the reasons for some of the rules, 
you are bound to follow them. If anyone states a rule of law different from any I tell you, it 
is my instruction that you must follow. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. \ (c, 
Second degree murder is the killing of a human being without legal 
justification or excuse and with malice aforethought. 
The killing of a human being is legally justified when done in defense of 
self, another, or property. You will be instructed on the elements of legal 
justification in a later instruction. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _l1_ 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Murder in the Second Degree, as charged in Count I, 
the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about the 1st day of January, 2006; 
2. in the state ofldaho; 
3. the defendant, JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, engaged in conduct which caused the 
death ofVonette L. Larsen; 
4. the defendant acted without justification or excuse, and; 
5. with malice aforethought. 
If you fmd that the state has failed to prove any of the above, then you must find the defendant 
not guilty of Murder. If you fmd that all of the above have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
then, you must fmd the defendant guilty of murder. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that for Mr. Ellington to be guilty of Murder in the Second 
Degree the state must prove that the killing of Vonette Larsen occurred with malice 
aforethought. 
Malice may be express or implied. Malice is express when there IS manifested a 
deliberate intention unlawfully to kill a human being. Malice is implied when: 
1. The killing resulted from an intentional act. 
2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life, and 
3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with 
conscious disregard for, human life. 
When it is shown that a killing resulted from the intentional doing of an act with express 
or implied malice, no other mental state need be shown to establish the mental state of malice 
aforethought. The mental state constituting malice aforethought does not necessarily require any 
ill will or hatred of the person killed. 
The word "aforethought" does not imply deliberation or the lapse of time. It only means 
that the malice must precede rather than follow the act. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. )C\ 
Jonathan Wade Ellington contends as a defense in this case that the killing 
was an excusable homicide. 
Homicide is excusable: 
When committed by accident and misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful 
means, with usual and ordinary caution, and without any unlawful intent: 
Or 
When committed in self-defense. (As defined further in these instructions) 
The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
homicide was not excusable. If there is a reasonable doubt whether the 
homicide was excusable, you must find the defendant not guilty 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~0 
Homicide is the killing of one person by another. The cnmes of Murder and 
Manslaughter comprise unlawful homicide 
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INSTRUCTION NO.~ 
In order for the defendant to be guilty, in Count II, of Aggravated Battery, the state must 
prove each of the following: 
1. On or about the 1st day of January, 2006; 
2. in the state ofldaho; 
3. the defendant, JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, committed a battery upon Jolene 
Larsen; 
4. by means of a deadly weapon and/or instrument. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must fmd 
the defendant guilty 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
In order for the defendant to be guilty, in Count III, of Aggravated Battery, the state must 
prove each of the following: 
1. On or about the 1st day of January, 2006; 
2. in the state ofldaho; 
3. the defendant, JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, committed a battery upon Jovon 
Larsen; 
4. by means of a deadly weapon and/or instrument. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must fmd 
the defendant guilty 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~j 
A "battery" is committed when a person: 
(1) willfully and unlawfully uses force or violence upon the person of another; or 
(2) actually, intentionally and unlawfully touches or strikes another person against 
the will of the other; or 
(3) unlawfully and intentionally causes bodily harm to an individual. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~'i 
When considering the crime of Aggravated Battery you are instructed that an 
act is "willful" or done "willfully" when done on purpose. One can act willfully 
without intending to violate the law, to injure another, or to acquire any 
advantage. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ?b 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that a "deadly weapon or instrument" is one likely to produce death 
or great bodily injury. It also includes any other object that is capable of being used in a deadly or 
dangerous manner if the person intends to use it as a weapon. 
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INSTRUCTION NO .. :l /d 
If your unanimous verdict is that :Mr. Ellington is not guilty of Second Degree Murder 
you must acquit him of that charge. In that event, you must next consider the included 
offense of Voluntary Manslaughter. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~ '1 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter, the state must prove each 
of the following: 
1. On or about the 1st day of January, 2006; 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON engaged in conduct which caused the 
death of V onette L. Larsen, and 
4. the defendant acted unlawfully upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion and without 
malice aforethought in causing such death. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ,6 8 
The distinction between murder and manslaughter is that murder requires 
malice aforethought, while manslaughter does not. 
There is no malice aforethought if the defendant acted with adequate 
provocation while in the heat of passion or a sudden quarrel, even if the 
defendant intended to kill the deceased. The provocation would have been 
adequate if it would have caused a reasonable person, in the same 
circumstances, to lose self-control and act on impulse and without reflection. 
Heat of passion may be provoked by fear, rage, anger, terror, revenge or 
other emotion. Adequate provocation does not exist, however, when a person 
acts from choice and malice aforethought even though experiencing any number 
of emotions. 
The defendant would not be acting in heat of passion or sudden quarrel if 
sufficient time elapsed after the provocation for a reasonable person in the same 
circumstances to have regained self-control and for reason to have returned. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~C\ 
If your unanimous verdict is that Mr. Ellington is not guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter 
you must acquit him of that charge. In that event, you must next consider the included 
offense ofVehicular Manslaughter withGross Negligence. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. JO 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter with gross 
negligence, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about the 1st day of January, 2006; 
2.. in the state ofldaho; 
3. the defendant, JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, while operating a 
motor vehicle committed the unlawful act of driving left of center on the roadway; and 
4. the unlawful act was committed with gross negligence; and 
5. the defendant's operation of the motor vehicle in such unlawful manner 
was a significant cause contributing to the death ofVonette L. Larsen. 
If you find that the state has failed to prove any of the above, then you must find 
the defendant not guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter with gross negligence. If you find 
that all of the above have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must fmd the 
defendant guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter with gross negligence. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _1_L 
You are instructed that that the law requires that upon all highways of sufficient 
width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway except as follows: 
When an obstruction exists making it necessary to drive to the left of the center of 
the highway. Any person doing so shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles traveling in 
the proper direction upon the unobstructed portion of the highway within a distance as to 
constitute an immediate hazard. 
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INSTRUCTION NO .. 3 'A 
You are instructed that gross negligence means such negligence as amounts to a 
wanton, flagrant or reckless disregard of consequences or willful indifference of the 
safety or rights of others. 
•. 
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INSTRUCTION NO., :3~ 
If your unanimous verdict is that Mr. Ellington is not guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter 
with Gross Negligence you must acquit him of that charge. In that event, you must next 
consider the included offense ofVehicular Manslaughter without Gross Negligence. 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 521 of 848
INSTRUCTIONNO. :JL( 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter without gross 
negligence, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about the 1st day of January, 2006; 
2. in the state ofldaho; 
3. the defendant, JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, while operating a 
motor vehicle committed the unlawful act of driving to left of center on the roadway; and 
4. the unlawful act was committed without gross negligence; and 
5. the defendant's operation of the motor vehicle in such unlawful manner 
was a significant cause contributing to the death of V onette L. Larsen. 
If you fmd that the state has failed to prove any of the above, then you must fmd 
the defendant not guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter without gross negligence. If you fmd 
that all of the above have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty ofVehicular Manslaughter without gross negligence. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 35 
The Homicide and/or Aggravated Battery was justified if Mr. Ellington was acting in 
defense of himself. 
In order to find that Mr. Ellington acted in defense of himself all the following conditions 
must be found to have been in existence at the time of the killing and/or aggravated battery: 
1. Mr. Ellington must have believed that he was in imminent danger of death or great 
bodily harm. 
2. In addition to that belief, Mr. Ellington must have believed that the action he took 
was necessary to save himself from the danger presented. 
3. The circumstances must have been such that a reasonable person, under similar 
circumstances, would have believed that Mr. Ellington was in imminent danger of 
death or great bodily injury and believed that the action taken was necessary. 
4. Mr. Ellington must have acted only in response to that danger and not from some 
other motivation. 
5. When there is no longer any reasonable appearance of danger, the right of self-
defense ends. 
In deciding upon the reasonableness of Mr. Ellington's beliefs, you should determine 
what an ordinary and reasonable person might have concluded from all the facts and 
circumstances which the evidence shows existed at that time, and not with the benefit of 
hindsight. 
The danger must have been present and imminent, or must have so appeared to a 
reasonable person under the circumstances. A bare fear of bodily injury is not sufficient to 
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justify a homicide and/or aggravated battery. Mr. Ellington must have acted under the influence 
of fears that only a reasonable person would have had in a similar position. 
The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
homicide and/or aggravated battery was not justified. If there is a reasonable doubt whether the 
homicide and/or aggravated battery was justified you must find Mr. Ellington not guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3/o 
The kind and degree of force which a person may lawfully use in self-
defense are limited by what a reasonable person in the same situation as such 
person, seeing what that person sees and knowing what the person knows, then · 
would believe to be necessary .. Any use of force beyond that is regarded by the 
law as excessive. Although a person may believe that the person is acting, and 
may act, in self-defense, the person is not justified in using a degree of force 
clearly in excess of that apparently and reasonably necessary under the existing 
facts and circumstances. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~ '1 
In the exercise of the right of self-defense, one need not retreat. One may stand 
one's ground and defend oneself by the use of all force and means which would appear to 
be necessary to a reasonable person in a similar situation and with similar knowledge. A 
person may pursue the attacker until he has been secured from danger if that course 
likewise appears reasonably necessary. This law applies even though the person being 
attacked might more easily have gained safety by flight or by withdrawing from the 
scene. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 38 
A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be compelled to testify. 
The decision whether to testify is left to the defendant, acting with the advice and 
assistance of the defendant's lawyer. You must not draw any inference of guilt from the 
fact that the defendant does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter 
into your deliberations in any way. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3'1 
It is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about" a certain date. If 
you find the crime was committed, the proof need not show that it was committed on that 
precise date. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. c.....1 0 
In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act and 
intent. 
? 
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INSTRUCTION NO. '1 l 
Certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. 
At the time this evidence was admitted you were admonished that it could 
not be considered by you for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which 
it was admitted. 
Do not consider such evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for 
which it was admitted. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. t.J '1... 
You are instructed that Vonette L. Larsen's prints were not found on the hood ofthe 
Blazer. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1-13 
As members of the jury it is your duty to decide what the facts are and to apply 
those facts to the law that I have given you. You are to decide the facts from all the 
evidence presented in the case. 
The evidence you are to consider consists of: 
1. sworn testimony of witnesses; 
2. exhibits which have been admitted into evidence; and 
3. any facts to which the parties have stipulated. 
Certain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including: 
1. arguments and statements by lawyers. The lawyers are not witnesses. 
What they say in their opening statements, closing arguments and at other 
times is included to help you interpret the evidence, but is not evidence. If 
the facts as you remember them differ from the way the lawyers have stated 
them, follow your memory; 
2. testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or which you have been 
instructed to disregard; 
3. anything you may have seen or heard when the court was not in session. 
In deciding the facts of this case, you will have to decide which witnesses to believe 
and which witnesses not to believe. You may believe anything a witness says or only part 
of it or none of it. In making your decision, you may take into account a number of factors 
including the following: 
1. Was the witness able to see, or hear, or know the things about which that 
witness testified? 
2. How well was the witness able to recall and describe those things? 
3. What was the witness's manner while testifying? 
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4. Did the witness have an interest in the outcome of this case or any bias or 
prejudice concerning any party or any matter involved in the case? 
5. How reasonable was the witness's testimony considered in light of all the 
evidence in the case? 
6. Was the witness's testimony contradicted by what that witness has said or done 
at another time, or by the testimony of other witnesses or by other evidence? 
In deciding whether or not to believe a witness, keep in mind that people sometimes 
forget things. You need to consider therefore whether a contradiction is an innocent lapse 
of memory or an intentional falsehood, and that may depend on whether it has to do with 
an important fact or with only a small detail. 
The weight of the evidence presented by each side does not necessarily depend on 
the number of witnesses testifying on one side or the other. You must consider all the 
evidence in the case, and you may decide that the testimony of a smaller number of 
witnesses on one side has greater weight than that of a larger number on the other. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. lft...f 
I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and have told you of 
some of the matters which you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the 
facts. In a few minutes counsel will present their closing remarks to you, and then you will 
retire to the jury room for your deliberations. 
The arguments and statements of the attorneys are not evidence. If you remember 
the facts differently from the way the attorneys have stated them, you should base your 
decision on what you remember. 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of your deliberations are 
important. It is rarely productive at the outset for you to make an emphatic expression of 
your opinion on the case or to state how you intend to vote. When you do that at the 
beginning, your sense of pride may be aroused, and you may hesitate to change your 
position even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, 
but are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment 
and declaration of the truth. 
As jurors you have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate before 
making your individual decisions. You may fully and fairly discuss among yourselves all of 
the evidence you have seen and heard in this courtroom about this case, together with the 
law that relates to this case as contained in these instructions. 
During your deliberations; you each have a right to re-examine your own views and 
change your opinion. You should only do so if you are convinced by fair and honest 
discussion that your original opinion was incorrect based upon the evidence the jury saw 
and heard during the trial and the law as given you in these instructions. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views, and deliberate with the 
objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual 
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judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a 
discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
However, none of you should surrender your honest opinion as to the weight or 
effect of evidence or as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant because the majority of 
the jury feels otherwise or for the purpose of returning a unanimous verdict. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. Ji5_ 
You have been instructed as to all the rules of law that may be necessary for you to 
reach a verdict. Whether some of the instructions apply will depend upon your 
determination of the facts. You will disregard any instruction which applies to a state of 
facts which you determine does not exist. You must not conclude from the fact that an 
instruction has been given that the Court is expressing any opinion as to the facts. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. l.f fo 
Upon retiring to the jury room, select one of you as a presiding juror, who will 
preside over your deliberations. It is that person's duty to see that discussion is orderly; 
that the issues submitted for your decision are fully and fairly discussed; and that every 
juror has a chance to express himself or herself upon each question. 
In this case, your verdict must be unanimous. When you all arrive at a verdict, the 
presiding juror will sign it and you will return it into open court. 
Your verdict in this case cannot be arrived at by chance, by lot, or by compromise. 
If, after considering all of the instructions in their entirety, and after having fully 
discussed the evidence before you, the jury determines that it is necessary to 
communicate with me, you may send a note by the bailiff. You are not to reveal to me or 
anyone else how the jury stands until you have reached a verdict or unless you are 
instructed by me to do so. 
A verdict form suitable to any conclusion you may reach will be submitted to you 
with these instructions. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. "J. 7 
An act is done intentionally if done on purpose. 
The word deliberate as used in these instructions means an act done with 
reflection. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DIST. 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff 
vs 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR 2006-1497 
VERDICT 
We, the Jury, duly impaneled and sworn to try the above-entitled action, for our verdict, 
unanimously answer the questions submitted to us as follows: 
QUESTION NO.1: Is Jonathan Wade Ellington guilty or not guilty of Second Degree murder? 
Not Guilty Guilty ----X--
If you unanimously answered Question No. 1 "Guilty" then you must skip to Question 
No.5 and answer that question. If you unanimously answered Question No. 1 "Not Guilty", 
then proceed to answer Question No.2. 
QUESTION NO.2: Is Jonathan Wade Ellington guilty or not guilty of Voluntary 
Manslaughter? 
Not Guilty ___ _ Guilty ___ _ 
If you unanimously answered Question No.2 "Guilty" then you must skip to Question 
No.5 and answer that question. If you unanimously answered Question No.2 "Not Guilty", 
then proceed to answer Question No.3. 
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QUESTION NO.3: Is Jonathan Wade Ellington guilty or not guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter 
with Gross Negligence? 
Not Guilty ___ _ Guilty ___ _ 
If you unanimously answered Question No.3 "Guilty" then you must skip to Question 
No.5 and answer that question. If you unanimously answered Question No 3 "Not Guilty", 
then proceed to answer Question No.4. 
QUESTION NO.4: Is Jonathan Wade Ellington guilty or not guilty of Vehicular manslaughter 
without Gross Negligence? 
Not Guilty ___ _ Guilty ___ _ 
Proceed to Question No.5 and No.6 
QUESTION NO.5: Is Jonathan Wade Ellington guilty or not guilty of Aggravated Battery 
upon Joleen Larson? 
Guilty ______,_)(______,_ _ Not Guilty ___ _ 
QUESTION NO.6: Is Jonathan Wade Ellington guilty or not guilty of Aggravated Battery 
upon Jovon Larson? 
,/ 
Not Guilty ___ _ Guilty-+-!\~--
3 [ -s..t Dated this ~=--.J_L__ __ day of January, 2012. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
~~~· l({jtoYl 
e endan ) 
-L---------------------' ) 
Phone ______________________ ___ 
DOB ______________________ _ 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 
ORDER FOR EVALUATION(S) 
AND SETTING SENTENCING 
In Custody J<1 Yes- Transport for PSI/Eval authorized 
/• "L No 
ed guilty in this matter, been found guilty by jury trial 
to: ? ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~T-rr~--~~~---------------------
the presentence investigation. The presentence report is due seven (7) days prior to the sentencing hearing. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that your continued release is conditioned upon your making and keeping all 
appointments with Probation & Parole, complying with all conditions of the presentence investigator, and 
obtaining any or all of the following evaluations. You must obtain any evaluation checked below. 
Substance Abuse Evaluation ......... [ ] } Pursuant to I. C. 19-2524, to be paid for by 
_____ Mental Health Evaluation ............... [ ] the Dept. of Health & Welfare subject to 
_____ Psychosexual Evaluation reimbursement by the defendant. 
Domestic Violence Evaluatior A/Vi ,• I }J I oO 
YOU ARE ORDERED to ap~ for sentenci n ~· d(/;. 2~ a~m. 
DATED this <3J day of , 20~n 
~~~ ~ ~~~~~~~====~~~~-===-------
udge 
.::() CER I ATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on thVl- day of , 2'i.Acopies of the foregoing Order 
were delivered in ~a~d-~ostage prepai , sent by lac ile or in~ce mail to: 
Defense Attorney: JaVJ Ul « J vfn ~ lJ Interoffice CJ Faxed _____ lj :i 
Defendant T L ~n Court D Interoffice D Mailed- address above .J) 3dJ, 
Probation & Pa.ole: !'?! J,71=! D. /1 1 In Court r; Interoffice ,YFaxed}>oa) 769-1481 
Prosecuting Attorney: ~ y_f4ctp~._l7 L-., fi In Court L; Interoffice Li Faxyt ~208) 446-1833 
Health and Welfare i_r Mailed n F~ ..,d (208) 769-1430 
Other: D In Court n fJ Faxed •. 
ORDER FOR EVALUATION(S) AND SETTING SENTENCING DC 010 Rev. 7-09 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
STATE OF IDAHO } 
., "J-v C()(jt\ I , OF KOOY::NAJ SS 
FILEC -· 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 20i? FEB 13 PH 2: 39 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
--------------------------~) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL 
COMES NOW, Jonathan Ellington, the above named defendant, by and through his 
attorney, Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby submits this Motion for judgment of 
acquittal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29(c). Briefing in support of this motion will be 
subsequently filed. 
Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29( c), a judge may set aside a jury's guilty verdict and 
enter a judgment of acquittal on a motion for judgment of acquittal made within fourteen days of 
the verdict I.C.R. 29(c). A Rule 29 motion for acquittal turns upon whether there "whether there 
is substantial evidence upon which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 683, 99 P.3d 
1069 (2004). In this case, the State failed to produce evidence to support each element of the 
crime such that a rational trier of fact could have found they were proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
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Counsel requests that this motion be set for hearing in order to present oral argument, 
evidence and/or testimony in support thereof. Requested time is 30 minutes. 
DATED this \¥day of February, 2012. 
• 
OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI 
UNTYPUBL EFENDER 
BY: 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by 
facsimile on the \3(j..c..-- day of February, 2012, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor 208-446-1833 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender lOt(; 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
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Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fe I 
v. 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
__________________________) 
COMES NOW, Jonathan Ellington, the above named defendant, by and through his 
attorney, Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby submits this Motion for New Trial 
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 34. Briefing to support this motion will be subsequently filed. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 34 provides, "The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new 
trial to the defendant if required in the interest of justice." I. C. R. 34. The relevant grounds for a 
granting a new trial in this case are outlined by Idaho Code Ann. § 19-2406(5), (6) and (7). 
These subsections recognize a new trial is warranted: 
5. When the court has misdirected the jury in a matter of law, or has erred in the 
decision of any question of law arising during the course of the trial. 
6. When the verdict is contrary to law or evidence. 
7. When new evidence is discovered, material to the defendant, and which could not 
have been discovered with reasonable diligence, and produced at the time of trial. 
Idaho Code Ann. § 19-2406(5)(6)(7). 
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First, Mr. Ellington is entitled to a new trial because the verdict is contrary to law and 
evidence under 19-2406(6), due to the prosecution's failure to prove the elements of the charged 
offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, pursuant to 19-2406(5), Mr. Ellington should be 
afforded a new trial for two primary reasons, the first being that the court misdirected the jury by 
denying Mr. Ellington's requested jury instructions, and violated Mr. Ellington's right to counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution made applicable to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Denying 
defense counsel's requested instructions misdirected the jury and precluded defense counsel 
from making arguments to the jury to support Mr. Ellington's defense and to rebut the State's 
evidence. Third, this court erred by denying Mr. Ellington's motion(s) for new trial, dismissal of 
the Information and mistrial based on the cumulative effect and pattern of prosecutorial 
misconduct, which prevented Mr. Ellington from having a fair trial, as mandated by the Due 
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I§ 13 
of the Idaho Constitution. Fourth, Mr. Ellington has discovered new and material evidence that 
could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at trial. 
Counsel requests that this motion be set for hearing in order to present oral argument, 
evidence and/or testimony in support thereof. Requested time is 30 minutes. 
DATED this [bLA day of February, 2012. 
BY: 
TAYLOR 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by 
facsimile on the \'3ft- day of February, 2012, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor 208-446-1833 
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[J ORIGIN. __ 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
STATE Qf: IDAHO l 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
) Fel 
) 
) MOTION TO EXCUSE 
) DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE 
) 
) 
______________________________) 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order excusing the defendant's 
presence at the Motion for New Trial and Motion for Judgment of Acquittal set in the above 
entitled matter on March 16, 2012. This motion is made on the grounds that defendant is 
currently residing in Utah. 
DATED this 1~ day ofDecember, 201 I. 
MOTION TO EXCUSE 
DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE 
BY: 
~~OF THE K~NAI Cr UN~ Y PUBLIC \E//"1 ~{AA() YJ I ~ AYtoR---' ( 
DEP Y PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by 
facsimile on the ilj day of December, 2011 addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Plaintiff, ) Fel 
) 
v. ) 
) ORDER TO EXCUSE 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, ) DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE 
) 
Defendant. ) 
-----------------------------
The Court having before it the Motion to Excuse Defendant's Presence and good cause 
appearing, now, therefore 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's presence is excused from the Motion for 
New Trial and Motion for Judgment of Acquittal hearing scheduled for March 16, 2012 in the 
above-entitled matter. 
·-\:\--
DATED this A8day of February, 2012. 
JOHN LUSTER 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE ) 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of th~..9regoing was pers pally served by 
placing a copy of the same as indicated below on the~ da~fFebruar f,j2012, addressed 
to: (t_ciJ / \ / 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446- , _ 
Kootenai County Pubiic Defender FAX~-~ 
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BARRY McHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way/Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1971 
Telephone: (208) 446-1800 
ASSIGNED ATTORNEY 
ARTHUR VERHAREN 
~T~TE OF OOJo 1 , . 
COU'ITY OF KOOTENAI f SS 
FILED: 
2012 M.AR -8 PH ?.: 58 
RICT COUI~i 
f /);,(//Ju 
I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. CRF06-1497 
PLAINTIFF'S 
SENTENCING MATERIALS 
The State, by and through Arthur Verharen, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, hereby submits the 
following materials for the Court's consideration in sentencing herein: 
1. Copy of victim impact statement from Joel Larsen. 
2. Copy ofletter from Von Berry. 
3. Copy ofletter from Joanne Carroll 
DATED this 7 day of MMfl± , 2012. 
AR~£~~ 
PLAINTIFF'S SENTENCING 
MATERIALS: 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
PAGE 1 
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I 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the _2_ day of ,MiVlCi f- , 2012, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was caused to be mailed or sent interoffice mail as follows: 
PUBLIC DEFE:NTIERS OFFICE 
FAXED 
PLAINTIFF'S SENTENCING 
MATERIALS: PAGE2 
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LJ ORIGINA1 
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT 
STATEOFIDAHOV. ~e&'/-11a¥J ~//t'11J~ 
cAsENo. Fo~-1141 
VICTIM'S NAME: 
Joe/ La.rsen 
PHONE NUMBER: (H) (:,b t ... 9J7J7b(W) 9 00 ..._55/-oS(J j 
RECEiVED 
. Please describe the impact of this crime on your life and/or the life of your family members. 
Special attention should be given to describing the physical and/or the psychological impact 
resulting from this offense. 
Have you received any counseling or therapy as a result of this incident? If yes, please explain: 
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February 8 
Honorable Judge Luster 
I, Joanne Carroll, brother of Joel Larsen, respectfully submit this letter for your consideration in 
imposing sentence on Jonathan Ellington for the murder of my sister-in-law, Vonette Larsen. 
Several years ago, my brother, Joel and his fa..'Tiily, moved from our hometoVvn to Northern Idaho. He 
and his wife, Vonette, wanted to raise their three daughters in a quiet, rural setting. On January 1, 2006, 
Jonathan Ellington shattered that dream. Jonathan Ellington murdered Vonette in front of her husband 
and 2 daughters. On that day, Jonathan Ellington made a "choice" that forever changed the lives of my 
entire family. He took away a mother, grandmother, sister, daughter, and my brother's best friend and 
wife of more than 20 years! His predisposition to violence and deliberate actions have left my family 
to endure a lifetime of heartache and grief. In contrast, Mr. Ellington has never shown any remorse for 
his actions and is not willing to take responsibility for his actions. 
One of many personal gut-wrenching situations occurred shortly after Vonette's murder. My brother 
returned home one day to find his 4-year old grandson lying on his back in the snow. When asked what 
he was doing, his grandson said, "making snow angels and watching for grandma"! A birthday ofthe 
youngest daughter only 2 weeks after Vonette's murder, a senior prom shortly after, high school 
graduations, and the birth of a second grandchild, have been void of their mother's presence. 
Mr. Ellington was originally convicted of second-degree murder and 2 counts of aggravated assault and 
was sent to prison. Recently, he was granted a re-trial. To date, two trials have taken place. My 
brother and his daughters have had to relive the horror of that day in two separate trials. Jonathan 
Ellington has now sat before 24 jurors (two trials) and been found guilty a second time. 
It is now time for my family to have some sense of closure and try to move forward with their lives. 
Please take into consideration Mr. Ellington's total lack of remorse. Also, consider Mr. Ellington's 
background of criminal behavior which includes, but is not limited to, domestic violence, abuse, 
possession of a controlled substance, and multiple DUI's. 
Jonathan Ellington has a propensity for violence and making bad "choices" as evidenced by his prior 
felony convictions. His extensive "rap sheet" spans many years and several states. I also understand 
that he may have had an existing warrant(s) at the time of the murder. 
Having stated the above, I expect the maximum penalty to be imposed upon him for these convictions 
so as to deter the defendant from doing further harm to another family. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Joanne Carroll 
Sister of Joel Larsen 
Gary & Joanne Carroll 
851 Grapevine Ln 
Prescott, AZ 86305 
Sllie cl Allzlllll 
COII1Iy d YA // /IPR' / 
On1hls.1.dayof rc-.e. ~-~ 
11Rl88f8d7": l7A.R,Ro.c_,:_ (nsmeotsfgra),lhaaaldlnii!J 
• prowd to me oo tt1e b!>.sls oi satlsfactory Mine to be VII 
JliiiSOII whose nama m subscr:bsd to lhls document, and 1111o 
ldnowledged !hal h&'Ghe signed the abouelallach9d documMI:. 
(Seal) Clark;;«' .. /fh_,:"--:7 
Notary Nllic 
•• 
CATHERINE GITS 
Noi.y PUblic ·Arizona 
Yavapai County 
Mw Commission Expires 
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February 29, 2012 
Kootenai Co. Prosecutor's Office 
Art Verheren 
Re: Sentencing of John Ellington 
Your Honor, 
Thinking back in time. Remembering the birth of my daughter and how happy that was, the good times 
we all had together. The growing up and becoming a wife, Mother and Grandmother, I find it very 
difficult to see a very happy future for the family that is left behind. 
The Grandkids that will never know this great woman! The good times that could have been for 
everyone. This will never happen now. 
I know you cannot change things for this family that is left behind or for those of the future . I only ask 
that you find it in your heart to see that this man who has caused so much pain and suffering, remain 
incarcerated for the remainder of his sentence. Which I feel, was very, very short for the crime he 
committed! 
Thank you for your time and efforts with this trial. 
v~ 
Von Berry, Father of Vonette Berry Larsen 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai Co 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
POST VERDICT MOTIONS HEARING 
____________________________ ) 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order continuing the hearing now 
set for March 16, 2012. 
This motion is made on the grounds that one of the attorneys and the investigator in Mr. 
Ellington's case will both be out of town on this day. We are requesting a one week continuance. 
DATED this ~~ day of March, 2012. 
THE LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC 
"NO OBJECTION" 
/\ . ~~~ I " 'I ""-it:f~vE~~~ "--
DE~/~OFK~7':XCO~ 
BY:~~ ) 
DEPUTY PROSECUTOR DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
POST VERDICT MOTIONS HEARING Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy he foregoing was personally served by placing 
a copy of the same as indicated below on the ----:1~:=---J arch, 2012, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 
Via Fax 
~eroffice Mail 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender ofKootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
~TATE OF IDAHO, IN AND ~OR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________________________) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION TO CONTINUE SENTENCING 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order continuing the Sentencing 
now set for March 26, 2012. 
This motion is made on the grounds that the defense has requested a continuance on the 
II 5 M-f7:7.__ 0 6 ;j{oc_ L "i ~ i/ 
, "'--. . I /tv"V'\J ) tJci\A r·~ 
ARTHUR VERHAREN 
DEPUTY PROSECUTOR 
BY: 
MOTION TO CONTINUE SENTENCING 
ANNE TAYLOR 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct cop e fa going was personally served by placing 
a copy of the same as indicated below on the-+---+--- ay of March, 2012, addressed to: 
Kootenai County ProsecutOi FAX 446-1833 
~x 
Interoffice Mail 
MOTION TO CONTINUE SENTENCING Page2 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 560 of 848
\ 
ORIGINAt. 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
I f: IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
<j STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Plaintiff, ) Fel 
) 
V. ) ORDER TO CONTINUE HEARING 
) 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
_____________________________ ) 
The Court having before it the Motion to Continue Post Verdicts Motions and good cause 
appearing, now, therefore 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing scheduled for March 16,2012 is to be continued 
and reset after one week. 1- ,_. 
DATED this / 'i day of March, 2012. 
~,e._ P..+J.c-czf!Jl 
JOHN P. LUSTER 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certif'y that a true and correct copo/ the foregoing was personall;'~'-rved by placing 
a copy of the same as indicated below on the I day of March, 2012, addr;red to: 
Kootenai County Public Defender FAX 446-1701 ' 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1 701 
Bar Number: 5836 
sTATE Of IDAHO 
COUNTY OF KO 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________________________ ) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
ORDER TO CONTINUE SENTENCING 
The Court having before it the Motion to Continue Sentencing and good cause appearing, 
now, therefore 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Sentencing scheduled for March 26, 2012 is to be 
continued and reset after one week. 
DATED this ______ day of March, 2012. 
I hereby certif'y that a true and correct co71the foregoing was personally erved by placing 
a copy of the same as indicated below on the day of March, 2012, ad ssed to: 
Kootenai County Public Defender F A_X 446-1701 1 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 
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7:46 FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER~~~ Luster 
~ 
A. ne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
· Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
. PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814 
· .· Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
· Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTYOF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
141001/004 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
STJ;PULATION TO SHORTEN TIME 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
~~----------------------) 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne C. Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, and the State through Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Arthur Verharen, 
(via e-mail on 3/14/2012) stipulate that the Court enter an Order Shortening Time for hearing the 
Motion to Continue Sentencing in this matter. 
This motion is made pursuantto I.C.R. 45(c) and 12(d) on the grounds that will be 
presented orally in Co~.~ 
DATED this~ day of March, 2012. -· 
BY: 
TAYLOR 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
STIPULATION TO SHORTEN TIME 
•. 
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141002/004 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
' I hereby cert~fy that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by facsimile 
on the ~ y of March, 2012, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor by 208-446-1833 
JUDGE LUSTER by Fax 
STIPULATION TO SHORTEN TIME 
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 or~ 116/2012 Page 1 of2 
Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20120316 Motion to Continue 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth ) d Court Reporter PA Art VerHaren - ·-
DA Anne Taylor 
// 
'"-._ ( 
I 
' 
--~ .j ;--..._; -...__.- /-
I Datell3/16/20121 Location W 1 K-COURTROOM1 
I Time II Speaker II Note I I 09:05:25 AM D Calls case- PA VerHaren, DA Taylor present for hearing on the 
defense motion to continue sentencing 
I 09:05:51 AM II PA II Ready I 
09:05:54AM We have post-trial motions that we ask to be heard prior to 
DA sentencing. We're not seeking a lengthy delay. If we can have an 
additional week then we can have the motions heard. I have yet 
to receive a copy of the PSI. 
I 09:06:45 AM IIPA II Have you reset the motions? I 
09:06:52AM J I have not yet. I'm waiting to see if I have trials and there is potential to hear it in the 2nd week of my jury trials. 
09:07:35 AM I don't think that we'll be ready to respond in that short of time due 
PA to the information submitted. We're hoping for about 30 days to 
respond 
09:10:34 AM J APRIL 24, 2012 2:30PM FOR HEARING ON MOTIONS 
09:11:01 AM We object to continuing the sentencing. The family is here and 
PA took time off work to be here. Defendant has been convicted of 
murder and he is out of state and unsupervised. 
09:11:41 AM We'd like the benefit of the court's ruling before sentencing. It 
would be better to have the motions heard first. As to being 
unsupervised someone from Idaho contacted the police chief 
DA where he is and the family has been contacted. They know he's here and what he's been convicted of. He's exactly where he's 
supposed to be. If we have sentencing around that time then we 
can have the motions heard and he'll be here if he need be for 
1 sentencing. I 
09:13:17 AM Post trial motions is not justification in itself for continuance. I'll 
not concern myself about him being out of custody and out of 
J state but it sets bad precedent for continuing sentencing awaiting post trial motions. DENY CONTINUANCE - SENTENCING SET 
'I 
II MARCH 26 WITH POST TRIAL tv10TIONS APRIL 24. Defendant I 
I has a property bond posted. 
09:14:59 AM I llwe;re scheduled for 3:00pm and I ask that this be moved to 
file://R:\LogNotes- HTML\District\Criminal\Luster\CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan W... 3/16/2012 
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 o.r "''16/2012 Page 2 of2 
DA 
09:15:24 A 
09:15:24 AM 
J 
o9:15:54AM 
lo9:15:54 AM II End I 
earlier in the day in case this takes a while. 
I have law day all day long that day. If things get continued I'll 
have my clerk move things. We can readjust within reason if 
possible. 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www.fortherecord.com 
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L)O-...GINAL 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
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CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fe I 
NOTICE OF FILING 
IN RESPONSE TO PRESENTENCE 
INVESTIGATION 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Jonathan Wade Ellington, by and through his attorney of 
record, .A .. 1me Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, files the accompanying documents in response to 
Presentence Investigation. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
DATED this 
Records from Idaho Department of Corrections. 
The Supreme Court Opinion ofMay 27, 2011. 
Presentence Questionnaire. 
2):o day of March, 2012. 
THE LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC 
DEF~ER OF KOOTENAI COUNTY 
I ~ /7 /1 
BY AU!xt!JUU 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFEI\TDER 
NOTICE OF FILING 
IN RESPONSE TO PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION Page 1 
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·~ I 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct COQ.Y. o,i4le foregoing was personally served by placing a copy 
of the same as indicated below on the 'M" ' day of March, 2012, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor Hand Delivery r\ /\ (\ 
~w 
NOTICE OF FILING 
IN RESPONSE TO PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION Page2 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 
·C. L "BU'l'CH" OTICR 
ooveRNOR -
MARK A KUBINSKl . 
WILLIAM M. LOOMIS · 
:KRISTAL. HOWARD 
Deputy Attom<:ys .General 
CRTMINA T, DIVISION 
CORRECTION SECTION 
KEVIN BURNETT, Paralegal 
ANDREA-BLADES, Paralegal 
LA. W.R~CS O. WASPaN 
A ITORNEY OBNERAL 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0018 
(208) 658-2097 . 
Fax: (208) ~27· 7485 
·.-r F'fX ~SMISSION 
TO:_--=An____,__fJ_f,. ~b~f}.p...:.-l/tr~=-~=---·------
FROM: __ --..Jec:;,_:_j....:_//--=t_O~o~...~:tl~n7...!..!-P_t _· ____ _._ ___ _ 
FAX.NQ.;. _ ___....e· :JJ#'~·--=2::..........::(2~"" .,!..._'flf.....:=b--~.;..-~,....!....!:::....=.f}_.-~J~E:....::....· ZJ....:.-j __ _ 
IS Number of pages in tr~ssion including cover page: _____ _ 
· Original D will follow; ~ill not follow. · 
.·This Facsimile was transmitted from'the Office of Attorney General, Criminal Division~ Idaho 
Dept: of Correction. If you dicl not receive the number of pages listed above~ please call (208) 
658-,4097. . . 
NOTICE: This m~~ is. irltended 0111)' fot 1M \IS~ of the lndlvldUD! QJ' entity lo 1vhich h is l!ddrcsSC$ and may con(llin inforn1Atioo 1~1 is 
privileglld, conli.Sential, und c:x~mpt frcm diiela~urc under ·applicable );lw, If Ch~ reAdet of lhls nollco is not !he intended ret:lpionl or the 
employ~ or a;enl n:sponsii.lle for delivering !he llleaSRgl to the intiiOded recipient, YQU are hereby nQti/i~ ~at any dissemlnati011, diStnoutioo or 
topyinJ: of this communit;;!iOll is slrictly prohibited. Jr you have ~i"ed this col'Miunicction in error, plcs•e notiry· u.s immcdia~ely by 
tclephon• und return !llc5c pap<!r'f to tjj allhe addres.s slto\\11 ~b<lve vis 0'11 class lllllil. · 
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Anne Taylor, J)epllty Public Defender 
The Law Office ~ftbe Pv-bJic Defender of Kootenai County 
'PO Box9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 . . . -···· . -. 
:Phone: (208) 446·1700; ~-~~-= . (208) 446~ 1 7.0-l--· 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICI' COURT OF THE F1RST JUDICIAJ.. DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
P. 002 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
____________________ .) 
SUBPOENA DUCES 'n:CUM 
TO; William Loomis, Deputy Attomey General, Idaho Department of Corrections 
129' N Ol'ehsrd Strett Ste 110, Bol•tt Idaho 83706-2-266 
YOU ARE HBRBBY C~:MMA.NDED that laying aside all exwser, you appiiBl' in the District Court 
of the First 1ucUohtl Distriot of' the State ofldabo, in and t'ortho County ofKooteoa~ in Coeur d1Ale-rte, Idaho, 
on February 23, lOll at l 0:30~ as a wi,trtess in the above entitled matter on the part of the defmuianL 
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to provide k fuU<JWing dooumentary information at~d 
cwidence on the date and time as indicsJ:ed above; 
/.:1 ~-,;_,.plem cwof aii~,.icjilu of the Id4hoDepartment of Co~r:tifm 
( po,ttJin!ng to.lo,rat/1~ Jr~4~ Ellmgt~n ~~U;di#g ~u~ no~. ~iJnJtetl to all c~e ~otes.. 
)''9U.A!m~~1:l9}:)F~ _:roAT~\'OUF!a:JL rQ ~~AT1$.PLA.CEAND11ME ......... . 
SPECIFIED ABOVB. THAT YOU MAY BE HELD lN CONTEMPT 01' COURT A"ND THAT THE 
AGGRlBVE.D PARTY MAY RECOVBR FR.OM YOU THE SUM OP' !100,00 AND ALL DAMAGES 
WHICH HE MAY SUSTAIN SY YOUR FAILURB TO A'lT.BNJ) AS A Wll'NBSS. 
TI.flS S'OBPOENA CAN .ALSO Bl SATimD BYSUPPLYINGSA.ID JNFOBMATlON TO 
SUBPOENA DUCe$ TECUM 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 570 of 848
FEB/14/20!2/TUE 05:55PM P. 003 
.. 
THE LAW OFFICI OJ THE PUBLIC DEFENDER OJ KOOTENAI COUNTY, PRIOR TO TliE 
AFOREMENTIONED llATE AND 'l'IME. . 
GIVENUNDEB.MYHANDTHIS 9 dayof r.J}¥\M~ .2012. 
PI~ call the Publio Dotbncl«'s offi~:1 at 
(208) 446·1700 u~ rcecipt oftfria subpoma to 
Rhcdv lc the t11t1o (or your appemnce u a 
wlmess in thb mattfr, 
CLIFFORD T. HAYES 
CLERK OF T.HB :OJSTRICf 
" ... "- . .. . .. .. . ~-
- ... - -- .. -· --· ............. - .. -· .. . . - • • • • • "• •• • ••• ••• -··- • • •• --u • • 
SUBPOENA OUCES 1&CUM 
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Offender History· 
From: 2007-01-01 To: 2012-02-14 
ELLINGTON, JONATHAN WADE 83305 
Jarruary 22, 2007 
. ,• 
12:37 RDU glyon. 
RDU Recotmnends: Offender's :instant offense is for Mutder i.n the 2nd and Aggravated Battezy. No 
J&C available at this time. 
L Ther!l.l>cutic CommUDity 
2. Adult :Sasic Edu.cadon working towards GED 
3. Anger Management 
4. TABE Slll'vey 
5. Workfbrce Readiness 
6. Parenting Class 
.. 7. Relationships Class 
8. Facility Employment 
LSI·31, TCU-10, TABB-Locator. Reading A, Math M, Lallg D. 
February 06, 2007 
14:33 HOUSING CONCERNS rjacobs · · 
Moved into B·block from A-block. Unit rules and cell check-in signed. Wor:ks.in the kitchen. 
March 07, 2007 
11:22 WORK HISTORY 
---... !.~ ......... ,.,.._.,..=~.,..-=_,~-..- ... -~~~_!.&Cl!-~ ... - ..,g,qn~~ --· 
msteffen 
Inmate has been worlcing in the kitchen since 02104/07. Inmate bas been doini an excellent job in the 
kitchen. 
ELLINGTON, JONATHAN WADE 83305 
Pate: 02/1412012 14:04 ~tad By: abladel: Pqe I of 12 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 572 of 848
FEB/14/2012/TUE 05:56PM- P. 005 
May 09,2007 
09:17 PROGRAMMING 
_______ _1-It_!;~~~l .• -~--··- .. B.n~ Dat~~- ... -· 
aricbard 
Offender was added to education callout today~ Ai Co:o:ectional Specialist Brock was going over the 
rules, Offender Ellington advjscd that he was not interested in going to school at this time. Offender was 
told to contaot education if he changes his min4. lle will be dropped from the callout. 
July 20. 2007 . 
!~! ... ~---... -· .,.......,____ ----~- -= ·>- " -- ' , .. --~!~.&_~t..,_~~~e >-
14:22 POSITIVE tstienek 
Ellington volunteered to help move a large amount of gravel on the ballfield. Ellington did an excellent 
job. EOR. 
August 22, 2007 
T~.! ....... !~e __ ~ .. ~~on.-.. ~-!'lft~ .. X"-B'2-~ .. "',...~..-,.•~ror_,__-...~r.:-....~~_;.i~~.¥~~ . .,~ _ .... Jinlt12~te ... ~. 
04:32 HOUSING CONCEmNS btitswor 
Imnate moved to A-21SA. 
I~;-~.- == .................................... !~~ .: __ ·~=~ ... ...;E~eEL:.. ... :.:.-~t£Y£~. 
10:06 GENERAL CONI ACT - -. . btitswor - -
:&imate is not working going to school or programming at this time. 
06:18 GENERALCONfACT btitswor 
. Jnmate is not.worldng going to s~bool or pro~g at this time. 
ELLINGTON, JONATHAN Vf ADE 83305 
Date: 0211~12 14:04 ~By: ablades Page 2 uf ll 
,' 
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November 14, 2007 
__ ... !un_·_e,_JR.,._......,=·= ........... ,.. ...... ____ r~~-.......,.,.~"""""·~~ A.!i~L .. - ... !nJD:.:Ja~ ...... -. 
06:26 GENERAL CONTACT btitswor 
Inmate is not wo:d:ing he Is enrolled in GED classes no prograiXIllllng at this time. No questions or 
concet.nS-
Novernbe:r 16, 2007 
__ _..I .... iJP .... .e ........ ~..,.. ....... == .. ··""· ..•. ---- ... rwe ...... wot=-~---,_, .. ...,...~n~._.-. 
07:14 CORRECTIVE ACTION btitswor 
Imnate is upset he threw a work application under thr:~ door when I returned it to the inmate he was 
ins~cted the proper place to P\'t the applicatioo. and told not to slid thin~ under the do(lr as this is a 
saftey bazaxd. 
2007 
06:26 GENERAL CONTACT btitswor 
· · Inmate is not working he was enrolled in GED classes. He is having a hard time in the class with all his 
leagal WOik as well. He is notenroUed in any programs at thist time. · · 
JanuaJ"Y 23, 2008 
06:19 HOUSING CONCERNS shunsake 
June 03, 2008 
Offender was moved :from JKL toG 115. Meet with offender and set goals. Talk with offender on 
program. l'bm. 
11 ;27 HOUSING CONCERNS 
inmate requested a move to IClO 11 wbJle ago. Inmate is in Ok. Move denied 
ELL~GTON, JONATIIANW.Al>R 83305 
Dale: Q2/l.ql20lll4;04 O:eated ;By. ab~ Pase 3 of 1.2 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 574 of 848
FEB/!4/2012/TUE 05:57PM P. 007 
Febi\13.l)' 13, 2009 
ri ___ ... ,..,..E,ll~~bei--~~~ ... -==-· 
08:58 GENERAL CONTACf nrodrigu 
!mnate reported tbat his property did not arrive with him. :ftol:n tooe to ICC. Inmate states that he 
infollDed staff at the :Intake area at w.hich point he claims he was told that they would look fot his items_ 
Inmate is missing a television, ~:lock rarlio, petsona.l blankets, pillow bowls wllid and sever~tl misc. 
items. Info.oned inmate to put it in writing on r. Concem Fom to the :Ptope,rty Officer. I have signed 
tbe Concern Foxm and have forwarded it to IDOe tllrougb mail. 
__ ..., _ .. ___ ...A,i!!~"""""""'""""··"·"-"'··• .. ·"""· _E.!,l!!ti.nJ~~t., ... ___ §.ns:t.~----· 
16:43 CASE MANAGER CONTACT dhudon 
Offen.der face to :face contact: He claims to be currently enrolled in: Education Ciass; NONE Verified; 
YES, Program; NONE Verified; YES, Cunent work assignment; NONE1 Verified; YES OFFENDER 
WAS.APPROVED FOR Tim OPEN WHEEL CHAIR PUSHeR POSITION BUT HE ALSO 
REFUSED TO BE MOVED YESTERDAY SO THERE MAY BE AN ISSUE. 
· I asked ifhe has any concerns at this time: :Facility; NONE; Personal;· NONE, Medical; NONE, 
l'sychological; NONR · · · 
I would rate the Offemlers CtJJ:Xent D~eanor and I or Attitude 8s OK. 
Offende.r asked for OR was issued the followini Facility, Release Planning or Parole Hearing .Forms .. 
NONE. · 
Upon entering tb.is contact I also reviewed and /or modified offenders case plan goals in CIStOMP to 
reflect current needs and ANY n:cent accomplishments. · 
I also addressed any p~mt release plamring .issues NONE. 
09:04 OENBIW... CONTACI' 
J;nmats shQwcd m.e a Medical Request Disposition from CMS which stated that he fa..iled to show up for 
bis scheduled a-ppointment on Febn1aty 17th. It should be noted 1hat inmate was miding at ICC Qt the 
time. 
15:48 HOUSING CONCERNS 
- -· Offender E-llingtonmov~cl to H..-109 ftem·Medieah - ·- .... 
EU.INGTDN, JONATHANW ADE 83305 
Datt:: 02/14il01Z 14:04 ~~By: abladcl Page 4 o{ 12 
CIS/ClQVnun.ity Com:c:t!~j)OIIlri!FomUIOfferul~ 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 575 of 848
FEB/14/2012/TUE 05:57PM P. 008 
April 15. 2009 
__ ...,T=~~~ ... - --.. --- ...... ,.,...,_-==--=~!!!i: - .... _.,. _______ """~~.}..J:~L-~ ....... ?n.!!XE~----· 
14:26 CASE MANAGER. CONTACT mecarr 
Met with offenderBI~n to revieW his c:8.'5e plan with him. His PHD is 12131117,FIRD 12/30/30 and 
he is scbii!duled to .see the Board 6/17. He said he had just got baclc from the hospital for a burst 
appendix:. He said he is going to school for his GBD and has two tests left (Math &-. Writing). He has no 
DORs or detai.JJ.e.ta. lJe said he would like to take vocadonal classes once he completes his GED. 
Currently his Math T ABE is too low for Com Cumculmn so he will take a.a()ther T ABE test once he 
gets more wor~ in his Math class. He sa1d he is working in the warehouse, he had started thi.s job 
4/1/09. He said he is doing good at this time and has no qumions or concerns. 
-~""l,"":":.l...~~'="-------•----·,..,.~"':"'"....J:":"'~!. ..... _ '='=•n.,.., '"""'"'?"'" .... - ....... ~~1]i~~...$.E~e H ,. • 
08:31 CASE MANAGER CONTACT mecao: · - . 
June 03; 2009 
Spoke with offender Bllhl,gton in the pod. He said he is cu:rrently working irl the warehouse an,d going to 
school for his GBD. He said he should be taking his writing test around 6/9109. He 5aid that atter this, 
he should only have the math test left. He said he is doing good at this tinie and has no questiens or 
concerns. ' ' 
08:28 CASE MANAGER CONTACT mecarr 
July 14,2009 
Spoke w.ith offender Ellington in tho office while processing a mail-ont for him. He said he is· still 
working in the warehome. He said he has been there for about two moll'tb now. lie .sajd the job is 
going OK. .ae will be taking his writing ~t for his OED next week. He sa,ip thllt once lie aets paSt 1:llls · 
test he will only have the Math test to take and he will be done. He si!id that he had submitted a concern 
form requesting to be moved to I-pod if possible. He said things are going pretty good and he has no 
other questions or concerns. 
15;24 CASE MANAGER CONTACf mecarr 
Spoke with offandet Ellington in the office. He is still working :in the warehouse. He said that he did 
take his writing test fur his GED and has passed it. He said that he <Jnly bas the Math test 1e:ft .. S:e $Sid 
that .he ha.d.~nt .a. ~~ f.ll!:m. tQ lClQ tQ Ji~. if~ ~<2l!ld .~.moveg ll~Qll.l)._@ .h~ .ha& fam.ti:Y up _tl;lat yrey._.. .. . 
He said he is doing pretty good and has no questions or concerns at thia fune. 
ElliNGTON, JONATHAN WADE 83305 
Pate: fl2/1412012 14:04 P-. ~ of 12 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 576 of 848
-- ---·-------------------------------------------------
FEB/14/2012/TUE 05:58 PM P. 009 
09:52 HOUSn;JG CONCB:ENS mourtis 
Move request rer..eived. of:fun.der placed on waiting list fur IClO. 
15:10 CASBMANAGERCONTACT mecarr 
Offender bas been moved to caseload of Case Manager Moore efftctive 8/1/09. 
__ IUJt.~---.......-~~-~-.... =-~~~e;t .,. En~!;!tte_ ... __ _ 
17:20 WORKHlS!OlW 
:Fro.r.n: V ertrecs, Mariam 
Sent: friday, August 14, 2009 1:29PM 
To: Cm, Melissa 
Cc: Rodriguez. Norma 
Subject: :t.ilmate Jon Ellington 83305 H-109A 
Melissa, 
.mmoore 
Just thought you should know that Inmate Jon Ellington will terminate his employment mth the 
wareholl$e in two weeks on B/28/09, He w.ss hired in the ~ouse on 3-31-09. 
We have ¢Yen him e-vezy opportunity to learo. the warehouse procedures, but he seems .to have to be told. 
over and over again how to do simple wks.Whcm he ls called up on his mistakes, he always has an 
excuse that he was not taught' the proper way or it was someone 'elses falllt. :He wiU not take· 
responsiblity for his own !I.Ctions. · 
I had a di.scusSi()n with Mr. Ellington yesterday about the way he filled out an ls$Ue ticket (even though 
the job he was ooing did not even xequil'e an i.ssue ticket) ll.lld he blwed it on another-inmate saying t.h~t 
was the way that inmate did it. That is not tru<:. 
Mr. :Sllington oame to me this morning and said he was giving his two weeks notice and the 1·eason was 
that he thought I did not like him.He was alwaying getting in trouble for his mistakes but none of the 
othe:c woxkexs ever did when they made mistakes. We ha.ve alw11ys had high standards and expect the 
workers to take direction and learn the ptocedures for the warehouse. 
l beleive that people are sui~d for certain jobs ~~nd not for others. r think Mr. Ellington will be happier 
· m mioth~positiQI:i. · · · · · .. · · - · · · .. .. · · - · · · ...... • · ·-- ..... · · .... -- · · · ... · .... .. · .. · ... ·• 
ELLINGTON, JONATHAN WADE S330S 
Dale! 0211412012 14;04 Paga 6 of 12. 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 577 of 848
FEB/14/2012/iUE 05:58 PM 
Thank You. 
Mariam Vertrees 
ICC W.u-ehouse 
Phone: 208-331-2760 
Ext 2301 
Fax.: 208-331-276 
Mariam. Verrrees@oorrectionscorp.com 
August 15,2009 
P. 010 
!ilF~ ... -"fJ2! ___ ....._~ ..... =-··"""="""· . .,., _Ii.!!t--- ... ----............... ~~~~f.:e~Da~ -·. 
11:32 CASE MANAGER CONTACT mm.oore 
11 W8S just transferred on to my c~e load. "is currently worlcillg in the Warehotllle how=ver, he will be . 
done there in a.pptolcimate!y 2 weeks. "' is also working on his GJID studies. 11 does not have a Board 
date until 06/2017. 
September 17, 2009 
--~..!~~ .. ~~·-· ,_· _ ..... -----·-----_!'!gJ.............,..,._...,.,., ... " ........ ..,. ..... ~.,~~terine:,-1-.&~t. ,_ ..... inJD:.J2~--· 
17:07 RECLASSIFICATION mmoore 
Offwder conta.;ted and issued his scheduled reclass due 09/3012009. Cuneirt ctiSiody level is Medium. 
Offender scores 8 points, Medium Custody, and lam .recommending Medium CUstody. This has· been 
forwarded to the G~ification om~ for further processing. 
{7:10 .CASE MANAGER CONTAGT . .nunoore . 
. I met With A to ~sue his recia$sificatio.n. Work " is' still cuirently working in the WarehOl.lSei 
Education: ~'~is currently on his GED studies; PrQgrams: 1\ is not eligible to start p.rograms at this time. 
"has an issue with a charge that is listed in his PSI from 1978 and wanted tQ know what he needed to do 
to get this corrected, I have insttuctW " to meet with me and I would help him with this issue. No other 
concerns or issu.es were addressed at this tim~. · 
. . . . 
Septembe.r 25,2009 
-..li~! .. ~... ----- ---
12:08 PROGRAMMING 
Completed GED. 
El..LINGTON, JONATHAN WADE 
01118: 021141'2012 14;04 
__ .~;,.. ........................ """- , ... .,.~~~ A,e! ._ ... ..,..E,ngx,'Q~----· 
jboyd 
83305 
l'e8\\ 7 or 12 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 578 of 848
--- -·---· -·--- --------
FEB/14/2012/TUE 05:59 PM P. Oll 
November 11, 2009 
16:24 CASE'MANAGE.R CONTACT mmoo:re 
"was given the opportunity to do a 5 minute holiday video for Christmas. " declined this opportunity at 
tbill time. No issues or concerns were brought forth. 
December 18, 2009 
~---== .~ ..... ·.- ____ ..,Itt!=.. ____ .. __ ~ ...... -.-...,.._.,.~!';t~~~e. .. _.,En&l2a~. 
16:13 CASBMANAGERCONTACT mmoore 
I made coutact with " on H -pod when I delivered cookies to him. These cookies were baked by the 
Ladies in the LDS Church to be delivered to the Offenders housed here at ICC. No issues or concerns 
were disCl1Ssed at this time. 
January 06, 2010 
14:40 HOUSIN"G CONCERNS mecm 
Offender Ellington moved from H~l09A (Moore) to H·213A (Carr). 
~:-;-. .!YJle . ~ .... , ... ----.--~,..!!Vt------~~~~~~ ... ~~~E~t: .. , ... 
16:37 CASE MANAGER CONTACT mecarr 
Spolte with offender allingt.Cltl on the pod. He said he is working (warehouse) and he did complete his 
GED. He said he is doing good, thinks it should. work out good with his new celly. and he has ~o 
questions ox conDemS at this time. · · 
!~~ ..... TJ:V --~.~~--=-~~--":':"-~~=,., c;~~.:~ ... ~~ .. ~~~L-----i.U!t2~tc--.. 
15:48 CASEMANAGERCONTACT mecarr 
Spoke with offende.;- on the pod while distributing a memo xegarding the stomach £J:u. He said he is 
doing OK at this time and noted that there are no changes in his current status. He ha.d no questions or 
concerns .. 
ELLlNOTON~ JONATHAN WADE 83305 
Dale: !)2.1)4/2012 \4;04 fogs B. of l2 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 579 of 848
FEB/14/2012/TUE 05:59PM P, 012 
March 02,2010 
--..... ~~·-· !~. ---~---- .. -~-==-~~» .. ..,.I!~.--.~·-- .. ----~!:$~!...--~~~-~!~~---· 
15:45 CASEMANAG:ER CONTACT mecarr 
Spoke with o~der Ellington in the Wlit office. :He said he wanted to check in for the new month. He 
said there are no changes m hts work status, he is currently working in the warehouse. He is not taking 
any classes at this time. He hld some questioD! relating to recluses and the .lock-in/lock-out policy. He 
feels that as workers they should get better treatment and fee13 that it is being run like a maximum 
seCUJ:ity prison. He said thore is some progJ:ess m his case and. it is possible that he may get llllother trial. 
He had no other quesdo;ns or concerns at this time. 
Tilp_! , I~-----= -~-~"""""""""""""'""J~e __ _ _____ .]!:l~,a~t._,_...,E~_!!e,._=~--
17:58 CASE MANAGER CONTACI' mecan 
. Spol.<e with offender in the tl!rit· He is still working in the warehouse. he has been there for 1 year today.· 
He is not takiJ1i any classes but he will be attending the graduation for his GBD. He had coroplered his 
OED l.n Septembar of2009. He had some questions relating to the new classification system and the 
placement matrix CUJ.TeDtly .in effect. At this time he has a long tail on his senttenoe. Hf) said that he may 
be getting a new trial on his case and feels pretty good that it will take place. He said overall he is doing 
OK and has no other ques1ions or con(:ems. 
!tm.~ ... 'IJP:-..... ------......~,...,....-., ___ ._}'.i~!!......,. -~ .. ·-- --- ...... -~~t.. ............... ~~~-..---
14:57 CASE MANAGER CONTACT mecB.tT 
1une 26, 2010 
Spob -Mth offender Ellington on the pod. There are no .uew chilD8es at this time. He is still working 
but not taking any classes. He said be is doing pretty good and has no questions or concerns to note :J.t 
this moment 
15:44 CASE MANAGER CONTACT jegerdne 
Met with offender who stated he is still working ill the warehouse and doing well at this time. He is not 
in claB3es andb.As a pathway of#5 but will not see boMd or boiin prog.tllnliiling untjl2017. lcmate said 
he had no questions for me at this time. · 
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FEB/14/20t2/TUE 06:00 PM P. 0!3 
June 30, 2010 
....... ..:_!~!,. --------····--·"""-~~~-~-~~~ . .!?~-~.-. ........ ~ 
17:40 GENERAL CONTACT Jesardne 
July 24, 2010 
!~;.-~-===---=-=-.......,...., ~ _.....,.....,_,}'!~ ............... _____ ,.,.PitJ!ir!l.ha~L--_,....!a..~]~~--=--.,.--. 
15:51 CASE MANAGER CONTACT jega{du,e 
Met with offender who is still working. lie states nothing ever changes, and he is doing well and had no 
--·-- questions for me. 
1.5:52 . POSITIVE jegardne 
Received piX£a be~a.use the tier was judged cleanest in contest. 
15:23 CASE MANAGER CONTACT d.hudon 
. . 
Offender face to face contact: He claims to be curtently enroJled in: Education Class; NONE V orified; 
YES, .Program; NONE Verified; YES, Current work Msignment; WAREHOUSE, Veri£td; YES. I 
asked if be bas any concerns al this time rega(diog: Facility; NONE, Personal; NONE. Medical; 'NONE, 
Psychological; NONE. Case Plan f Pathways: NONE, I would rate the O:ffe.nders current Pernea.nor and 
I. or Attitude as OK. Offender asked 'for OR was issued the following Facility, Release Planning or 
Parole Hearing FOllDS.NONB. Reviewed aDd /or modified o:ffe.nde;rs case plan /:Pathways goals in 
CIS/OMP to reflect current need& and ANY recent accomplishments? NO. Any pertinent relell$e 
pla.nniiJg issues NONE. 
October 29, 2010· 
Ii.!n!, ~~......,.,. ...... ....,........,.......,.=-=~-= .. ..,.,.., ........ !.!!~.A,. .... _ ........ , .. ,,.,_ .... ,..._'l"_Enterinu.&~L .... ---!n,nQa,.te . __ ,..... 
16:25 CASE MANAGER CONTACI' dhudon · 
Offender !ace to face contact: He clalm8 to be Q\liiently enroll~ in: EQucation Class; NO:NE Verified; 
YES, Program; NONE Verified; YES, C1.U't8nt work assignment; W ARBHOUSB, Verified; YES. I 
as.lred if he has any concerns at this time rep,rd.ioi: Facility; NONE, Personal; NONE, Medical; NONE, 
. Psychological; NO~ Case :Plan I Pathways: NON.B;r would rate the Offendem current Demeanor and 
I or Attitude as OK. Offender asked for OR was issued the following Facility, Releallo Pla.u.tling or 
:Parole Zearing Forms NONE. Reviewed and/or modified offenden; case plan I Pathways goals in 
CIS/O:MP to reflect cummt needs and ANY n:cent accoxnplishtnents? NON:S. Any peJ:tin.ent release . 
. plalmingissu.esNONE .... -.- . . - ......... -- .... - -· .. ·. .. ·· · ··- • •· · 
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FEB/!4/2012/TUE 06:00PM P, 014 
M.~t~rin~enJ .,. ___ Jin,&~~~-~--· 
16:19 CASE MANAGER CONTACf dhudon 
Offender face to face contact IN W .AR.EHOUSB: He claims to be C\lllently en,rolled m: Education Class; 
NONE Verified; YES~ Progrsm; NONE Verified; YES, Current work assignment; WAREHOUSE, 
Verified; YES. I asked if he has 8JYJ concerns at this time regarding: Facility; NONE, PeJ:Soual; NONE, 
Medical; NONE, Psychological; NONE, Case Plan /l'athways: NONE, I would rate the Offenders, 
current Demeanor t.nd/ or Attitude as OK. Offender asked for OR was issued the following Facility, 
Release :Planning or Parole Hearing F oiJDS NONE. Reviewed and /or modified o:ffenden; case plan I 
Pathways goals in C!SIOW to reflect current needs and ANY .:ece.nt aocomplishments? NONE. luly 
pertinent release planning issues NONE. 
March 08, 2011 
Tim:__~----~ ...... -~ .............. _____ !U!i,._"'"\..,..,~~~- ~~tl;rintl.t-~!..- ......... i,n~E~-· 
17:00 CASEMANAGERCONTACf dhudon 
Offender face to face contact: 3/812011 FOR CASE PLAN REVIBW. 
¥ Cl.ll.UlliNT HOUSING: H213A 
¥PHD; 6/2017 TPD; NIA PED; 12131/17 FI'RD; 12/30/30 
¥ :NEXTRE-CLASS; 7/31111 OFFEDNE.R IS CURRENTLY MEDIUM CUSTOPY. 
¥Cue Plan I Pathways Issues: NONE, AT TBlS TIME, Assigned pathway is 5 . 
¥He claims to be ClliDmtly eJJ,I,'olled in: 
¥:Education Class; NONE, AT nfiS UME, Verified in tho sys~m; YES, 
¥ Progwn; NONE, AT THIS TIME, Verified in system; YES, 
¥ Current work assigmnent ia; W AltBHOUSE. Vetitied in system; YES. 
I asked if he has any concerns at this time re;iatding the following areas: 
¥Facility Issues; NONE, AT TElS 'l'IME, 
¥ Pmo.nalissues; NONE, AT THIS TIME, 
¥Medical Isaues; NONE, A1 TH!S TIME, 
¥Psychological Issues; · NONE, AT THIS TlM'.E, 
¥I would rat~ the O~ers current D~eanor and I or Attitude as OK. 
¥ Offender asked for OR was issg.er;i the following Facility 1 Release Plaillling or PBJ:ole Heas;ing F 01lilil 
NONE, AT TBIS riME. 
¥Reviewed and /or modified offenders case plan I Pathways goals in ClS/OMP to reflect current needs · 
and ANY recent accomplishments'? NONE, AT THIS TIME. 
¥Any ~ent ;telease planning issues NONE, AT 'THIS 100. 
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- ·- ------
FEB/14/2012/TUE 06:01 PM P. 015 
April 30, 2011 
17:00 CASE MANAGER CONTACT dbudon 
Offenders name was posted in the unit hallway and on the pod to come see me in my office for a period 
4/15/ll 4!30111, he failed to do so tbis is 11 considered as unwilling to participate in the case 
mailagement process. Offendet MAY have had an incidental or general contact tbat was not docwnenttd 
as it was not Case Plan related. 
15:19 CASE MANAGER CONTACT dhudan 
Offender face to flc~ contact 5/l8/20ll FOR CASE PLAN REVlEW. 
¥CURRENT HOUSING: H213A 
¥PHD; 6/2017 TPD; N/A :Pm>; 12/31/2017 FTRD• 12130/2030 
~ 12 months DOR FREE: YES, Last DOR 0 was a Class 0 
¥NEXT RE-CLASS; 7/31120110PPENDBR IS CUR.REN'i"LY MEDIUM CUSTODY. 
¥Case Plan I Pa1hways Issues: NONE, AT THIS TtM:B, Assigned pathway is 5 
¥Offender needs the following Assessments NONE, AT THIS TIME 
¥ R.oviewed and /or modified offender$ case plan I Pathways goals in CIS/OMY to reflect current needs 
and ANY recent accomplisbment!i? NONE, AT THIS Tllv.tE. 
¥He claims to be currently enrolled in: 
¥Education Class; NONE, AT THIS Tl:Ml!, Veri:tiod in the system; YES, 
¥Program; NONE, AT TinS 'ru4E, Verified in system; Y.BS, 
. ¥Current work assignment~; w AR.EHOUSE, Verified in system; YES. 
·l asked if he has any concerns at this time reprding the; following areas: 
¥Facility Issues; NONE, AT 'tHIS TIME> 
¥Personal Issues; NONE, AT TillS TIME, 
¥ Mewcal Issu.ca; NONE, AT THIS TIME, 
¥Psychological Issues; NONE, AT l'EIS TIME, 
¥ r would rate the Offenders cmrent Demeanor and I o• AttitQde as OK. 
¥Offender asked for OR was issued tbe: following Facility, Release Planning or PIITOle Hearing Forms 
NONE, AT THIS TIME. 
¥Any pe.rtinent release pl~g issues NONE, AT TIUS TIME. 
ELLINGTON, JONATHAN WADE 83:305 
Date; 02/141201214:04 P~~ 1.1. of 12 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 33843 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
) Boise, April 2011 Term 
:) 
) 2011 Opinion No. 68 
) 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON, 
) Filed: May 27, 2011 
) 
Defendant.:.Appellant. 
) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
) 
) 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the 
State ofldaho, Kootenai County.' Hon. John P. Luster, District Judge. 
The decision of the district court denying the motion for new trial 
is reversed. The conviction and sentence are vacated and the case 
is remanded to the district court for a new trial. 
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 
Erik R. Lehtinen argued. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 
Mark W. Olson argued. 
W. JONES, Justice 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Jonathan Ellington appeals from his convictions for one count of second-degree murder 
and two counts of aggravated battery. He argues on appeal that prosecutorial misconduct, 
evidentiary errors, a biased jury, and the cumulative-error doctrine entitle him to a new trial. We 
find merit in several of Mr. Ellington's assignments of error at trial, but we grant a new trial to 
Mr. Ellington on the basis that the district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Ellington's 
motion for new trial brought after evidence came to light that the State's sole rebuttal witness, 
Fred Rice, an Idaho State Police officer, provided false testimony at trial that went to the 
defense's sole theory of the case. 
1 
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
At about 11:00 a.m. on January 1, 2006, Mr. Ellington left his friend Ron Cunningham's 
house in Athol, Idaho, to go back home. While driving, he came upon a white Honda Accord, 
driven by Jovon Larsen, age 22, with her sister Joleen, 18, in the passenger seat. Mr. Ellington 
claims the girls were playing "cat and mouse" with him, attempting to cut him off, and that they 
flipped him off. Joleen claims that they were not cutting Mr. Ellington off, and Jovon maintains 
that they did not flip off Mr. Ellington. Mr. Ellington passed the Honda in his Chevy Blazer, and 
at the next stop sign, got out of his car, approached the Honda that was now stopped behind him, 
and yelled and cursed at the girls and hit the driver's side window. 1 
The girls called 911 and began following Mr. Ellington because there were no license 
plates on his vehicle and they wanted the police to be able to track him. After a short while, Mr. 
Ellington made aU-tum on the road and faced the girls, driving into their lane and then swerving 
back into the correct lane, passing them going the other way. Joleen testified that as Mr. 
Ellington went by them he flipped them off and mouthed an expletive at them. The girls turned 
around to continue to follow Mr. Ellington but were unable to catch up with him, and he went 
back home. 
The girls decided to stop and wait for an officer from the sheriff's department to arrive, 
as they were instructed to do by the 911 operator, and then called their parents, Joel and Vonette 
Larsen, who arrived about fifteen minutes later. The deputy sheriff arrived and then left again to 
investigate, and Mr. and Mrs. Larsen went the other way to look for Mr. Ellington in their 
Subaru. While driving along the road, Mr. and Mrs. Larsen saw the Blazer drive out of an 
adjacent driveway and back onto the road, and they began to follow it. As the Blazer and the 
Subaru turned the comer that Joleen and Jovon were waiting at, the girls pulled the Honda out 
behind the Blazer but in front of their parents in the Subaru. 2 At the same time, Joleen placed 
another call to 911. The girls were going about ninety miles per hour and Mr. Ellington was 
probably going about a hundred miles per hour. Mr. Ellington turned onto Scarcello Road, going 
westbound, and both the girls in the Honda and Mr. and Mrs. Larsen in the Subaru continued to 
1 Since Mr. Ellington did not testify at trial, most of the factual background in the record on appeal was provided by 
the State's witnesses. Particularly, the only description of the altercation and ensuing chase was the trial testimony 
of Mr. Larsen, Jovon and Joleen. We understand by the argument made by Mr. Ellington in his briefing to this 
Court that the facts regarding how the incident began and progressed are contested by Mr. Ellington. 
2 Joleen also claims that Mr. Ellington again flipped them off when he drove by. 
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chase him. Although the 911 dispatcher told the girls to be careful, that Mr. Ellington was likely 
driving fast because he was scared, and to stop following the Blazer once they told her they were 
going ninety miles an hour, the girls did not stop. 3 
Mr. Ellington made a left tum into a driveway on the south side of Scarcella Road, 
apparently intending to reverse his direction, where he skidded onto a snowbank. The Subaru 
then passed the Honda, coming into the (incorrect) eastbound lane of traffic. Mr. Larsen has 
testified inconsistently as to whether he was attempting to block the Blazer in, or whether he was 
attempting to block the Blazer from hitting the Honda. On direct examination, Mr. Larsen 
testified: "I told the wife, I go get around the girls and block him from hitting the girls, because 
he's already threatened the girls, he ran them off the road, I wanted to protect my girls." In 
contrast, Deputy William Klinkefus testified that when he interviewed Mr. Larsen upon arriving 
at the scene, Mr. Larsen told him that he "was able to park his vehicle behind the Jimmy in an 
attempt to block him in so that they could wait for law enforcement to get there." 4 
Mr. Ellington reversed back out of the snowbank and was now pointed back east. As Mr. 
Ellington was attempting to drive away eastbound down Scarcella Road, the Blazer made contact 
with the front of the Larsens' Subaru which was still slowly moving toward the Blazer, 
seemingly blocking most of the eastbound lane. Acceleration marks suggest that Mr. Ellington 
was attempting to swerve around the Subaru. The expert testimony at trial also tended to show 
that the impact with the Subaru caused the Blazer to rotate somewhat in a counterclockwise 
direction, so that the Blazer was pointing across the road toward where the Honda was in the 
westbound lane, instead of pointing toward its initial path eastbound. 5 After making contact 
with the Subaru, the Blazer continued past the Subaru and impacted the front left comer of the 
Honda which was located mostly in the opposite, westbound lane. 6 
3 After the 911 operator told Joleen that the police officer "wants you to pull over and not-not follow him at that 
speed, okay?" Joleen responded, "Well we want to keep our-we can slow down. That's not a problem. We just 
want to see where he turns when he gets on 41." 
4 Mr. Larsen explained this discrepancy in his statements at trial as a result of him not being properly able to 
articulate what he meant, which was that he was attempting to "block" Mr. Ellington from hitting his daughters' car. 
5 Mr. Larsen testified that after the Blazer impacted the Subaru, Mr. Ellington "could have left, he could have went 
straight and left" but that instead he turned around the Subaru and accelerated toward the Honda. 
6 While Jovon maintained during her testimony at trial that they were completely in the westbound lane, even the 
State's accident reconstructionist testified that the scuff marks over the centerline of the road indicated that the front 
of the Honda extended at least twelve to seventeen inches over the center line. 
3 
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After the impact, the Blazer rode up onto the Honda, and the Blazer pushed the Honda 
across the road and into the shoulder on the opposite side. Mr. Larsen then grabbed his .44 
Magnum revolver from under his seat in the Subaru and got out of the passenger side of the car 
to run toward the Blazer, right around the time it was backing up and disengaging from the 
Honda. At the same ·time, Mrs. Larsen got out of the Subaru and ran toward the Honda. Mr. 
Larsen approached the passenger side of the Blazer around the same time that Mr. Ellington put 
the Blazer into drive. Mr. Larsen initially leveled his gun at Mr. Ellington from right outside the 
Blazer's passenger window, and then because he did not want to hit his daughters, fired a shot 
that traveled through the front-quarter passenger-side panel of the Blazer, allegedly attempting to 
hit the motor. 
Mrs. Larsen was running across the road in front of Mr. Ellington, attempting to get to 
her daughters, and as Mr. Ellington punched the gas, she put her hands up and started to move 
back toward the middle of the road. Mrs. Larsen was struck by Mr. Ellington, which caused her 
body to come down on the hood of the Blazer before falling to the road. Once she fell to the 
road, the tires of the Blazer ran over her head and torso, causing catastrophic injuries that 
resulted in her death. Mr. Ellington left the scene and went back to the Cunningham residence, 
where he had been earlier in the day, and was eventually arrested there after police officers 
spotted his car. 
Mr. Ellington was charged with two counts of aggravated battery for hitting the Honda, 
and one count of second-degree murder for Mrs. Larsen's death. At Mr. Ellington's first 
preliminary hearing, the magistrate found that there was not sufficient evidence to bind Mr. 
Ellington over for second-degree murder or for the aggravated batteries at issue here. The State 
then dismissed the original charges and refiled them under a new case. At the second 
preliminary hearing before a different magistrate Mr. Ellington was bound over on all charges. 
On March 23, 2006, Mr. Ellington filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the evidence adduced at 
the second preliminary hearing was not sufficient to hold him for trial. The court denied the 
motion, finding no abuse of discretion by the magistrate, while noting at least in the case of the 
aggravated battery counts, 
a serious question is present in this case as to whether Mr. Ellington was trying to 
escape a volatile situation or whether he intentionally brought harm to the girls or 
acted willfully in crashing into their car. In this court's opinion that is a question 
for a jury to resolve. 
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Jury selection occurred on Tuesday August 22, 2006, and the next day the State began to present 
its case-in-chief, which lasted seven days, from Wednesday, August 23, until Thursday, August 
31. After the State rested, the defense moved for an acquittal on all charges under I.C.R. 29. 
Although the motion was denied, the district court granted it as to the "express malice" theory of 
second-degree murder, finding that a reasonable juror could not find, based on the evidence 
presented, that Mr. Ellington intentionally and deliberately took Mrs. Larsen's life away. 
However, the court allowed the case to go to the jury on the theory that Mr. Ellington acted with 
"implied malice." 
The defense presented its case-in-chief over the course of three days, and the State then 
presented its single rebuttal witness, Corporal Fred Rice, to rebut the testimony of the defense's 
accident reconstruction expert, Dr. William Skelton. The jury deliberated for about a day and a 
half before returning their verdict that Mr. Ellington was guilty of two counts of aggravated 
battery and one count of second-degree murder. Mr. Ellington was sentenced to twenty-five 
years with twelve years fixed for the second-degree murder conviction, and fifteen years with 
seven years fixed for each aggravated battery charge, to be served concurrently. The Judgment 
and Sentence was filed on December 14, 2006, and Mr. Ellington timely filed a notice of appeal 
on January 4, 2007. 
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the State act improperly in four alleged acts of prosecutorial misconduct, including a 
comment on Mr. Ellington's post-arrest silence and the use of inflammatory language in 
questioning witnesses? 
2. Did the district court make evidentiary errors in failing to strike the word "homicide" 
from an exhibit, admitting the opinion testimony of Trooper Daly, and allowing the 
pathologist to testify? 
3. Were Mr. Ellington's due-process rights violated when three prospective jurors that were 
not impaneled expressed their opinions of Mr. Ellington's guilt during voir dire? 
4. Were the errors at trial harmless, and did the accumulation of errors in the trial deprive 
Mr. Ellington of a fair trial? 
5. Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Ellington's motion for new trial 
based on newly-discovered evidence that the State's sole rebuttal witness testified 
inconsistently in a previous trial and may have perjured himself in Mr. Ellington's trial? 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
5 
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Mr. Ellington assigns four distinct instances of prosecutorial misconduct: an Improper 
comment on his post-arrest silence, questions to two witnesses designed to inflame the jury, and 
fraud upon the court in the offer of the testimony of the pathologist. 
1. Standard of Review 
Where a defendant alleges error at trial that he had contemporaneously objected to, this 
Court reviews the error on appeal under the harmless error test. State v. Perry, 150 P.3d 209, 
227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). When the alleged error is prosecutorial misconduct, first the 
defendant must demonstrate that prosecutorial misconduct occurred, and then the Court must 
declare a belief beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct did not contribute to the jury's 
verdict, in order to find that the error was harmless and not reversible. !d. at 227-28, 245 P.2d 
979-80. 
2. The State Improperly Commented on Mr. Ellington's Post-Arrest Silence 
Mr. Ellington argues that the prosecutor acted improperly in allegedly commenting on 
Mr. Ellington's post-arrest silence through the questioning of a detective witness during the 
State's case-in-chief. On direct examination of the State's witness Sergeant Brad Maskell of the 
Kootenai County Sherriffs Department, when asking about Sergeant Maskell's arrival at the 
location on Scarcella Road where Mr. Ellington was apprehended after the incident, the 
prosecutor proceeded with the following line of questioning: 
Q. At the time that you got there and he was in the back of that patrol car, was he under 
arrest? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And so you did not interview him? 
A. I attempted to. 
Mr. Ellington alleges that this was an improper comment on Mr. Ellington's post-arrest 
silence. The State argues that the prosecutor specifically asked the question, "And so you did not 
interview him" in a leading way, to avoid any comment on silence and therefore there was no 
improper comment by the prosecutor himself. In denying Mr. Ellington's motion for mistrial 
that was made immediately following this line of questioning, the district court found that "[i]n 
this particular case I don't think there is a sufficient showing to satisfy the court that it was the 
government's manifest intention to do that which has occurred here in terms of any inference 
that could be drawn," and as a result there was no misconduct. 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as well as Article I, 
section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, guarantee a criminal defendant the right not to be compelled 
6 
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to testify against himself. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Idaho Const. art I, § 13. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has interpreted this right also to bar the prosecution from commenting on a 
defendant's invocation ofthat.right. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-14, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 
1232-33 (1965). In the case of post-arrest silence, the U.S. Supreme Court has provided 
guidance as to when and how that silence can and cannot be used by the State at trial. First, 
because of the pr~mise present in a Miranda warning, 7 a prosecutor may not use evidence of 
post-arrest, post-Miranda silence for either impeachment, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 
S. Ct. 2240, 2245 (1976), or as substantive evidence of guilt in the State's case-in-chief, 
Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292, 106 S. Ct. 634, 639 (1986). A prosecutor may use 
evidence of pre-Miranda silence, either pre- or post-arrest, for impeachment of the defendant. 
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 628-29, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1716-17 (1993) (pre-arrest, pre-
Miranda silence may be used for impeachment); Weir v. Fletcher, 455 U.S. 603, 607, 102 S. Ct. 
1309, 1312 (1982) (post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence may be used for impeachment). The U.S. 
Supreme Court has not spoken as to whether post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence may be used as 
evidence of substantive guilt, and the federal Circuits are currently split on the issue. 8 However, 
this Court has held that a defendant's right to remain silent attaches upon custody, not arrest or 
interrogation, and thus a prosecutor may not use any post-custody silence to infer guilt in its 
7 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1996) established that statements made by a defendant in 
response to interrogation while in police custody cannot be admitted at trial unless the defendant was informed of 
the right to consult with an attorney and the right to remain silent, and that the defendant not only understood these 
rights but voluntarily waived them. 
8 The Seventh, Ninth and D.C. Circuits hold that substantive commentary on a defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda 
silence violates a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (en bane) ("post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence cannot be admitted into evidence in the government's case in 
chief); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 386 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("It simply cannot be the case that a citizen's 
protection against self-incrimination only attaches when officers recite a certain litany of his rights."); United States 
v. Hernandez, 948 F.2d 316, 322-23 (7th Cir. 1991) (silence pre-Miranda cannot be used in the government's case 
in chief). The Second Circuit has assumed, without expressly deciding, that the use of pre-Miranda silence is 
impermissible. United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.l981) (holding without discussion that pre-
Miranda silence could not be used in the State's case-in-chief but finding the error harmless). The First and Sixth 
Circuits have gone even further and held that using pre-arrest silence can violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment 
rights. Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 280-83 (6th Cir. 2000); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1567-68 (1st Cir. 
1989). The Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that it does not violate a defendant's Fourth Amendment 
rights to use post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence. United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d II 02, 1109-11 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(admission of testimony on defendant's pre-Miranda silence is not error); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 
1568 (11th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir. 1985) (same). The Fifth Circuit 
has not yet ruled on the issue. United States v. Salinas, 480 F.3d 750, 759 (5th Cir. 2007) (addressing post-arrest, 
pre-Miranda silence issue, and stating, "[b ]ecause this circuit's law remains unsettled and the other federal circuits 
have reached divergent conclusions on this issue, even assuming that the prosecutor's comments were improper, [the 
defendant] cannot satisfy the second prong of the plain error test-that the error be clear under existing law"). 
7 
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case-in-chief. State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 820-21, 965 P.2d 174, 180-81 (1997). From the 
record, it is unclear whether Mr. Ellington was Mirandized at the time Sergeant Maskell 
"attempted to" intervi'ew him. However, from Sergeant Maskell's testimony, he was certainly in 
custody and under arrest at that time, and thus under this Court's holding in Moore, his right to 
silence was protected. 
This Court also held in Moore that "[t]he constitutional right against self-incrimination is 
not absolute ... and applies only when the silence is used solely for the purpose of implying 
guilt." Moore, 131 Idaho at 821, 965 P.2d at 181; see also State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 701, 
132 P.3d 455, 458 (Ct. App. 2005) ("A defendant's decision to exercise his or her right to remain 
silent, whether before or after arrest and Miranda warnings, cannot be used for the purpose of 
inferring guilt."); State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 959, 231 P.3d 1047, 1056 (Ct. App. 2010) ("A 
defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent concerning an alleged offense may not be used 
by the State at trial in order to raise an inference of guilt."); accord Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 
756, 764-65, 107 S. Ct. 3102, 3108 (1987) ("The fact of Miller's postarrest silence was not 
submitted to the jury as evidence from which it was allowed to draw any permissible inference, 
and thus no Doyle violation occurred in this case."). Because defense counsel moved for a 
mistrial immediately after Sergeant Maskell's answer here, it is unclear what the prosecutor's 
line of questioning regarding the fact that Mr. Ellington was not interviewed at that time was 
being used to establish. However, the jury was likely to infer that the reason Sergeant Maskell 
only "attempted" to interview Mr. Ellington rather than actually interviewing him was because 
he chose to invoke his right to remain silent once he was put under arrest. 
The prosecutor represented to the district court that he phrased the question to Sergeant 
Maskell in a leading way in order to avoid a comment on Mr. Ellington's silence. However, the 
State cannot provide any reason why it was at all relevant to ask the question to Sergeant 
Maskell to begin with, whether it was crafted in a leading way or not. The fact that Mr. 
Ellington was not interviewed by the police was simply unnecessary testimony, and the only 
conclusion this Court can come to is that the prosecutor or Sergeant Maskell was attempting to, 
and did, draw attention to Mr. Ellington's post-arrest silence. Further, the State's argument that 
it was Sergeant Maskell that commented on Mr. Ellington's silence, and therefore the prosecutor 
was not responsible for what Sergeant Maskell said, is unavailing. Sergeant Maskell is an officer 
with the Kootenai County Sherriffs Department, and therefore a representative of the State. To 
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hold that a prosecutor may elicit prejudicial answers or comments on a defendant's silence from 
State officers acting as witnesses by later claiming that the officer and not the prosecutor himself 
supplied the prejudicial answer, would undermine the purpose of the rules barring misconduct 
during trial by superficially allowing the prosecutor to shift the blame to the State's own 
representative. As a representative of the State, Sergeant Maskell had the same duty as the 
prosecutor not to improperly comment on Mr. Ellington's silence. Even more, when an officer 
of the State gives any unsolicited testimony that is gratuitous and prejudicial to the defendant, 
that testimony will be imputed to the State for the purposes of determining prosecutorial 
misconduct. Sergeant Maskell's comment on Mr. Ellington's silence may not have been 
specifically solicited by the prosecutor, but it was undoubtedly both gratuitous and prejudicial to 
Mr. Ellington. Further, there was absolutely no reason for the prosecutor to engage in this line of 
questioning in the first place, particularly given that he clearly knew the line of questioning 
would create a high risk of an improper comment on Mr. Ellington's silence. Therefore, we hold 
that there was misconduct. 
3. The Prosecutor Engaged in Misconduct by Inflaming the Jury in (1) Eliciting an 
Unnecessary and Prejudicial Response from a Witness Regarding the Disturbing 
Nature of the Crime and (2) Repeatedly Using Versions of the Phrase "ran over 
your wife" in Questioning Mr. Larsen 
Mr. Ellington alleges that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by (1) eliciting a 
response from a witness that he had only worked at his job for two months because the crime had 
disturbed him so much and (2) repeatedly stating that Mr. Ellington "ran over" Mr. Larsen's wife 
while questioning Mr. Larsen, because this conduct was calculated to inflame the passions and 
prejudices of the jury. "While our system of criminal justice is adversarial in nature, and the 
prosecutor is expected to be diligent and leave no stone untumed, he is nevertheless expected and 
required to be fair." State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273,285 (2007) (quoting State 
v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427-28, 725 P.2d 128, 132-33 (1986)). However, in reviewing 
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct the Court must keep in mind the realities of trial. !d. A 
fair trial is not necessarily a perfect trial. !d. 
In questioning Eric Hartmann, the forensic audio analyst who enhanced the 911 audio 
recording of the incident, the prosecutor asked: "Can you tell us, please, why you only worked at 
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RMIN for two months?"9 Mr. Hartmann answered: "The simple answer is this case in particular 
left me with the inability to sleep and I decided that-" The defense objected to the answer, and 
the objection was sustained and the response stricken. Mr. Hartmann then stated, without being 
asked a question: "So I had some trouble with this case." The prosecution next asked: "After 
you worked on this particular recording you decided not to work for RMIN anymore?" to which 
Mr. Hartmann answered, "That's correct." The defense objected on the ground of relevance, was 
overruled, and after cross-examining Mr. Hartmann, moved for a mistrial based on prosecutorial 
misconduct in asking and answering the question regarding why Mr. Hartmann had only worked 
at RMIN for such a short time. On appeal, Mr. Ellington argues that "there was absolutely no 
proper purpose for [the prosecutor] to have posed the question that he did," and that this 
"smacked of an improper attempt to once again influence the jury with an emotional appeal." 
The State argues that the question and answer were relevant and thus proper in order to explain 
that Mr. Hartmann's short time working on the case was "not because of poor performance or for 
a reason related to his ability to do his job well." It also argues that even if the question and 
answer was prejudicial, it "was not so inflammatory as to cause the jury to determine guilt on 
factors outside the evidence," because the "gruesome and tragic nature of what happened was 
well documented and clearly before the jury in various forms of evidence and testimony." 
"[A ]ppeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory 
tactics are impermissible." State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. App. 
2007); see also State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 942, 877 P.2d 905, 913 (1994) (holding that the 
un-objected to statements made by the prosecutor did not "indicate an intent on the part of the 
prosecuting attorney to inflame the minds of the jurors or to arouse passion or prejudice against 
[the defendant], nor were they so inflammatory that the jurors might be influenced to determine 
guilt on factors outside the evidence," and thus there was no misconduct). In Field, this Court 
found that the prosecutor's question to a witness about a previous investigation was improper 
because "[c]learly the testimony the State was attempting to elicit from [the witness] was highly 
prejudicial and irrelevant in this case." Field, 144 Idaho at 572, 165 P .3d at 286 
We find that the testimony the prosecutor was attempting to elicit from Mr. Hartmann 
was similarly highly prejudicial and irrelevant. While the prosecution here claims that the 
9 RMIN is the Rocky Mountain Information Network, a govemment funded company that contracts with law 
enforcement for various media related services. 
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question was relevant to rebut anticipated impeachment or attacks on Mr. Hartmann's character 
by the defense by attempting to establish that Mr. Hartmann was not fired for poor performance, 
a witness's credibility and character may not be supported before it has been attacked. I.R.E. 
608(a), (b); Pierson v. Brooks, 115 Idaho 529, 532-34, 768 P.2d 792, 795-97 (Ct. App. 1989) 
(holding that testimony supporting the witness's character for truthfulness was improperly 
admitted on re-direct examination because there was no attack on the witness's credibility or 
character during cross-examination). Even more, the length of Mr. Hartmann's employment was 
only before the jury because the prosecutor had intentionally elicited that testimony from him. 
As with its comment on Mr. Ellington's silence, the prosecution never should have gone down 
the road of questioning Mr. Hartmann about his length of employment knowing full well that it 
ended with another prejudicial reflection on the disturbing nature of the incident. The testimony 
regarding why Mr. Hartmann had only worked at RMIN for two months was irrelevant at this 
point in the testimony. The district court sustained the objection to this answer, implicitly 
acknowledging the low or non-existent probative value and highly prejudicial nature of the 
answer. Thus, as the district court noted, the testimony "was unnecessarily elicited here from the 
witness." Thus, we find that there was prosecutorial misconduct. 
Mr. Ellington's next assignment of misconduct concerns the questioning of Mr. Larsen. 
During this questioning, the prosecutor asked four questions in a row that included a version of 
the phrase "ran over your wife" in order to apparently establish whether Mr. Ellington was in the 
wrong lane of travel when Mrs. Larsen was hit. These included the colorful phrases "After he 
got done running over your wife," "How long after-he ran over your wife," "After he got done 
running over your wife," and "How long-after he got done running over her," all asked one 
after the other. After defense counsel objected and the prosecutor was told by the court to "move 
on," the prosecutor immediately asked again what Mr. Larsen did "after Mr. Ellington ran over 
your wife." Mr. Ellington argues that the prosecutor's "intentional, gratuitous references to Mr. 
Larsen's wife having been run over were calculated to, and did, appeal to the emotions of the 
jurors, and as such, constituted misconduct." We agree. 
The State argues that "[t]he fact that Ellington ran over Mr. Larsen's wife was an 
undisputed fact of this case," and that therefore "the focus of the repeated statements was not on 
the fact that Mr. Ellington ran over Mr. Larsen's wife, but that he ran her over in the wrong 
lane-indicating that he intentionally ran her over." It may be true that the prosecutor was 
11 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 594 of 848
attempting to establish whether Mr. Ellington was in the wrong lane or not. However, the 
prosecutor could have very easily made the same points and elicited the exact same testimony 
from Mr. Larsen by phrasing the questions in a less inflammatory way. Repeatedly reiterating 
the image of Mr. Ellington "run.11ing over" Mr. Larsen's "wife" was wholly unnecessary. While 
a prosecutor "may strike hardblows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones." Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633 (1935). We are also troubled that the prosecutor 
seems to have completely ignored the court's admonition to "move on,"b y immediately asking 
another inflammatory question. The court should not have to lecture the prosecutor in front of 
the jury in order to get its point across that the current line of questioning is inappropriate and the 
prosecutor should move to a different one. Thus, we find that the prosecutor's repeated use of the 
phrase "ran over your wife" was also misconduct. 
4. The Offer of Proof for Dr. Ross' Testimony Was Not a Fraud But Was 
Unnecessarily Misleading 
Mr. Ellington alleges misconduct by the prosecution in offering the testimony of the 
pathologist, Dr. Ross, regarding the injuries suffered by Mrs. Larsen. Mr. Ellington argues that 
the prosecution claimed in its offer of proof that Dr. Ross would be testifying about where Mrs. 
Larsen was in the roadway when she was struck and the speed of Mr. Ellington's Blazer but 
instead the testimony focused only on the gruesome nature of the injuries in order to inflame the 
passions and prejudices of the jury, and thus the prosecutor committed a fraud upon the court. 
The State argues that the testimony was consistent with the offer of proof and that its purpose 
was not to inflame the jury but rather to show how the injuries were inflicted in order to help the 
jury determine whether Mr. Ellington acted intentionally. The record reveals that part of the 
State's offer of proof for Dr. Ross included distinguishing injuries that were the result of being 
struck and those that were the result of being run over, which was relevant to the issue of what 
direction Mrs. Larsen may have been facing or where she was located on the roadway. This in 
tum was probative as to whether Mr. Ellington acted intentionally or not, because if she was not 
in the lane of traffic Mr. Ellington was attempting to leave from, it would be more likely that he 
had intentionally come after her by crossing into the wrong lane of traffic. 
Dr. Ross described Mrs. Larsen's injuries in great detail, and then testified that the 
injuries to her chest were more consistent with being struck by a motor vehicle than dragged by 
one and that the injuries to her head were consistent with being run over by a tire. This allegedly 
went to the issue of which way she may have been facing, and may have provided potential 
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information as to where she was placed in the roadway. However, Dr. Ross did not actually 
testify to where Mrs. Larsen was standing and what direction she was facing. The vast majority 
of the testimony was focused on cataloguing and describing in detail each of Mrs. Larsen's 
injuries. We will not go so far as to hold that the prosecutor committed a fraud upon the court as 
Mr. Ellington suggests, however, the offer was at the least misleading as to the majority of the 
focus of Dr. Ross' testimony, and highlights yet another attempt by the prosecutor to influence 
the jury's passions and prejudices. 
B. Admissibility of Evidence 
Mr. Ellington argues that there was reversible error when the district court failed to strike 
the word "homicide" from an exhibit, admitted the opinion testimony of Trooper Daly, and 
allowed the pathologist Dr. Ross to testify. 
1. Standard of Review 
The question of whether evidence is relevant is a matter of law subject to free review. 
State v. Shackleford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010). The district court's 
determination of whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. The decision to admit expert opinion testimony is also 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 645, 962 P .2d 1026, 1029 
(1998). If the Court finds that the district court erred by abusing its discretion in admitting the 
evidence over an objection by the defense, it then must determine whether that error is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979; State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 
477, 498, 873 P.2d 122, 143 (1994). 
2. The Failure to Strike the Word "Homicide" from a Diagram Depicting the Scene 
Was an Abuse of Discretion 
Mr. Ellington argues that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to strike the 
word "homicide" from Exhibit 46, a large diagram that was used by Trooper Charles Robnett in 
laying out the scene of the accident, because the prejudicial effect of that word substantially 
outweighed any probative value it had. Defense counsel did not object to the exhibit's admission 
when it was initially offered. Mr. Ellington claims that "homicide" is synonymous with 
"murder" in the jurors' minds and therefore its probative value was very low, or nonexistent, and 
its prejudicial value was very high. The State argues that the district court properly ruled that 
because "homicide" was a legally accurate representation of the scene, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in failing to strike the word. 
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Normally, a party waives an objection to the admission of evidence by failing to object at 
the time of its admission. State v. Stevens, 126 Idaho 822, 824, 892 P.2d 889, 891 
(1995). However, when a party brings a motion to strike a portion of that evidence before the 
evidence is "published to the jury, before the close of arguments, and before the case has been 
submitted to the jury," the claim that the trial court erred by refusing to strike prejudicial 
evidence is properly preserved for appeal. State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 634, 977 P.2d 890, 
896 (1999) (citing Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415, 424, 242 P.2d 971, 976 (1952) ("[O]rdinarily 
an objection comes too late for the purpose of review on appeal, if made for the first time after 
the jury has retired or the cause has been submitted to them, or after the close of the arguments, 
or on motion for new trial or otherwise, after the verdict has been rendered.")). While the exhibit 
was admitted by the court and Trooper Robnett testified from it, there is no indication from the 
transcript that it was published to the jury before the defense brought its motion to strike. The 
motion was certainly well before any closing arguments or submission of the case to the jury. 
Therefore, Mr. Ellington properly preserved his claim on this issue for appeal. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "homicide" as "[t]he killing of one person by another." 
Black's Law Dictionary 802 (9th ed. 2009). It goes on to explain that "[t]he legal term for 
killing a man, whether lawfully or unlawfully, is 'homicide.' There is no crime of 'homicide.' 
Unlawful homicide at common law comprises the two crimes of murder and manslaughter." !d. 
(quoting Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law 204 (1978)) (emphasis in original). It is 
true that the diagram contained no mention of "murder" or "crime" and that the trial judge had 
expressly forbidden the State from making references to the "murder scene" earlier in the trial. 
However, there was very little if any probative value to the word's continued inclusion in the 
exhibit, even if it was technically legally accurate. Also, even though "homicide" was an 
accurate representation of the diagram, it still contained the risk that an average juror would 
equate it with "murder" and thus carried a substantial amount of prejudice. See Barron's Law 
Dictionary 221 (3d ed. 1991) (stating that the term "homicide" is "most commonly used to refer 
to an unlawful killing of a human being by any other human being."); The Merriam-Webster 
Online Thesaurus, http://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/homicide (last visited May 23, 
2011) (defining "homicide" as "the intentional and unlawful taking of another person's life" and 
listing "foul play," "murder," and "slaying" as synonyms). 
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This Court must evaluate whether the district judge "perceived the issue as one of 
discretion, acted within the bounds of that discretion and consistent with established legal 
standards, and reached its decision through the exercise of reason." State v. Thorngren, 149 
Idaho 729, 732, 240 P.3d 575, 578 (2010). Mr. Ellington argues that the district court never 
evaluated whether the inclusion of the word "homicide" in the diagram had any probative value, 
and therefore it abused its discretion. A review of the record indeed shows that the district court 
did not explicitly evaluate any probative value that the word's inclusion would have. "[T]he trial 
judge must measure the probative worth of the proffered evidence" in evaluating evidence under 
I.R.E. 403. Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107, 110, 753 P.2d 1253, 1256 (1987). The 
court did reason that the term "homicide" was not prejudicial because it was accurate and did not 
include inflammatory and accusatory words such as "murder scene" or "crime scene." However, 
because the district court failed to evaluate at all whether the word "homicide" has any probative 
value, and because there does not appear to be any probative value in its inclusion in the 
diagram, nor does the State provide this Court with any argument on the matter, we find that the 
district court abused its discretion. 
3. Trooper Daly's Opinion Testimony that Mr. Ellington Acted Intentionally Was 
Inadmissible 
Mr. Ellington argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Trooper 
Daly to testify over Mr. Ellington's objection that the incident was not an "accident." He 
contends that this testimony does not "assist" the jury pursuant to I.R.E. 702 because the jury 
was capable of drawing the inference that Mr. Ellington acted intentionally on its own. 
Trooper Daly is an accident-reconstruction expert. He testified as to how he reconstructs 
accidents, and then he explained how he had reconstructed this accident. After doing so, he 
expressed an opinion based on his specialization and knowledge in reconstructing the scene of a 
crash, that the scene indicated that Mr. Ellington was in "full control" of his vehicle. Later in his 
testimony, he was asked whether he was "able to determine any speeds from this accident," to 
which he responded "I'd like to define this as an incident, not an accident. An accident is when 
you're walking through the forest with your wife and a tree hits her, or your husband." No 
objection was made to Trooper Daly's response. During re-direct examination, Trooper Daly 
was asked why no attempts were made to come up with speed assessments for the Blazer, and he 
answered: "There isn't an accident." The defense objected to that answer, and argued outside of 
the presence of the jury that Trooper Daly's opinion that this was not an accident was 
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inadmissible opm10n testimony. After conducting its own questioning of Trooper Daly to 
attempt to clarify the connection between the lack of any speed assessment and Trooper Daly's 
opinion that Mr. Ellington acted intentionally in hitting the Honda and Mrs. Larsen, the court 
determined that Trooper Daly based his opinion on the lack of any evidence of evasive action, 
and therefore it was admissible expert opinion testimony. 10 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 governs admissibility of expert testimony. It provides: "If 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." 
I.R.E. 702. "In order to be admissible under I.R.E. 702, the expert's testimony must assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact that is in issue." Chapman v. 
Chapman, 147 Idaho 756, 760, 215 P.3d 476, 480 (2009). Pursuant to I.R.E. 704, an expert's 
testimony is not inadmissible merely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided in the 
case; however, "[ e ]xpert testimony that concerns conclusions or opinions that the average juror is 
qualified to draw from the facts utilizing the juror's common sense and normal experience is 
inadmissible." !d. This is because "[t]he function of the expert is to provide testimony on 
subjects that are beyond the common sense, experience and education of the average juror." 
Warren v. Sharp, 139 Idaho 599, 606, 83 P.3d 773, 780 (2003) (quoting Rockefeller v. Grabow, 
136 Idaho 637, 647, 39 P.3d 577, 587 (2001)). 
Thus, the relevant question here is whether Trooper Daly's opinion that this was not an 
"accident" concerned an inference that could be drawn by the jurors utilizing their own common 
sense and normal experience. In Warren, this Court found that the accident reconstructionist's 
opinion testimony that the accident could have been avoided by the defendant was inadmissible. 
!d. at 606, 83 P.3d at 780. 11 It reasoned that "the jurors could have determined whether or not 
they thought that Mr. Warren could have avoided the accident given the facts and expert 
testimony, including the opinion [that Mr. Warren had control of his vehicle] presented at trial." 
10 Trooper Daly explained to the court outside the presence of the jury the apparent basis for his opinion: 
I built my opinion on what I have seen in photographs, the evidence I have seen on the roadway, 
the crush on the cars, the correlating damage to the vehicles, and I believe the speed is going to be 
minor just from training and experience .... But the fact that there is no evasive action at each event 
and the fact that the Honda was pushed so hard, so far, without disengaging from the Honda and 
taking a different route is why I believe it was an intentional act. 
11 Warren was a civil case involving a wrongful death claim. Warren, 139 Idaho at 601, 83 P.3d at 775. 
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!d. Here, Trooper Daly concluded that Mr. Ellington acted intentionally because there was a lack 
of any evidence of evasive action, which indicated that Mr. Ellington was in full control of his 
vehicle. As in Warren, this conclusion was impermissible opinion testimony because a juror 
could have determined whether or not he or she thought that Mr. Ellington acted intentionally 
given the evidence presented; that there was a lack of any evidence of evasive action, and that 
Mr. Ellington seemed to be in full control of the vehicle. See also State v. Turner, 136 Idaho 
629, 633, 38 P.3d 1285, 1289 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing State v. Parks, 693 P.2d 657, 659-60 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1985) ("I see it as analogous to the question in a civil action, 'In your opinion was the 
defendant negligent?' And that's objectionable, not because it's the ultimate issue to be 
determined by the jury, but because the witness is not better able than the jury to reach a 
conclusion on that issue.")) As stated in Warren, this type of opinion "is more suited to a closing 
argument than expert testimony." Warren, 139 Idaho at 606, 83 P.3d at 780. Thus, we find that 
Trooper Daly's testimony that there was "not an accident" was clearly inadmissible opinion 
testimony on Mr. Ellington's state of mind that was not helpful to the jury, and the district court 
abused its discretion in admitting it. 
Further, the opinion testimony was non-responsive to the question Trooper Daly was 
asked, which was why he had not performed speed assessments. Trooper Daly gratuitously and 
unnecessarily injected his clearly inadmissible opinion that Mr. Ellington acted intentionally. 
Not only was his answer an inadmissible intrusion into the jury's domain of determining the 
defendant's state of mind, it was also completely unsolicited and wholly unnecessary. As an 
officer of the State, Trooper Daly's gratuitous and prejudicial response is imputed to the State, 
whether or not the State intended to elicit that response. Had Mr. Ellington raised this issue as 
another instance of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal, we would have found, once again, that 
the State's conduct was improper. 
4. There Was No Abuse of Discretion in Denying the Motion in Limine for Dr. Ross' 
Testimony 
In addition to its argument that the prosecution's offer of Dr. Ross' testimony was 
prosecutorial misconduct, Mr. Ellington also argues that the court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion in limine to preclude Dr. Ross from testifying. He argues that the probative 
value of Dr. Ross' testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of both unfair prejudice 
and cumulative evidence because the testimony regarding Mrs. Larsen's injuries had a low 
probative value and was inflammatory, and thus the motion in limine should have been granted. 
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The State argues that the testimony was relevant in order to distinguish which injuries were the 
result of being struck and which injuries were the result of being run over, which could help the 
jurors place where Mrs. Larsen was in the road when she was struck and what way she might 
have been facing. This Court notes that a party need not make a renewed objection to the 
admission of evidence it has unsuccessfully attempted to exclude through a motion in limine in 
order to preserve that objection for appeal. Davidson v. Beco Corp., 112 Idaho 560, 563-64, 733 
P.2d 781, 784-85 (Ct. App. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 114 Idaho 107, 753 P.2d 1253 
(1987). 
Thus, the issue is whether the testimony of Dr. Ross should have been excluded because 
of its potential prejudicial and cumulative nature. "It is well established that where allegedly 
inflammatory evidence is relevant and material as to an issue of fact, the trial court must 
determine whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice." State v. Winn, 121 Idaho 850, 853, 828 P.2d 879, 882 (1992); I.R.E. 403. The fact 
that evidence may cause an emotional reaction in the jury does not automatically lead to the 
conclusion that the evidence should be excluded. Winn, 121 Idaho at 853, 828 P.2d at 882 ("The 
fact that the photographs depict the actual body of the victim and the wounds inflicted on the 
victim and may tend to excite the emotions of the jury is not a basis for excluding them.") 
Dr. Ross testified as to the types of injuries Mrs. Larsen had suffered in an alleged effort 
to describe whether the injuries were consistent with being hit by a fast-moving car or a slow-
moving car, and whether they were consistent with being struck, dragged or run over. He 
described, in great detail, the injuries to her torso and to her face and head. He then briefly 
testified that based on his observations, the injuries were more consistent with being hit by a fast-
moving object than being dragged, and more consistent with being struck than run over. This 
was potentially relevant to where Mrs. Larsen may have been standing and if she was possibly 
moving, all of which had at least some probative value to the issue of whether Mr. Ellington 
intentionally went after her with his car or whether he hit her by accident because he did not have 
time to react. It was also certainly cumulative to some degree because Mrs. Larsen's injuries had 
already been put before the jury in photos and other testimony, though not specifically to explain 
the type of impact. 
Although the testimony regarding the injuries was undoubtedly prejudicial to Mr. 
Ellington because the descriptions of the injuries were the focus of the testimony, we hold that 
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the district court did not abuse its discretion in ultimately determining at the time it ruled on the 
motion in limine that the prejudice did not substantially outweigh what it had determined was the 
probative value in the testimony. The district court weighed the probative value of the offer of 
proof given by the prosecutor, which was that Dr. Ross would help distinguish the injuries by 
explaining how each one was caused to help establish Mrs. Larsen's location on the roadway. 
The court also acknowledged the prejudice that describing the injuries would have, stating that 
much of the testimony "may very well be cumulative and unnecessary." However, the court 
weighed the danger of the cumulative evidence and prejudice and determined that the probative 
value was not outweighed, and the evidence should not be excluded in the form of barring Dr. 
Ross from testifying. Thus, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing 
Dr. Ross to testify according to the prosecutor's offer of proof. 
C. Biased Jury 
Mr. Ellington argues that the district court erroneously denied his motion for mistrial 
during voir dire because the opinions expressed by three potential jurors that they believed Mr. 
Ellington was guilty impermissibly biased the rest of the jurors, depriving Mr. Ellington of a fair 
trial. 
1. Standard of Review 
A "mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the 
trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which 
is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial." I.C.R. 29.1(a). 
The standard of review of a denial of a motion for mistrial is well-settled: 
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably 
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial 
motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether the event which 
precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in 
the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied 
in a criminal case, the "abuse of discretion" standard is a misnomer. The standard, 
more accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our focus is upon the continuing 
impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial 
judge's refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed 
retrospectively, constituted reversible error. 
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007). 
2. Mr. Ellington Cannot Show That His Due-process Rights Were Violated When 
Three Prospective Jurors Expressed Their Opinions During Voir Dire That Mr. 
Ellington Was Guilty 
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Mr. Ellington contends that his motion for mistrial should have been granted because his 
due-process rights were violated "when three prospective jurors tainted the entire panel of 
prospective jurors by expressing their preconceived views ... that Mr. Ellington was guilty of 
the charged offenses." He also contends that some of the actual jurors that deliberated were not 
neutral, evidencing the prejudice that the prospective jurors had on the actual panel. We find that 
there was no error because Mr. Ellington's due-process rights were not violated. 
During voir dire, the judge asked the pool of jurors if any of them had formed an opinion 
that Mr. Ellington was guilty. Mr. Ellington argues that the responses of the following three 
jurors prejudiced the entire pool. First, prospective juror Ron Dykstra stated that he had "read 
about it in the papers" and believed Mr. Ellington to be guilty. Immediately following that 
response the judge reiterated that the case is only to be decided on the evidence within the 
courtroom, and after Mr. Dykstra stated that he could not do so, the court excused him for cause. 
Next, prospective juror Jessica Welk stated that she had a conversation with a member of the 
Larsen family the day after the incident and she was "on her side of him being guilty." The 
judge stated that he did not want to engage in any factual details of the conversation, and once 
again reiterated that the case must be decided only on the evidence presented in the courtroom. 
After Ms. Welk stated that she could not be fair, she was excused for cause by the court. Finally, 
prospective juror Mark Felder stated that he had already formed an opinion based on the news he 
had read in the papers and seen on television such that he could not give Mr. Ellington a fair 
trial. The judge again reiterated the importance of deciding the case based on what happens 
inside the courtroom and not what happens outside, after which Mr. Felder stated that he could 
"try" to do so. Mr. Felder was not selected for the final jury. 12 
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury. U.S. Const. 
amends. V, VI, XIV; Idaho Const. art. 1, §§ 7, 13. However, even a juror's expression of his 
own opinion of the case during voir dire does not render him partial. A juror is presumed to be 
impartial. 
[T]he Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross section of the 
community is impartial, regardless of the mix of individual viewpoints actually 
represented on the jury, so long as the jurors can conscientiously and properly 
carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular case. 
12 One party likely exercised one of its peremptory challenges to remove Mr. Felder, however those challenges were 
not exercised on the record. 
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Ross v. OklahonJa, 487 U.S. 8.1, 86, 108 S. Ct. 2273, 2277 (1988) (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 
476 U.S. 162, 184, 106 S. Ct. 1758, 1770 (1986)). This Court has agreed: 
The trial court does not need to find jurors that are entirely ignorant of the facts 
and issues involved in the case. To hold that the mere existence of any 
preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is 
sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be 
to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his 
impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in 
court. 
State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 506, 988 P .2d 1170, 1180 (1999) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted); see also State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 688, 85 P.3d 656, 664 (2004). 
None of the jurors who expressed the opinions on Mr. Ellington's guilt that are at issue 
on appeal actually sat on the jury. At worst, the jurors who actually deliberated received a 
second-hand opinion from those three prospective jurors that Mr. Ellington was guilty. They did 
not receive any specific facts as to why, other than that the prospective jurors read about it in the 
paper and in one instance interacted with a member of the Larsen family. 13 The impaneled 
jurors were instructed at the end of voir dire that they were to decide the case only based on the 
evidence presented in the courtroom. They were again instructed of this duty before their 
deliberations. Under the U.S. Supreme Court's and this Court's case law, Mr. Ellington has not 
overcome the presumption that the jury was impartial. 14 "Where a defendant does not allege or 
cannot demonstrate that a member of his or her jury was biased or prejudiced, a due process 
challenge must fail." State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 64, 14 P.3d 378, 384 (2000). 
The only allegation Mr. Ellington provides to show that an actual member of the jury was 
biased is that two jurors came forward during the trial and expressed concerns to the court. Once 
13 Prospective Juror Jessica Welk stated that when she was at the gym the day the incident happened "one of the 
aunts related the [sic] Larsen family told about this incident and gave her informative opinion and we had a 
discussion about it. So I'm unfortunately on her side of him being guilty." This was the extent of her testimony 
regarding her basis for her opinion. 
14 Mr. Ellington argues in his brief, as he did before the district court in bringing his motion for mistrial, that the 
district court used the incorrect standard in questioning of the prospective jurors during voir dire. He cites the Court 
of Appeals' decision in State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho 603, 150 P.3d 296 (Ct. App. 2006), to stand for the proposition 
that merely "trying" to be fair is not the standard mandated by the Constitution when the court is questioning 
potential jurors. Hauser involved a different set of facts in which a juror was not excused for cause after he 
admitted bias, but stated that he would "try" to be fair. !d. at 609-10, 150 P.3d at 302-03. Mr. Ellington here 
makes no challenge to any specific juror who was not dismissed for cause that he believes should have been. 
Instead he focuses his challenge on appeal on the denial of the motion for mistrial, which assigned error only in the 
statements of the three prospective jurors, none of whom sat on the jury. Because those prospective jurors were all 
dismissed, the holding of Hauser does not apply here. 
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again, those two jurors, one whose mother-in-law worked at the physical-therapy clinic where 
Jovon was receiving treatment and one who was receiving treatment at that same physical-
therapy clinic assured the court that they had not discussed the case at all outside the courtroom, 
and reiterated that they would be able to be fair and impartial in continuing to sit on the jury. 
Although not always dispositive, the trial judge is entitled to rely on assurances from venire 
persons concerning partiality or bias. Yager, 139 Idaho at 688, 85 P.3d at 664. Mr. Ellington has 
not shown that the jurors in question were partial or biased. State v. Tolman, 121 Idaho 899, 
902, 828 P.2d 1304, 1307 (1992) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a 
mistrial when a juror in a molestation trial revealed during the trial that his wife was molested 
because the court thoroughly questioned the juror and the juror repeatedly stated he would be fair 
and did not think his wife's molestation would affect his judgment). Particularly within the 
framework of Mr. Ellington's motion for mistrial, he has not shown in any way that these actual 
jury members had been influenced by the three prospective jurors' statements during voir dire. 
This is also not a case where Mr. Ellington has shown that bias to the impaneled jury 
might be presumed because of the extent of publicity during the trial. See State v. Scroggins, 91 
Idaho 847, 848, 433 P.2d 117, 118 (1967) (mid-trial newspaper article stating other charges filed 
against the defendant which was discussed in the jury room did not present the degree of 
publicity necessary to overcome the presumption of impartiality); see also Marshall v. United 
States, 360 U.S. 310, 312, 79 S. Ct. 1171, 1173 (1959) (jury's exposure to newspaper article 
which was highly prejudicial to defendant necessitated new trial); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 
U.S. 333, 356, 86 S. Ct. 1507, 1519 (1966) (atmosphere of a "Roman holiday for the news 
media," a "deluge of publicity," and "massive pretrial publicity" necessitated new trial); Estes v. 
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543, 85 S. Ct. 1628, 1633 (1965) (live radio and television broadcast of 
trial and pre-trial proceedings deprived defendant of "judicial serenity and calm to which [he] 
was entitled"); State v. Hall, 111 Idaho 827, 831,727 P.2d 1255, 1259 (Ct. App. 1986) (denial of 
motions for change of venue and sequestration not an abuse of discretion because prospective 
jurors were not "incessantly exposed to news stories throughout the pretrial period" and the 
"intensity of the initial coverage was dissipated by the passage of time"). 
Thus, Mr. Ellington has not shown that the expressions of three prospective jurors that 
Mr. Ellington was guilty overcome the presumption that the impaneled jurors were impartial, and 
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to that end he cannot show a violation of his due-process rights. Because there was no error, the 
Court will not evaluate whether that error was harmless or reversible. 
D. Cumulative Error 
Mr. Ellington argues that the alleged errors during trial which are analyzed above, as well 
as the prosecution's "larger pattern of attempting to prejudice the jury," constitutes cumulative 
error that necessitates a reversal. "Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, 
harmless in and of themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. However, a 
necessary predicate to the application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error." Perry, 
150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at 982. 
Given the multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct and evidentiary errors, there 
was undoubtedly more than one error at Mr. Ellington's trial. We note that when ruling on a 
motion for mistrial brought after an instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct, the district 
court should not limit its view of the misconduct to the specific isolated incident, but should also 
take into consideration whether or not the prosecutor is engaging in a pattern of misbehavior. 
From a review of the record in this case it seems that the prosecutor was attempting to use every 
opportunity possible to appeal to the passions and prejudices of the jurors, including ignoring 
warnings and admonitions by the judge to try the case based on the facts. While the isolated 
instances of misconduct and evidentiary error in this case may not rise to the level of reversible 
error, we implore district courts to take into account all the factors surrounding a motion for 
mistrial, particularly in an emotionally charged trial such as this one where there are several 
indicators that the prosecutor is attempting to try the case based on emotion. We do not decide 
whether the errors individually or cumulatively warrant a reversal here because our resolution of 
the motion for new trial issue discussed below is dispositive. 
E. Motion for New Trial 
Mr. Ellington argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for 
new trial based on newly-discovered evidence in the form of prior inconsistent testimony of the 
State's sole rebuttal witness, Cpl. Fred Rice. 
At trial, the State called reconstruction expert and Idaho State Police Cpl. Fred Rice to 
the stand to rebut testimony offered by Dr. William Skelton, Jr., regarding average perception 
and reaction times and using crash debris to locate a point of impact. Dr. Skelton testified as an 
accident reconstmctionist expert for the defense, and stated that there was an average perception-
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reaction time of 1.5 seconds and that crash debris from the accident could be used to locate 
where the vehicle was on the road. This average perception-reaction time took into account that 
it takes .75 seconds to perceive the hazard and .75 seconds to react to the hazard. He concluded 
based on those facts and his reconstruction both that Mr. Ellington did not have the time to react 
to avoid hitting either the Honda or Mrs. Larsen, and that the debris field in the westbound lane 
indicated that Mr. Ellington was traveling in the correct, eastbound, lane of travel when the 
Blazer and the Honda collided. 
During Cpl. Rice's rebuttal testimony, he stated that Dr. Skelton's 1.5 second reaction 
time could not be used because "there is no average perception reaction time in the world." He 
also testified that a debris field is not reliable in placing a vehicle at the scene because "debris 
can be moved, kicked around, like I said, it sprays" and that the debris field was "not going to 
tell me where the point of impact happened." 
After the trial, Mr. Ellington filed a motion for new trial on the grounds that he had 
discovered new evidence that Cpl. Rice had testified inconsistently for the State in a vehicle-
pedestrian collision case in the district court of Elmore County called State v. Ciccone, in 
January of 2005. 15 In that case, Cpl. Rice testified that the location of the crash debris in the 
form of glass "definitely coincides with where the impact point is."16 Mr. Ellington also 
submitted evidence that the training materials Cpl. Rice teaches from, which he prepared 
himself, state that the average perception-reaction time is 1.6 seconds. 17 Cpl. Rice testified in 
15 The case number of that case is CR-2003-4441. Mr. Ellington submitted as newly-discovered evidence both the 
testimony of Cpl. Rice at the trial, which occurred on Tuesday, January 11, 2005, and the testimony of Cpl. Rice 
from the preliminary hearing in the same case, which took place on December 29, 2003. 
16 This testimony was consistent with Cpl. Rice's testimony in the preliminary hearing: 
Q: Were you able to determine an area of impact? 
A: Oh, absolutely, yes. 
Q. How did you make that determination? 
A. Well first of all, we see the tire; so we know the path that the vehicle was traveling. And we have our 
first headlight glass where it starts to show up on the ground. Now, knowing that an automobile was 
traveling when this impact took place, when the glass is broke, it is not going to fall directly to the ground; 
gravity has to pull it. But the glass is going to travel what the speed of the car was. So the glass is going to 
be located, in this case, farther to the right of what the actual impact took place. So if we just take some 
estimates, knowing approximately how high the glass was when it broke and things such as that, we can 
come back with knowing how fast the car was traveling and say, approximately, where the area of impact 
was. 
17 Those materials state, "Reaction time is the length of time from when a person perceives a given situation as being 
a hazard to when he reacts to his perception. When a person's reaction time is unknown, a reaction time of 1.6 
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the Ciccone preliminary hearing that he had used a reaction time, which he clarified was only the 
time to react and did not include the time to perceive, of0.75 seconds, supporting the testimony 
here of Dr. Skelton. 18 
1. Standard of Review 
This Court reviews a denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144, 191 P.3d 217, 222 (2008). Because a motion for new trial involves 
mixed questions of law and fact, "[a]n abuse of discretion will be found if the trial court's 
findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence or if the trial court does not correctly 
apply the law." !d. 
2. The District Court Correctly Applied the Drapeau Standard 
A defendant who has been found guilty of a crime may seek a new trial under I. C. § 19-
2406 "[ w ]hen new evidence is discovered material to the defendant, and which he could not with 
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial." I.C. § 19-2406(7). "Newly 
discovered evidence warrants a new trial only if the defendant demonstrates: (1) the evidence is 
newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) the evidence is 
material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) it will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) 
failure to learn of the evidence was not due to a lack of diligence on the part of the defendant." 
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 144, 191 P.3d at 222 (citing State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d 
972, 978 (1976)). "[A] defendant wishing to gam a new trial based 
on newly discovered evidence must show that the evidence meets all four of the requirements set 
out in Idaho law." Stevens, 146 Idaho at 146, 191 P.3d at 224. "Motions for a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence are disfavored and should be granted with caution, reflecting the 
importance accorded to considerations of repose, regularity of decision making, and conservation 
seconds may be used for investigation purposes. This figure accounts also for any unknown perception delay and is 
therefore a perception-reaction time." (italics and bold in original). 
18 He stated: "[W]e're going to say that the person has a reaction time, not perception time that I'm talking about, 
just reaction time. Using three quarters of a second that a person is going to react." This is the exact same reaction 
time that Dr. Skelton used in his testimony that led to the ultimate conclusion that it takes 0.75 seconds to perceive 
and another 0.75 seconds to react, for a total average perception- reaction time of 1.5 seconds. ("Perception reaction 
time is defined by a lot of associations as the time that it takes to perceive an oncoming danger or an oncoming 
event plus the time that it takes to react to avoid that impact or that danger or whatever is necessary. The perception 
is generally accepted as three-quarters of a second. In other words, if you're driving down the road, you're going to 
travel for three-quarters of a second while you're seeing that there is a danger approaching. Then it takes another 
three-quarters of a second for you to move, to either turn your steering wheel, put your foot on the brake, do 
whatever you're going to go [sic]. So the total perception reaction time is generally accepted as 1.5 seconds.") 
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of scarce judicial resources." !d. at 144, 191 P.3d at 222 (citing State v. Hayes, 144 Idaho 574, 
577, 165 P.3d 288, 291 (Ct. App. 2007)). 
Mr: Ellington claims that the court abused its discretion in not applying the standard this 
Court adopted in State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 716 P.2d 1152 (1985) to Mr. Ellington's 
motion for new trial. In that case, this Court stated that "where a defendant submits an affidavit 
by a government witn€ss in which the witness recants his testimony and specifies in what ways 
he dishonestly testified and in what ways he would, if given the opportunity to testify again, 
change that testimony and where a defendant makes a showing that such changed testimony may 
be material to a finding of his guilt or innocence, a new trial should be held." Scroggins, 110 
Idaho at 385, 716 P.2d at 1157 (emphasis added). The standard applied in Scroggins 
considers (1) whether the testimony given by a material witness was false; (2) whether without 
that testimony the jury might have reached a different conclusion; and (3) whether the party 
seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given and was unable 
to meet it, or, did not know it was false until after the trial. Bean v. State, 119 Idaho 632, 638, 
809 P.2d 493, 499 (1991) (citing with approval the Scroggins test for new trial based upon the 
recantation of testimony by a witness). In Scroggins, the only eyewitness for the defense 
delivered a note to the court after the trial insinuating that he had not told the truth in his trial 
testimony. Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 384, 716 P.2d at 1156. The Court went on to hold that the 
note did not constitute an affidavit and even so, it was subject to multiple inferences, such that 
the Court could not conclude that the witness had provided evidence that he had recanted his 
testimony. !d. at 385, 716 P.2d at 1157. 
The Court of Appeals recently confirmed that the language in the Scroggins case suggests 
that the use of that standard should be confined to a specific set of facts "when a trial witness has 
recanted his or her trial testimony and evidence of that recantation has been presented to the trial 
court." State v. Griffith, 144 Idaho 356, 366, 161 P.3d 675, 685 (Ct. App. 2007) (citations 
omitted); see also State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 152, 730 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Ct. App. 1986) 
("Scroggins provides the standard for evaluating recanted testimony in Idaho."). Excepting 
evidence of recantation, "[a ]ny other type of new evidence presented by a defendant as an 
alleged basis for a new trial, including other types of proof of petjury and evidence of a 
recantation that has itself been subsequently disavowed by the trial witness, are subject to the 
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Drapeau test." Griffith, 144 Idaho at 366, 161 P.3d at 685 (citations omitted); 19 see also Cootz v. 
State, 129 Idaho 360, 366-67, 924 P.2d 622, 628-29 (Ct. App. 1996) (applying the Scroggins 
test to a newly-discovered affidavit from the witness which constituted a recantation, but 
applying the Drapeau test to a newly-discovered affidavit from a third party that suggested a 
witness had perjured himself). 
This is not a situation where a government witness specifically identified that he had 
perjured himself on the stand, and further expressly recanted his testimony. Cpl. Rice has not 
submitted any affidavit, and has not presented anything to the trial court to indicate that he is 
recanting his testimony in the Ellington trial. While the evidence suggests he may have perjured 
himself, he did not recant his testimony. Therefore, the district court properly applied the 
Drapeau test. 
3. The District Court Abused Its Discretion in Finding That the Newly-Discovered 
Evidence Could Only Be Used for Impeachment Purposes 
To begin, neither party argues that the district court erred in finding that the first and 
fourth prongs of the Drapeau test were met, and so we hold that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in finding that the evidence was newly-discovered and could not have been 
discovered at the time of trial with reasonable diligence. Rather, we focus on the second and 
third prongs of the test, both of which the district court found that Mr. Ellington had not met. 
The district court determined that the newly-discovered evidence of Cpl. Rice's 
completely inconsistent testimony from the Ciccone case and training materials Cpl. Rice had 
personally prepared and used was not material and would probably not produce an acquittal. 
Turning first to the materiality prong, the Drapeau test requires that the newly-discovered 
evidence be "material," not "merely cumulative or impeaching." Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 
P.2d at 978. Thus the question to be resolved on appeal is whether the district court abused its 
discretion in determining that Cpl. Rice's testimony in the Ciccone case was merely impeaching 
19 The Court of Appeals cited a series of cases from this Court and the Court of Appeals in which the Drapeau test 
was applied to allegations of perjury that do not rise to the level of recantation. Griffith, 144 Idaho at 366-67, 161 
P.3d at 685-86 (citing State v. Fields, 127 Idaho 904,914-15, 908 P.2d 1211, 1221-22 (1995); State v. Ransom, 124 
Idaho 703,711-12, 864 P.2d 149, 157-58 (1993); State v. Welker, 129 Idaho 805, 812,932 P.2d 928,935 (Ct. App. 
1997); Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360,366,924 P.2d 622,628 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 15-17, 
909 P.2d 624, 633-35 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Barlow, 113 Idaho 573, 577-79, 746 P.2d 1032, 1036-38 (Ct. App. 
1987).) The Court of Appeals also noted that there was only one case in which the Scroggins test was applied to 
evidence of perjury that was not a recantation, State v. Dunn, 134 Idaho 165, 170, 997 P.2d 626, 631 (Ct. App. 
2000), noting it was "an apparent inadvertent aberration." Griffith, 144 Idaho at 367, 161 P.3d at 686. Neither this 
Court nor the Court of Appeals has addressed any cases on these two competing standards since Griffith. 
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and not substantive and material to Mr. Ellington's case, which is essentially an evidentiary 
ruling. See Stevens, 146 Idaho at 152, 191 P.3d at 230 (Horton, J., specially concurring) ("The 
second question [in the Drapeau test], whether the evidence is material, not merely cumulative 
or impeaching, appears to be a purely evidentiary question."). "When reviewing the trial court's 
evidentiary rulings, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard." Foster v. Traul, 145 
Idaho 24, 28, 175 P.3d 186, 190 (2007). 
The Court of Appeals has aptly described the difference between impeachment evidence 
and substantive evidence: 
Unlike substantive evidence which is offered for the purpose of persuading the 
trier of fact as to the truth of a proposition on which the determination of the 
tribunal is to be asked, impeachment is that which is designed to discredit a 
witness, i.e. to reduce the effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth the 
evidence which explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony. 
Examples of impeachment evidence would include prior inconsistent statements, 
bias, attacks on [the] character of a witness, prior felony convictions, and attacks 
on the capacity of the witness to observe, recall or relate. Evidence may be both 
substantive and impeaching. 
State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862, 868-69, 119 P.3d 637, 643-44 (Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Small v. 
State, 132 Idaho 327, 334-35, 971 P.2d 1151, 1158-59 (Ct. App. 1998)) (emphasis added). 
"One recognized method of impeachment is by showing that on a prior occasion, the 
witness made a statement inconsistent with testimony he gave at trial." Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 
688, 551 P.2d at 975; I.R.E. 613(b). In Idaho, a prior inconsistent statement can also be used as 
substantive evidence, so long as the declarant testifies at trial, is subject to cross-examination 
concerning the statement, and the statement was given under oath at a prior proceeding. I.R.E. 
801 ( d)(l ). Cpl. Rice testified at trial, was subject to cross-examination, and gave the prior 
inconsistent statements while under oath during the preliminary hearing and trial in the Ciccone 
case, thus, his testimony would have been admissible as substantive evidence. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "material evidence" as that evidence "[h]aving some 
logical connection with the consequential facts." Black's Law Dictionary 1066 (9th ed. 2009). 
Mr. Ellington argues that the evidence is not merely impeaching because "it would have 
provided substantive support for Dr. Skelton's calculations and opinions." We agree. Cpl. 
Rice's testimony and training materials used in the Ciccone trial could have been offered not 
only to attack Cpl. Rice's credibility, but also to lend more support to the conclusions Dr. 
Skelton had made, and which Cpl. Rice was attacking, that given Dr. Skelton's statement that the 
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average perception-reaction time is 1.5 seconds (.75 seconds for perception and .75 seconds for 
reaction), Mr. Ellington did not have time to react and avoid the Honda or subsequently, Mrs. 
Larsen. Further, the evidence would lend support to the use of a debris field to locate a point of 
impact, further bolstering Dr. Ske!ton's testimony that the impact with the Honda occurred in the 
correct, eastbound, lane. This would also make it more likely that Mr. Ellington did not act 
intentionally because he did not travel across the center line before the collision. Not only is this 
evidence material, it goes directly to the main question at trial, which was whether Mr. Ellington 
acted with implied malice. Thus, the district court abused its discretion in determining that the 
evidence was only impeaching and not material, because it was both impeaching evidence and 
material substantive evidence. 
While we hold that in Mr. Ellington's case the newly-discovered evidence was not 
merely impeaching or cumulative and did meet the Drapeau standard, we also hold that in the 
particularly egregious case of perjury by a State officer, a defendant will receive a new trial even 
if that evidence is merely impeaching or cumulative. That is, if a state law enforcement officer 
perjures himself by making statements that are prejudicial to the defendant, the prong of the 
Drapeau test requiring the defendant to show that the evidence is material substantive evidence 
that is not merely impeaching or cumulative, need not be satisfied. 
4. The District Court Abused Its Discretion in Determining That Mr. Ellington 
Could Not Show That the Newly-Discovered Evidence Would Probably Produce 
an Acquittal 
The district court reasoned that there was evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of intent to 
support the aggravated battery counts and implied malice to support the second-degree murder 
count in the form of the altercation that occurred with the girls earlier in the day, the 911 tape, 
and what it perceived as the ineffective testimony of Cpl. Rice, 20 such that the newly-discovered 
evidence was "merely speculative" and "would not alter the outcome," and accordingly it would 
not probably produce an acquittal. While the district court clearly perceived its discretion, we 
find it did not act within the bounds of its discretion because the defense's entire theory at trial 
rested on the testimony of Dr. Skelton that Mr. Ellington did not have the time to perceive and 
20 The district court noted in its decision, "From the perception of the court it is likely that the only one impressed 
with the testimony of Fred Rice was Fred Rice." 
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react to the Honda or Mrs. Larsen, and thus he did not act intentionally in hitting either. 21 The 
newly-discovered evidence provides support directly to the core of that theory. Further, the 
newly-discovered evidence provides very compelling evidence that Cpl. Rice perjured himself 
during the Ellington trial. 
Cpl. Rice, a police officer with twenty five years of experience, who teaches accident 
reconstruction to other Idaho police officers and who has testified for the State on many other 
occasions regarding accident reconstruction, took the stand and attacked Dr. Skelton's testimony, 
derailing its credibility in the eyes of the jurors. Cpl. Rice was also not merely expressing his 
opinion on the usefulness of debris fields and average perception-reaction times in this case as 
the State attempts to argue, he was emphatically stating that a debris field could not be used to 
locate a point of impact, and that an average perception-reaction time does not exist. He testified 
falsely according to the well-established principles of accident reconstruction Dr. Skelton had 
already testified to as well as his own testimony in the Ciccone case and his own training 
materials. He was not uninformed or ignorant as to these principles; he was well aware of them, 
testified to them in Ciccone, published them, and taught them to other police officers. While the 
record does not indicate whether Cpl. Rice was wearing his uniform at trial, we know that he was 
21 Mr. Ellington's Opening Statement was focused on the idea that Mr. Ellington did not have time to perceive and 
react: 
Skeltons will tell you about perception and reaction time. There is a time to see something and be 
able to make your body react to it. Mr. Ellington had no time when that Subaru threw that Blazer 
into the Honda to perceive the Honda's presence and to hit his brakes and react to it. 
"He simply did not have time to see Mrs. Larsen and react to her presence while he was trying to get away from the 
gunshot." Mr. Ellington's Closing Argument emphasized Dr. Skelton's testimony and once again emphasized the 
defense's theory that Mr. Ellington did not have the time to perceive and react to the Honda or Mrs. Larsen. 
Dr. Skelton talked to but [sic] perception reaction time. It's been accepted for years and years and 
years that one and-a-half seconds is perception and reaction time. That's how long it takes to a 
[sic] danger and react to the presence of the danger .... Perception reaction time is the time you 
see something in front of you and can react. That your brain can make your body take an action 
against that. That's very critical in this particular case. 
If you go to a further instruction, malice is defined as an intentional act with disregard to the 
consequences of that act. You would have to believe that Mr. Ellington intentionally drove his 
vehicle at Mrs. Larsen and intended to hit her. There simply wasn't time for him to do that. Dr. 
Skelton told you that he had a half a second to less than three-quarter second time from leaving the 
Honda until she was struck. And the less than three-quarter second places her in the position 
where it's the closest distance, not counting the carry distance because of gravity. That's not even 
time to complete perception, and certainly there's no time to react to her presence there. Mr. 
Ellington can not [sic] be found guilty of Second Degree Murder, there simply wasn't time for him 
to intend to drive his vehicle at her. 
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presented to the jury as an Idaho State Police Officer as well as a training officer at the Police 
Academy regarding accident reconstruction. Under such circumstances, it is not unlikely that 
the jury would place a great deal of reliance upon his testimony. He has taught for many years 
and reconstructed hundreds, if not thousands, of accidents. It is not unusual for a jury to place 
more reliance upon a state police officer of his stature than they would place on a privately 
retained· accident constructionist such as Dr. Skelton. 
Had the defense been able to both impeach Cpl. Rice's statements with his own 
inconsistent statements at a previous trial as well as with the information contained within his 
own training manuals for the ISP, and at the same time lend support to its theory of the case by 
bolstering Dr. Skelton's testimony regarding perception-reaction times and debris fields, the 
jurors would have been presented with a very different picture of what was already a very close 
case. The jury would have been given more evidence to support the theory that Mr. Ellington 
did not have time to react to the Honda, that the crash occurred in Mr. Ellington's correct 
eastbound lane as he was trying to flee while being shot at by unknown assailants, and that Mr. 
Ellington did not have time to react to Mrs. Larsen's presence in the road. It simply cannot be 
said that it was not probable that this new evidence that showed Cpl. Rice testified falsely, and 
likely intentionally, in the Ellington trial would have affected the jury's determination of 
reasonable doubt, because it went straight to the heart of the defense's main theory of the case. 
We also note that "a conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is 
fundamentally unfair" as a violation of due process. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 
S. Ct. 2392, 2397 (1976). We have no way to know whether or not the prosecutor had any 
knowledge of the falsity of Cpl. Rice's testimony given his past testimony and training materials, 
but we recognize the serious constitutional implications of the possibility. It is extremely 
disturbing to this Court that an officer of the law would present false testimony in any case, 
especially a murder case. In this case, however, it is impossible to believe there was any truth to 
the testimony of Cpl. Rice. It is abhorrent to this Court, as it would be to any other court, that a 
man can be sentenced to twenty-five years for second-degree murder based primarily on the false 
testimony of a trooper of this State. 
For these reasons, we find that the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant 
Mr. Ellington a new trial. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
We find merit in several of Mr. Ellington's assignments of error at trial. However, we 
hold that the district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Ellington's motion for new trial. 
Because our resolution of the new trial issue is dispositive, we do not reach the issue of whether 
each trial error was reversible or whether there was cumulative error. Mr. Ellington's conviction 
and sentence are vacated, and his case is remanded to the district court for a new trial. 
Chief Justice EISMANN, Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR. 
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. PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION 
! PERSONAL ffiSTORY QUESTIONNAIRE 
LegruNwne:~~~~~~~!~~~~o~ncc~~~~·~·~~~---· --~~~~~-------------
1 First Name Middle Name 
\ 
Other names you have used (Maideh Name /Former Married Name/ Name You Were Bom With I Adopted 
Name I Alias I Nicknames): ! · · 
i 
I 
CUrrent Address: · l 
House Numb;r & .~treet ~ame · · f 
Mailing Address: '#.O I VlO l"'fti.\. -1-eO ,E;;.s r 
Home Telephone#~ <i 0 /-79~ ~ O.A51 Message#: 
So~ial Security Number: P 9/-J 7 ~ 0 7C:, 3 
List other Social Security Numberslyou have used: _______ ~--------------
1 
Sex: y1IL Height:.~ ' Wefgbt: 8... D..S Age: :5 / ;Hair Color: B r Race: 
Complexion:U )\~k. Eye Color:...8j.c_ Glasses;~, Contacts.:_k1Q_ Both: t1o 
Circle one: LE or~HAND__W or BOTH 
Date of Birth Otiher Dates of Birth you· ha-ve used: _______ _,__ _ __.__ 
..-z~.- I 
Place of Birth: 14~-e.r/ Q:;~ 1'\. rqr(C -· l;{H ~ 
City i State 
U.S. Citizenship:-~ NO ~her Citizenship (if any):----------
If Resident Alien:~ obtained I Number(s) ____________ _ 
I . 
TAL STATUS (please mark one) 
Single [ ] Divorced [ ] Separated [ ] Widow(er) [ ] 
· Domestic Partner [ ) · 
List all Scars. Tanoos an ics you have (Indicate where on ~our body and describe them): 
k'IA..\ V\A J 6 o. . : +-- Gt r· Cr ,n · 
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Defendan 's Version of the Crime (Your written :version): 
Please write your version of the crinle on the following lines. Stick to the facts, but explain HOW and WHY 
the crime occurred. Please write so fue investigator/interviewer can read it. 'Sign and date your written version 
when you are ,finished. (Use addit.lohaJ. pages if necessary) · " 0 , 
:C(.,Jqf dove/~ lfctt'ft, ~ •~3' f..d__ .~·vAS Q_ ,.;h.,:tc ~ r~.,J/,,7 0Pf"' N fi..~ 
.Ydt ¢£ & !t2Qf .<>< .z:p;.,led a.rt:zu.d. ~',L,,t;l 7Wied ,o..,/ qnd r:;:"vhl 
M'( ..j.o lzqiv-e_ io jO /..,£ Y4-e s•q:LI,~j J~.e wd-~ kMS qb()J!: 
,·
11 C? Af2ocl 1>7 Cd/;;J'/el ::C (2!:.5~ -t!;,~'r Car- 4,d · ~ev.d J~ .Pran.f.&P /f_ 
I ~u{i d ed bk £:' . 
Yom s;gnarm~ t::t~ Date S;8Jled 2-3-J:;L 
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Looking back on it now, how do yo )l feel about having committed the crime(s)?. v\at au~ (.(LL 
0 (j 
Co-Defendant(s) (if any): 
Were you under the influence of: A ' :1 IHUJ -DRUGS -NONE when you conunitted the crirne(s)'l 
(Circle one, both, or none) 
PRIO: ~ARREST AND CONVICTION IDSTORY 
{[] -·· .:1. all J -·· and Adult Mi1 _. mnn. Felonies and Traffic Ci1 ... ! 
Date of Arrest Citv, Cc ~v. & State Crime Sentence 
- /) ;._ ~~ ~ 
I 
-· 
Age at first arrest ·{q 
Were you ever punished for prison br jail miscondu~t? YES I @It Yes, what for: 
I . . 
List the cities or states where you h ~ve been in jail or prison: o_~ CA.-f.-_ l:d. 
I l 
.. 
Have you ever escaped or 
-r to escape from a youth or adult correctional facility. including institutional 
PRESENTENCE QU n:st10NNAIJ ~-PAGE3 
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and/or community release facilities? YES II{;) · 
Have you ever been or are you now n prob~ crt parole? (Including JuveQj.le) fJYI NO 
If yes,list where, when, why and the name of your Probation/Paro~e Officer~ 
F. 004 
Did you have any violations? YES I 0 If yes, what were your violations? -----------
. Natural Father:.___,j:.....__~--.-_::.--P~'-"-='-'o-.;;;;;..,!Luu..:~<~-=~-- Living (YES.~ Age. __ _ 
Address: · · · ·1 · · Home TelePhone ' · · 
What does he do for a living? __ -+/-----,..-~*--11----------------.N~tul"al Mo~er. ad lA. . i dlv..1, Le Edt/~ . . . Living (YES I ~ge: ___;_ . 
Address: . . . · ·· H~me Telephone: · · . 
What does she do for a living?-~~'------~-----~-------------
Step Father:.·_-~· ----------1~------------Living (YES·/ NO) Age:. __ _ 
~~:::·e_s_. ~-e-d-o-'~'-or_a....;li:_'v_i_rt_g?-. ~~~~:.+-+~~~~~~~~~~~:~~~~~~~~~·-·_H_o_Itl_e_T_e_le-pho_n_e_=·-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_~_-_-
- . Step Mother: ------·-+-1 _.------~--'------Living (YES I NO)· Age: __ 
. ·· Address:._· _· _· __:__ _ _,;.__..-.._-·;_· -+j_. __ ...:.;·-~ ______ Home Telephone:_· ··_· -____ ........___ 
What does she do for a living?---!-'-------~----------------
. I . . 
Were you adopted?-YES eo/ If y~, ~t what age:. ___ Who adopted you? ------------
Were you ever in foster· care? YES I. 0 · · ·- t 
How often do you visit family either ~ phone_ ~r in person? _,,_fc=-v:...=e.:....r_~Ft-"C.....L.;~;.,.._~:-.--------
How is your relationship with other ratives? (brothers, sisters, grandparents, cousins, in-laws~ aunts, uncles) 
I . 
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SIBLINGS 
:Number of Brothers: ber of Sisters: 1 Your position in the family: (e.g., 3 of 5) 
Step Brothers: Step Sisters: __ 
Half Brothers: Half Sjsters: __ 
Home Telephone 
Do ony members of your family, ~luding spoijse and close relalivcs, have a crlminal =old? 1l'iWt NO · 
If yes, list who and what tbei< c~ was: W: ft. , 'f&>aAf """ \ "'- :f.'\?7 
I 
DESCI>ffiE YOUR fAMD ,y LIFE 1 ~1111.11.1!2!21! UNTIL YOU Ll!lT IIOME. Include income, li vfug condffions, 
I 
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relationships, sexual and/or physical a~se, health problems, discipline, age when you left home, the reason you 
left home, and any family drug/alcohol abuse. Tell who primarily raised you. (i.e., mother, father, 
grandparents, aunt, UJJcle or foster ho ). Tell what effect, if any, divorces and/or remarriages bad on you. 
Include the positive and negative even in your life. (Use the back of this page or more sheets if necessary) 
) : . . . . ' . 
Have you ever been1he victim of ph~ cal or sexual abuse? YES elf yes, explain:: __ · _____ _ 
Have you e.ver physically or sexually isaulted someone else? YES ~ ·. 
I 
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INTERESTS AND ACTIVITIES 
What do you enjoy doing in your s . are time? ...... G__.~= ..... I1o""fp ...... ,t.L>~~· ,_,_~...>.>::.-Sc""""-~-~~· ~-r-..... SJ'Y"-'p._.o ....... c_:l:-'t-. _\.____ _ _ 
Do you belong ro any type of organizations? YES I NO. Hie?. name them:=_:._.~-~ _ _!_ _ ___ ~-~~~~----
Do you have any gang affiliations? YES ®:>rr yes, whi~h one:-------------
RESIDENCE B1STORY 
(Include Military Duty Stations) 
Present Address: --::;::P--n-.__....;__-+-_L_-6_;bc_Oz.3_ .. f-_· -~_.!....· :...__&_~___;;__~~--4::._f-__;_<"{._itJ_· ~-/~_-_· _ 
o 1 Apt. Nurber . street Name City state Zip . Phone 
J ?CJt 7t:tte a ;t.5 r Date you moved into the residence - -J/ 
Have you moved three or more tim during the past year? YES~ 
Do you like the place in which you live?@ NO Do you plan tO move? YES(§) 
Do you consider your neigbborhoo a high crime area? YES tJ1fD · 
Who are the other occupants in the !home? tJ.} ~ ee ~~~ C\0'\A .qJ-1 > w~~ 
Any children in the home? YES It Please list: · 
List all the weapons in your home, ebicle, or those kept by friends or family members (i.e. rifles, hand~ns, 
BB guns, hunting knives, swords, low darts, martial arts weapons, etc.): -------~-~--
\ . Whete else in ldoho have yoo liv~ f{q f4<Lrc.vo ,!/c.y.k 
1
, j;;,;,; M. 1 
In what other states have you livedt~ y\:,._ s11.f.. U t . I I . 
In what other countries have you li ed?_-~ot\+n"""'a~.tl.c= __ _;: _______________ _ I 4• -=-- . 
~NT RELATIONSHIPBISTORY 
Are you presently involved in a marriase or lationshi~O . 
Name: ' \1\ V\. 8t It\ Y\ ~0 Relationship: ....::(;]::::.....__~ -=C<__'-=-----
Dat.e of Marriage and/or Equivalent I 'J-.- Pf -II : 
Are you ~dissatisfied with ~ur marital or equivalent situation?~ NO 
I 
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PREVIOUS MARRIAGES f SIGNIFICANT PRIOR RELATIONSHIPS 
lsf; c:M.vt cl.l-<. 0~ ~6 
Nhfne of former spouselpartntr Age · Telephone 
Date of marriage or equivalent: [9" ~ '7 . Date relationship end~d~·_,_"f q_q_~----
Reason for the relationship ending: ·ILJe- A_ ;~4 <:;;~-\- '3 ~ 0'1 ~· 
2nd: :TOM-; L.le_r.KS I .Jf g O 
Name of former spouse/partner l Age Telephone 
Dare of marriage or equivalent: lqA# Date relationship ended: {"4' <f ;1.....-
Reason forth~ rela5nship ending: -+\~S!.L.:t.c..-.---~,~~:_.!.__....;_,_ ___ · -------~~--
3td; r ~rl/'" . :53 <ftJ ( .~~ t, 5 
. Name of former spo e/partner Age . . . Telepho!le 
Date of marriage or equivalent: f?J{,p · Date telationship en.ded:__./.....:<t~'?O......._ _ _ 
Reason for the relationship ending· hr. ·d"~L ~ /2_-ecJz,j/1 
CHILDREN 
Full Name Ap;; I Gender City & State Custody Other Parent 
13"'"'1~"' lJuk 15t~t ~~ 31 .YY1 .. w+. . ' 
S'cl~ Bv~~ ~If,'~ 3.;1 I .. ~ 4+-
fk.~Jc.. q(fW~~ Ell~~-~ .7tP I :M ·t-r+-
. a,:,.~ .uq_ E ,;~~~ :;1"'.)... . I ::F •' rpr6'~f Uz . . . ' . '• . 
T3~ctVJ rjc..d.e Ef~~+/)rl r9' I .' fVI " rY]fl 
u. 
' 
(/ I .. , .. 
·, 
. . 
. . 
. ' 
Were you ordered by the Court to pa} child support: YES I NO If yes, how much? $ 
. To whom do you pay the child suppo 't? 
Do you owe back child support? ~ /NO l'f yes. how much? $ 
.E UC ON 
r 
Name of the high school you last at~ded: ~~'--J..-£_'t __ ~;:.__~_;_vJ-=-S_J.....!H_t -r+~-4---=K..:.:..ai..rS=--QI-r l/.e___;__'1f....,_. 
I 
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Date you last attended: -t-__,____,-'-=-+-----
Did you graduate from High Schoo ? YES t!!!P If yes. what year did you graduate?--------
llnm,why? _______ ~----+-----------------------------------------------
Name of C<>llege(s) you h~e --r Olld m~o' (lf an.y): _____________________________ __ 
Did you G.raduate: YES I NO Wh~~ Month and Year? If not. please explain why: ___ _ 
Were you ever suspended or expellbd from school?~ I NO ~ l \17M, t,-..~ ~ I ... J.k[ Please explain why suspended ore\ pelled and reason(s): ff=~y~- :! "'- ·~ 4;(!,..-t~ p! 77~ 
If you didp't go>duate, did you o~oor GED? YES I NO Wh~ did you obtain the GED? Where? ~C.~ B~~· 
Were you ever in ~y kind of Speci Education: Classes or diagnosed with a learning disability? YES I NO 
If yes, please explain:------+-------------~~--------------------
'no you have any problems readingj writing, s~g or understanding English? YES ® 
If so, please explain: --~---r--~---------------------------------------
1 
What fuxeign languages do You ftttly .i!pellk. relid llildlm write1 ----.~----------------
/ MILITARY 
(B+g a copy of your DD Form 214long fonn) 
Are you registered with the Selecti e ServiCe? YES Have you ever served in the military? YES 
If Yes: Date you entered military s rvice: What branch of service?------------------
What was your position and nuilc:C What t<cllnical militMy schools did yon attend and what"""' 
you !m!gbi? I 
I 
. I 
What was the highest rank you hel.Y What was your rank at discharge? 
Did you ever .receive any military \iseiplinary Action (i.e., Article !5, SuiJIIDIIJ:)' court-martial, SpecW cou.i-
PRESENTENCE QUESTIONN --PAGE 9 
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martial, or General court-martial)? SINO If yes, then explain: -------------
Did you ever serve in any recognizJ war zone? YES I NO If yes, where? ----------'---
Date of di~barge: I :· Type of discharge: -------------
EMPWYMENT HISTORY 
Please bring tn last two pay Ytubs 
Present Emplayer: ..... ____ ____,_+---------,..-----:-:----::-----,-------:-:-........;..----:-
Address: --~~~------~+---~-----~~---------,~--------~---
Business Address J · · City State zip 
Telephone:. __________ ---+ Titlc/Position:._~~-----Wage/Salary; ~~-----
. Date you· started this job:_._ __ ---+-1 ___ Is youremployet awaie of this charge:·-·-~-----:--
Your supervisor's name:._. ----+1 _____ _:_ __ _.:.: _____________ --:--
Do you get along with your boss J , like and/or.resjrect hlmlher , willingly follow his/her 
orders , seek bis/her opinidn on· perso~al matters ·? · 
·Do you get along wifu your co-workb? YEs I NO Do you like your work? YES.f NO 
. 
Second Job (if any): ,_,__ _ ___.__-+---------~-~----------
·Address:._......_ __ ....._ ___ +------------~---------~---
. · : Business Address City State Zip 
Telephone:_·_·· ----....:.----1 Title/Position: _______ ~Wage/Salary: -------
Date you started this job:·-----+---- Is your employer aware of this charge: ~-------
Your supervisor's llame.: ___ -4--------------~----------
I PASTEMPLOYERS ~Please list most recent employer first) 
I 
l 
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1. Employer's Name or Business 
Complete Address: Jk, ~d 
Position: bc~r Wa 
, . ·. I rl_ _ I;) 
FAX No. 801-796-0190 P. 011 
2. Entployer•s Name or Business ¥8:!Ue: ~ ~ I~· 
. Complete Address; Sar4 .Lork:.J Giu \ Jj i- Telephone: _______ _ 
Position: txf V-(r WagJSalary: ( Dates Employed-From: 1).06 '3 To: d.,t!Jo :5"" 
Month/Year Month/Year Wh~ did you leave thisjob?____.Yfllc..:..__.:_:~=~------~-----
1 
3. Employer's Name or Business Name:------------------~--
Complete Address: -----+-----------Telephone:---------
Position: ______ wagJalary: ____ Dates Employed; From: To: ____ _ 
I
. MonthlY ear MonthlY ear 
Why did you leave this job?_--t·-----------------------
1 
. . b kills! . I 
WhatJo s experience do you :Pave?-------~--------------
- . I 
Do you have any problems hoi~ steady employment? YES t@ H yes, pl""'e. <>Xplain: _____ _ 
Do you have any physical or ment reasons why you can not WQrk? YES I@ Ji yes, explain: ____ _ 
I 
I 
PRESENTENCE QUESTIONNA1RE ~- PAGE 11 
REVISED; 05/04/09 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 626 of 848
FEB/03/2012/FRI 01:37PM MACEY'S PL. GROVE FAX No. SOt-796-0\90 P. 0\2 
What is the longest period of time y u held the same job? __.3""'---,d+.etl----"'-r....,;S __________ ~ 
During the past year, how many m ·nths total have you been unemployed? __ ::::r.(Q=-----~~----­
Have you ever been fued? YES 
l HEALTH PHYSlCAL A.ND MENTAl HEALTH . (Do ot include Alcoholism or Drug Addiction) 
. I f-~! How wo~ld you describe your physifal health?_.;._~--+-'-~~-=------------------
Do you have any long term, serious ~hysical health proble~: YES@ ·If yes, ~ve a brief d~cription: 
I 
Are you taking ~y prescription meJcations: YES @ If yes, then please complete the following (copy the 
. . . f .. ·. . . . . : ' 
name of the medication from :)lour ~edicine bot*): · . 
. . . 
N arne of Medication ·How often do you take it Wh_y are you taking it 
. . . l ,., . 
. I. 
i 
Do you have any medically dia~o j ph~or.neotal health lbnitatloll$: YES<lM0 l! yes, then explain 
(also list the name of the physician 'fo made the diagnoses): · · · 
Do you have any allergies? YES I 
Have you ever had Surgery? ES rO If yes, then e><plain:_..:._{:h-1-, ·~r-ldfl!=-C:.Jpe_;(:.:::.-=::;z:::.._~------~ 
Have you ever bad any major injllrie\? {!fjJ NO l! yes, then explain; ..:..H..!..11'-l>pf.i....lj\...=..~J ... ?¥*-:;;.._------
I 
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Are you currently under a. doctor's care? YES@ If yes. then explain: ~-----------
Have you·ever consideredlanemp~ suicide? YES~ yes, explain: -------------
Have you ever received psycholo~ (individual mental health and/or family) counSeling? YES (@ 
lf yes, give the name. address and ~lephone number of the doctor and/or counselor: ---------
j ' 
When did you obtain an evaluation and/or begin counseling? _______________ -:--
How often did you atteud counse · g? ------------------------
Why are you; or why were you :Jiving counseling? 
Do you think yoo "would benefit ••r COUD8eling now? ~ lf yes, please explain;-------
Do you feel you need an evaluatio \currently (such as for depre$Sion. anxiety, etc.)? YES~· lfyes, please 
explwm: ____________ ~----------------------------------
Were you ever admitted to a men (psychiatric) Institution: YES 1€M yes. please explain why and 
where, and also include dates of adhussion and discharge: . 
I 
1s there a history of mental health roblems in your family? YES@ yes, please explain: _____ _ 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
ALCOHOL 
I 
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How old were you when you first began drinking a_noholic beverages? 1 ,) 
What alcoholic beverages do you ustally drink? --L-lJ1,J,..;o!::...:~~~=:..... -,~------------:----­
How often do you drink? (D~ily, wejkly, etc.) 1: don~ f · When did you last drink? ...:a&"""·~r~~=-­
Has there been a time when your us~ of alco~ol was more th~ it is now?~ I NO 
If yes. explain:_';{::' l.A!2-L {~ Jl/'11\!c. a- I of 
Where do you usualiy dti~? , j: 8.ov1 '\- ~ With whom?--=-----~-~---
How often do you become intoxicaJ~ on average? =+. cle vt,{ CJn '>1 k- . 
Have you ever attended counseling q~ a treatment prqgram for alcohol abuse issues? YES Qi'9 
If yes, explain when and where: --+1----'------------'--------:--~----­
Did you complete the program(s)? r ·,NO If no, please explain: -------------
If yon cotnpleted tbe piOgram, bow r• aftex completion did you resume drinking? (if at all) _____ _ 
Do ~ou feel you hll:Ve an a:-ohol pro~lem? YES@ lJNSYlffi - . · . . · 
Do you have a desire to stop drinking? YES I NO . 
Is an alcohol treatment program nec~ssary for you at this time? YES~ -~ 
Do you feel you have too many outside obligations (work, family, etc.) to be in -alcohol treatment?· YES:~ . 
'I ~RUG NAME'·. 
'·' t )'b . 1 
AGE ArFlRST USE 
(3 I 
DRUGS 
I. HoW· OFTEN o~~v\. 
I~LASTUSED ,. 
{o · ~i .e-4· r S 
Have you over had couDSeling or a t~tment piOgram for drug abuoe issu .. ? YES I@ 
If yes. please 6Xplain when, where jd for how long; ------------------
1 
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Did you complete the program(s) i I NO If no, please explain: 
Do you have a desil'c to stop using gs? YES I NO 
If you completed the program, ho~l soon at'te.r completion did you resume using drugs? (if at all) 
Do you feel you have a problem w drog use? YES I~ UNSURE 
Is a drug treatment program necess for you at this time? YES Afc)) 
Do you feel yo"ll have too many oufide obligations ~work. famil~) to be in drug treaime_nt? YES@· 
I 
INHALANTS . 
Have you ever used an inhalant to ~et high? YES~ If yes, what did you use? (e.g., glue, pain~. gasoline. 
etc.) ~ow old were you when you first began using inhalants? _____ _ 
How often did you use inhalants? <r·8·· daily, weekly. etc.) When was the last time you used 
anum~t? ________ ~--------------------------------------
Substance Abuse Comments (Do y~u feel yoo haVe a~. your plan for recovery, el<.): ------
MONTHLY BILLS 
Monthly Bill 
I 
Rent ! 
Mortgage Payment 
Cartrruck Payment I 
Finance Company 
Revolving Charg~ (Seaxs/The Bo~credit cards ... ) 
Car!Truck Insurance 'l 
Groceries 
Utilities (Electric/Gas/Water/Pho4e ... ) 
Doctor/Hospital Bills 
Restitution (Not including curren~ ~rime) 
I 
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. 
Balaoce Due: Monthly Payment: 
$ $ 
$ $ 
$ $ 
$ $ 
$ $ 
$ $ 
$ $ 
$ $ 
$ $ 
$ $ 
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'• 
Personal Loan (From Family or F~bnds) $ $ 
Collection Agency $ $ 
Cable TV $ $ 
Other: $ $ 
ECONO:MlCSTATUS 
ASSETS [Anything vou own of va ue (i.e. furniture, weapons, TV. vehicles ... )] Value 
$ 
$ 
s PuRCES OF INCOME PER MONTH 
Emplovment $ 
Food Stamps $ 
Social Security $ 
'•. . · ..
Spouse's Income $ 
Unemployment Benefits $ 
Welfare $ 
Retirement $ 
VA .or Other Disability ·. l $ 
WIC $ 
Other $ 
Have you ever filed Bankruptcy? ~ ~ 
If yes, please explain the reason and bircumstauces: ----~--------~----
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1:\ • 
Are you worried a~ut having suf~cient money to pay debts?. YES ~ . 
In the past year, one or more perso~al checks have "bounced .. or been returned "NSF?" 
Are your wages currently being g~nished? YES 1@ 
l• . 
SELF EVALUATION (your values and outlook on life) 
What is important to you in life? [):Q,...,.' ( l 1 4od.- . 
List the problem areas in your life at have caused you to commit crimes:. 
YEs/®} 
1) __________________ +-~---------------------------------------
~----------------~--------~--------------------------------
3) ________________ ~--------------------------------------~--
How will you work on changing elh of these if placed on p£obation? 
1) I · ·· · 
2) ________________ -+----------------------------------------
3) ____________________ +~------------------------------~~~~---------
I I . 
Considering the crime you have befn convicted of, ,combined with your background and circumstances, the 
most appropriate sentence would br: 'J?ro bafr o """ . Jf you have a plea agreement, what is it 
and do you feel it is fair? :r:: n. n o + CfA \ \ ~ I ~ l . 
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Pe.--al RefJcos (People other than relatives and cu:rent ~ployers) 
· If f. · r r · :YQU · re er, you may bnng in letters o re erence. 
Name Complete Address Telephone Relationship 
~:~~ bN'l~On 1"3 ~ ~~~J3~....,~r Lei tf/hof~ ~0'/ ;,.,-~7 Iff .J.f ~ ~;~ .. d_ 
~'.b.· c.~ & o- ~.e.~ · J A;:;7 /y.J./~ ·t-n--~1>'\dg R~-f~di"~ 'f~ ~b1"S'o"'""' ~ 
\ 
' ~ . ' 
I . 
THE INFORMATION WHICH I lfA VE FURNISHED IN THIS PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION .. 
PERSONAL IDSTORY QUESTIONNAIRE IS TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF~ · . 
KNOWLEDGE. 
IF SOMEONE ELSE FILLS OUT rS QUESTIONNAIRE FOR YOU, THEN tHAT PERSON MUST 
ALSO SIGN AND DATE IT. . 
Date Signed:--------+---
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N arne Printed 
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D ORIGII\IAL 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________________________ ) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fe I 
MOTION FOR ADMITTANCE 
TO BAIL OR RELEASE UPON THE 
DEFENDANT'S OWN RECOGNIZANCE 
AND STAY EXECUTION OF SENTENCE 
PENDING APPEAL 
COMES NOW, the defendant, Jonathan Wade Ellington, by and his attorney, Anne 
Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and moves this court for an order releasing Mr. Ellington on 
bond and stay execution of sentence during the further pendency of the appeal. This motion is 
made pursuant to I.C.R 38(b); I.C.R. 46(d) and I.A.R. 13(c)(8). See also State v. Carrington, 
108 Idaho 539, 700 P.2d 942 (1985) (finding that the right to bail after verdict and pending 
appeal is a matter of procedure and the Idaho Criminal Rules prevail over statutes in matters of 
procedure). 
Good cause to grant the motion exists because Mr. Ellington's appeal is not frivolous, 
presents meritorious legal issues, and was not filed for delay purposes. Mr. Ellington's case 
presents the issue of: 
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A. Improper pre-trial ruling on Brady Issues; motions in limine' and denial of 
motion to continue trial; 
B. Denial of Motion to fire weapon 
C. Improper evidentiary ruling in admitting graphic,and photographic evidence; 
D. Improper denial of motion for mistrial/dismissal based on prosecutorial 
misconduct; 
E. prosecutorial misconduct depriving Mr. Ellington of a fair trail; 
F. Improper denial of defense requested jury instructions; 
G. Improper jury instructions; 
H. Improper denial of Motion to Continue Sentencing; 
I. Abuse of discretion in sentencing; 
J. Misleading Expert Testimony presented by the State; denying Mr. Ellington of 
a fair trial. 
Thus, the issues presented in this case are not frivolous and the appeal was not filed for 
purposes of delay. 
In addition, many of the factors listed in I.C.R. 46(c) favor release. Jon Ellington is not a 
flight risk. Mr. Ellington, after being released in this case upon remand by the Idaho Supreme 
Court, voluntarily surrendered himself to Kootenai County. Mr. Ellington rode a bus for 17 
hours to do so. Mr. Ellington remained in Kootenai County jail until a property bond could be 
secured. Once admitted to bond, Mr. Ellington has abided by the conditions set by the Court. 
Mr. Ellington remained in regular contact with counsel. Mr. Ellington appeared promptly for his 
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trial and for his sentencing. His behavior while out of custody shows he is not a risk to flee. 
Mr. Ellington is a member of a large family. Many family members reside in Utah. Mr. 
Ellington has been allowed to live in Utah with family. Mr. Ellington's family has been 
supportive of him. Family members have assisted him in transportation for work, a stable home 
and transportation to Court. Mr. Ellington's family members will continue to assist him. 
Mr. Ellington has community ties in the Utah area where he has been allowed to reside. 
He is a member of a faith that is popular in the area. He regularly attends and involves himself 
with meetings, activities and friendships from his church. 
Mr. Ellington spent 5 lh years in custody awaiting his appeal. He made significant 
personal changes during that time. Mr. Ellington continues to live the changes. Mr. Ellington 
continues to strive to better himself in his faith and family. He chooses to abide by the rules of 
his faith that prohibit consumption of alcohol. He involves himself with positive activities. 
Mr. Ellington has valid issues for his appeal. Many are identical to the issues addressed 
by the Idaho Supreme Court in the previous appeal. 
Finally, should Mr. Ellington's conviction be vacated on appeal, the length of his post-
trial incarceration is a relevant consideration in determining whether he was denied due process 
such that he could never be retried. In United States v. Antoine, 906 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1990), 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that "extreme delay in the processing of an appeal 
may amount to a violation of due process." !d. at 1382. That court found that "the length of the 
delay is three years - a substfu1tial amount of time." ld The court then went on to find that in 
determining whether there was a due process violation one factor to consider was prejudice to 
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the defendant. !d. In considering this factor, the court recognized that even if the defendant 
could not prove other types of prejudice, "he may have suffered unjust confinement if he 
subsequently brings an appeal and it proves substantively meritorious. Indeed, in such case, a 
due process violation may have occurred even if [the defendant] would not be prejudiced in his 
arguments on appeal or at retrial." !d. at 1383. 
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Ellington respectfully requests that this court admit Mr. 
Ellington to bail or release him on his own recognizance and stay execution of sentence pending 
the conclusion ofhis appeal. 
DATED this ZJo day of March, 2012. 
THE W OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC 
DEF N R OF KOOTEN CO TY 
BY: 
ANNE TAYLOR 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
t\-A.Uj:;) ~ VLV'I...? 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy M=oregoing was personally served by ~ f 
~of the same as indicated below on the day of March, 2012, addressed to: 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
----------------------------
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER IN 
DIRECT APPEAL; RETAINING TRIAL 
COUNSEL FOR RESIDUAL PURPOSES 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender and hereby moves the Court for an Order pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-867, et 
seq., and Rule 13(b ), (12) and (19) for its order appointing the State Appellate Public Defender's 
Office to represent the Appellant in all fiLrther proceedings. This motion is brought on the grmm.ds 
and for the reasons that Mr. Ellington is currently being represented by the Office of the Public 
Defender, Kootenai County; the State Appellate Public Defender is authorized by statute to represent 
Mr. Ellington in all felony appellate proceedings; and it is in the interest of justice, for them to do so in 
this case since he is indigent, and any further proceedings on this case will be appealed. 
DATED this ~ day of March, 2012. 
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DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this JiSt&:;:::;:: day of March, 2012, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER via interoffice mail or as otherwise indicated upon the parties as follows: 
X Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney via Interoffice Mail 
P.O. Box 9000 
X 
X 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3050 Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83 720-001 0 
u 
u 
129 
u 
u 
OCI 
First Class Mail 
Certified Mail 
Facsimile (208) 334-2985 
First Class Mail 
Certified Mail 
Facsimile (208) 854-8071 
Reporter for District Judge John P. Luster, Anne MacMannus, Kari Veare and Valerie 
Nunemacher via Interoffice Mail 
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Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
ThP, Law Office of the Public Defender Kootenai County 
POBox 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
------------------------~ 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER IN 
DIRECT APPEAL; RETAINING TRIAL 
COUNSEL FOR RESIDUAL PURPOSES 
TO: OFFICE OF THE IDAHO STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, AND, ANNE 
TAYLOR, DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER, KOOTENAI COUNTY. 
A judgment having been entered by this Court orally on March 26, 2012, and the defendant 
having requested the aid of counsel in pursuing a direct appeal from this district court in this felony 
matter, and defendant's trial counsel having filed a timely notice of appeal, and the Court being 
satisfied that said defendant continues to be a needy person entitled to public representation, 
therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, in accordance with I.C. 19-870, that the State Appellate Public 
Defender is appointed to represent defendant in all ft.L.rther proceedings involving PJ.s appeal. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that trial counsel shall remain as appointed counsel of record 
for all other matters involving action in the trial court which, if resulting in an order in defendant's 
favor, could affect the judgment, order or sentencing in the action, until the expiration of the time 
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limit for filing said motions or, if sought and denied, upon the expiration of the time for appeal of 
such ruling with the responsibility to decide whether or not a further appeal will be taken in such 
matters. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that trial counsel shall cooperate with the Office of State 
Appellate Public Defender in the prosecution of defendant's appeal. 
DATED this fJ ~ day ofMarch, 2012. 
b-L?Jd~oP~ 
JOHN LUSTER 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this ___;) ':J day of March, 2012 served a true and 
correct copy of the attached ORDER FOR APPO~ OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER via facsimile, interoffice mail or as otherwise indicated upon the parties as follows: 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Kootenai County Public Defender Interoffice Mail 
Facsimile (208) 446-1701 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney [ ] Interoffice Mail 
"'N Facsimile (208) 446-1833 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3050 Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Supreme Court (certified) 
First Class Mail 
Certified Mail 
Facsimile (208) 334-2985 
First Class Mail 
Certified Mail 
Facsimile (208) 854-8071 
For Kootenai County Clerk Processing Appeal: 
Sent 
Supreme Court (certified copy) [ ] 
[ ] 
I I by ___________ ,, Deputy Clerk 
lJ;j)~ 
First Class Mail 
Fax Certified (208) 334-2616 
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BARRY McHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way/Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 446-1800 
ASSIGNED ATTORNEY: 
ARTHUR VERHAREN 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CRF 06-1497 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S POST 
TRIAL MOTIONS 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW, Arthur Verharen, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, and 
hereby submits the state's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Post Trial Motions. 
1. Judgment of Acquittal 
A motion for judgment of acquittal under I.C.R. 29 is limited to the issue of whether 
there was sufficient evidence produced at trial upon which a jury could convict. State v. Griffith, 
127 Idaho 8, 11 (1995). The standard of review for such a motion "is whether there was 
substantial evidence upon which a trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 684 (Ct. App. 2004). In 
assessing such a motion, a court should "give full consideration to the right of the jury to 
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determine the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be afforded evidence, as well as the right to 
draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence before them." State v. Hamilton, 129 Idaho 
938, 941 (Ct. App. 1997). The evidence should also be considered "in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution." State v. Herrera-Brita, 131 Idaho 383,386 (Ct. App. 1998). 
A. Requisite Intent for Murder in the Second Degree 
Murder is defined as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought and 
without legal justification or excuse. I.C. § 18-4001, Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 701. Such 
Malice can be express or implied. I.C. § 18-4002. It is express when there is a deliberate 
intention to unlawfully take away the life of another. Id. It is implied when no considerable 
provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and 
malignant heart. Id. It is the prosecution's burden to prove every element of the crime charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365, 90S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970). 
In Idaho, it has long been the law that there is a presumption of malice when a deadly 
weapon is used in a killing: "By the use of a deadly weapon by one person upon another, and it 
results in unlawful homicide, then malice may be presumed." State v. Snowden, 79 Idaho 266 
(1957), see also State v. Jaco, 130 Idaho 870 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934 (Ct. 
App. 1994); State v. Ziegler, 107 Idaho 1133 (Ct.App.1985); State v. Wolfe, 107 Idaho 676, (Ct. 
App. 1984); State v. Rodriquez, 106 Idaho 30 (Ct.App.1983); State v. Warden, 100 Idaho 21 
(1979); State v. Gomez, 94 Idaho 323 (1971). 
1. Express Malice 
In our case the evidence submitted by the state to the jury was substantial and proved that 
the Defendant acted with express malice when he killed V onette Larsen. The evidence can be 
categorized as physical evidence and testimonial evidence. Most of the physical evidence took 
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the form of photographs ofthe scene. The photographs included the various vehicles involved, 
the damage to those vehicles, road debris, and tire marks left on the road. This evidence 
established the placement ofthe Subaru and the Honda at the time of impact by the Blazer, the 
route of the Blazer during the incident, and the location of Mrs. Larsen's body after impact. 
The physical evidence proved at trial that the Defendant intentionally turned left and 
accelerated into the Honda at a point where there was another alternate escape route. The 
physical evidence established that the Defendant used his vehicle to drive in the wrong lane and 
intentionally push the Honda using maximum acceleration over 48 feet across the road until the 
Honda's passenger side tires were mired in the dirt. During this time the Defendant intentionally 
turned to the left, away from an escape route, as established by the scuff mark on the door of the 
Honda left by the right front wheel of the Blazer. 
The physical evidence established that the Defendant then backed off the Honda, 
accelerated and intentionally turned left staying in the wrong lane rather than continuing straight 
into the open eastbound lane and struck Mrs. Larsen. The physical evidence established that 
there was alternate route for him to leave the area that did not involve running over Mrs. Larson. 
The physical evidence established that the Defendant did not attempt to brake or otherwise avoid 
Mrs. Larsen, but instead it showed that he deliberately accelerated and intentionally drove 
directly into her. The physical evidence established that he intentionally struck Mrs. Larsen and 
ran her over in the wrong lane of travel and left the scene to park his vehicle in an unusual 
location at the Cunningham residence. A reasonable person could draw the inference that he 
attempted to conceal the Blazer at the Cunningham residence. The physical evidence and the 
common sense interpretation of what it illustrated was corroborated and meticulously explained 
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by the state's expert, John Daily. Mr. Daily's testimony was, in general, neither challenged by 
the Defendant nor rebutted. 
In addition to the physical evidence, there was testimonial evidence from the Larsen 
family that witnessed, in varying degrees, the actions of the Defendant. This testimony, although 
challenged in some respects, was not rebutted and was in fact corroborated. The testimony of the 
Larsen family as to the events that took place before Scarcella Road as well as the actions of the 
Defendant in terms of the murder were corroborated by the physical evidence. The sisters' 
account of what took place was further corroborated by the 911 calls. Jolene and Joel Larsen's 
testimony of the placement of Mrs. Larsen before impact and establishing that she was in a 
location visible to the Defendant was corroborated by the pathologist who described injuries 
consistent with being struck and then run over. Joel Larsen's testimony of the timing of the 
shooting as well as shot placement was corroborated by the RMIN expert and Fred Swanson. 
The testimony of the Larsen sisters also established the Defendant's frame of mind in 
terms of his actions on Scarcella Road. They testified that he passed them, stopped in front of 
them and approached their vehicle. He yelled at them and struck their window. He got back in 
his vehicle and then stopped again on Brunner Road and backed quickly up to their car. A few 
minutes later he drove at them in their lane before swerving back to his lane. These actions 
occurred within an hour of the events on Scarcella Road and establish that the Defendant was 
willing to utilize his vehicle to threaten the Larsen sisters. The actions of the Defendant as 
described by the Larsen sisters were consistent with what was heard on the 911 calls. The 
testimony of the Larsen sisters was also consistent with the testimony ofhis former girlfriend as 
to the Defendant's state of mind after his contact with them and just prior to his actions on 
Sca.rcello Road. 
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Additionally, there can be no dispute that the vehicle utilized by the Defendant was a 
deadly weapon. The evidence adduced at trial proved that the Defendant used that deadly 
weapon in a deadly manner. Specifically, he used said deadly weapon in the killing ofVonette 
Larson and in so doing established that he acted with express malice. 
In summary, the state submitted substantial evidence as to the issue of express malice to 
the jury for the charge of murder in the second degree. A reasonable juror could have determined 
there was sufficient evidence to prove the Defendant did manifest a deliberate intention to 
unlawfully kill Mrs. Larsen with malice aforethought. Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient physical and testimonial evidence upon which a 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt in 
order to convict the Defendant of murder in the second degree under the theory of express 
malice. 
2. Implied Malice 
As previously discussed, malice aforethought can also be proven through the showing of 
implied malice. Malice shall be implied "when no considerable provocation appears, or when the 
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart." I. C. § 18-4002. 
Adequate provocation exists when there is a "highly provoking injury inflicted upon the person 
killing, sufficient to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person." Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 
859 F.2d 110, 113 (1988). The elements for implied malice are also forth in the Idaho Criminal 
Jury Instructions, which include when "the killing resulted from an intentional act; the natural 
consequences of the act are dangerous to human life; and the act was deliberately performed with 
knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life." ICJI 702. 
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Generally, because malice aforethought is a condition of a person's mind, "the only way 
to decide what is in his mind is to infer it from his acts and that inference is one of fact for the 
jury." US. v. Celestine, 510 F.2d 457,459 (9th Cir. 1975). As discussed earlier, malice 
aforethought may be inferred from evidence of use of a deadly weapon. US. v. Vallez, 653 F.2d 
403,406 (9th Cir. 1981). A deadly weapon is defined as an "object which, as used or attempted 
to be used, may endanger the life of or inflict great bodily harm on a person," including a 
vehicle. United States v. Sanchez, 914 F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir.1990). 
The state proved malice aforethought under the theory of implied malice by 
establishing that the Defendant used his vehicle as a deadly weapon to inflict great bodily harm 
upon Mrs. Larsen. The physical and testimonial evidence as presented under the theory of 
express malice also supports the theory of implied malice. Setting aside the evidence of the 
Defendant's anger towards the Larsen sister before Scarcello Road, his mental state on Scarcello 
Road was proven based upon several intentional acts. After contact with the Subaru, he 
intentionally turned his vehicle left into the direction of the Larsen sisters, intentionally 
accelerated and struck their vehicle with his and intentionally pushed their vehicle until it could 
not be pushed any further. He then backed off the Honda, intentionally accelerated and 
intentionally turned his vehicle left into Mrs. Larsen and ran her over. Obviously, those 
intentional acts by the Defendant are and were dangerous to human life and he committed those 
acts while having alternate escape routes. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was substantial 
physical and testimonial evidence upon which a trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict the defendant of murder in 
the second degree Uilder the theory of implied malice. 
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B. Lack of Passion 
The Defendant was not entitled to a defense of heat of passion. At the Defendant's 
request, the Court instructed the jury as to the law of self defense. Self defense and heat of 
passion are two different theories that cannot logically coexist in the same case: "The affirmative 
defense of self-defense is, of course, inconsistent with the claim that the defendant killed in the 
heat of passion." Mathews v. US., 485 U.S. 58, 64, 108 S.Ct. 883, 887 (1988). In our case, the 
defense chose to present self defense as their only defense. The defense did not request a heat of 
passion instruction. The jury was instructed as to meaning of heat of passion and the distinction 
between murder and manslaughter. Instruction 28. However, a heat of passion instruction may 
not be appropriate depending on the defense case. Ellis v. Hargett, 302 F.3d 1182 (2002). This 
is especially true when the defense raised is one of self defense: 
Goulsby, like Ellis in the present case, was charged with murder and raised self-
defense as his sole defense. The trial court instructed on self-defense and on heat 
of passion manslaughter as a lesser included offense. The appellate court 
distinguished Lofton partly on the ground that Lofton's "sole defense to murder 
was that the homicide was committed in the heat of passion," whereas Goulsby 
claimed self-defense, not heat of passion. 
Id at 1187, quoting Goulsby v. State, 742 P.2d 567 (Okla.Crim.App.1987). 
Thus, because self defense, not heat of passion, was the chosen defense the instructions 
presented to the jury were appropriate. Furthermore, the evidence set forth at trial did not lay the 
foundation for a heat of passion defense. In order to instruct as to an affirmative defense there 
must be some facts adduced at trial to warrant the pertinent instructions. US. v. Lofton, 76 F.2d 
918, 919-920 (1985). The state is only required to "prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence 
of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide 
case." US. v. Scafe, 822 F.2d 928, 932 (1987) quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704, 
95 S.Ct. 1881, 1892, (1975) (emphasis added by lOth Circuit). Heat of passion was not properly 
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presented in the Scafe case where the defendant testified that the victim had threatened his life. 
Id at 932. Conversely, the facts adduced at trial in the Lofien case established the defendant shot 
the victim because he had molested the victim's daughter. Id at 919. In our case there was no 
basis adduced at trial to suggest that a heat of passion defense instruction should have been given 
to the jury. None of the Larsen family members spoke to the Defendant. None of them 
physically touched the Defendant. The only contact before commission of the aggravated 
batteries was that of the minimal Subaru-Blazer contact. There was no evidence as to the 
Defendant's frame of mind, other than his anger. Thus, a heat of passion defense instruction was 
not warranted because the defense chose self defense and also because there was an insufficient 
factual basis at trial to warrant such an instruction. 
The United States Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur held that "the Due Process 
Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of 
passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case." 421 
U.S. 684, 703 95 S.Ct. 1881, 1892 (1975). Further, the court held that the defendant's due 
process rights were violated by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to prove such 
provocation. Id at 703 and 1892. United States v. Lofton explained that a defendant acts without 
malice when acting upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. However, the United States 
Supreme Court in Patterson v. New York upheld a New York statute that required the defendant 
to prove the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance for the charge of murder in the 
second degree. 432 U.S. 197, 220, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2332 (1977). The Court recognized that 
"extreme emotional disturbance" is the modem equivalent to "heat of passion." Id at 220 and 
2332. Patterson recognized that the holding in Mullaney has been imputed to mean that the 
"State may not permit the blameworthiness of an act or the severity of punis!unent authorized for 
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its commission to depend on the presence or absence of an identified fact without assuming the 
burden of proving the presence or absence of that fact, as the case may be, beyond reasonable 
doubt." Id at 214 and 2329. Patterson cautions that this reading should not be so broadly 
interpreted and declined to "adopt as a constitutional imperative ... that a State must disprove 
beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the 
culpability of the accused." Id at 210 and 215 and 2327 and 2329. The Court acknowledged that 
the "Due Pr<;>cess Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the 
elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged" but refused 
to require the prosecution to prove the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses." Id at 210 and 
2327. By giving due consideration to the court's analysis under Patterson in our case, lack of 
passion can be equated to the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance and should 
not be an element the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt for the charge of 
murder. 432 U.S. at 220, 97 S.Ct. at 2332. 
It is also important to put Mullaney in context. The backdrop for the Supreme Court's 
analysis was a statute that created a presumption. In our case, the instructions provided to the 
jury did not create a presumption or shift the burden of proof or lesson the state's burden of 
proof. As previously mentioned, in Idaho there is a string of cases that stand for the proposition 
that malice may be presumed through the use of a deadly weapon. Had the jury been instructed 
as to that case law the defense argument would have merit. The ultimate issue is whether the 
Court's instructions to the jury required the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the offense 
of second degree murder. More specifically, was the state required to prove the Defendant's 
requisite mental state beyond a reasonable doubt? That is the real impact of Mullany in our case: 
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crime, creating a conclusive presumption as to an element, or shifting to the defendant the 
burden of persuasion on an essential element, is impermissible." State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 
47 (Ct. App. 2000) citing Mullaney. The Court's instructions to the jury did not lighten the 
state's burden. The instructions did not create a presumption or shift the burden of persuasion in 
terms of an essential element. 
The jury was properly instructed in terms of malice and heat of passion. Instruction 28 
described the distinction between malice aforethought and heat of passion. The state was 
required to prove malice in order to prove murder. The jury was specifically instructed that 
"[t]here is no malice aforethought if the defendant acted with adequate provocation while in the 
heat of passion or a sudden quarrel, even if the defendant intended to kill the deceased" 
Instruction 28. The jury was further instructed as to what level of provocation was necessary and 
defined heat of passion. An additional distinction between murder and voluntary manslaughter 
was made in Instruction 27, whereby the jury was instructed that the lesser charge of Voluntary 
Manslaughter includes proof of sudden quarrel or heat of passion without malice aforethought. 
Certainly there was sufficient physical and testimonial evidence presented at trial that 
proved the Defendant was not acting in the heat of passion or with adequate provocation. In this 
case, the Defendant's state of mind must be inferred from circumstances of the case, including 
the Defendant's actions. The Larson sisters did not initiate the contact with the Defendant. The 
Larson sisters did not get out of their vehicle. The Larsen sisters did not use their vehicle to 
threaten the Defendant. They simply followed him while on the phone with a 911 operator. This 
factual scenario does not support a finding of adequate provocation. In a similar vein, the 
evidence proved he was simply angry at the Larsen sisters and not in the heat of passion. He 
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Honda. He used his vehicle to threaten them on Brunner Road and then again on Seasons Road. 
His frame of mind when he got home was consistent with his earlier interactions with the Larsen 
sisters. The evidence proved that he was not acting in the heat of passion, rather it proved that he 
was angry at two young women. 
On Scarcella Road neither of the Larsen vehicles blocked the Defendant from leaving. 
Joel and Vonette Larsen did not get out of their vehicle until the Defendant initiated his attack 
upon their daughters. Joel Larsen could have shot the Defendant after he backed off the Honda 
butchose to shoot at the motor. Joel Larsen only shot at the Defendant after he had murdered his 
wife. The facts set forth at trial proved that there was no adequate provocation in terms of the 
conduct of the Larsen family. The Defendant could have left the area after contact with the 
Subaru but he chose to attack the Larsen sisters and then run over their mother. The evidence 
proved that he was acting intentionally and made conscious decisions to turn his vehicle left, 
accelerate and hit the Honda and then continue pushing it until it was partially off the road. He 
then intentionally turned left into the wrong lane and ran over Vonette Larsen. He made the 
decisions while having an open avenue of escape. This evidence as set forth at trial proved that 
he was not acting in the heat of passion, but was making deliberate choices and intentionally 
using his vehicle as a weapon. 
C. Requisite Intent for Aggravated Battery 
A person commits an aggravated battery who, in committing a battery, causes great 
bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement or through the use of a deadly 
weapon or instrument. I.C. § 18-907. To be found guilty ofbattery, the state must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that force or violence was willfully and unlawfully used against another; or 
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the actual, intentional and unlawful touching or striking of another person against the will of the 
other; or unlawfully and intentionally causing bodily harm to an individual. I.C.§ 18-903. 
In our case the state proceeded to trial under the theory that the Defendant committed 
battery upon the two Larson sisters through the use of a deadly weapon. There can be no dispute 
that the Defendant's vehicle, utilized as it was in this matter, was a deadly weapon. As 
addressed earlier, the evidence adduced at trial was extensive and proved that the Defendant, 
after contact with the Subaru, intentionally turned his vehicle to the left, intentionally accelerated 
and rammed the vehicle containing the Larsen sisters. He then intentionally pushed the vehicle 
using maximum acceleration, turning the wheel to the left away from his escape route, until he 
could push no more. Jovon Larsen suffered significant injuries to her back and her knees were 
bruised. Joleen Larsen's lip was split by the airbag of the Honda. This evidence proved that the 
Defendant committed a battery upon the Larsen sisters and did so through the use of a deadly 
weapon. 
D. Reduction of Murder Conviction to Manslaughter Conviction 
The Defendant argues that this Court should reduce the conviction for murder as reached 
by the jury to manslaughter. However, the authority cited for this procedure is federal authority. 
United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635 (2nd Cir. 2001). The Defendant does not cite to any Idaho 
case law, statute or rule under which this Court could amend a conviction in the manner as 
suggested by the Defendant. As addressed earlier, the evidence was sufficient to support a 
conviction for second degree murder. The decision to convict the Defendant of the charged 
offense rather than an included offense was a decision for the jury: 
Ultimately, it is "the province of the jury to determine whether the evidence in the 
record only supports a conviction of voluntary manslaughter ... or, on the other 
hand, whether there is sufficient proof of malice, to justify a conviction of either 
first or second degree murder." 
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State v. Rodriquez, 106 Idaho 30, 36 (Ct.App.1983) citing Gomez, 94 Idaho at 325. 
2. New Trial 
A. The Verdict 
A new trial may be afforded when the verdict is contrary to law and the evidence 
presented. I. C. § 19-2406 ( 6). A motion for a new trial on the basis that "the verdict is contrary 
to law or evidence" ordinarily "applies to circumstances in which the defendant asks the court to 
overrule the verdict of the jury." State v. Olson, 119 Idaho 370, 372 (Ct. App. 1991). This may 
be construed as a claim that there was not substantial evidence to support the verdict ofthe jury. 
!d. 
Similar to the analysis under I.C.R. 29, the appropriate legal standard of a claim based 
upon insufficient evidence under I.C.R. 34 is "whether a reasonable mind would conclude that 
the defendant's guilt as to each material element of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt." State v. Hamilton, 129 Idaho 938, 941 (Ct. App. 1997). In assessing such a claim a court 
should "give full consideration to the right of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, 
the weight to be afforded evidence, as well as the right to draw all justifiable inferences from the 
evidence before them." Id. In addition, "the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution." Olson, 119 Idaho at 3 72. The issue of whether there existed a sufficient 
factual basis for the jury's verdict has been addressed under the Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal and will not be reiterated. 
B. Jury Instructions 
Jury instructions must inform the jury on all matters of law necessary for the jury's 
information. State v. Halbesleben, 139 Idaho 165, 169 (Ct. App. 2003). "This requires that the 
instructions include every element of the charged offense that the State is obligated to prove." 
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Id, citing State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 716-17 (2002); State v. Buckley, 131 Idaho 164, 165 
(1998); State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 47 (Ct.App.2000). Grounds for a new trial exist "when the 
court has misdirected the jury in a matter of law, or has erred in the decision of any question of 
law arising during the course of the trial." I.C. § 19-2406(5). The appropriate standard for 
assessing whether to grant a new trial based upon erroneous jury instructions is straightforward: 
If the instructions taken as a whole, and not individually, fairly and adequately 
present the issues, state applicable law, and do not mislead the jury or prejudice a 
party, then there is no reversible error. 
State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 64 (Ct. App. 2005). 
The defense argues that pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406(5) "Mr. Ellington should be afforded 
a new trial because the court misdirected the jury" and "[w]ithout the instructions Mr. 
Ellington's counsel could not make appropriate arguments to the jury to support Mr. Ellington's 
defense and to rebut the State's evidence." Motion for New Trial, p. 14. Specifically, the 
defense asserts that the "court misdirected the jury by failing to instruct that the prosecution had 
to prove lack of passion beyond a reasonable doubt in order for the jury to find that Mr. Ellington 
acted with malice aforethought ... " Id Further, the defense argues that the Defendant was 
entitled to jury instructions which included the individual definitions of "willfully," 
"unlawfully," "deliberately," and "with malice aforethought" for the charge of murder in the 
second degree. Id at 15. 
Although the specific definitions of"willfully" and "unlawfully" were not provided for 
the offense of murder in the second degree, such terms are of common knowledge within our 
society and it was unnecessary to define them further for the jury: "Pursuant to Idaho law, terms 
that are of common usage and are generally understood need not be further defined when 
inst•"'Jcting the ju..ry". State v. Cortez, 135 Idl'll}o 561, 565 (Ct. App. 2001). The Defense was 
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successful in convincing the Court to give an instruction explaining the term deliberately- during 
jury deliberations -that was not taken from the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions and was 
opposed by the state. That instruction certainly should not be viewed as being prejudicial to the 
Defendant and should not be a basis for the defense to argue that the Court gave erroneous jury 
instructions. 
The state was required to prove that the murder was willful, unlawful and 
deliberate. Instruction 1 7 mandates as an element that the state prove that the 
Defendant's actions were without justification or excuse, in other words, that they were 
unlawful. Instruction 18 mandates as a requirement for express malice that there is 
"manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to kill a human being." (emphasis added) 
The same instruction also requires the state to prove in terms of implied malice that the 
"act was deliberately performed" by the Defendant. (emphasis added) Thus, the 
instructions provided to the jury did adequately delineate what the state was required to 
prove. 
As previously addressed under the Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, by giving 
due consideration to the court's analysis under Patterson, lack of passion can be equated 
to the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance and should not be an element 
the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt for the charge of murder in the 
second degree. 432 U.S. at 220, 97 S.Ct. at 2332. This is especially true in our case 
where the defense at trial was self defense. As such, the Court was not required to utilize 
Defendant's requested Instruction Number 2, which included lack of passion as an 
element to the charge of murder in the second degree. 
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In event lack of passion is an element that the Court deems the state was required 
to prove then the Court's Jury Instruction Number 28 did illustrate to the jury the state's 
burden in terms of that issue. Instruction 28 described the distinction between malice 
aforethought and heat of passion. Additionally, the Court appropriately made the 
distinction between murder and voluntary manslaughter with Jury Instruction Number 27 
and defined voluntary manslaughter to include proof of sudden quarrel or heat of passion 
without malice aforethought. Therefore, the proposed defense instructions were properly 
denied. 
The jury in our case was provided with the applicable and Idaho Supreme Court 
approved instructions regarding the charge of murder in the second degree, and taken as a 
whole, adequately presented the proper issues, applicable state law and did not prejudice 
the Defendant nor mislead the jury. Further, there is no indication that the Instructions 
provided in this case, taken as a whole, were inaccurate or misleading and thus cannot be 
a basis for a new trial. 
C. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
I. C. § 19-2406 sets forth statutory limits under which a motion for a new trial must fall. 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 397 (Ct. App. 2000). The decision by a trial court to grant a 
new trial is discretionary, however the basis or reason must fall within the statute. State v. 
Morgan, 144 Idaho 861, 865 (Ct. App. 2007). Prosecutorial misconduct is not a basis for a new 
trial under I.C. § 19-2406. State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469 (2007). However, I.C. § 
19-2406(5) provides a basis for new trial when the court has "erred in the decision of any 
question oflaw arising during the course of the trial." 
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In our case, the Defense argues the Court "erred by denying Mr. Ellington's motions for 
mistrial and to dismiss the Information." Motion for New Trial, p. 23. Said motions were 
premised on alleged patterns of prosecutorial misconduct resulting from a "continued reluctance 
to obey court orders" and playing on the jurors' emotions. Id at 29. The Defense also alleges the 
prosecution "committed a Brady violation mere days before trial by failing to disclose material 
exculpatory information that excluded Mrs. Larsen's palm prints from those discovered on the 
Blazer." Id at 24. Further, the Defense argues the "State violated the court's order and profited 
from its Brady violation by calling attention to ... improperly held evidence by twice referencing 
a "fingerprint" when questioning a witness, in violation of this court's order." Id at 24. 
As indicated, prosecutorial misconduct is not amongst the grounds for which a new trial 
may be ordered. Additionally, the Court previously ruled on such motions and properly denied 
Defendant's Motion for Mistrial and Dismissal based on the allegations ofprosecutorial 
misconduct. However, in the event the Court is inclined to reexamine those issues then the state 
again maintains that the due process rights of the Defendant were not abridged. 
Under Brady v. Maryland, a defendant's due process rights are violated if the state 
withholds evidence that is favorable to the accused when the evidence is material to either guilt 
or punishment. 373 U.S. 83, 87, S. Ct. 1194, 1197 (1963). Evidence is material "only if there is 
a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." United States v. Kohring, 637 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
The court in US. v. Johnson found that "[w]here the government makes Brady evidence 
available during the course of a trial in such a way that a defendant is able effectively to use it, 
due process is not violated and Brady is not contravened. 816 F.2d 918, 924 (N.J. 1987). So 
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long as Brady evidence is made available to the defense, even if during trial, a due process 
violation is not triggered. United States v. Clark, 538 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir.1976). Under I.C. § 
19-2406 (5) a "district court has wide discretion to grant or disallow a new trial, and, on appeal 
... [shall] not disturb that exercise of discretion, absent a showing of manifest abuse." State v. 
Mack, 132 Idaho 480, 483 (Idaho App. 1999). 
As previously discussed in the state's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, the state provided forensic evidence ofthe handprints found on the Defendant's Blazer 
to the Defense several days before trial. The Court exercised its discretion in fmding that a 
Brady violation did not occur. Absent a showing of abuse of discretion, the Court's denial for 
mistrial and dismissal based on the alleged Brady violation should not be disturbed. 
The Court issued an order to prohibit questioning or reference to the handprint evidence. 
The state, by mistake, referenced the handprint in the questioning of a witness resulting in a 
harmless error. Under the harmless error test, the defendant must prove that prosecutorial 
misconduct occurred and the court must find beyond reasonable doubt that the misconduct did 
not contribute to the jury's verdict, so that the error was harmless and not reversible. State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). The defense contends that the evidence of the handprints 
could have been used to impeach witnesses in regards to Mrs. Larsen's positioning at the time 
she was hit by the Defendant's vehicle. Motion for New Trial, p. 26. The defense is correct that 
such evidence could have utilized during trial and the defense had ample opportunity to do so but 
it was the Defendant's choice to decline to use that evidence. 
While the State agrees that the mention of the handprint was in violation of the Court's 
order in the questioning of a witness, there is no indication that such a mistake contributed to the 
jur"y's decision to con·vict the Defendant of murder in the second degree and two cou..11ts of 
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aggravated battery. There was substantial evidence presented by the Larsen family regarding the 
fact that Mrs. Larsen was standing before she was struck by the Defendant's Blazer. The 
pathologist also testified that Mrs. Larsen had injuries consistent with being struck in her torso 
area that corroborate Jolene and Joel Larsen's testimony that Vonette Larsen was visible to the 
Defendant. Moreover, the Court instructed the jury that "V onette L. Larsen's prints were not 
found on the hood of the Blazer." Jury Instruction Number 42. As such, the error was harmless 
and the Court's denial of Defendant's Motion for Mistrial and Motion for Dismissal was proper 
and should not be a basis for a new trial. 
Additionally, the Defense references prosecutorial misconduct through allegations of 
playing on jurors' emotions through the use of the phrase "ran over your wife" and the word 
"anger" in relation to the questioning of Ann Cunningham. Motion for New Trial, p. 31. The 
Court denied Defendant's Motion for Mistrial on the basis that it would be impossible to avoid 
putting some measure of context to the point in time after which Mrs. Larsen was ran over by 
Defendant's vehicle. Rough Draft, p. 5. The Court also determined the state did not over-utilize 
the phrase, "ran over your wife" and noted that objections would have been made had related 
concerns arisen. Id It is likely the Court would have also objected had concerns arisen 
regarding the use of the word "anger." Absent a showing of abuse of discretion, the Court's 
denial for mistrial should not be disturbed. 
D. Juror Misconduct 
Grounds upon which a new trial may be granted include any juror misconduct "by 
which a fair and due consideration of the case has been prevented." I.C. § 19-2406 (3). "There 
is a two-fold test for determining whether a defendant is entitled to a new trial due to juror 
misconduct. "First, the defendant must present clear and convincing evidence that j11ror 
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misconduct has occurred. Second, the trial court must be convinced that the misconduct 
reasonably could have prejudiced the defendant."" State v. Reutzel, 130 Idaho 88, 96 (1997) 
citing State v. Seiber, 117 Idaho 637, 640 (Ct.App.1990). 
The defense in Bellville v. Ford Motor, Co., Inc. argued "that a new trial is warranted 
because one juror prepared a series of questions and answers while at home during a break in 
deliberations and discussed these notes with the jury." 319 Fed.Appx. 525, 527 (9th Cir. 2009). 
Further, the defense claimed the 'juror's notes contradicted the district court's jury instructions 
and referred to excluded evidence." Id However, the court held that the juror's notes could not 
be used to impeach the verdict because they were not extraneous information, but merely 
reflected the juror's internal thought process. Id, Fed.R.Evid. 606 (b); and Tanner v. United 
States, 483 U.S. 107, 117, 107 S.Ct. 2739 (1987). Ultimately, the court found "that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the notes were not extraneous information 
and could not establish juror misconduct." Ford Motor, Co., Inc., 319 Fed. Appx. at 527. 
In our case, the defense alleges that "On the Monday morning following the weekend 
break from deliberations, a juror brought in at least one type-written question to the jury room ... 
and it is reasonable to conclude that prejudice could have occurred due to the jury's exposure to 
extraneous evidence and improper deliberation process by a juror's continued efforts to 
deliberate independently, outside the presence of other jurors." Motion for New Trial, p. 33. 
However, the defense does not provide a copy of the alleged juror question, nor indicate exactly 
what the question said. As such, the defense fails to present clear and convincing evidence that 
such misconduct did in fact occur, as there is no evidence corroborating such an allegation. 
However, if it were established by clear and convincing evidence that juror misconduct 
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internal thought process. There is no indication or method of proving that the note was prepared 
by reviewing or consulting extrinsic evidence as the defense even admits that "a juror may have 
considered ... extraneous evidence." Motion for New Trial, p. 33. This situation is similar to 
the case in Ford Motor, Co., Inc. except there is no evidence in our case that the juror referenced 
excluded evidence. As such, it would be unreasonable to assume that such misconduct 
prejudiced the Defendant in any manner and Defendant's Motion for New Trial should be denied 
on the basis of juror misconduct. 
E. New Evidence 
I.C. § 19-2406 (7) permits a new trial to be granted on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence. There are four factors that must be met by a defendant seeking a new trial on the basis 
of new evidence. State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691 (1976). The factors the Defendant must 
demonstrate are as follows: "(1) the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the 
defendant at time of trial; (2) that the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; 
(3) that it will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) that failure to learn of newly discovered 
evidence was not due to a lack of due diligence on the part of the defendant." Id. Each and 
every factor must be met by a defendant. State v. Pugsley, 119 Idaho 62, 63 (Ct. App. 1991). 
The burden is substantial: 
Motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are disfavored and 
should be granted with caution, reflecting the importance accorded to 
considerations of repose, regularity of decision making, and conservation of 
scarce judicial resources. 
State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144 (Ct. App. 2008), quoting State v. Hayes, 144 
Idaho 574, 577 (Ct. App. 2007). 
In our case, the defense argues that newly produced evidence should serve as a basis for a 
new trial. Such evidence involves testimony offered by the state's expert witness, John Daily. 
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Motion for New Trial, p. 36. The new evidence is based upon allegations that Mr. Daily falsely 
testified during trial regarding the theory of rotational mechanics thereby misleading the jury in 
relation to the collision between the Defendant's Blazer and the Larsens' Subaru and the 
consequences of the subsequent Blazer and Honda collision. Id at 37. Specifically, it is argued 
that Mr. Daily applied the wrong formula in his calculations in regards to the Blazer-Subaru 
collision. Id Further, it is alleged that Mr. Daily's testimony which described the tire marks 
made by the Blazer after striking the Subaru as acceleration marks was false and misleading. Id 
The above mentioned allegations are based upon assertions that Mr. Daily's trial testimony was 
inconsistent with his textbooks, Fundamentals of Crash Reconstruction and Fundamentals of 
Applied Physics for Traffic Accident Investigators. The defense expert, Mr. David Rochford, 
claims to have discovered such inconsistencies upon completion of the trial. Id at 38. However, 
Mr. Daily's testimony at trial was wholly consistent with his written publications, most notably 
his textbooks, Fundamentals of Crash Reconstruction and Fundamentals of Applied Physics for 
Traffic Accident Investigators. Plaintiff's Exhibits 1-12. Furthermore, the conclusions reached 
by Mr. Rochford in his pretrial report as well as his post trial affidavit are questionable. 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1-12. As such, the defense allegations of new evidence fail. 
In the alternative, if such "new evidence" were to be evaluated under the Drapeau test, 
all four prongs of the test would fail as well. The evidence the defense is claiming to be newly 
acquired evidence is derived from Mr. Daily's textbooks , Fundamentals of Crash Reconstruction 
and Fundamentals of Applied Physics for Traffic Accident Investigators, both of which were 
originally published prior to trial in this matter. Also prior to trial, the defense was provided 
with Mr. Daily's Curriculum-Vitae, which included Mr. Daily's specialized training in Traffic 
Accident In,vestigatior~/Reconstruction, teac:b.ing experience, list of publications and awards. 
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Curriculum-Vitae, Plaintiffs Exhibit 2. As acknowledged by the defense, Mr. Daily referred to 
his published work several times throughout his testimony. Motion for New Trial, p. 38. At any 
time before or during trial, the defense could have acquired Mr. Daily's textbook and used it to 
impeach his credibility as a witness, but chose not to do so. I.R.E. 613 (b). Mr. Daily's prior 
written publications were well known and accessible to the defense before and throughout the 
trial and thus prong one fails. 
Next, it is argued that Mr. Daily's alleged incorrect usage of the theory of rotational 
I 
mechanics was material, as it mislead the jury into believing the Defendant intentionally caused 
the second crash between the Blazer and the Honda, as opposed to being rotated in that direction 
due to the force of the collision between the Blazer and the Subaru. Motion for New Trial, p. 37. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that the defense is correct in arguing that a different theory 
should have been utilized in evaluating the collision, this evidence is merely impeachment 
evidence and is not material. Evidence is material "only if there is a reasonable probability that, 
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different." Kohring, 637 F.3d 895 at 902. 
Mr. Daily's testimony that the Blazer merely sideswiped the Subaru and was not spun in 
a counterclockwise direction was not solely based on the theory of rotational mechanics, but was 
. corroborated in part by evidence of damage to the two vehicles. According to Mr. Daily, the 
damage to the Subaru was slight, indicative of a minor interaction between the two vehicles that 
would not cause a counterclockwise rotation of the Blazer. Trial Testimony, Rough Draft, p. 46. 
Sufficient physical evidence in the form of photographs was introduced at trial to support Mr. 
Daily's testimony and thus new evidence of a different theory is not material and is proper for 
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Similarly, the defense alleges Mr. Daily falsely identified the acceleration marks on the 
roadway. Motion for New Trial, p. 39. The defense argues the identification of such marks was 
not consistent with photos depicted in his outside written work, which would indicate rolling and 
side-slipping of the tires and not of acceleration. Id at 37. Mr. Daily testified the tire marks 
created by the Blazer were indicative of acceleration. However, Mr. Daily does not conclusively 
rely on the actual marks on the roadway, as he additionally evaluated the placement of the Honda 
after being engaged by the Blazer, the damage caused to both vehicles, soil berm on the Honda's 
passenger tires, the placement of debris, and tire scrub on the Honda in his determination that the 
contact with the Subaru did not cause the Blazer to impact the Honda. Trial Testimony, Rough 
Draft, p. 54-66. Thus, there was sufficient physical evidence presented at trial to support Mr. 
Daily's testimony and evidence of the disputed acceleration marks is not material and is proper 
for impeachment purposes only. 
For much the same reasons element two fails, the third part of the Drapeau test also fails. 
New evidence regarding a different theory that should have been used by Mr. Daily and new 
evidence regarding the alleged falsity of the acceleration marks would probably not result in an 
acquittal of the Defendant. The corroborating evidence of the damage to the Blazer and the 
Subaru indicates that the collision was slight and therefore did not fully rotate the Defendant's 
vehicle directly into the path of the Honda. Additionally, the damage to the Blazer was near the 
center of the vehicle and not to the rear of the vehicle. The evidence demonstrates that the 
Defendant's intent in making a sharp left turn was to intentionally run into the Honda. Further, 
the evidence regarding how far the Honda was pushed by the Blazer, damage to the vehicles, soil 
berm around the passenger tires of the Honda, the location of debris and tire scrub mark on the 
Honda, combine to explain the effect of :fiJll throttle acceleration. Given the sufficiency and 
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extensiveness of the physical evidence in this case, the allegations of newly acquired evidence 
would not probably have produced an acquittal. 
Lastly, the fourth prong of the Drapeau test has not been met, as the defense could have 
easily discovered, through due diligence, Mr. Daily's allegedly inconsistent statements by 
reviewing his written work. The defense knew Mr. Daily was going to be called as a witness and 
were put on notice of his prior written works. They had ample opportunity to investigate and 
review his published material. It was only after the trial that Mr. Rochford took the time to read 
Mr. Daily's textbook and other publications. Motion for New Trial, p. 38. With due diligence, 
such evidence could have been discovered and introduced at trial. 
It is a defendant's burden to provide evidence in support of a motion for a new trial. I. C. 
§ 19-2406 (7). Here, the defense failed to prove that the alleged new evidence meets the 
required four factor test found in Drapeau. Thus, the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial 
should be denied on the basis of new evidence. 
3. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above stated reasons, the state respectfully requests that the Defendant's 
Post Trial Motions be denied. 
I 
DATED this J/L_ day of April, 2012. 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 1.lz_ day of April, 2012, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was caused to be Fi\JffiD to PlJBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE A~u~~~ 
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I 
/ Log of lK-COURTROOMl o• '6/2012 Page 1 of4 
Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20120326 Sentencing 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth 
Court Reporter Amy Wilkins 
PA Art VerHaren 
PA Barry McHugh 
OA Anne Taylor 
OA John Adams 
I Date 113/26/20121 Location 111 K-COURTROOM1 
Time II Speaker I Note 
03:13:37 PM D Calls case- PA VerHaren, PA McHugh, OA Taylor, OA Adams 
present with defendant - not in custody - for sentencing 
03:14:09 PM I PA Ready VerHaren 
03:14:14 PM !loA Taylor I Ready 
03:14:22 PM D I have received a number of supplemental sentencing information from the defense and I assume that the state has been provided copies of all documentation submitted. 
I 03:15:15 PM E:=J I have received them and have no information for the court 
considering them. 
I 03:15:27 PM !loA Taylor II Provides corrections to PSI 
I 
I 03:31:45 PM I PA Provides corrections to PSI - calls Jamie Larsen VerHaren 
I 03:34:23 PM II Jamie II I'm not going to do it. I 
03:34:27 PM PA IJovon has a statement she wants to read. 
I VerHaren 
03:34:45 PM J She can read the statement and if OA wants to XE her on it we 
can allow that. 
03:35:13 PM c Swears 
03:35:28 PM #1 Jovon Larsen - reads statement 
03:40:53 PM XE None 
03:40:56 PM PA Calls #2 
03:41:13~~ wears 
03:4-4.~3 r 2 ! D 11 1:lnhhu11 0 B d t t t 
.• ·--- ·- ----7 e oer - rea s s a emen 
03:43:47 PM XE 'None 
03:43:50 PM PA No further witnesses or evidence. 
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03:44:00 PM DA !calls #3 
03:44:04 PM c Swears 
03:44:19 PM Mark Ellington - Jonathan is my brother. I'm the youngest. I have 
a brother and sister between us. I live in Ogden, UT. We have 10 
siblings. One died when he was 14- hit by a car. Our siblings are 
in UT, Missouri, Georgia, Montana and Idaho. In Utah there are 4 
living there excluding Jonathan. I'm aware why we are here today. 
I brought him here for court today. I've been able to see him for a 
few times. He's been living with me the last week and I've spent a 
#3 fair amount of time together. Before he went to prison I spent time 
with him. There is a huge difference between that time and now. 
He's focused on where he's going and has become very religious 
and dedicated. I also share that same faith- I'm LDS. Most of us 
share the same faith. We use no alcohol, tobacco or drugs. We 
have talked about Ms. Larsen losing her life - he says he thinks 
about it every day and it is constantly on his mind. I'll stand by my 
brother and support him. We have children and my wife is very 
particular who is around them and he's welcome in our house. 
03:48:11 p !None I 
03:48:12 p !calls #4 I 
03:48:15 p c !swears I 
03:48:44 PM Daniel Hayes - clinical psychologist - practicing in Idaho 20 years 
and in the field 38 years. I have met Jonathan on 2 occasions -
June 2006 and July 2011. Each time I spent just under 3 hours 
with him. On the second occasion I noticed there was quite a bit 
#4 of change in him and from others as to why they think he's 
changing. A lot of people try to con. I think there was a quality 
difference and that there are significant changes in this individual 
and that they are real changes. After you work with people as long 
as I have you kind of pick up on it. 
03:51:02 PM XE#4 by Re: past characterizations of Mr. Ellington in report. I wrote that at 
PA the time. What I meant by "criminal" is robbery, burglaries and the 
VerHaren like. I believe I was aware of his assaults and it was in the report. 
03:53:31 PM Those are things that came out of the 2006 report. Mr. Ellington 
informed me about those things. Prior to age 15 he had no 
troubles and then he dropped out of school and got into drugs and 
RD#4 by alcohol and his problems stemmed around those. In 2011 when I 
DA Taylor saw him again i saw him as a different person. Certain things 
change people. He hit his threshold and there was a shift in 
attitude and behavior. I think the events of that day and the 
incarceration changed him significantly. 
I 03:55:16 PM IJ Excused 
I 03:55:24 PM j~A Taylor I No additional witnesses I 03:55:30 PM Ill Recommendations - we think the appropnate sentence 1s the one 
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you handed down before 25 years 12 fixed and agg battery 15 
years with 7 fixed. The conduct of that day is not something I'll 
belabor. What he did that day was something he did by choice. 
He made the choice to drive across the road. His choices were 
deliberate. He caused substantial injuries to Jovon and took the 
life of another person. I've never met Vonette but she seems to be 
PA a remarkable woman. The other reason is because he's not taken 
VerHaren responsibility for what he did. The focus should not be as high on 
rehabilitation in a case where one doesn't take responsibility for 
what he's done. The other basis for the recommendation is his 
past criminal history. There is a pattern of assault and violence on 
other people and substance abuse driving related offenses. In this 
case those things had an influence on what happened. Relates 
criminal history and convictions. We think that the sentence you 
handed down was appropriate and he should go to prison. 
04:01:53 PM It sounds like the state is inviting you to look back at a conviction 
that was based on perjured testimony and prosecutorial 
misconduct. I though today about what I should tell you about Jon. 
When he got out of the car at Ramsey and Brunner he got back 
in. What he didn't do was anything else. He left. He didn't go 
home because there were people behind him. He didn't stop his 
car, get out or anything- he kept going. On Seasons he went fast 
to lose the people behind him. He stayed there for 30 minutes and 
left. When he saw the people there he tried to leave. At Scarcella 
he tried to leave -he had 12 seconds and tried to leave. He's 
always felt badly that Ms. Larsen lost her life, that he hit them. He 
always maintains that he didn't intentionally his Ms. Larsen or the 
car. He's a person who struggled with alcohol in the past. He 
struggled. He's a guy to thinks about what happened every day-
not feeling sorry for himself but bad about what happened. Think 
DA Taylor about what's happened in the last 6 years. In KC he spent 23 hours per day in lock down awaiting trial - for almost a year. 
Transported to prison and he worked to change himself and to 
look at where his life had been, where he was and what he could 
do. He went back to the faith that he was raised in and that was 
the only program that was available to him but that's exactly what 
he needed. We submitted a letter from his Bishop in prison about 
his commitment. He was choosing behaviors to make his life 
better. He has remorse. The court takes into account the Twohill 
factors. Society doesn't need him to serve one more day in prison 
- he spent 2,128 days in jail and society is not better protected by 
him spending more time in prison. He's made changes and 
focuses on his family and religion. The Ellington family does not 
all live in Kootenai County. You've heard from 2 in court and more 
by letters. He has the support of his family. You have to look at 
what he's done since the conviction was vacated. He was 
--1-----1 ---1 -----.&. .&.- I IT ---1 --.-1- -I t::m~i::l::St::U i::liiU WI::: Ill LU U I C:UIU ! UUC::: a 
f14:~fJ Reviews written statement 
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04:16:52 PM DA 
04:17:15 PM 
J 
04:35:17 PM DA 
04:35:48 PM 
J 
04:36:17 PM 
04:36:17 PM End 
The only legal reason to not proceed to sentencing is the pending 
motions 
GUlL TY 2ND DEGREE MURDER AND 2 COUNTS 
AGGRAVATED BATTERY ON JURY FINDINGS comments I 
have to look at this case from a fresh perspective - I'm familiar 
with the facts of this case and will never be able to make sense 
out of the actions that day. It's not my task to fix things and make 
things whole. I have to consider the facts and the individual that 
comes in front of the court. You've had a long history of 
irresponsible life style. By your own admissions you worked hard 
and played hard and had a basic disregard for the safety of 
others. You were basically a disaster waiting to happen. I believe 
that you are sincerely sad at the death of Ms. Larsen but I don't 
think that you've taken full responsibility. I acknowledge that you 
have changed since you were here last time. There is still some 
work to be done and substances abuse issues don't go away by 
simple abstinence. You took advantage of some programs but 
there is still work to be done. I see you have made positive strides 
in that regard. I don't agree that the same sentence needs to be 
imposed when I take into account all the circumstances. 2ND 
DEGREE MURDER 18 YEARS 8 FIXED BATTERY 10 YEARS 6 
FIXED EACH COUNT- ALL TO RUN CONCURRENT FIND 
SUBSTANTIAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROBLEM AND 
RECOMMEND THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY CREDIT FOR ALL 
TIME SERVED IN THIS CASE SINCE ARREST 1/1/06 
EXCLUSIVE OF THE TIME ON RELEASE ON BAIL. We have 
motions set April 24 and we don't want defendant transported 
prior to the hearings. 
Submits motions for the Court to consider- appointment of state 
appellate PD and motion for appeal bond release 
Order appointment of state appellate PD. As far as the motion to 
stay and appeal bond I'll allow that to be presented at our April 
hearing. 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www. fortherecord .com 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
vs. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
DOB
SS# 
Defendant 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
( 
'· 
Case No. CR 06-1 
JUDGMENTANDSENTENCE 
On March 26, 2012, before the Honorable John Patrick Luster, District Judge, you, 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, personally appeared for sentencing. Also appearing were 
Barry McHugh, Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, Idaho, Art VerHaren, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, Idaho, and your lawyers Ann Taylor and John Adams. 
WHEREUPON, the Court reviewed the presentence report and the Court having ascertained 
that you have had an opportunity to read the presentence report and review it with your lawyer, and 
you having been given the opportunity to explain, correct or deny parts of the presentence report, 
and having done so, and you having been given the opportunity to make a statement and having 
done so, and recommendations having been made by counsel for the State and by your lawyer, and 
there being no legal reason given why judgment and sentence should not then be pronounced, the 
Court did then pronounce its judgment and sentence as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND IT IS THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT that you, 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, having been found guilty ofthe criminal charge(s) stated in 
the Information on file herein as follows: 
COUNT I, MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, I.C. §18-4001, 02, 03, 
COUNT II, AGGRAVATED BATTERY, I.C. §18-903(a)(c), §18-907(b) and 
COUNT Ill, AGGRAVATED BATTERY, I.C. §18-903(a)(c), §18-907(b), 
felonies. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that on the charge of 
COUNT I, MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, I.C. §18-4001, 02, 03 you are 
sentenced pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-2513 to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections, 
to be held and incarcerated by said Board in a suitable place for a fixed term of eight (8) 
years to be followed by an ten (10) years for a total unified sentence not 
to exceed eighteen (18) years. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that on the charge of 
COUNT II, AGGRAVATED BATTERY, I.C. §18-903(a)(c), §18-907(b) you are 
sentenced pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-2513 to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections, 
to be held and incarcerated by said Board in a suitable place for a fixed term of six (6) 
years to be followed by an indeterminate term of four (4) years for a total 
unified sentence not to exceed ten (10) years. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that on the charge of 
COUNT Ill, AGGRAVATED BATTERY, I.C. §18-903(a)(c), §18-907(b) you are 
sentenced pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-2513 to the custody ofthe Idaho State Board of Corrections, 
to be held and incarcerated by said Board in a suitable place for a fixed term of six (6) 
years to be followed by an indeterminate term of four (4) years for a total 
unified sentence not to exceed ten (10) years. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment and sentence on all counts shall run 
concurrent. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that you shall receive credit for time served following arrest 
January 1, 2006. 
Defendant is remanded to the custody ofthe Department of Corrections commencing March 
26, 2012. 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
YOU, JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that you have a 
right to appeal this to the Idaho Supreme Court. Any notice of appeal must be filed within forty-two 
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(42) days ofthe entry ofthe written order in this matter. 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that if you are unable to pay the costs of an appeal, you 
have the right to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis or to apply for the appointment of 
counsel at public expense. If you have any questions concerning you right to appeal, you should 
consult your present lawyer. 
ENTERED this .Ay\J day of Aoc•' ( , 2012. 
~~,~~~--------
:J~ \)J:J'--~~ 
JOHN PATRICK LUSTER 
District Judge 
CERTIFICAT{'pF MAIL E 
I hereby certify that on th&~ of_-hnq':~~~-­
foregoing Judgment and Sentencing Disposition were 
___1:,___ .t..jl/&, _ \)S2_ , Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County interoffi~ mail to: (/ _ / 1i 
l__ ?/'-/19 .:... 2# , Defense Attorney 
__ Defendant, , c/o KCSO 
__ Idaho Department of Correction (via fax 208 327-7445) 
__ Probation & Parole-d-mail Distl @idoc.idaho.gov 
$__Kootenai County Sheriffs Department "/'/& ~JJ.b1 
__ Idaho Dept. of Transportation (via fax 208-334-8739) 
__ Information Systems Department, Idaho Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, 
W. 451 State Street, Boise, ID 83 720 
__ Department of Corrections 
Central Records 
Idaho Department of Corrections 
1299 N. Orchard Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83 706 
(FAX) 208) 327-7444 or 7445 ' /] 
CCD Sentencing Team- e-mail CCDSentencingteam@ii·ro.gov 
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[}ORIGINAL 
Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
STAT£ Of IDAHO 1 
COUNTY Of KOOTENAI1 SS 
FILED:/q~ 
2012 APR I 9 AH 9: 44 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________________________ ) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Anne C. Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defender, moves the Court for an Order Shortening Time for hearing the Motion 
for Reconsideration of Sentence in this matter. 
This motion is made pursuant to I.C.R. 45(c) and 12(d) on the grounds that will be 
presented orally in Court. 
DATED this \C\ V:ay of March, 2012. 
BY: 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 
OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI 
C0)'1NlY PUBLIC JPPFEND~ 
(Akvho~lJ 
ANNE TA YLQ:I{"' 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by facsimile 
on the \0\ day of March, 2012, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor by 208-446-1833 
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~·'"""" u THU 12 OZ9 FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER ~~~ Lu.ter 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
~ 001/002 
v. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
OF SENTENCE PURSUANT TO 
I.C.R. 35 
Defendant. 
_____________________________ ) 
COMES NOW the above named defendant by and through his attorney, Anne Taylor, Deputy 
Public Defender, and pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 3 5 requests the Court to reconsider the 
Judgment and Sentence entered herein March 26,2012. This motion is made as a plea for leniency. 
Counsel requests a hearing be scheduled in order to present oral argument and/ or testimony in 
support of the foregoing motion. Requested time is 30 minutes . 
.. -/ 
DATED this . f:.b · day of April, 2012. 
BY: 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
OF SENTENCE PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 35 
THE LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER OF KOOTENAI COUNTY ~ 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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[) ORIGhliAL 
Anne C. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
Fel 
v. 
REPLY BRIEF 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
__________________________) 
COMES NOW, Jonathan Ellington, the above named defendant, by and through 
his attorney, Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby submits Reply Brief to 
the State's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Post Trial Motions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence That Mr. Ellington Did 
Willfully, Unlawfully, Deliberately and With Malice Aforethought Cause the 
Death of Mrs. Larsen. 
Mr. Ellington's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal alleged that the prosecution did 
not present sufficient evidence to prove that he acted with malice aforethought, either 
express or implied. In its memorandum in opposition to ~Ar. Ellington's motion the State 
conceded the prosecution carries the burden to prove every element of the crime charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution had the burden to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Ellington kilied Mrs. Larsen without legal justification or 
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excuse and with malice aforethought. 
A. Malice Aforethought. 
The State did not present sufficient evidence such that a reasonable juror could 
conclude that Mr. Ellington acted with malice aforethought. First, the manner in which 
the State charged Mr. Ellington (as articulated in the Motion for Acquittal and Motion for 
New Trial), and the evidence it presented at trial demonstrated an effort to prove that Mr. 
Ellington acted with express malice. However, there is no evidence to demonstrate that 
Mr. Ellington intended to hit Mrs. Larsen. 
Contrary to the prosecution's assertions, no evidence or testimony placed her 
definitively in the roadway. As argued in Mr. Ellington's post judgment motions, the 
evidence adduced at trial did not place Mrs. Larsen as standing upright in the roadway. 
The medical expert testified that if Mrs. Ellington was hit head-on she would have likely 
suffered broken bones in her legs, given the height of the grill on Mr. Ellington's Blazer. 
However, these injuries were not observed in Mrs. Larsen. Mr. Rochford also recognized 
that Mrs. Larsen likely fell or slipped on the roadway prior to impact with the Blazer 
because no evidence on the roadway correlates to her standing at the time of impact. 
(Rochford Affidavit). In addition, as attested to in Mr. Rochford's Affidavit (attached 
hereto), Mr. Ellington could not see the pavement for over twenty three (23) feet in front 
of his Blazer (Rochford Affidavit, pp. 5, 23). 
In addition, contrary to the prosecution's characterization of the evidence, the tire 
mark analysis involving the Blazer-Subaru collision does not show that Mr. Ellington had 
a clear path by the Subaru; rather, the tire marks show that Mr. Ellington steered away, to 
the right, from the oncoming Subaru. (Rochford Affidavit, p. 17). In addition, Daily's 
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analysis and calculations at trial and in his recent Affidavit, do not include the variables 
related to the speed ofthe vehicles, and the fact that Ellington's right tires were not on the 
roadway following the Subaru-Blazer collision. (See also Rochford Affidavit, p. 16). 
For example, there were no tracks used to measure the vehicles' path of travel prior to 
the collision, which you need to determine where impact occurred and the consequence 
of that impact between the Subaru and Blazer. (See Rochford Affidavit, p. 16). In 
addition, as Mr. Larsen testified, the Subaru had been moved several feet after the 
accident occurred, thus skewing the relative analysis conducted by the State's expert. 
Moreover, contrary to the state's assertion that Mr. Ellington intentionally steered 
toward the Honda after the impact between the Subaru and Blazer, the Honda was only 
approximately twenty six feet (26') away from Mr. Ellington after the Subaru hit his 
vehicle. (Rochford Affidavit, p. 18). After impacting the Subaru, where Mr. Ellington 
had to partially drive through a ditch to escape, he would have reached the Honda's 
location in approximately one (1) second. (Rochford Affidavit, p. 18). More 
importantly, the evidence demonstrates that the Honda was over the center line at the 
time of impact, in Mr. Ellington's lane of travel, as evidenced by the debris field and tire 
marks. (See Rochford Affidavit, p.18). 
1. The State Improperly Shifts the Burden to Mr. Ellington by Claiming 
that Malice May be Presumed. 
The State cites State v. Snowden to support its claim that there is a presumption of 
malice when a deadly weapon is used in a killing. State v. Snowden, 79 Idaho 266 
(1957). However, it is the State's burden to prove that Mr. Ellington acted with malice 
aforethought, and by arguing that malice should be presumed lessens the burden on the 
State to prove that Mr. Ellington acted with malice. A presumption of malice "would 
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conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the 
accused and which extends to every element of the crime. " Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 
U.S. 510, 521 (1979) (emphasis in original) (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 
246,274-75 (1952)). See also lvfullaney v. Wilbur, 421U.S. 684 (1975). 
Furthermore, even if such an inference is allowed, a reasonable juror could not 
have concluded that the state presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate implied 
malice. For example, the facts in Snowden are significantly different from the facts in this 
case. In Snowden, the defendant pled guilty to first degree murder, however appealed the 
judgment sentencing him to death. The court found that Snowden had "viciously and 
sadistically cut and mutilated the victim's body," including cutting out her voice box, 
inflicting multiple stab wounds all over her body, cutting away her clothing, cutting her 
right nipple off and lacerating her breasts and vagina. !d. at 269-270. The court further 
held that "no considerable provocation existed for the gruesome and sadistic conduct of 
the defendant." !d. at 272. The court found that due to the sadistic manner in which 
Snowden used the knife, which resulted in a homicide, malice could be implied. 
In contrast, in this case, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that Mr. Ellington 
used his vehicle in a gruesome or sadistic way such that it could be compared to the 
deadly weapon in Snowden. The Snowden court acknowledged that "[t]he mere fact that 
an instrument produced death does not establish its character as a deadly weapon, 
although it may be evidence thereof." Snowden, 79 Idaho at 272. Thus extrapolating the 
court's finding that malice was implied in Snowden's case to other cases is improper. 
On the other hand, however, State v. Jaco supports the State's assertion that the 
"element of malice may be presumed when a defendant uses a deadly weapon against the 
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person of another in a deadly manner." State v. Jaco, 130 Idaho 870, 876, 949 P.2d 1077 
(Ct. App. 1997). Yet, again, the weapon at issue there was a gun that was discharged and 
defendant was tried and convicted for second degree murder. In Jaco there was sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that the defendant used a deadly weapon against another person 
in a deadly manner because witnesses testified that they saw the shooting, and the 
trajectory of the bullet demonstrated the angle of the shot was near ninety degrees and not 
likely accidental. Id. 
In another case cited by the prosecution, State v. Ziegler, 107 Idaho 1133, 695 
P.2d 1272 (Ct. App. 1985) (which is likewise cited by Jaco), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
held that the defendant failed to rebut the presumption that "where a defendant uses a 
deadly weapon in a deadly manner, the element of malice can be presumed." Id. at 1275. 
However, this presumption only arises if the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a person uses a "deadly weapon in a deadly manner." Ziegler involved a fatal 
stabbing which was witnessed by at least two people, and which was corroborated by 
incriminating statements made by the defendant while he was in jail in addition to 
testimony from other witnesses. 
In Zeigler, similar to the other cases the State cites for support, the facts are 
significantly distinguishable from those in this case, where the timing, speed, sequence of 
the events and the evidence presented at court did not and cannot show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Ellington intentionally used his vehicle as a deadly weapon in a 
deadly manner to strike and kill Mrs. Larsen. Rather, as the State's expert testified, and 
as the Larsens testified, no one could precisely place where Mrs. Larsen was prior to her 
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being struck by the Blazer. The evidence did not demonstrate that Mr. Ellington 
intentionally struck Mrs. Larsen. 
2. The Prosecution Improperly Comments on Mr. Ellington's Silence. 
In addition, the prosecution states that "Mr. Daily's testimony was, in general, 
neither challenged by the Defendant nor rebutted." (Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Post Trial Motions, p. 4). This statement, proffered by the State, ignores the 
Constitutional protections Mr. Ellington has. Mr. Ellington has an absolute right to 
remain silent. The State should not make comment, even in briefing, about his exercise 
of such. Mr. Ellington has a due process guarantee that he will not be convicted of an 
offense except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The State should wrongfully 
attempts to lighten its burden with comments such as appear on page 4 of the State's 
Memorandum in opposition to Mr. Ellington's motions. However, as articulated above 
and in Mr. Ellington's post judgment motions, it is the State's burden to prove each 
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and this burden should not be 
transferred to the defendant. This is yet another example of the prosecution attempting to 
undermine Mr. Ellington's due process right to a fair trial pursuant to the United States 
Constitution Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and Idaho Constitution Article I § 13. 
In addition, the prosecution's argument improperly comments upon Mr. Ellington's right 
to remain silent pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article I § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. 
B. Lack of Passion. 
It is the State's burden to prove that Mr. Ellington acted in the absence of heat of 
passion in order to find Mr. Ellington guilty of second degree murder. (See Motion for 
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Judgment of Acquittal, Motion for New Trial). In its argument, the State improperly 
shifts the burden to Mr. Ellington to prove passion as a defense. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 
421 U.S. 684, 690 (1975). This is another attempt to shift the burden to Mr. Ellington. 
Based on the facts presented, beginning with the State's opening argument, passion was 
an issue in the case. The state had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt a 
lack of passion, Instead, the prosecution alleges the Mr. Ellington excluded this avenue 
of defense by requesting self defense instructions. The State not only ignores its own 
burden but is incorrect. 
The prosecution misstates the law as articulated in Mathews v. U.S., 485 U.S. 58, 
64 (1988). The prosecution claims that "The affirmative defense of self defense is, of 
course, inconsistent with the claim that the defendant killed in the heat of passion." 
(Opposition to Defendant's Post Judgment Motions, p. 7) (citing Mathews, 485 U.S. at 
64). However, this reading of Mathews is out of context. In the sentence preceding that 
cited by the prosecution, the Mathews court recognized that it is possible for courts to 
give instructions to inconsistent defenses, for example in Stevenson v. United States, 162 
U.S. 313 (1896), the court held that "the evidence was sufficient to entitle the defendant 
to a manslaughter instruction, but the Court also decided that the defendant was entitled 
as well to have the jury instructed on self-defense." Mathews, 485 U.S. at 64 (citing 
Stevenson, 162 U.S. 313). The Mathews court went on to recognize that "Federal 
appellate cases also permit the raising of inconsistent defenses," and "state cases support 
the proposition that a homicide defendant may be entitled to an instruction on both 
accident and self-defense, two inconsistent affirmative defenses." Id. In Mathews the 
State argued against allowing inconsistent defenses in criminai matters because of the 
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risk that it may encourage peljury, lead to jury confusion, and subvert the truth-finding 
function. !d. at 64-65. However, the Court dismissed this argument: 
We do not think that allowing inconsistency necessarily sanctions peljury. Here 
petitioner wished to testify that he had no intent to commit the crime, and have his 
attorney argue to the jury that if it concluded otherwise, then it should consider 
whether that intent was the result of Government inducement. The jury would 
have considered inconsistent defenses, but petitioner would not have necessarily 
testified untruthfully. 
!d. at 65. Accordingly, the state's reliance on Mathews is misplaced. 
The State further argues that Mr. Ellington only raised self defense, not heat of 
passion at trial, and asserted that the evidence at trial did not lay the foundation for a heat 
of passion defense. (Opposition to Defendant's Post Judgment Motions, 7). However 
that is incorrect. The evidence demonstrated that Mr. Ellington was either acting in self 
defense and/or was provoked given the circumstances of three people hunting for him for 
a period of approximately forty minutes, chasing him at speeds up to ninety miles per 
hour until he hit a snow bank, blocking his lanes of travel, and shooting at him. Thus, as 
the State recognizes, it is the state's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 
absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation ifthe issue is "properly presented." 
As demonstrated by the evidence, provocation was presented at trial by the prosecution 
itself in its attempt to demonstrate that Mr. Ellington was "angry," and by the defense in 
opening remarks, closing remarks, cross-examination, and presentation of evidence. 
The State also relies on Patterson v. New York to support its argument, but as 
argued in Mr. Ellington's post judgment motions, this argument should fail. Patterson is 
distinguishable because the statute at issue therein did not include "malice aforethought" 
as an element of the crime. 
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II. Mr. Ellington is Entitled to a New Trial 
As argued in Mr. Ellington's Motion for New Trial, he should be afforded a new 
trial due to the commission of several errors, pursuant to Idaho Code Ann. § 19-
2406(2)(3)(5)(6) and (7). (See Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial). 
Specific to subsection (7), the State asserts that defense counsel should have 
addressed any inconsistencies with Mr. Daily's testimony at the time of trial. (See 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Post Trial Motions). Again, the State is 
attempting to shift the burden of proof to Mr. Ellington, improperly commenting on Mr. 
Ellington's silence in violation of his rights pursuant to the United States Constitution 
Fifth Amendment applicable via the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Idaho Constitution 
Article I§ 13. 
It is always the burden of the State to prove its case. It is never the responsibility 
of a person defending a charge to disprove any portion of the State's case. The United 
States and Idaho Constitution affords protection to a person charged against this very 
thing. 
Even if it were proper to fault a person charged for not cross examining in a way 
deemed appropriate by the State this false testimony could not be anticipated. Mr. 
Ellington, prior to trial, should not have to read and learn everything in a publication 
authored by a witness for the prosecution. Mr. Ellington should not have to presume a 
witness called by the State would give testimony that is false when compared with 
written work. 
In this specific circumstance it was not possible to address Mr. Daily's false 
testimony at the time of trial because it was not until Mr. Rochford was able to obtain 
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copies of the sources cited by Mr. Daily at trial that Rochford was able to begin his 
analysis of Mr. Daily's testimony. Although his textbooks were obviously available prior 
to trial (because they were published prior to the date of trial), given Mr. Daily's 
voluminous publications, it was not clear what specific formulas or texts that Mr. Daily 
would cite to until he provided his testimony at trial. Further, the State submitted a 
supplemental report from its expert during trial. 
In addition, the State does not fully address Mr. Rochford's post trial affidavit. 
Rather, the state merely says that the Mr. Rochford's conclusions are "questionable." 
Thus, the State does not clearly deny the validity of Mr. Rochford's observations, nor 
does the State attempt to explain Mr. Daily's inconsistencies. 
CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons, and as articulated m Mr. Ellington's Motions and 
Memoranda in Support of Acquittal and for New Trial, Mr. Ellington respectfully requests this 
court to grant his Motio~~fl~cquittal and Motion for New Trial. 
DATED this '1-Y' day of April, 2012. 
BY: 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing W];S~sonally served by 
placing a copy of the same in the intetofficc mttilbox on the _2_2__ day of April, 2012, 
addressed to: ~ \\o...wJ 0-.J ~ve.~n 
Kootenai County Prosecutor by Fax (208)446-lg:r/ /, , _ A f1 A 
LP~JL/ _____) 
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I Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 r •12412012 Page 1 of22 
, Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20120424 Post Trial Motions 
Judge Luster 
Clerk Wanda Butler 
Court Reporter Val Nunemacher 
PA Art Verharen, Barry McHugh UJavtA£JJA_~J.Jlv DA Anne Taylor 
I Datell4/24/201211 Location 111 K-COURTROOM1 I 
I Time I Speaker Note 
02:34:31 PM Ellington CR06-1497 Mr. Adams and Ms. Taylor for Mr. Ellington 
J in custody Mr. Verharen and Mr. McHugh for the state. Post trial 
motions for Mr. Ellington. 
02:34:44 PM Anne 
Taylor, Df Request OF writing hand to be released to write notes. 
A tty 
02:35:03 PM J Not a problem. 
02:35:13 PM Ms. Taylor Logical order to call a witness and check into recently filings. Filed a reply brief, hand delivered. 
02:35:40 PM J liT was 
02:35:42 PM Anne 
Taylor, Df Another affidavit and CV hand filed to Chambers and PA office. 
A tty 
02:36:28 PM J Have transcripts, reply brief, and have the affidavit of Mr. Howe 
and the attached CV. 
02:36:53 PM Anne 
I Call Dave Rochford Direct 
I 
Taylor, Of 
A tty 
02:36:57 PM I clerk II Administered Oath for testimony. I 
02:37:19 PM I am a private investigator and accident reconstruction, 40 years, 
private investigation 20 years. Company I run. I worked prior with 
Anaheim Police Dept and Anchorage Alaska for 20 years. Yes 
David consulted for Ellington case end of November of 2011. Reviewed 
Rochford files of previous trial and interviews and transcripts of testimony 
and photographs. Did work with scene of accident, I did draft a 
report. I listened to testimony in trial, and John Daily, I ordered a 
copy of the book he referred to in his testimony - received it 3 
weeks later. 
02:39:18 PM I did review a report and supplemental by John Daily right as trial 
I 
u was starting. Yes, lot of mathematical formulas. I reviewed the textbook and testimony of Mr. Daily. ! could tell issue with part of what he testified to. 
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. 02:40:11 PM Art 
[Objection 
I 
Verharen, 
KCPA 
02:40:13 PM Judge Sustained Luster 
02:40:16 PM I did form an opinion. I relied on physical evidence at the scene, 
David portion of training used accident traffic investigation courses and 
Rochford experience. Rotation upon impact with Subaru - where it met the 
Blazer, Tire marks left by blazer, sliding sideways. 
02:41:11 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
02:41:13PM Judge Sustained Luster 
02:41:16 PM Training in traffic accident reconstruction I wrote a training class 
David about it and tire mark evidence. A photo of the area where the 
Rochford blazer rotated post impact with Subaru. Similar to state admitted in trial and in John Daily's testimony. Striations in tire tracks 
rotating sideways than forward 
02:42:51 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
I 02:42:52 PM I Judge 
. Luster Sustained 
02:42:57 PM I have looked at thousands of tire marks. I have seen striations. 
Learned what caused them. Looking at striations hundreds. Yes, I 
have reviewed sideways marks and used my training in Ellington 
t"~~Q I rlirl fnrrn nnininn nf hb7Qr rnnHinn rnnrQ ~iriQ\M~\/~ th~n 
David "'"""""'""'• I \wll,... 1"1111 '-'1"'1111""'11 "' LIU,.A.-.."""1 III....,VIII:;:, 111"""1'-" ""''-""WW"""']"'-' '-''"'"""'' 
Rochford forward terms of striations of tire marks. Blazer was impacted on its side caused it to rotate in a counter clockwise rotation. The 
Subaru impacted it. In trial heard that couldn't happen, in John 
Daily's testimony. Yes compared to something written in his text 
book. He spoke of rotational mechanics. I learned that 
02:45:18 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
I "'" "r- "" r"""\a • II 1 I. - I I UL:40:LU t"'IVI I Juage Sustained Luster 
02:45:22 PM I did bring a copy of the text book with me. I did make copies of 
David the pages of the relevant portions of the book to you. Describes 
Rochford when and when not should be used. I assume they have been 
I I provided to the court. 
I 02:45:59 PM 
I e:rharen. Objection 
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KCPA 
02:46:00 PM Judge Sustained Luster 
02:46:03 PM No his testimony was not consistent with what he wrote about. I 
David have prepared a written affidavit. I have read John Daily's 
Rochford affidavit. I have my copy of the affidavit. Paragraph 10- I am familiar with the presentation. Pg 306 ! am familiar with that. 
Those two examples not the same type of incident. 
02:48:01 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
02:48:02 PM Judge Overruled Luster 
02:48:05 PM David Yes, the Rochford 
02:48:14 PM Art I Objection I 
Verharen, 
KCPA 
I 02:48:16 PM I Judge 
. Luster !sustained I 
02:48:19 PM Paragraph 11 I recall Mr. Daily using Newton's 2nd law- this 
David collision non penetrating sideswipe and this is a full on impact. 
Rochford Two vehicles never reach common velocity- and this one they 
did at time impulse occurs to apply Newton's laws. 
02:49:23 PM Paragraph 18. Low energy sideswipe - could be different than a 
low penetrating. Could be same or different, non penetrating 
mean no impulse 
02:49:53 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
I 02:49:55 PM Judge !sustained 
I Luster 
I 02:49:57 PM David I Non penetrating no impulse no common I Rochford 
I 02:50:10 PM Art I 
Verharen, !Objection 
I KCPA 
02:50:12 PM Judge Overruled Luster 
02:50:15 PM David Rotational mechanics material published by tv1r. Daily is the 
Rochford approach angle. 
02:50:55 PM Art 
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Verharen, 
KCPA 
02:50:59 PM Judge 
Luster 
02:51:01 PM David 
Rochford 
02:51:34 PM Art 
Verharen, 
KCPA 
02:51:37 PM Judge 
Luster 
02:51:39 PM David 
Rochford 
02:52:11 PM 
Objection 
Overruled 
Formula assumes 90 degree angle of impact if not a 90 degree 
approach angle. That was not accounted for in Mr. Daily's 
analysis. 
Objection 
Jsustained 
Yes angle matters- in his printed material he writes angle has to 
be 90 degrees and correction has to be made of approach angle 
different than 90 degrees. 
Paragraph 27 It was rotating and side slipping. Acceleration mark. 
That tire was side slipping and forward rotation minor relative to 
the side slip- could be tire was rotating, acceleration would be 
able to tell. the rear tires tracking outside the front tires, not be a 
normal turn where it would track inside the front tires. 
I 02:53:43 PM II I Somewhat familiar with rotation - only seen it in Mr. Daily's works. II 
02:54:14 PM 1!1 did set through all Mr. Daily's testimony, I did review the 
L___j transcript and his written work. 
02:54:35 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
f\">·&::A ·'27 orv1 .,,,..,,...., 
1 
ve-.v~.v' 1 1 1 
1 
L~~te~ 
02:54:41 PM David 
Rochford 
02:55:29 PM Art 
Verharen, 
KCPA 
I 02:55:31 PM II Judae I . - II Luster 
02:55:34 PM D .d av1 
Rochford 
I 0" _,... ,.... .. r""''o.&VI II A j 
I L:oo:.54 t-'1 1 • p,n: 
Sustained 
I did arrive at opinion by comparing what said at trial, written 
report, and book- there was some differences in book and what 
he testified to. 
Objection 
I Overruled 
Fundamentals of traffic crash reconstruction. I did not review 
entire book but relevant portions. Pg. 310 This it the book Mr. 
Daily spoke about on the stand. Found inconsistencies. 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
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02:56:36 PM Judge Overruled Luster 
02:56:48 PM David Contained in last paragraph in 310- not to use formula if 
Rochford approach angle is less than 45 degrees - yes approach angles. 
02:57:25 PM Were some other inconsistencies. Examples used on stationary 
vehicles. 
02:57:53 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
02:57:55 PM Judge Sustained Luster 
02:57:57 PM David Starts on pg. 306 and forward. Yes, book Mr. Daily authored and 
Rochford talked about on the stand. In the book one vehicle target vehicle 
was stationary in Mr. Ellington's case both vehicles were moving. 
02:58:56 PM I I Art Verharen, KCPA 
02:58:58 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
02:59:02 PM Judge Answer yes or no 
I Luster 
02:59:08 PM David Everything else on those 2 pages. 
I Rochford 
I 02:59:16 PM II No other inconsistencies that I can see right here. I 
I 02:59:52 PM I Art 
I 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
02:59:55 PM Judge There is late answer. 
I Luster 
02:59:59 PM David None involved rotation mechanics ...... 
I Rochford 
03:00:09 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
03:00:11 PM .ll1rlnP. 
1 Sustained IL.~;fe~ 
03:00:14 PM David 
Rochford 
03:00:38 PM Art 
'Verharen, ,-,b;e,._+;o .... '-J j \JLI I I I 
KCPA 
03:00:39 PM Judge 
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Luster Believe it has been but go ahead. 
03:00:53 PM David pg 226 - I think that's all. Rochford 
03:01:37 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
03:01:40 PM Judge Believe he answered but go ahead. Luster 
03:01:58 PM Can only involve a stopped vehicle - yes inconsistencies - with 
testimony and written work about a tire mark pg 226. 
David Fundamentals of Crash reconstruction Vol. II. Same book 
Rochford purchased after trial -tire marks from the first book not the 2nd book. First book authored by John Daily. Direction of the 
striations and acceleration mark parallel with direction of the tire. 
Testimony was tire marks in photos striations perpendicular. 
03:03:55 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
I 03:03:57 PM I Judge Overruled Luster 
I 03:03:59 PM I David Deals with direction of force of the tires, from tires or impact. Rochford 
03:04:22 PM Anne 
Taylor, Of Nothing further. 
A tty 
I 03:04:27 PM I e:,haren. ex 
I IKCPA 
03:04:32 PM Yes, 3 pages inconsistent- 306-310- one incident, and the 226. 
Yes, that's all. Not in that book no. I have read his other 
textbooks. No haven't studied under him. No I don't have a math 
David or engineering degree, I have a bachelors of science in criminal 
Rochford justice. I don't have a masters. Nothing in engineering or 
mathematics. Courses taken at Norwestern University are 
mathematics courses in reconstruction - Greno Schmidt though 
WA Assoc of traffic investigators. 
03:06:54 PM Anne 
I Objection 
I 
Taylor, Of 
A tty 
03:06:56 PM Judge I overruled I Luster 
I 
03:07:00 PM David 
Rochford 
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03:07:07 PM Anne 
Taylor, Of Objection 
A tty 
03:07:09 PM Judge Sustained Luster 
03:07:12 PM I have written nothing published. I have read Mr. Daily's ... ! have 
David not written textbooks before. I was aware that Mr. Daily was 
Rochford state's expert. I didn't read it months before trial, part read as trial 
began. 
03:08:06 PM Anne 
Taylor, Of Objection 
A tty 
03:08:09 PM Judge Clarify- go ahead. Luster 
03:08:24 PM Yes read a report during trial and some time before. We never 
met- reputation in field yes, knew of his textbooks. I didn't know 
David about the 2nd book, Fundamentals- forget the name of it- first 
Rochford one. 2nd book was the one I refer to Fundamentals of Traffic Crash Reconstruction. No didn't know about this book until the 
trial. First I ordered it. I glanced through CV didn't see that book in 
there. I have been to his website but after the trial. 
03:10:04 PM Rotational mechanics. No, familiar with it because I used it once. 
No not based on lack of advanced physics. I have a basic 
understanding. I can define it. Yes, familiar because I have used 
it once and reviewed the material. 
03:11:06 PM Anne 
Taylor, Of Objection 
A tty 
03:11:10 PM Judge Overruled Luster 
03:11:12 PM Don't know if they would be or not. No, that the Subaru impacted 
the Blazer caused the rear end to rotate - no based upon a few 
I things ....... yes it had induced damage left front fender- not that I 
I could see from photos. I don't think there is any tire marks to 
show Subaru was moved tire marks from Blazer. No, not center 
David of mass. To which vehicle. Its located equal distance between 
Rochford two side and an equal distance from front axle. Door lock not 
center mass - not on door. between the passenger and driver 
seat and depending how much forward - depends on vehicle -
don't remember the feet and inches. Yes, some experience in this 
field know how important to non subjective. I don't know if report 
has subjective report. 
03:15:28 PM Anne 
II 
Taylor, Of Objection 
A tty 
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03:15:30 PM Judge Continue not sure what we are talking about yet. Luster 
03:15:41 PM David I did write that - that is not subjective its objective. No is the 
Rochford answer. 
03:16:07 PM That's right no trauma to her legs. Impact damage of the vehicles. 
Say that's correct, minor abrasion on her knee to be trauma, run 
over but not struck. No not in contrast to the pathologist. 
03:16:55 PM Anne 
Taylor, Df Objection 
A tty 
03:16:57 PM Judge Sustained Luster 
03:16:59 PM David No medical training. Rochford 
03:17:05 PM Anne 
Taylor, Df Objection 
A tty 
03:17:07 PM Judge Sustained Luster 
03:17:20 PM David 
Rochford 
03:18:29 PM Art 
Verharen, No further questions. 
KCPA 
03:18:53 PM Anne 
Taylor, Df Redirect 
L\H" IULJ 
03:18:57 PM David 
Rochford 
03:19:12 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
03:19:15 PM Judge Sustained Luster 
03: ·19: ·17 Pivi David That is was improperiy in this case - rotationai formuia - no not 
Rochford about the formula itself- comparing it to the testimony and report 
of Mr. Daily to his book mentioned today. 
03:19:52 PM Art 
Verharen, ReCX 
ll"r-<t. A 
,t',L,t"",LJ., I' I 
03:19:57 PM David IPg 310- read it into record if you want I Rochford 
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I 03:20:09 PM Art I Please I 
Verharen, 
KCPA 
I 03:20:10 PM I David Reads book ............... this collision was far less than 45 degrees 
Rochford so this formula should not have been used. 
I 03:21:02 PM II I No further questions. 
03:21:07 PM Anne 
Taylor, Of No other witness, but have affidavit. Mr. Howes yes. 
A tty 
03:21:18 PM Art 
Verharen, Call John Daily Direct 
KCPA 
03:21:22 PM Clerk Administers Oath for testimony. 
03:21:51 PM John G. I did testify at trial. Talked about qualifications at trial. Ex. 2 CV- if 
Daily Nov. 2011 yes accurate copy. 
03:22:35 PM Rotational mechanics Newton's laws - Newton's 2nd and 3rd laws 
- translation for moving along an axis and laws for rotation or 
spinning- Newton's Torque= Hi alpha- units pounds feet equals 
mass moment of the vehicle function of mass of distribution of 
that mass and alpha radiance per second squared Torque X 
Delta P 
03:23:46 PM Angular impulse. Angular momentum change, or translational 
ideas or change in linear momentum. 
03:24:36 PM Use a diagram - conservation of linear momentum deals based 
on ideas of particle impacts. Does not predict rotation. Rotational 
mechanics looks at a force acting on a lever arm 90 degrees 
doesn't matter how force comes in where is point of rotation 
I I where is center mass compared to force. 
03:25:38 PM They are independent of each other derived from Newton's 2nd 
and 3rd laws. 
03:25:58 PM Recognize diagram Fig. 17.9 of Ch. 17 from my book 
Fundamentals of Traffic Reconstruction -
03:26:23 PM Art Ex. 5a 595 in that exhibit. Rather than create another exhibit offer Verharen, 
KCPA 5a pg 595 and publish. 
03:27:43 PM Anne 
Taylor, Df Contained in pi materials no objection to use it. 
A tty 
03:27:50 PM J I have it in front of me. 
03:28:12 Piv1 1 John D. II Describes the difference between the tvvo - first of all could be I II 
Daily moving or not. 
03:28:30 PM I Anne I 
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Taylor, Df Objection A tty 
03:28:36 PM Judge Overruled Luster 
03:28:44 PM Object at rest remain at rest and object in motion remains in 
motion. - Force acting on object. Net result of force motion of 
object will change. Force coming into the side of the vehicle, 
shows center mass, lever arm between force and center mass at 
John D. a right angle to center mass, force will two things to vehicle - first 
Daily accelerate in linear sense, where linear momentum analysis 
come into play and cause a linear force - torque and acceleration 
in this direction. Pound second - use pounds miles per hour-
impulse force from one acting on the other. Newton's 3rd law 
forces equal in direction. Change motion of one vehicle, must 
change the other. 
03:31:24 PM No change in motion of one, and do in the other, then have to 
look for another cause of motion. I looked at physical evidence 
impact Subaru stopped and blazer cut around it. Marks looked to 
be curving accelerations scuffs. Because the motion of the 
Subaru had changed from its interaction with blazer. If we had 
sideswiping motion, would rotate Subaru and rotate the blazer. If 
rotation of the blazer caused by interaction of the Subaru should 
have seen more rotation on the Subaru but no evidence to that. I 03:33:28 PM D I disagree with Mr. Rochford on pg 310 of my book mixing apples 
and oranges. Describes the example. 
03:34:37 PM 
n 
Yes recall his testimony about my testimony was different than 
my book Subaru stopped or so little motion no impact. Blazer 
running past it. That's not right Newton's law of motion changing 
the motion of one must change the motion of one and if not 
u impact not serious enough to cause an accident. No side rotation, frictional force between the two is too low to overcome the tires so it can't rotate. 
03:36:05 PM D Rotational mechanics - I am pretty familiar with it have taught it in 1996 or 1997. I have written on rotational mechanics. Yes learned in undergraduate education. 
1 03:37:23 PM In Pg. 310 last paragraph- I kind of answered that before, this was an experiment we set up did it twice in Jacksonville Florida. Describes the exoeriment. 
~ ~ I 
03:38:50 PM In case looked at Delta V required of Blazer to cause impact use 
a lever arm of 2 feet -defined by this - shows diagram. Subject of 
2nd report I wrote. 
03:39:44 PM 
II D,.. ')')a I "'"' ....... '"' .. "I<"Y'\"'I'Y\h,...,. .. ,..,h....,+ n"in ... h"' , ... ,,..,~ t'V\,..,l,inn ahn• •+ +ha+ I r~. L.L.V! UVII t 11:;:1111:;:1111.11:;:1 VVIIC:H tJUIIIL IIC VVCli:> IIICll"\111~ LJUUL Lll L. II 
No nothing on that page inconsistent with what I testified to at 
triai. That's indicative of an acceleration mark. 2 ages after the 
straight line acceleration stuff pulled off and put in Mr. Rochford's 
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l I I affidavit. Pg. 5 B I believe so. 
03:41:43 PM Affidavit- paragraph 18 - No don't agree that paragraph 18 is in 
correct. Lever arm defined as the right angle distance to the 
center of mass 595 of textbook. Yes, Mr. Rochford is confusing 
issues - I don't care where force comes into vehicle, calculate 
from 90 degrees center of mass I can calculate the rotation. 
Recall about the non penetrating sideswipes Newton's law of 
motion apply to all impact, fundamental law well known for over 
300 years. No way it couldn't apply. 
03:44:34 PM Re: Mr. Howe's affidavit.. reviewed it briefly this morning. I don't 
agree - we can use rotational mechanics look at rotation of 
vehicle that is centrically hit. Only way get rotation. No center of 
mass, no rotation. No, no evidence to apply conservation of linear 
momentum. Subaru forces so low motion of Blazer wasn't 
changed by Subaru. No don't agree with that, no change in 
motion on Subaru. Can't do energy analysis have to have 
damage profile don't have on either vehicle from that interaction. 
03:47:51 PM I saw no analysis done for either - back it up with analysis -
number crunching pencil to paperworking the equation. Have a 
theory back it up with analysis. Nothing in his theories backed up 
by his analysis- Rochford. His theories not consistent with what I 
wrote. Angle of Subaru impact was 45 degrees off path of Blazer. 
come in about 225 degrees. 
03:50:09 PM Depends on actual impact happened- it we had hard enough 
impact to cause change of motion, a head of center mass rotation 
clockwise, if not have rotation of counter clockwise. Diagram 
using is top of car. Center mass symbol. Initial it was ahead then 
it moved back from center mass tells me it was a sideswipe. 
Force would have been tangential - driver side of the car on 
1 
diagram and force would have been this direction. I 
03:51:57 PM D No it wasn't would have been from the evidence would have been scraping motion and force on that drivers side of vehicle. 
03:52:24 PM Art 
I No further questions. 
I 
Verharen, 
KCPA 
03:52:29 PM Mr. ex Adams 
03:52:37 PM 1-L.- r"\ uUIIII U. There was a side swipe between the two. Daily 
03:52:47 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
03:52:50 PM I • I Judge Sustained Luster 
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03:52:54 PM John D. There was not an impact for motion change. Daily 
03:53:08 PM Mr. Ask to be struck. Adams 
03:53:13 PM Judge Denied. Luster 
03:53:16 PM John D. Not sure what you mean by term of art - I think there is a 
Daily difference between impact and sideswipe. 
03:53:36 PM Mr. Move to have that testimony struck. Adams 
03:53:42 PM Judge Denied. 
I Luster 
03:53:44 PM John D. No didn't say that. Daily 
()':H:;A· r'\h.,... 
03:54:06 PM Judge Sustained Luster 
03:54:10 PM John D. That was not my testimony Newton's law apply to this what I did 
Daily say this impact or sideswipe was not forceful enough to cause 
change of the motion. 
-
03:54:45 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
03:54:48 PM Judge Sustained Luster 
n~·t:;A .,;:;1 Dl\il lnhn n It ended up \Nhere diagram indicated. That's right- I don't knO'vv if vv.v-r.v 1 1 lVI UVIIII &..I'. 
Daily that's true heard it said. 
03:55:21 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
03:55:24 PM Judge Don't think totally answered go ahead. ! Luster 
I 
03:55:37 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
03:55:39 PM Judge Witness not answering. Luster 
03:55:45 PM 
II- • - . I don't know. Sides'lJipe incident- don't think they did hit more John u. than once- Yes the sideswipe took place at less than 45 degrees. Daily I have no evidence that the Subaru was moving, if they were 
moving it was so slow as to not cause any significant change of 
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~ II I motion 
03:56:59 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
I 03:57:02 PM I Judge Allow to answer. Luster 
I 03:57:06 PM I John D. Newton's laws applied. Daily 
03:57:12 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
03:57:14 PM Judge Sustained Luster 
03:57:17 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
03:57:26 PM Judge Sustained Luster 
03:57:29 PM John D. No didn't hear testimony of the sisters in car. Daily 
03:57:50 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
03:57:53 PM Judge Overruled Luster 
03:57:55 PM John D. Pt.ln Lrnnu.tlorlno nf +h""+ _ nn rlirln'+ l"nne>irlor th!:!t e>t!:lt.:::.rnont 
Daily I "tV 1'\.IIVV IVU~V VI Lllf;Al. - IIV UIUII I. VVIIWIUVI 1.1 H.A'- '-oJL\.A'-VIll"-'1 u .. 
03:58:31 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
03:58:38 PM Judge Allow to answer. Luster 
03:58:42 PM John D. No didn't consider statements by witnesses. Daily 
03:59:05 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
03:59:08 PM Judge Refine to contact point. Luster 
I 03:59:16 PM I I didn't do it, i depending on Corp of Det. Greer to do that Yes 
John D. based it on someone else's work. My results only as good as his 
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l Daily evidence, if his evidence is tainted in some way than my analysis 
is not correct. I only know what I was given don't know how 
correct it was. 
04:00:46 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
I 04:00:48 PM I Judge Answered already. Luster 
04:00:56 PM John D. Paragraph 8 - Collision of Subaru and Blazer don't agree don't 
Daily have sufficient evidence. Subaru position didn't change. 
04:02:25 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
04:02:28 PM Judge I let answer 
I Luster 
04:02:31 PM John D. Saw no evidence Daily 
04:02:42 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
04:02:45 PM Judge Not giving opportunity to answer- have a problem with witness 
Luster address the court. 
04:03:01 PM John D. 
Daily 
04:03:12 PM Art 
Verharen, Objection 
KCPA 
04:03:14 PM Judge Sustained Luster 
04:03:56 PM It had a tractor and a trailer in the example driving Honda into 
John D. rear tandems of trailer. It didn't move. It wasn't moving when it 
Daily was hit and didn't move after hit. Right. If we look at impact 
analysis yes one vehicle not moving. 
1"\11 • 1"\. '..,. ....... 
. .""t lVI "!!~ !::th vehicles moving. 
1"\ A .n A _r-r- r-\a" 1\ _...._ 
U"'- : U"'- : 0 0 t"' lVI 1"\rl 
Verharen, Redirect 
KCPA 
04:04:59 PM Essentially the difficulty of setting up the experiment, large vehicle 
John D. moving simultaneously as Honda and impact at that point, 
.....,._: ... difficult. Can do it with S!!1aller vehicles. Can't do with tractor II LJi::t!!Y 
trailer. Nothing that I am aware of. 
04:05:51 PM Art 
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Verharen, Nothing further. KCPA 
04:05:57 PM Judge Step down. Short break for other matter. Luster 
II 04:23:10 PM J Return to State vs Ellington. 
04:23:28 PM Art 
Verharen, Other than affidavits no. 
KCPA 
04:23:35 PM Anne 
Taylor, Df No. 
A tty 
I 04:23:46 PM I on argument. 
04:23:53 PM The two specific ones motion for new trial and acquittal - won't not 
repeat everything I have in briefs, important things to touch on -
motion for new trial and work backwards, based on newly 
discovered evidence. Court needs to consider, very strongly in 
light of history. Court knows case well, new evidence of false 
testimony. Where we are today, what you heard today 
establishes it. Mr. Daily said approach angle was less than 45 
degrees compare to what Mr. Rochford read into record not to 
use that formula for less than 45 degrees. Not saying Mr. Daily 
doesn't know math or physics but formula was improperly used in 
this case, and mislead the jury. Talk about DePoe's factor. 
Ellington prior trial - where we are new trial. DePoe criteria we 
meet those as well. 
04:26:49 PM J Supreme court refer to perjured testimony not false testimony. Not come close to that. 
04:27:14 PM ltc:. tn1,::. I rlnn't h!:!\1,::> nrinr C:.\11/nrn t,::.dimnn\1 h11t h,::. rlirl t,::.c:.tif\1 !:It tri!:!l ··-··--I --II .. ··-·- f""ll-1 -·W-Ill ·--'-1111-IIJ, __ .. II--·- '---"'''J -· .. Il-l 
Anne and his written works indicate it he knows that - prior sworn 
Taylor, Of testimony - we don't have that here - same situation witness from 
A tty state testifies in one way strongly before jury and his written work 
not the same. We don't expect that of every witness prior to 
hearing. Would stall hearings. 
04:28:27 PM Analyze the DePoe criteria- rotational mechanics analysis -
Subaru go at great speed to rotate blazer. Did not exist in 
previous report was handed to us late. Handed to us - the book -
when it became known to us about that book, Mr. Rochford 
ordered and studied it. It is new, not known until trial. Said on 
stand and what was written. 
04:29:38 PM Evidence not impeaching and its critical. Too left hand turns, 
anger and speed. Mr. Daily said no way could have rotated it. 
Back to incident with Ms. Larson - leaned on each other comes 
I back to this moment, comes back to this impact and this resuit 
material evidence not merely impeaching. Court will recall have a 
couple exhibits brought up ..... 
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I 04:31:13 PM OF Ex. 0 and Of. Ex. NG 
04:31:21 PM Starting with 0 - shows court where area where left hand turn 
occurred impacted and back end rotated. Important for states 
argument. More time, not correct. Back end was rotated on 
blazer. Places it with Honda the second time. Changes the result 
of the trial a lot. 
04:32:20 PM This is N- depicts position of Subaru was moved, shows the 
borrow hit- without states testimony that Subaru have to be going 
way fast misleads jury. Rotation impact causes the rotation of the 
blazer. Result would have been changed. Us knowing now and 
not based on lack of diligence, don't have to come to trial reading 
everything someone has written, and testified. Expect state to 
come to trial with accurate testimony. This book was ordered and 
read after trial, brought to court's attention and PA as soon as 
possible. Not something we had for months and months. Juror 
misconduct. State wrote in brief we didn't submit questions, but 
we did. Jury went out for deliberation on Friday and deliberated 
for several hours. Monday deliberations resumed. Did not go 
downstairs and jury had a question, issue we have with that-
typed - occurred some time over the weekend - no computer and 
as soon as they are there deliberating, and submitted. Someone 
deliberated on their own- or investigation on their on, did 
prejudice occurred -we should get a new trial. State vs 
McCloskey. 
04:36:16 PM J What's the misconduct? No doubt typed up outside the jury 
room .... can't tell them not to think about it. 
04:36:54 PM Anne More than just thinking about it. Took time to reflect on what 
Taylor, Of happened on Friday and decide what question by him or herself. I 
A tty think that is improper. Taking if further than thinking about it doing thinn~ nn thAir nwn r~thAr th~n tnnAthAr _, .. ";:;>- _, _,_ .. - ..... __ ,_, _,_ .. --;:;>--"-" 
04:37:35 PM A day later, similar issue, they were together, but did come up 
with similar question together although written and worded 
different. Wrong decision on a question of law, states briefing 
really seeking trial on Prosecutorial misconduct, errors in ruling 
prior to and during trial. Enough to give us a new trial. Brady 
issue right before trial lab report with fingerprints - had a motion 
based on Brady violation dismiss. Think we should have gotten 
dismissal at that time. Court decided due process not implicated if 
able to use and protections put in place, how information 
presented to jury, another partial print not to be mentioned. We 
argued court to dismiss case on that violation, court made choice 
to have case go forward with protection in place. During trial -that 
order ignored -we asked for a mistrial - problem is a Brady 
violation and is exculpatory information. That's the protection put 
I 
in ... l .... ,..e f,... .. 1\Jir Clli ... ,..+,...... c .. ,...+ .... ,..+ hi.,. rl • ...... "'""'"'"'"'S .. i,..h+.,. 
Ill tJIC.\J lVI. lVII. ~IIIII~LVII. I 1\.IL'CI\..rl lll.:l' UU'C; tJIV\J'CI~ II~IIL\:). 
04:40:50 PM J Instruction court gave to the jury give Mr. Ellington full potential 
no prints of Ms. Larsen on blazer. 
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· 04:41 :23 PM Anne 
Taylor, Of Understand court did what it could to correct the problem. 
A tty 
I 04:41:33 PM I J !virtue of the instruction court eliminated the problem. I 
04:42:17 PM Anne Understand what court is saying, I respectfully disagree. No way 
Taylor, Of to have Ms. Larsen's other prints tested. Requested them and 
A tty weren't available and sat a long time. 
04:42:52 PM Problem brought out in open court, in front of jury, when I object 
twice the jury draws inferences from that. You calculate 
objections in certain ways in front of jury, can have a negative 
inference, violated OF rights. Our mistrial should have been 
granted. What's happened not fair to Mr. Ellington. Nothing 
happens at that point, we have a ruling to try and protect him. 
04:45:43 PM I want an expert to that effect, show in evidence, should have 
been from Mr. Cushman. We were put in a position where I could 
let things come out that weren't to come out, or let jury make 
inference. Think mistrial should have been granted. Anger and 
running over your wife, were emphasized way too much in first 
trial and second. Shouldn't have to object in front of jury when we 
had a pretrial motion. Against his rights to fair trial. Timing -
before or after- timing of sequence of the events - one big thing 
or emotional pool - death of somebody - overuse of phrase pulls 
jury in that emotional place. Mistrial motion granted on that basis 
as well. 
04:48:01 PM Another grounds, jury being misdirected. Fought long and hard 
over what instructions were to be submitted. 
04:48:25 PM Those instructions were important that we submitted, important 
as to the way state charged the case. State chose to charge the 
w~v it rlirl ~nrl rhnc::~=> it thl=>\/ h::arl c::iv \/l=>::arc:: tn rh::ann~=> it . II m1 
··--J ... -·- -··- """··--- ·~, , .... _J ··-- _,,, J--·- .. - -··-··~- ..... --·1 
instructions 1 and 2- became the problems with the jury. 
Instructions one and two. Define definitions, argue from those, not 
having those instructions precluded an argument for OF. 
04:49:42 PM Instruction should have been given on implied malice theory, that 
instruction was not given, 18-4002- statutory definition. Indicates 
the state needs to overcome strong provocation emotional 
attachment- said anger all the way through but didn't say the 
action was based on just meanness should have been a jury 
instruction on it - #28 talks about difference between involuntary 
manslaughter and murder, definitional instruction given after 
acquit comes into the wrong contest doesn't put burden on state. 
04:51:45 PM State indicates we ask for a self defense instruction couldn't get 
heat of passion, we don't prove or disprove, they have to prove 
the implied malice they didn't prove it. Jury improperly instructed 
I 
I II and get a new triai on that basis. I 
04:52:32 PM 
I I Last ground verdict contrary to law and evidence. Preference of 
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course exactly what your honor should do today. 
04:52:59 PM Both parties agree court reviews jury verdict evidence on each 
element rational jury could be met. 
04:53:24 PM State should have been held to charging instruction. They didn't 
prove intent to kill. Should be end of discussion. 
04:53:44 PM State vs Porter clarified the definition of implied malice. State 
needed to prove that Mr. Ellington deliberately drove his car to 
Ms. Larsen and know it would hit here dangerous enough to kill 
and he didn't care. State didn't prove it, not there. 12 second time 
lot of things happening. Cars in motion, not much time. State's 
expert, no evidence to place Ms. Larsen in roadway no 
perception in reaction time. State wouldn't say he had time to 
know she was there. 
04:55:14 PM Deliberately killed her, add the gun shots. Intervening event, state 
didn't meet implied elements. Heat of passion all up there for jury 
to consider. 
04:55:54 PM That's not a malice murder, that's a voluntary manslaughter. 
State's briefing, state comments that we didn't do anything for 
him. That burden can't be shifted to us. US Supreme vs Sanstrom 
can't burden shift. State failed to prove what it charged. Judgment 
of acquittal should be entered. Battery charge- absent that 
testimony, no proof of intent, one second time frame, time to see 
and hit the Honda. Ask for judgment of acquittal. Or reduce 
conviction to involuntary manslaughter. Came in with expressed 
malice and got implied malice, ask to reduce to voluntary 
manslaughter. 
04:57:43 PM Motion for new trial, if you decline judgment of acquittal, Rule 34 
says grant a new trial. look at all factors. Taking all this together. 
nf rlirln't r~l"'~i\/~ ~ f~ir tri~l ~+ rninirYH II"Yl Trnllhlinn th~t ct~t~'c 
-· -·-· 1 ~ I---· W- '-" 1'-"11 Ll 1 ...... 1 ........ I I Ill lllllllo.CI II• I I -U..,III I:::J Ll I"""'L '-'"""""'""' V 
makes comments on shifting burden. In addition to shifting 
burden, burden on all constitutional rights. Granted a new trial or 
acquittal. 
04:59:10 PM Some of the comments in brief, dispute thrust of comments 
directed at 5th amendment rights, comments directed at evidence 
in the record. In this case have to look at all evidence. You have 
heard it many times, OF made deliberate choices, turned wheel, 
Art accelerated toward the Subaru, that was the physical evidence 
Verharen, presented at trial, OF duty to dispute that evidence. Also 
KCPA established physical evidence with Honda, escape route chose to turn left, based on physical evidence enough to convict, backed 
up by 911 call. This court was sufficient to convict DF of charged 
crimes. Issue of evidence sufficient on express or implied 
analysis. Cuts either way. No reason to believe same argument 
--- L...- --..J- =--·=- ...... --·=<""'!.- -· .u:,....,:--.&. &--"'- "'- ---· ~=-"' ~..oa! 1 ue 11 1aue, !! ! !f .. meu 1! !d!!ve- ;::.U!!!I.Ae! n !C!vl:::. LV vU! !V!vl. 
05:02:15 PM n Think issue of iack of passion is an issue most interestingone. Case law out there lease it less than clear. Look at that argument 
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-first situation defense didn't request that instruction, did request 
self defense. Can have two inconsistent defense, not want lack of 
heat of passion, negate each other. Don't do it at trial, only after 
trial, claim that is basis for new trial. Problem from analysis they 
did get defense they wanted. 
05:03:58 PM I don't know sufficient factual foundation for the court to give that 
instruction, testified he was angry, Larsen family was minimal -
followed on cell phone- Larsen did follow- traffic accident. No 
gestures words between Larsen and OF, other than contact for 
the vehicles. Striking and running her down, facts of the case, 
instruction court gave #28 was sufficient in this area. Reviews 
#28. Malice vs forethought ICJA 707. Court gave all the approved 
Idaho criminal jury instructions in this matter. Not instruction for 
lack of heat of passion. Gave instruction saw fit- describes 
distinction - legal analysis - whether the court properly instructed 
the jury and I think you did. 
05:07:26 PM Argument from defense, they do have some merit to some extent, 
was proven, not talk about deliberate obstruction -they objected 
and the court gave it. 
05:08:04 PM 1~ ~~e to prove DF Actions were deliberate. #18 - ICJI 702 -
05:08:28 PM De!!berate intention to kill a human being. 
05:08:40 PM l~as deliberately performed with knowledge. 
05:08:56 PM Court told jury that it had to be deliberate. Hard to argue those 
two things didn't happen in this case. 
05:09:24 PM Fingerprints used twice, run over, all issues court already ruled 
on, palm print evidence was given to OF prior to trial, exculpatory 
evidence. I used words fingerprints made mistake ..... Don't think 
transcript shows I was trying to do that- got it from Lt Maskel, and 
finally got it from Lt. Swanson. No prejudice to Of. 
05:11:22PM Phrase of run over your wife, conscious of using phrase, didn't 
connect it with him and the blazer. Context of the question, it was 
not objected to. No objection until later in the proceeding, court 
ruled on it. Not conduct that warrants a new trial. 
05:12:15 PM Juror misconduct, nothing in question that is extraneous 
information. If juror brought in new info - seems to be appropriate 
legal analysis. Has been proven. She or he -write out a question. 
Doesn't amount to juror misconduct. That is not grounds to 
warrant a new trial either. 
05:13:27 PM Court is the fact liner- no indications at all that Mr. Daily was 
untruthful at trial or today. All alleged inconsistencies dropped on 
him today, were all explained. He has experience and training 
I 
that fair exceeds Mr. Rochford doesn't have. Books, writings, etc. 
Mr. Daily knows what he is talking about. 
05:14:39 PM 
Affidavits, they didn't impeach him, don't have credentials that Mr. 
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05:17:23 PM 
05:18:04 PM 
05:18:33 PM 
05:19:12 PM 
05:20:21 PM 
05:20:59 PM 
05:21:29 PM 
05:24:26 PM 
I I 
(• ........ . 
oa·uy_t1~s'.· n~arn.-~ettb~r¢·Witti·the firsr one newly di-scovered, cv 
. . . ~ . , . , ... r . ' ... . . . 'T . • ...... .,_ . . , . . . .. . .. 
Mr: Dai1y·doh~·ta~t year., •Copy ~as· textbooks that he helped write. 
Had· it A~gusfih~-iast year~' Not' substantive. Result in acquittal-
might be jaded but make common sense inference. Based on 
damage of v~hicles, marks onroad and body of Ms. Larsen .. 
De_terrni;neq.:.ir:u~ com_mon se,riserrg~nrierby John Daily. To .say 
sqmething .el~e l:tappened ctoesn't.make sense. Minimal damage 
tq vehicle, da_m.age tq Subaru and impact.. Would it produc·e 
acquittal, don't.th·inldhey·met that elem~ent. 
Due Diligence, they were given the information. Should be 
denied, doesn't meeffour faCto~s.. . . . . 
Anne ci~r-pbsJ.tlon.not-that s·ub·a'ru ·n,~~e blazer tiing_into Honda; 
Taylor, Of qa.!Jsed the blazer to: rotpte. Misstating what we say. Never said 
Atty that... ·· 
D Expe.rt disc.lo.sure its tru .. eWe had cd and initial report in August, portion of testimony contradictory to books, that part given on 1/1'8/12. Scope wasn't known Lmtillie took the stand, only part of the sto'ry. " · · · · · .· · · 
Fingerprint issue, possibility of prejudice information mentioned, 
court recognized by creating the rule. Supplied that transcript, 
everybody recognized prejudice not to place a limit and that limit 
was not followed: Motion for new trial can look at whole thing and 
ruling and give him a new trial. 
Statements- running over wife, I don't have to object every time, 
especially when talked about before trial. Timing of gun fired, 
bring jury into emotio,n~l place. 
State agre·e they have to prove deliberate act - come back need 
to have Of instructions 1 and 2 - to argue what charged and what 
they showed, · · · 
When we talk about state needing to prove the absence of heat of 
passion provocationiC 18-4002. Its their burden. I don't have to 
come in and ask you to give instruction on reasonable doubt, 
state has to prove lack of passion. Adequate provocation in here. 
There was initial chase. Him getting out of the car, bad wrong, he 
regrets, chase up roads ... while chase going ,on and back down 
and they lose Mr. Ellington but don't go home, provocation when 
they wait, or call in reinforcements with a gun, going to friends 
house with two cars chasing - not just following 90 mph - not a big 
highway - country windy road, Jan. 1, its wet - provocation -two 
cars, where incident happens - OF tries to back out, tries to use 
driveway Subaru angles in collision in state didn't prove lack of 
passion states burden, I don't have to use it. They didn't do it. 
Thank you. Court has received !ot of information in support and 
opposition to motion, motion seek a new trial or judgment not 
withstanding the verdict are interchangeable, some issues 
reviewed previously, not so certain court is persuaded to revisit 
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ruling, think court be best advised to do that and issue something 
appropriate in written format. Some issues of less concern, juror 
misconduct have reservations of that. Thinking about case at 
J home decide to type note and present note presumable after 
discussion with fellow jurors don't think that juror engaged in 
misconduct. Can't expect them to go home and not think about 
the case. 
. . 
05:26:31 PM Ellington case has history, supreme court ruling, newtrial ordered 
and conducted. Recognize some problems with the fingerprint 
evidence. 2rid trial conducted in different manner than the first 
one - not withstanding some issues state conducted in 
appropriate fashion, tried on facts and law, not on passion. 
05:27:27 PM Think this case was tried retried in appropriate fashion -some 
issues arose prefer they had not, but how the case was 
conducted, that the state engaged in PA misconduct and 
misappropriately convey jury. Accident reconstruction, listened to 
it several times, that information needs evaluated, jury 
instructions and the way evidence should be evaluated. 
05:28:31 PM Take under advisement and give written decision. More than 
adequately submitted, no more briefing. Written opinion to cover 
these issues. OF still housed in KC and will address that when 
finish the decision. 
05:29:21 PM Anne 
Taylor, Df Motion for appeal bond after decision? 
A tty 
05:29:29 PM Know you have a number of other motions attached to motions 
J set today - out of time, don't know if court is persuaded to deal 
with those this evening, Rule 35 and motion on appeal bond. 
Determination on where case is going before those issues. 
05:30:07 PM Anne 
Taylor, Df Clarification. 
A tty 
05:30:11 PM J Not sure saw in court file motion to Rule 35 - saw a notice of hearing, may have been filed and not presented. 
05:30:32 PM Anne 
Taylor, Df To my knowledge will double check. 
A tty 
05:30:42 PM Art 
Verharen, Got notice, not sure if I got motion. 
KCPA 
05:30:49 PM jJ Jend 
05:30:53 PM I 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
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SUMMARY: 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
JOHN R. HOWELL 
ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTIONJST 
An Accident Reconstructionist with over 24 years of experience who has 
investigated, to date, numerous traffic accidents. Works conducting on 
scene investigations, follow-up technical analysis, scene m.1pping, 
animation and accident reconstruction. Has worked in both the criminal 
and civil arenas, and is certified as an Expert Witness in Nevada justice, 
2nd and 8th Judicial District Courts as well as employee appeal forums. 
Instruct in crash scene mapping and utili2;ing Total Station's and laser 
measuring devices, ACT AR accredited rec:onstructionist #1)43-
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: 
1992 to Date JOHN HOWELL a ASSOCIATES LLC, Las Vegas, NV 
ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTIONIST: In business as an Accident 
Reconstructionist. Have reconstructed motor vehicle traffic accidents for 
civil litigation and employment appeal purposes. 
NEVADA HIGHWAY PATROL, Las Vegas, NV 
STATE TROOPER: Enforcing traffic laws and investigating traffic 
accidents in the Urban Las Vegas area. 
WASHOE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Reno, NV 
DEPUTY SHERIFF: Worked as Deputy Sheriff and Crime Scene 
Investigator. Handled crime scene investigations and forensics. 
r989-1991 WASHOE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Reno, NV, Reno 
Cannon InternationaL Airport Narcotics Detail. 
LEAD OFFICER: Supervised the unit's activities, and maintained 
liaison with the main narcotic task force as well as approximately 125 
additional airport narcotic task forces throughout the country. While in 
this position opened and broke a major case in oarcotic smuggling in 
seven states through proficient and complete investigation. 
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WASHOE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Reno1 NV 
TECHNICAL ACCIDENT INVESTIGATOR: Investigated over 
I ,ooo traffic accidents in rural Washoe County. Became a technical 
accident investigator and a member of the on~call Fatal Investigators 
Team. Authored "Accident Investigator Check" software for IBM 
compatible computers to assist in accident investigations and make 
presentations of mathe-matics appear more professional in court. 
EDUCATION: 
Degrees: 
Master of Science in Criminal justice: Almeda University 
Bachelor of Science Business Administration: Almeda University 
Ongoing Education: 
Credited courses in Business Administration 0" Criminai]ustice: Almeda 
University 
Credited courses in Law Enforcement aJ" Administration of justice: Truckee 
Meadows Community College 
L9jZ~I974 Credited Courses, Industrial e Technical Photography: Brooks 
Institute of Photographic Art:s & Sciences 
r97~ Credited Liberal Arts Courses: American River College Carmichael, 
CA 
TRAINING: 
Credited. Courses in Motor Vehicle Traffic Accident Investigation: Basic and 
Advanced Levels, Northwestern University Evanston Illinois. 
Credited. Courses in Technical Traffic Acctdent Investigation and Accident 
Reconstruction: Northwestern University Evanston Illinois. 
Crash Data Retrie-val Technician and Analyst Level Cours-es: IPTM 
University of Souch Florida and Crash Safety Inscicuce through 
V ~Tronics Inc. 
Bicycle and Pedestrian Seminar: Southwestern Association of Technical 
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Accident Investigators 
Crush Applications and Uses Seminar: ARC/CSI Annual Seminar 2004 Las 
Vegas, NV 
Numerous training seminars with Southwest Association of Techncal 
Accident Investigators. 
PRESENTATIONS: 
Instructor Accident Scene Mapping utili~ing Total Station, Laser 
Measuring Devices and specific CAD mapping software to Nevada 
Highway Patrol, private entities, and Law Enforcement Agencies: On 
going. 
Utilization of a Laser Measuring Device in a unique method to measure 
and 3D map crush on a motor vehicle producing 3D wire diagrams of 
crush damage: Las Vegas 1 NV, ARC/CS1 Conference ~004. 
Utilization, methods, and limitations of the use of Crash Retrieval Data 
in the insurance claims industry. Progressive Insurance Companies 
Claims Agents ~arterly Training: Las Vegas, NV, February zoo4 
AFFILIATIONS: 
Southwestern Association of Technical Accident Investigators 
National Association of Professional Accident Reconstruction Specialists 
Accreditation Committee for Traffic Accident Reconstructionist 
SAE~ Society of Automotive Engineers 
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1 THE COURT: All right. Now that the jury's 
2 out of the room, go ahead, Ms. Taylor. 
3 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I believe that the 
4 words 11 crime scene 11 were words that were subject to a 
5 motion in limine before this trial began. Those were 
6 not words to be used. I'm not allowed to say 11 accident 
7 scene. 11 I would bring that up in conjunction with six 
8 instances of variations of ''after your wife was run 
9 over, 11 before your wife was struck, 11 that happened 
10 during Joel Larson's testimony. 
11 Your Honor, at this time based on that 
12 statement, as well as the six prior ones during Joe 
13 Larson's testimony, we'd move the Court for a mistrial. 
14 These were things that were subject to the Court's 
15 pretrial ruling. These were things that, especially the 
16 part about 11 after your wife got struck, 11 or 11 after your 
17 1tlife \•las run over," that was something that was talked 
18 about in State versus Ellington by the Idaho State 
19 Supreme Court. This is exactly what we tried to prevent 
20 from happening, and here we are. I think the Court 
21 should declare a mistrial at this point. 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Verharen? 
23 MR. VERHAREN: Well, at no time did I say 
24 "after Mr. Ellington got done running over your wife," 
25 and that I -- as I recall, was what was the Idaho 
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1 Supreme Court had a hard time with. And my questions to 
2 the witness were simply designed to put context to when 
3 something was happening, no more and no less. And I did 
4 nothing here to try to inflame the emotions of the jury. 
5 As to the allegation here that I violated the 
6 pretrial ruling of the Court, that•s not the case. I 
7 haven't had this witness refer to this particular 
8 location as a crime scene. I'm asking about his 
9 training in crime scenes. 
10 As the Court has noted in our pretrial 
11 motions, it•s going to be impossible to ask certain 
12 witnesses whether or not they've had any training in 
13 terms of accident investigation. And obviously the same 
14 is true when you're talking about crime scene 
15 investigations. And so this witness has not called this 
16 incident a crime or a crime scene or a homicide or any 
17 
18 
19 
20 
of those things. The order 
Court has not been violated. 
the pretrial order of the 
THE COURT: Anything else, Ms. Taylor? 
MS. TAYLOR: Judge, I think that he's just 
21 dancing all the around the Court's pretrial order. When 
22 he's talking about his investigation at this scene, at 
23 this incident, and then asking him about crime scene 
24 investigation, it's not a far leap. And, Judge, I don't 
25 think what the supreme court meant was the two words 
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1 "got done." I think it's the entire statement, and I 
2 don't think the supreme court or your Honor needed to 
3 spell out all the ways that that could be violated. Six 
4 times of "after your wife got run over, after the Blazer 
5 struck your wife," that was not necessary. That's 
6 clearly in violation of the motion in limine that we 
7 brought before this trial started. 
8 THE COURT: Well, the motion for a mistrial is 
9 based upon the question of this officer about his 
10 experience in crime scene investigation. He is a law 
11 enforcement officer. He is entrusted to investigate 
12 criminal conduct there. There's been an objection to 
13 the foundation of this particular photo. I surmise it 
14 is necessary for the state to lay out what this officer 
15 may have to do in investigating a situation like this 
16 which may certainly pertain to a crime scene. I don't 
17 believe he's called this a crime scene at this 
18 particular point in time. So I don't know that what 
19 Detective Maskell testified to was in itself 
20 inappropriate. 
21 I suspect we're probably not going to 
22 reiterate crime scenes, but we're going to get into what 
23 type of work that he does in his investigation to lay 
24 the foundation for this photo. As far as the comment 
25 about -- as far as the concern about Mr. Verharen's 
4 
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1 references to Mr. Larsen's testimony, it is correct the 
2 Court did note that there were a number of questions 
3 that were used and posed to Mr. Larsen not only to put 
4 in perspective the time sequence, obviously the supreme 
5 court was concerned, as this court is concerned, and the 
6 state should be concerned, that repeated references in 
7 using the terminologies "after he had run over your 
8 wife" or other such references were certainly repeated 
9 to the point that the supreme court was concerned and 
10 rightfully so; however, on the other hand, I don't know 
11 how we can avoid not putting some measure of context a 
12 point in time after Mrs. Larsen was, in fact, struck by 
13 the motor vehicle. 
14 I think the Court was listening carefully and 
15 had a concern about that, and I felt a few more such 
16 references, the Court would have been objecting, but the 
17 state did not proceed past that point that I thought was 
18 a concern. So at this point in time, I'm not inclined, 
19 of course, to grant a mistrial. So I'll certainly note 
20 the motion and we'll deny it accordingly. Anything else 
21 at this point? 
22 MR. VERHAREN: Not from me, Judge. 
23 THE COURT: All right. Let's bring our --
24 anything else, Ms. Taylor? 
25 
5 
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THE COURT: Good morning, this is district 
3 court. I'm Judge Luster. This is the time scheduled 
4 for hearings in matters concerning State versus 
5 Ellington. And looks like the parties are all present. 
6 And I understood, Ms. Taylor, at the conclusion of our 
7 proceedings on Friday that you may have a motion or two. 
8 I don't know that I've received any written motions, but 
9 I'll go ahead and defer to you at this point. 
10 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I apologize for the 
11 delay in this. I do have a written motion, if I can 
12 approach. 
13 THE COURT: That would be fine. 
14 MS. TAYLOR: The state has a copy. There are 
15 four attachments that go with that motion. It's a 
16 motion for a mistrial and also a motion to dismiss in 
17 this case, and I can wait just a minute until you've had 
18 a chance 
19 
20 
21 
THE COURT: We'll take a break. 
(Recess.) 
THE COURT: All right. I've had a chance to 
22 go ahead and review the motion that was submitted. The 
23 only thing I haven't reviewed is the accident or 
24 collision reconstruction report, and I suspect that will 
25 have some variance among the matters at some point. So 
2 
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1 go ahead, Ms. Taylor. 
2 MS. TAYLOR: Thank you, Judge. Your Honor, I 
3 apologize for the delay in getting the written work to 
4 the Court. 
5 Your Honor, we are here to move the Court for 
6 a mistrial, and then as a result of that, a dismissal of 
7 the case entirely. Your Honor, we requested a mistrial 
8 on Friday afternoon, bringing up the first part of 
9 what's contained in the written motion, that the six 
10 phrases talked about there. 
11 I think that it's important to revisit that 
12 issue as we bring up the motion for mistrial again. The 
13 Court should look at the entirety of what's happened in 
14 the case rather than just a single instance to decide 
15 whether a mistrial is warranted or not. 
16 Your Honor, in this case, I want to go back 
17 and consider how when this case came back to the 
18 district court here, what the supreme court said, and 
19 the supreme court was quiet clear about what is 
20 prosecutorial misconduct, and the supreme court was 
21 quite clear that using phrases like 11 after he got done 
22 running over your wife repeatedly," and against the 
23 court's order to move along, was prosecutorial 
24 misconduct. That happened again in this case by this 
25 same prosecutor in exactly the same way on Friday. 
3 
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1 That, in and of itself, our position is, warrants 
2 mistrial. 
3 Your Honor, we took precautions prior to the 
4 beginning of this trial to seek a motion in limine and 
5 an order and a pretrial ruling from this court, which 
6 was granted, that those kinds of phrases would not 
7 become part of this trial. The purpose of that is to 
8 not have an overly emotional appeal. 
9 I believe that the state even stipulated that 
10 those kinds of phrases should not come into this trial. 
11 And yet, on the third day of trial, six separate 
12 occasions during one person 1 s testimony, those phrases 
13 were used. Your Honor, the defense position is that the 
14 state completely disregarded the supreme court's ruling 
15 in State versus Ellington and completely disregarded 
16 this court's ruling pretrial granting our motion in 
17 limine to prevent it from using those phrases. That, in 
18 and of itself, should warrant us a mistrial in this 
19 case. 
20 But it doesn 1 t stop there. Your Honor, 
21 shortly before trial on the 12th of January, it came to 
22 the defense attention that the fingerprint report done 
23 in this case in 2006, there was information left out of 
24 that report, and the report quite itself was misleading. 
25 We had a motion on the 17th of January discussing that 
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1 issue and our request for a dismissal of the case based 
2 on a Brady violation. The Court believed that because 
3 we found out prior to trial, we could go forward with 
4 some limitations. 
s One of the attachments that I brought today 
6 for the Court is the Court's ruling about the 
7 limitations. The only way for that to be fair to talk 
8 about the prints was to just simply say the palm prints 
9 excluded Vonnette as being the person that left them 
10 there. The single latent print that had been lifted 
11 should not be mentioned. The Court's ruling was quite 
12 clear on that. 
13 And then on Friday afternoon, and the Court 
14 has that transcript, as well, two times in a row, 
15 Mr. Verharen talked about a print besides the two palm 
16 prints, in violation of the Court's pretrial order. 
17 Judge, the reason that the palm print becomes 
18 important is contained in the reconstruction report 
19 given to the Court as an attachment in support of this 
20 motion, and that becomes important because the 
21 reconstructionist for the defense has analyzed the 
22 photographs of the scene, of Mrs. Larsen, and of the 
23 vehicles involved. And based on his training and 
24 experience, his opinion is that Mrs. Larsen was laying 
25 on the road, she had and tripped and fallen or was 
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1 somehow on the road, and was run over and was not struck 
2 by a moving vehicle. That becomes really important, 
3 then, for the palm prints. Mr. Larsen and Ms. Joleen 
4 Larsen both testified that they saw Vonnette Larsen's 
5 hands come down on the top of Blazer. 
6 When those palm prints are excluded as 
7 Vonnette's, then that is very supportive of the defense, 
8 and it also impeaches two of the state's main witnesses 
9 in this case. So those palm prints become important. 
10 Your Honor, further 1 Julie Morgan is the Idaho 
11 State police officer who lifted the latent prints off 
12 the Blazer. She's no longer with Idaho State Police. 
13 That causes us some difficulty in determining anything 
14 about that fingerprint, but the Court determined that we 
15 didn't need to, that that wouldn't be mentioned, and so 
16 we didn't need to worry about trying to find who that 
17 belonged to or who it didn't belong to. And yet, the 
18 state chose to violate that court order. But moreover, 
19 it violates Mr. Ellington's due process rights. 
20 He has a due process right under the Fifth 
21 Amendment of the United States Constitution and also 
22 under the Idaho Constitution, Article 1, Section 13, to 
23 due process and a fair trial, and that's just not 
24 happened here. 
25 The state, Mr. Verharen has chosen to ignore 
6 
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1 the supreme court's admonishments, had chosen to ignore 
2 his own agreement, and has chosen to ignore this court's 
3 order. 
4 There is no way that Mr. Ellington could have 
5 a fair trial. Your Honor, that is the very reason that 
6 we took the time to go through and do the motions in 
7 limine. One would think one wouldn't need to with the 
8 supreme court opinion in this case, come into court 
9 again, this same case, this same prosecutor, but we took 
10 the precaution and Mr. Verharen has completely walked 
11 all over the top of that. Mr. Ellington cannot receive 
12 a fair trial and he can't receive a fair trial now based 
13 on the actions that Mr. Verharen took. 
14 Your Honor, I'm going to move on to the 
15 portion where I'm going to ask the Court to dismiss the 
16 case for double jeopardy. That comes into play when the 
17 defense is basically forced into a place to ask for a 
18 mistrial, which is where we are right now. 
19 It was a lot of thought and a lot of 
20 conversation between the team members for Mr. Ellington 
21 before we came in today to do this, but we have to do 
22 this, Judge. 
23 Mr. Verharen and the state has chosen to 
24 create a situation where Mr. Ellington cannot receive a 
25 fair trial. And I want to point out a couple of things 
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1 in support of our motion to dismiss based on the state 
2 creating this situation that forced us into the corner 
3 to ask for the mistrial that we're requesting today. 
4 One is that reconstruction report. When the 
5 Court has a chance to review that, I think that you'll 
6 see how important those palm prints become. And it 
7 really causes some concern when you look back at Gary 
8 Cushman's testimony and you look at the portion where 
9 Gary Cushman said that Mr. Verharen had gotten ahold of 
10 him to find out what part of the palm he analyzed. And 
11 this is before we get notified that the palm prints 
12 definitely exclude Vonnette Larsen. So it kind of has 
13 to create a picture in the back of your mind that maybe 
14 there's something else going on here. 
15 Your Honor, this palm print is very important. 
16 When the state found out that we were not going to 
17 stipulate to that report 1 that's when we got the 
18 information from Gary CUshman. When the state found out 
19 that we'd have to call Gary CUshman to talk about those 
20 prints, and we intended to, that's when we found out 
21 about the palm print information. 
22 And, your Honor, when the state knew that we 
23 were going to require a live witness to testify that 
24 those prints weren't Mrs. Larsen's prints, then 
25 Mr. Verharen told me that he would call Mr. Cushman 
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1 himself. So on Friday afternoon when Detective Maskell 
2 said that he had ordered palm prints to be lifted from 
3 that Blazer and had rolled six prints of Mrs. Larsen's 
4 hands and sent those all to the state lab for 
5 comparison, and I left it there because he wasn't Gary 
6 Cushman, then the state was mad, and the state was mad 
7 because I brought it up first and they didn't bring it 
8 up first. And so they created this situation by twice 
9 in a row asking about fingerprints in violation of your 
10 order, taking advantage of their Brady violation, and 
11 they did that so that I'd be in here today, on Monday 
12 morning, asking you to give me a mistrial, and that's 
13 what I'm asking you to do, and,then dismiss it. 
14 
15 
THE COURT: Mr. Verharen. 
MR. VERHAREN: Well, first of all, Judge, let 
16 me state your order was clear and I did violate your 
17 order, and the mistake I made was one that was the 
18 result of being a long day on Friday. It was close to 
19 the end of the day and I simply used the word 
20 "fingerprint" when I shouldn't have. And I know the 
21 Court has ruled on that. 
22 I would ask the Court, though, to look at the 
23 transcript. The jury didn't hear any evidence that 
24 there were fingerprints taken off the Blazer. My line 
25 of questioning for Detective Maskell was simply to get 
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1 that exculpatory information out on the table as early 
2 as possible. I was not mad at Ms. Taylor. 
3 If a transcript of the rest of my direct 
4 with -- redirect with Maskell was ordered, I think it 
5 would show that I asked him and tried to make it 
6 abundantly clear that the prints taken off the Blazer 
7 did not match Mrs. Larsen, and I believe that is the 
8 evidence that the jury was left with. They were not 
9 left with any evidence that there was a fingerprint that 
10 was not analyzed and that may or may not have been hers. 
11 That didn't go anywhere near that direction. And so I 
12 don't think that in of itself is grounds for a mistrial. 
13 In regards to the other part of the motion 
14 here about "running over your wife," I purposely did not 
15 attempt to use language in questioning Mr. Larsen that 
16 would appeal to the emotions of the jury. I purposely 
17 attempted to separate Mr. Ellington's name from 
18 questions about that part of the incident. In terms of 
19 that phrase, I did not use any of the words that the 
20 supreme court objected to. More importantly, there were 
21 no objections from the defense about the phrases I used. 
22 I purposely attempted to stay away from any phrases that 
23 might be objectionary, and I thought I was successful 
24 because there were no objections to any of those 
25 questions. 
10 
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1 And so I think those two things together, 
2 Judge, don't amount to grounds for a mistrial. I 
3 realize that I made a mistake on Friday and I realize I 
4 asked that question. And I wasn't tracking when the 
5 Court first sustained the objection. I didn't realize 
6 what I had done. It was only after the second time that 
7 I realized that the Court's ruling here was specifically 
8 directing me to obviously go back to that prior ruling. 
9 And the jury didn't get any information that was 
10 specifically ordered by the Court not to get in front of 
11 the jury. And I believe I attempted to and was 
12 successful in correcting any mistake. 
13 The evidence that the jury was left with on 
14 Friday was there were two palm prints on that Blazer and 
15 they were not Vonnette's. And so I don't think that 
16 there's a basis at this point to grant a mistrial. 
17 The other issue here, and I realize the 
18 defense is certainly not obligated to stipulate, but the 
19 state would be, you know, obviously willing to stipulate 
20 that the palm prints, if further evidence is needed at 
21 this point, are not Vonnette Larsen's. And stipulate, 
22 as well, that the fingerprint, if the Court is concerned 
23 that they're left with some sort of impression that was 
24 a fingerprint left on the Blazer, is not hers as well. 
25 Thank you. 
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1 
2 
THE COURT: Ms. Taylor. 
MS. TAYLOR: Thank your Judge. First, to 
3 clear up my record a little bit, I did not state and I 
4 mean to state that the federal due process rights apply 
5 to Mr. Ellington through the 14th Amendment, and I 
6 wanted to make sure that I've cleared my record up. 
7 But, Judge, what I'm hearing today is that 
8 Mr. Verharen made a mistake. And the fingerprint 
9 evidence, palm print evidence that we didn't get for six 
10 years, well, that was through inadvertence. 
11 Judge, after a while, all these mistakes, all 
12 this inadvertence, Mr. Ellington doesn't have to pay 
13 that price. The state's the entity that's in possession 
14 of the information. The state's the one that sets the 
15 tenor of this case and whether it was Brad Maskell that 
16 said fingerprint or Mr. Verharen, I don't think it 
17 matters. 
18 I think it's worse that it was Mr. Verharen 
19 that did it, because you said don't say it and he did 
20 twice in a row, even after you sustained an objection in 
21 the middle of the two times. 
22 Mistakes and inadvertence, I believe it's 
23 State versus Guzman, and I think the Court cited to this 
24 in the September 14th opinion that this court wrote, 
25 assuring us that we'd have a fair trial this time. 
12 
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1 I think State versus Guzman tells the Court 
2 that after a while all these mistakes, you should look 
3 at them with a jaundiced eye and take the appropriate 
4 action. 
5 The appropriate action in this case, Judge, is 
6 to grant us a mistrial and then dismiss this case. This 
7 case -- and we don't look at it in a vacuum, I think 
8 when you're looking at what's going on here. You look 
9 at what happened six years ago and how that trial came 
10 down and all the instances of misconduct that occurred. 
11 And then you look at the supreme court saying, yeah, 
12 that is prosecutorial misconduct. And they didn't say 
13 we don't reverse on those grounds because there isn't 
14 enough. They said we don't need to decide that issue 
15 because we have this other ground that we're going to 
16 reverse on. And yet, here we are, in the same case, in 
17 the same courtroom, with the same prosecutor, with the 
18 same stuff going on. 
19 These aren't just mistakes. These aren't just 
20 mistakes. This is Mr. Ellington's due process right. 
21 And violating court orders and violating agreed rulings, 
22 pretrial motions in limine, repeatedly, that rises to 
23 the level of not just a mistake; that rises to the level 
24 of intentional conduct. The appropriate result for that 
25 intentional conduct, your Honor, is to grant us a 
13 
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1 mistrial and then dismiss this case. 
2 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Ms. Taylor. 
3 I'm going to just take a few minutes. I'll come back 
4 and get a ruling on this. 
5 {Recess taken.) 
6 THE COURT: Well, I wanted to review just a 
7 few things. In fact, while I hadn't received this 
8 motion earlier, I had anticipated it after the 
9 conclusion of our proceedings on Friday. In fact, my 
10 court reporter had provided me pretty much the 
11 rough-draft documents that were filed in support of this 
12 motion, as well as a request of my reporter to go ahead 
13 and peruse the record to make sure that during Detective 
14 Maskell's cross-examination on Friday, that Ms. Taylor 
15 did not make reference to the word fingerprint, which 
16 would thereby open the door to perhaps some possible 
17 follow-up questions by the state. Of course, that did 
18 not occur, as Ms. Taylor certainly argued in her motion 
19 here today. 
20 When I left Friday, the Court, of course, 
21 rather being relieved that the week's work was over, the 
22 Court had a degree of frustration about circumstances 
23 because I certainly anticipated that this issue wouldn't 
24 be coming back in front of the Court here today and now 
25 it has resurfaced as a motion to -- for a mistrial in 
14 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 739 of 848
ROUGH DRAFT - UNCERTIFIED COPY - ATTORNEYS' USE ONLY 
1 this particular case. 
2 The motion for a mistrial is combined with the 
3 earlier motion for a mistrial based upon the use of the 
4 term 11 run over,. by the state during the examination of 
5 the few witnesses that have already testified in this 
6 particular case in conjunction with the violation of the 
7 Court's directive last week. 
8 Now, the Court certainly has a degree of 
9 frustration in what happened on Friday because there's 
10 no question that this court had entered a ruling that in 
11 the motion in limine that was presented, and more 
12 directly I think in the motion to dismiss that was 
13 presented in conjunction with a motion to continue. The 
14 Court made it very clear that if the state has any 
15 intention to discuss fingerprints, fingerprints or the 
16 possibility of a fingerprint belonging to Ms. Larsen, 
17 then that can be grounds for the defense to have a 
18 continuance so that they could take whatever efforts 
19 were necessary to potentially examine and exclude, if 
20 necessary, that fingerprint. 
21 However, the Court resorted to simply make it 
22 very clear that we will not talk about fingerprints. 
23 Fingerprints will not be mentioned. That seemed to be 
24 something that was very clear to the defense. 
25 Ms. Taylor certainly did not bring that up. It seemed 
15 
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1 to be very clear to whose testimony was very clear not 
2 to make such a reference, but apparently Mr. Verharen 
3 made a mistake. 
4 Now, I will accept the statement that he made 
5 a mistake because mistakes can be made, but Mr. Verharen 
6 is a very experienced prosecuting attorney. He's also 
7 very aware of the stakes that are present in this 
8 particular case. He's very aware of the directives from 
9 that the supreme court has already concluded, as this 
10 court, that he has habit of disregardin court orders and 
11 court directives. 
12 Mr. Verharen cannot afford to make mistakes. 
13 "Do not mention the fingerprint," this is a directive to 
14 the seasoned attorney. That is a mistake that shouldn't 
15 be happening. It's not like telling a teenage girl not 
16 to use the word "like." That might not be something 
17 that one could reasonably expect to occur. 
18 Ms. Taylor certainly danced around the term; 
19 Detective Maskell did. Mr. Verharen basically brought 
20 that out. The Court tried to minimize the impact of 
21 that inquiry by basically making -- sustaining the 
22 objection without any argument, making it very clear 
23 that there was no question about a fingerprint, and then 
24 Mr. Verharen again went forward before the Court had to 
25 get rather stern and bring it to the attention of the 
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1 state that that had been previously ruled upon. 
2 Now, this has been offered -- this misstep has 
3 now been offered in conjunction with the motion for 
4 the -- and the motion for the mistrial with the earlier 
5 language regarding "having run over Ms. Larsen." I've 
6 already discussed that issue. 
7 I understand that unfortunately Ms. Larsen was 
8 struck by a motor vehicle. Her body was rolled over a 
9 number of times, as even the state's reconstruction 
10 expert report indicates. The reality of the situation 
11 is that Ms. Larsen was run over by a motor vehicle. The 
12 use of the term "run over" is simply not going to be 
13 avoided in this particular case because it will have to 
14 arise from time to time from the various aspects of the 
15 testimony. 
16 What I think the supreme court and this court 
17 certainly is concerned about is that it not be used in 
18 the inflammatory manner that it was in the first case, 
19 and I've already articulated, that while the Court has 
20 some concerns about it, I felt that it had not reached 
21 the point that it had in conjunction with othe~ issues 
22 in this case to justify the granting of a mistrial. 
23 At this point in time, I think the Court needs 
24 to make it very clear that when that last ruling came 
25 out of the supreme court in Mr. Ellington's case, I 
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1 certainly was particularly disturbed that the supreme 
2 court concluded that an Idaho State police officer had 
3 committed perjury in a case and were very alarmed about 
4 that. 
5 I was very concerned that the supreme court 
6 had noted that there were a number of prosecutorial 
7 misconduct instances that impacted Mr. Ellington's right 
8 to a fair trial. Rather than being upset about the law 
9 enforcement officer who had committed perjury or the 
10 prosecutor that had committed misconduct, this court 
11 takes that very seriously, because it's my job and it's 
12 my responsibility to make sure that Mr. Ellington has a 
13 fair trial in this case. 
14 I can assure everybody in this case, and 
15 particularly the elected prosecutor, that if the state 
16 encourages a mistrial in this case, there will not be 
17 another trial, at least authorized by this court. 
18 I will dismiss the case with prejudice, and if 
19 the state wants to try it again, they'll have to seek 
20 permission from the appellate courts of this state. 
21 I have to look at Rule 29 and conclude what 
22 has happened thus far in this particular case. While I 
23 understand you have to take things in a vacuum, and that 
24 certainly will come into play if this court is forced to 
25 declare a mistrial, while I have to looked at what has 
18 
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1 occurred at this particular stage. 
2 At this particular stage, I do not think that 
3 Mr. Ellington is being denied a fair trial. I think the 
4 trial has been conducted appropriately with the 
5 exception of some of the missteps that we've discussed 
6 here, but I don•t think that the jury has information 
7 that rises to the level to where I could conclude even 
8 intending the gravest benefit of the doubt to 
9 Mr. Ellington that he has been denied a fair trial at 
10 this juncture, and so I'm not satisfied that I can grant 
11 a motion for a mistrial at this particular portion of 
12 the trial. 
13 I certainly will accept at the direction -- at 
14 the request of the defense, if they feel it•s 
15 appropriate, an instruction to the jury that basically 
16 would provide that the parties stipulate that there are 
17 no fingerprints or palm prints retrieved from the hood 
18 of the Blazer that are attributable to Ms. Larsen, and 
19 that that can be presented to the jury in the form of 
20 some instruction. 
21 Whether the defense wishes to reinforce that 
22 information is up to the defense and ! 1 11 leave it to 
23 the discretion of the defense to make that request and 
24 make that offer. But at this point, r•m simply going to 
25 deny the motion for a mistrial. Any questions, 
19 
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1 Ms. Taylor? 
2 
3 
4 
5 
MS. TAYLOR: No, thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Verharen? 
MR. VERHAREN: No, Judge . 
THE COURT: All right. With that, we will 
6 take a short recess and reconvene in courtroom No. 1. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
20 
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1 ROUGH DRAFT - UNCERTIFIED COPY - ATTORNEYS' USE ONLY 
2 
3 
Please be aware when using or saving onto a hard 
4 computer disk, or receiving a rough realtime ASCII that: 
5 1. Because of the nature of stenographic 
outlines, differences WILL exist between the 
6 Livenote/Realtime copy and the certified transcript 
prepared by the reporter. Those differences will 
7 include the following, among others: 
8 a. Words may change; 
b. Page and line numbers may change; 
9 c. Punctuation may change; and/or 
d. Quotes may change. 
10 
2. The rough realtime draft is an uncertified, 
11 rough draft copy of the proceedings. 
12 3. A rough realtime ASCII or saving rough 
realtime onto a computer hard drive will only be 
13 provided when a certified copy is purchased and that 
there will be a charge for the rough realtime ASCII in 
14 addition to the charge for the certified copy. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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1 
2 THE COURT: And if you'll come forward and 
3 raise your right hand, the clerk will administer the 
4 oath. 
5 JOEL LARSEN, 
6 called as a witness herein, 
7 having been duly sworn on oath, 
8 testified as follows: 
9 THE COURT: And, sir, if you'll go ahead and 
10 have a seat. As soon as you're comfortable, 
11 Mr. Verharen will have some questions for you. 
12 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
13 MR. VERHAREN: Q. Joel, would you please 
14 state your full name and spell the first and last names. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
21 Athol? 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
24 Athol? 
25 A. 
Joel Larsen, J-0-E-L, L-A-R-S-E-N. 
How old are you? 
I'm 48. 
Where do you live? 
Athol, Idaho. 
How long have you lived at your residence in 
Close to 15 years, 14. 
Who lives with you now at your residence in 
Just me and Joleen, my middle daughter. 
2 
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Q. 
A. 
Do you have some other children? 
Yes, I do. I have Jamie, and then I have my 
3 oldest daughter Jovan. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
And who is the mother of your three daughters? 
Vonnette. 
How long were you and Vonnette married? 
It would be approximately 27 years now. 
At some point did you and Vonnette move to 
9 Athol, Idaho? 
10 
11 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, we did. 
About when was that? 
'98, November of '98. 
And at that point did you begin work at a 
14 company in the area? 
15 A. Yes, I transferred up here. I've been working 
16 for that company for 25 years. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
How long? 
Twenty-five. 
And what's the name of the company? 
Baker Commodities. 
Where did you transfer from? 
I lived in Battle Ground, Washington, but I 
23 transferred from the Portland plant. 
24 
25 
Q. 
A. 
Portland, Oregon? 
Portland, Oregon. 
3 
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1 Q. Okay. At the time that your wife was alive, 
2 was she employed? 
3 A. Self-employed, yes, she was, at -- she did 
4 work at a -- she was both self-employed and at the time 
5 she worked part time for a hair salon in Coeur d'Alene. 
6 Q. Maybe you could describe for us the residence 
7 that you live at with your daughter Joleen? 
8 MR. ADAMS: Judge, I'm object to that. That's 
9 not relevant to any material issue in dispute here. 
10 THE COURT: I think there's been discussion 
11 certainly about the proximity of the residence, so ... 
12 
13 
MR. ADAMS: Proximity, yes. 
THE COURT: Well, I'll let you explore this a 
14 little bit. Go ahead, Mr. Verharen. Continue, please. 
15 Overruled. 
16 THE WITNESS: We have 11 acres, log house, and 
17 between Spirit Lake and Athol. 
18 MR. VERHAREN: Q. All right. So if you get a 
19 little bit closer to that microphone, you're kind of 
20 dropping off there. 
21 THE COURT: That actually removes from its 
22 hole there if you want to hold it, if that's more 
23 comfortable. 
24 
25 
THE WITNESS: I'll sit closer. 
THE COURT: All right. 
4 
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1 MR. VERHAREN: Q. Let me direct your 
2 attention to January 1st, 2006, okay? That morning, 
3 about when do you think you got up? 
4 
5 
6 
7 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Approximately 6:00 o'clock. 
So 6:00 in the morning? 
A.m., yeah. 
And who was there at your house on the morning 
8 of January 1st, 2006? 
A. My youngest daughter Jamie, my grandson Zach, 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
and Vonnette. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
to Joleen 
17 was? 
18 
19 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Where was Joleen? 
She was in town at my oldest daughter's house. 
At some point that morning did you ever talk 
on the telephone? 
Yes, I did. 
And how long do you think the conversation 
Less than five minutes. 
After you talked to Joleen on the telephone, 
20 did you go any place? 
21 
22 
23 to? 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, we did. 
And when you say "we," who are you referring 
Me and Vonnette. 
Where did you and Vonnette go? 
5 
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1 
2 at. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
We went to try to find where the girls were 
In doing so, did you take a vehicle? 
Yes, we did. 
Which vehicle did you take? 
Subaru. 
What color is the Subaru? 
Maroon. 
How long had you had this maroon Subaru? 
Five years, just a guess. 
Did it -- approximately what year was it, if 
12 you recall? 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I think it was a '98. 
After -- who was driving? 
Vonnette was. 
At the time did you have an injury? 
Yes, I did. I had torn my left biceps off and 
18 had it reattached. 
19 
20 
Q. 
A. 
How did you tear your left biceps off? 
I was falling at work and grabbed with my left 
21 hand and caught my whole weight and it ripped off. 
22 
23 
Q. 
A. 
Did you have to have it surgically reattached? 
Yes, I did. I had it -- two days after I had 
24 it torn off, it was reattached. 
25 Q. And at the time that this incident happened, 
6 
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1 was your arm in a sling? 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes, it was. Mobilized -- immobilized. 
Were you off work because of this injury? 
Yes, I was. 
And how long did that last for? 
I believe it was close to nine months, because 
7 I have a physical job where I -- and there was no --
8 there was no light duty. There was no light duty. 
9 Q. Could you still nonetheless drive a car with a 
10 stick shift at the time? 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I could. 
Where did you and Vonnette go? 
We went to where the girls were parked. 
Where were they parked? 
They were parked on Ramsey Road. 
Okay. At the intersection of some 
Brunner. 
-- street? 
Brunner and Ramsey. 
How long do you think it took you, 
21 approximately took you and your wife to get to the house 
22 from where your two daughters were? 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
Less than ten minutes. 
When you went to the place where your 
25 daughters were, did you talk to them? 
7 
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A. 
Q. 
Yes, we did. 
How long do you think you spoke with your 
3 daughters for? 
4 
5 
A. 
Q. 
Just a couple minutes, less than five. 
And then after you had this conversation with 
6 them the first time, did you and your wife go any place? 
7 A. Yes, we did. On the way there we had seen 
8 some people out looking at some donkeys or mules and 
9 they were standing outside, so we went back to talk to 
10 them. 
11 MS. TAYLOR: All right. Let me get you an 
12 exhibit. If I can approach, Judge? 
13 
14 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
MR. VERHAREN: Q. Let me show you what's 
15 already been admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2. 
16 I'll stick it up here on this easel. And if you could, 
17 show us where you first contacted your daughters. 
18 
19 
A. 
Q. 
Right there. 
And then show us where you went back to talk 
20 to these people you had seen earlier. 
21 
22 
A. 
Q. 
Right there. 
And these people that you had seen earlier, 
23 how many were there? 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
Two, a man and a wife. 
And whereabouts were they on that piece of 
8 
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1 property you were just pointing to? 
A. Right on the corner. The field is the corner 2 
3 of where the donkeys were at where the right at the 
4 corner of the two, Weir and Brunner. 
5 Q. And what was the conversation in regards to 
6 with these two people? 
7 A. I had just asked them if they, since they were 
8 standing outside, had seen this gold and white Blazer. 
9 Q. Now, when you were speaking with these people 
10 at that location, were you outside of the Subaru? 
11 A. Yes. The wife Vonnette had parked in the 
12 driveway and I walked up to the people. 
13 Q. When you walked up to the people, was your arm 
14 still in that sling you described to us? 
15 A. Yes, sir. 
16 Q. Did you have anything in your right hand when 
17 you walked up to talk to these people? 
18 
19 
20 
21 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
22 please. 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
No. 
Was there a gun in the Subaru? 
Yes. 
Why don't you describe that gun for us, 
It's a Smith and Wesson .44 magnum. 
What color is it? 
It's silver and black. 
9 
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1 Q. How long is the barrel? 
2 A. Eight and three-eighths. 
3 Q. How long have you had it? 
4 A. At that time or now? 
5 Q. Take your pick. 
6 A. Probably 20 years now. 
7 Q. Okay. Do you -- today and did you then, have 
8 a concealed weapons permit? 
9 A. Yes, I do. 
10 Q. And how long 
11 A. And then. 
12 Q. And how long have you had that? 
13 A. I've had that approximately 20 years also. 
14 Q. What was that gun doing in the Subaru? 
15 A. I had been hiking the day before and I had it 
16 underneath the seat. 
17 Was the gun in a holster? Q. 
18 A. No, it was not. It was just by itself under 
19 the seat. 
20 Q. Did it have any -- was it loaded? 
21 A. Yes, it was. 
22 Q. Describe how it was loaded, please. 
23 A. It was loaded with five bullets. I always 
24 carry -- carry it on an empty cylinder. So in case I 
25 drop it or it gets hit, it doesn't go off. 
10 
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1 Q. Have you ever left it in the Subaru before 
2 prior to this date? 
3 
4 
A. 
Q. 
Many times. 
How long do you think your conversation was 
5 with these two people? 
6 
7 
A. 
Q. 
Maybe five minutes. 
Okay. And during that entire time, did you 
8 ever go back and get the gun out of the Subaru when you 
9 were speaking with them? 
10 
11 
A. 
Q. 
No, I did not. 
After you spoke with these two people there at 
12 the corner of Brunner Road -- and that street doesn't 
13 have 
14 
15 
A. 
Q. 
16 right. 
Weir. 
Weir, I'm sorry. I was going too far to the 
17 After you spoke with them, what's the next 
18 thing that happened? 
19 A. Walked back to the Subaru. And at that time, 
20 I could look over and see there was another vehicle, a 
21 Kootenai County sheriff with the daughters. 
22 Q. Can you show us using that pointer on 
23 Plaintiff's Exhibit 2? 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
Right there (indicating). 
So you were able to look down from the corner 
11 
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1 of Brunner and Weir? 
2 A. This is all a field. There's nothing here. 
3 This is a field. It's treed some on this side, but this 
4 is just a grass field. There's a little square here. 
5 Q. When you saw the police car down there by your 
6 daughters, what did you and your wife do? 
7 A. I got back in the vehicle and she drove over 
8 there. 
9 Q. When you got to where your daughters were at 
10 Ramsey and Brunner, was the police officer still there? 
11 A. He had turned -- when we came I got back 
12 in, we went this way, and he had turned around so we met 
13 him he was at the intersection here. We went around 
14 him and then he went this way. 
15 Q. Could you see where he went after he took a 
16 left on Brunner? 
17 A. No, because this tree is here. I mean, we can 
18 see on this little bit here, but we -- he turned left 
19 and went this way. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
at 
Q. 
that 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Did you go and speak with your daughters there 
intersection a second time? 
Yes, I did. 
How long did you talk to them the second time? 
Just a couple minutes. 
And after you and your wife spoke with your 
12 
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1 daughters there the second time, where did you two go? 
2 A. Got back in the vehicle and I believe we went 
3 to this house here. It's a fairly well-manicured house, 
4 yard and stuff, we went there. 
5 Q. And is there a driveway from Brunner that goes 
6 up to that house? 
7 
8 
A. 
Q. 
9 the house? 
10 A. 
11 far. 
12 Q. 
Yes, it is. Yes, there is. 
And how far is that driveway about going up to 
Oh, it's only maybe 30 yards. It's not very 
When you got to that driveway, how far in did 
13 your wife drive? 
14 
15 
A. 
Q. 
Maybe half ways. 
And what were you and your wife doing this 
16 second time around? 
17 A. I wanted to go up to that residence and ask 
18 permission to walk their fence line to look into this 
19 other treed part right here where there's a house in the 
20 middle. There's another house between Weir and where we 
21 pulled in. 
22 
23 
Q. 
A. 
And why did you want to do that? 
Because I -- this is all treed here. Like I 
24 say, a bunch of junk there. I want to walk down the 
25 fence line and look behind their shops and stuff just to 
13 
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1 see if I could get a visual to tell the officer exactly 
2 where he was at. 
3 Q. Are you talking about this Blazer that you 
4 referred to --
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 done? 
10 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
-- earlier? 
Yes, sir. 
Had you seen this Blazer, what would you have 
MR. ADAMS: Objection, Judge, that's not 
11 relevant. Speculation. 
12 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to overrule. I'm 
13 not sure it's speculation. Overrule. Go ahead. 
14 
15 trying 
THE WITNESS: Like I said, I was just 
since the officer went the other way, I just 
16 wanted to see if we could see him, the Blazer, and then 
17 I would have went back to the kids. They had cell 
18 phones; we did not. 
19 MR. VERHAREN: Q. When you went the second 
20 time down to that driveway in the wooded area, when you 
21 got out of the vehicle, did you bring that gun? 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
It was in the car under the seat. 
Did you bring it with you when you got out of 
24 the car and approached the house? 
25 A. No, I did not. 
14 
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1 Q. Okay. Were you able to walk all the way up to 
2 the door and contact the people for permission to walk 
3 that fence line? 
4 A. No, I did not. I got close to the door and I 
5 heard a loud noise, a vehicle start. 
6 
7 
Q. 
A. 
8 trees. 
9 Q. 
From which direction? 
From the middle property that was in these 
And when you heard that, were you able to see 
10 something at that point? 
11 A. I dropped down to one knee to see underneath 
12 the trees. They were pruned up about 5 feet. I dropped 
13 down to one knee and I could see a white top, gold 
14 Blazer pulling around the shop from the backside. 
15 
16 
Q. 
A. 
17 anymore. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
22 direction. 
23 Q. 
24 again? 
25 A. 
And so where did this Blazer go? 
It just went around the shop. I couldn't see 
What did you do? 
I ran back to the Subaru and got in. 
Then what happened? 
The wife backed out and turned in that 
At some point were you able to see the Blazer 
Yes. When we got up -- after she backed out, 
15 
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1 she headed in that direction. The Blazer was coming out 
2 of that driveway. 
3 
4 
Q. 
A. 
Can you show us using your pointer? 
Again, that treed area right here, there's 
5 one, two, three, it came out from the second driveway. 
6 Q. And so were you east or west of the driveway 
7 where the Blazer came out of? 
8 A. We were west. We were on -- we were on this 
9 side here. The driveway it came out of is in the middle 
10 and the donkey people are over here. 
11 Q. So when the Blazer got to Brunner Road from 
12 that driveway, where did it go? 
13 
14 
A. 
Q. 
Could you ask that again? 
When the Blazer came out of that driveway and 
15 got to Brunner Road, where did it go? 
16 
17 
18 wife? 
19 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Oh, it went west down Brunner, turned west. 
So it had to pass in front of you and your 
Yes, it did. And then another thing was I --
20 I was trying to get a front license plate because the 
21 daughter told me there was no rear license plate. 
22 Q. As the Blazer passed in front of you and your 
23 wife, were you able to.see the front of it? 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I was. 
Could you see whether or not there was a 
16 
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1 license plate on the front? 
2 
3 
A. 
Q. 
There was not. 
Were you able to see the occupant or occupants 
4 of the Blazer at that time as it went in front of you 
5 and your wife? 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I did. 
How many people were inside? 
There was one. 
And was that a driver, I assume? 
Yes. 
And was that a male or a female? 
It was a male. 
All right. Where did the -- this person drive 
14 that Blazer to after turning to the west on Brunner 
15 Road? 
16 A. Down to Ramsey and then he turned left on 
17 Ramsey going by the girls. 
18 
19 
20 
Q. 
A. 
out of 
What did you and your wife do? 
The wife pulled in in this driveway. He carne 
when we were corning this way, he carne out, we 
21 pulled in the same driveway, she backed up, went to 
22 leave, didn't back up far enough to go in the grass. 
23 She backed up again and then proceeded in that 
24 direction. 
25 Q. And were you able to, at some point as you 
17 
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1 were going down Brunner westbound, see your daughters 
2 move their vehicle? 
3 
4 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I did. 
And describe that for us. 
5 A. After he turned, went by the daughters, then 
6 my daughters pulled out behind him. 
Q. 
A. 
Were you still --
And I was -- we were still on Brunner 
7 
8 
9 approximately right here when we were just passed 
10 this driveway, probably right in here, when he was 
11 turning going this way. 
12 
13 
Q. 
A. 
Did your daughters then get in front of you? 
They were way in front, yes, because we were 
14 still on Brunner. 
15 Q. What did you and -- what did your wife do when 
16 you got down to Ramsey Road from Brunner? 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
19 that time? 
20 
21 
A. 
Q. 
22 Honda? 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
She turned left also. 
And so which vehicle was in front of you at 
The daughter's Honda. 
And could you see what was in front of the 
The gold Blazer. 
Back in 2006, did you or your wife Vonnette 
25 have cell phones? 
18 
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1 
2 
A. 
Q. 
No, we did not. 
Did you have any means of communicating with 
3 your daughters at that point? 
4 
5 
A. 
Q. 
We did not. 
Describe your speed as you drove down Ramsey 
6 Road following your daughters. 
7 A. Again, through these corners, I estimated we 
8 were probably doing 60. Down here, we may have got up 
9 to 80 before this -- in here, it's a straight -- this is 
10 a straight stretch. 
11 Q. And during this entire time, was your 
12 daughter's vehicle in front of you? 
13 
14 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, it was. 
Were you able to see their vehicle and the 
15 Blazer the whole time or not? 
16 A. Not the whole time. Like when we were 
17 coming --we wouldn't see them-- these corners, we'd 
18 see them and then lose them. They'd be -- when we'd 
19 turn, we couldn't see, then we'd see them here again. 
20 You know, it was corners so we were far enough 
21 several hundred yards behind them to where we would 
22 at points we would lose sight of the daughters. 
23 
24 Road? 
25 
Q. 
A. 
What happened when you got down to Scarcella 
They turned -- turned right onto Scarcella. 
19 
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1 It only goes to the right there. 
2 Q. Okay. And did you see the Blazer turn right 
3 there or not? 
4 A. It turned right first, then the daughters, and 
5 then when we got to that intersection we also turned 
6 right. 
7 Q. So as you came down Scarcello Road, was it the 
8 same positioning, the Blazer in front followed by the 
9 Honda, and then you and your wife? 
10 
11 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, it was. 
In terms of Scarcello Road, is there a point 
12 where there's a rise and a curve at the same time? 
13 
14 
A. 
Q. 
15 pointer? 
16 
17 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, there is. 
Okay. Can you point to that using that laser 
Right there (indicating). 
And when you come up to that rise, are you 
18 able to see what's on the other side of it before you 
19 get over it? 
20 
21 
A. 
Q. 
Before, no. You have --
As you and your wife came over the rise there 
22 on Scarcello Road that you just pointed at, describe 
23 what you could see in front of you. 
24 A. I seen brake lights as both the daughter and 
25 the Blazer. The Blazer had brake lights on, and then so 
20 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 765 of 848
ROUGH DRAFT - UNCERTIFIED COPY - ATTORNEYS' USE ONLY 
1 did the daughters. 
2 Q. When you saw the brake lights of the Blazer 
3 activated, where was it? 
4 A. It was braking to turn into that -- where the 
5 yellow arrow is right there. 
6 Q. Okay. And where were the brake lights you 
7 could see from your daughter's vehicle? 
8 
9 
10 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
They were in the westbound lane. 
What did you and your wife do? 
We came up up on them, went by the daughters 
11 in the westbound lane, like we passed them. Pulled 
12 partly into the west -- sorry. We were in the eastbound 
13 lane, went by the daughters, pulled in -- partially into 
14 the westbound, and then turned back. 
15 
16 
17 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Turned back --
Into the eastbound lane. 
All right. And when you turned back into the 
18 eastbound lane, what was the Blazer doing? 
19 A. When we were coming by the girls, he was 
20 turning around, when we were coming up. 
21 Q. All right. And so what happened after the 
22 Blazer got itself turned around? 
23 A. After it turned around, it started to head 
24 eastbound and struck the front of our vehicle. 
25 Q. And so which part of the front of the Subaru 
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1 did the Blazer strike? 
2 
3 
A. 
Q. 
Passenger front corner. 
What part of the Blazer struck that part of 
4 the Subaru? 
5 A. Round about the back of the front driver's 
6 side fender on the Blazer and front of the door. 
7 Q. Was your wife still moving? Was the car still 
8 moving at the time of contact between the Subaru and the 
9 Blazer? 
10 
11 
A. We were all but stopped. 
Explain: Your head goes down and at the same 
12 time impact when we were barely moving. 
13 
14 
15 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
So you were still moving forward then? 
Yes, all but stopped, though. 
All right. After the Blazer made -- after 
16 there was contact between the Subaru and the Honda, 
17 where did the Blazer go? 
18 A. It turned left and went around behind us 
19 towards the girls. 
20 Q. And at the time that it went to the left, was 
21 the eastbound lane of Scarcella open? 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
Wide open. 
After the Blazer went -- came around you and 
24 went to the left, where did it go? 
25 A. It went straight at the girls. 
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1 Q. And then what happened? 
2 A. It impacted the girls. 
3 Q. As it was driving to the vehicle your 
4 daughters were in and at the time of impact, 
5 hear any noises coming from the Blazer? 
6 A. It was very loud, as full throttle. 
7 Q. After impact, describe what you could see 
8 happen. 
9 A. It crawled right up on top of the daughter's 
10 car. I could see daylight underneath the driver's side 
11 front tire on top of my daughter's hood. 
12 Q. Describe what you could see from there. 
13 A. I just seen them continue -- the motor sounded 
14 full throttle the whole time, never le-t up, and it just 
15 kept pushing my kids backwards. 
16 Q. Were you watching this happen? 
17 A. Yes, I was. 
18 Q. How were you watching this happen if you were 
19 in the passenger's seat of the Subaru? 
20 A. It's a hatchback Subaru. It's got -- that 
21 particular one's got a huge bubble back window. And we 
22 were -- at the time it happened, we were watching around 
23 the front, the side, and then we were looking out the 
24 back watching him push the kids backwards. 
25 Q. And was your wife saying anything or making 
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1 any noises as you were watching this happen? 
2 A. She was screaming hysterically. 
3 Q. What did you do when you saw this happen? 
4 A. After we seen this happen out the back window 
5 what he was doing, I reached under the seat, grabbed the 
6 pistol and hit the door open. 
7 Q. Did you see what your wife did at this point? 
8 A. She got out. She opened up the passenger's --
9 or the driver's side, excuse me, the same as I was doing 
10 going out the passenger. 
11 Q. Did you see where she went? 
12 A. We both ran back straight towards the vehicle. 
13 Q. And in terms of where you went, describe that 
14 for us, please. 
15 A. I was running straight towards the driver's 
16 side of the Blazer. She was side over here. Looked to 
17 me that she was trying to run around the backside of the 
18 Honda towards the other side. 
19 Q. Joel, when you're describing what your wife 
20 was doing, it's very important that you not describe 
21 what you think she was trying to do or what her 
22 intentions may have been, okay? 
23 A. I saw her going towards the backside of the 
24 Honda. 
25 Q. All right. Describe what you did as you got 
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1 your pistol out of the car and you ran to the back of 
2 the Blazer. 
3 A. I was --my intent was to go to the driver's 
4 side of the Blazer. Before -- right as I got there, it 
5 was put into reverse and came back, which would cut off 
6 my straight line to the driver's side door. 
7 Q. As you got out of the Subaru with that gun, 
8 what was the Blazer doing at that time? 
9 A. It was still pushing my kids. The motor 
10 screaming, full throttle, however you want to say it, 
11 and never let up. It was still pushing my kids when I 
12 got out running that way. 
13 Q. As the Blazer backed off your daughter's 
14 Honda, what happened? 
15 A. It struck me -- we came into contact, the back 
16 passenger's side of the Bronco. I hit the back end and 
17 shoved off with my right hand to keep from going 
18 underneath the back of the Bronco. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Was this the right hand that had the pistol? 
Yes, it was. 
And after that occurred, what did you do? 
I rolled around the back corner and then 
23 proceeded to the front side door. 
24 Q. And so are you on the passenger's side of the 
25 Blazer at this point? 
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A. 
Q. 
Yes, I am. 
Are you walking or running up the length of 
3 the Blazer? 
4 A. I was running. I had came to a complete --
5 like I say, bounced off the back, hit the back, and then 
6 so it wasn't a complete run or nothing, but then I 
7 started towards the front of the vehicle. 
8 Q. And at that location at the back of the 
9 Blazer, could you see into the Blazer at all at that 
10 point? 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
see 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
in. 
Q. 
No, I could not. 
Why not? 
The backside window was tinted. I couldn't 
All right. As you got closer to the 
16 passenger's side door of the Blazer, were you able to 
17 see inside? 
18 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes, I was. 
Describe what you could see, please. 
I first see, you know, the passenger door, the 
21 dash here, and then I see a hand come up onto the gear 
22 shift and pull it straight down at the same time the 
23 motor was racing again. 
24 Q. Where were you when you saw the hand put 
25 the -- move the gear shift selector? 
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1 A. Approximately like right here. I mean, I was 
2 coming up on the door, like I say. I couldn't see 
3 anything until the dash, and I was probably right at the 
4 edge of the door when I could actually see the hand 
5 coming down. That was the next thing. And then I could 
6 see him inside the vehicle, and at the same time it came 
7 down, the gas came back on full throttle again. 
8 Q. Were you able to see whether or not there was 
9 a passenger in the vehicle? 
10 
11 
12 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
There was not, but there was a dog. 
Where was the dog? 
In between the seats. I believe it was bucket 
13 seats. It looked like it was next to him. 
14-~~------Q-. -~-AnG--a-s---y-GU-Game---a:ld±'e-ast-----arul--a'f-~~-saW---t-be----~-~-----
15 person put this into drive and heard the acceleration, 
16 were you, as you came abreast, able to see the person? 
17 
18 
19 time? 
20 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes, I was. 
All right. And did you recognize him at that 
As being the same person I seen coming out of 
21 the driveway on Brunner, yes. 
22 
23 
24 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
All right. And is that person here today? 
Yes, he is. 
Describe where he's seated and tell us what 
25 he's wearing. 
27 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 772 of 848
1 
2 
ROUGH DRAFT - UNCERTIFIED COPY - ATTORNEYS' USE ONLY 
A. 
Q. 
He's wearing a suit right there with glasses. 
Okay. At the time that you came abreast of 
3 Mr. Ellington, were you able to see through the 
4 passenger's side of the door through the driver's side 
5 front door window? 
6 A. Yes, I was. It was -- neither side was 
7 tinted. They were clear glass. 
8 Q. And could you see beyond that? 
9 A. Yes, I could. 
10 Q. What could you see? 
11 A. I could see the roof of the daughter's Honda. 
12 Q. And at that point were you -- could you see 
13 your wife Vonnette? 
14 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes, I could. 
Where was she? 
She was approximately running past -- just 
17 past the center line into the westbound lane crossing 
18 the road. 
19 
20 
21 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
And was she walking or was she running? 
She was running. 
Which -- without telling us what you thought 
22 she was doing, which direction was she running? 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
She was running north. 
And which direction with your daughters? 
They were facing northwest. They were 
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1 pushed -- they were -- the vehicle at that time wasn't 
2 completely westbound. It was pushed off the road and 
3 facing what I would say northwest. 
4 
5 
6 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Talking about the Honda? 
Yes, I am. 
All right. And at this moment when you could 
7 see through the windows of the Blazer and see your 
8 daughter's car on the other side, and you could see 
9 Mr. Ellington as well, and you could see your wife off 
10 to the right, what did you do? 
11 A. Well, at that time I had the gun up pointed at 
12 him. I couldn't shoot because my daughters were right 
13 there. My wife was over here, so I just -- only thing I 
14 could think of to do, I split the difference, shot at 
15 the motor hoping that I'd hit something that would shut 
16 it off. 
17 Q. When you shot at the motor, did you have some 
18 concerns for your wife on the street? 
19 A. No. Because I was -- like I say, I was 
20 splitting the difference between where my daughters were 
21 and my wife. I was angled to the middle and into the 
22 vehicle. 
23 Q. Did you think shooting the motor would stop 
24 the Blazer? 
25 A. I was hoping. 
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1 Q. Why did you feel that you needed to stop the 
2 Blazer? 
3 A. Because he was going after my wife in my 
4 wife's direction. 
5 
6 
Q. Joel, it's important 
MR. ADAMS: Object. Ask that that be struck 
7 and instruct the jury to disregard that comment. 
8 
9 
10 area --
11 
THE COURT: Overruled. Will stand. 
MR. VERHAREN: Q. Did your shot to the 
THE COURT: Excuse me. I am going to strike 
12 that because I'm not sure that the response -- the 
13 response seems to indicate what Mr. Ellington's intent 
14 may have been. If you want to -- I'm going to go ahead 
15 and strike that, so sustain the objection. 
16 MR. ADAMS: Would you please instruct the jury 
17 to disregard that. 
18 THE COURT: Yeah. The jury will disregard 
19 Mr. Larsen's response to that question at this point. 
20 
21 
MR. ADAMS: Thank you, Judge. 
MR. VERHAREN: Q. Did your shot to the area 
22 of the motor of the Blazer work? 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
No, it did not. 
What happened? 
The Blazer continued eastbound and to the 
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1 north, turning left. 
2 Q. Had you fired that gun before that shot to the 
3 motor of the Blazer before? 
4 
5 
A. 
Q. 
No, I did not. 
What happened after you fired into the motor 
6 area of the Blazer? 
7 A. It continued to be full throttle and the 
8 vehicle was turning to the left. 
9 
10 
Q. 
A. 
And where was your wife at this time? 
She was in the westbound lane, like I say, 
11 just crossing the center line. She was heading north. 
12 
13 
Q. 
A. 
Describe what you saw happen. 
I seen the Blazer go towards the wife, 
14 Vonnette, and then I seen her stop and reverse her 
15 direction to go the other way, and then the vehicle 
16 struck her. 
17 Q. Where in terms of the vehicle did it strike 
18 her? 
19 A. Right dead center to me, it looked like, in 
20 the front of the vehicle. 
21 Q. And was your wife's head visible above the 
22 hood of the vehicle? 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes, it was. 
When it -- she was struck? 
I could see like right at her armpit, 
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1 shoulders right here, above what I could see. 
2 Q. So her shoulders, neck and head, were they 
3 above the hood of the Blazer as it struck her? 
4 A. Yes, it was. I could see the top of her 
5 shoulders. 
6 Q. At the time that the Blazer struck your wife, 
7 which direction was it turning? 
8 
9 
A. 
Q. 
It was turning left. 
And in which lane was the Blazer traveling at 
10 the time it struck your wife? 
11 
12 
A. 
Q. 
Westbound lane. 
After the Blazer -- after Mr. Ellington struck 
13 your wife, what's the next thing that you saw? 
14 A. The next thing I -- it shot her out in front. 
15 She disappeared. Next thing I seen was her laying with 
16 her head right at the center double yellow line, which 
17 was in front of the vehicle. It went over the top of 
18 her head and neck. 
19 Q. What part of the Blazer went over your wife's 
20 head and neck? 
21 A. The passenger front tire. I could see 
22 daylight. It like launched over the top. It went over 
23 the top. I could see daylight underneath the Blazer 
24 when it went over the top of her head, neck, and 
25 shoulders. She was laying with her head towards the 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
south. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Were 
Yes, 
What 
When 
her feet towards 
they were. 
happened as the 
the back wheels 
the north? 
back wheels got to her? 
got to her, again, this 
6 vehicle was accelerating, never let up, I seen it go 
7 over the top of her head, neck, and shoulders again, and 
8 then spit her out, swung her around the opposite way now 
9 she was facing, then she rolled this way. 
10 Q. When it spit her out and swung her the 
11 opposite way, which way are you referring to? 
12 A. Now, the total reverse direction from what her 
13 head before. She then -- because again, it ran over her 
14 head, neck, and shoulders, and the tires spinning, spit 
15 her out like-- she was like this (indicating), all the 
16 way around like this and rolled like this (indicating). 
17 Q. So when she came to her final rest after the 
18 Blazer ran over her, which way was her head pointing? 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 that? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
North. 
And her feet? 
South. 
You said she rolled. What do you mean by 
24 A. With the tires spinning, it -- like it spit 
25 her out. It just flung her out because it was at full 
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1 throttle. From what it sounded like to me, engine was 
2 racing, and it just shot her out. Spun her around the 
3 other way, then she rolled over. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
What did you do after that? 
Emptied the rest of my gun at the Blazer. 
So that would have been four shots? 
Four shots, yes, sir. 
Do you know if you connected at all in the 
9 last four shots? 
10 A. I know the one side back passenger, and then I 
11 do not believe my third shot. I was -- I couldn't 
12 believe what I seen. 
13 MR. ADAMS: Objection, your Honor. That's not 
14 responsive. 
15 
16 
THE COURT: Yeah, sustained. 
THE WITNESS: I believe I hit one other time. 
17 I missed my third shot, I believe, and then one of my 
18 last two I heard hit. 
19 MR. VERHAREN: Q. Couldn't see where you hit 
20 though? 
21 A. No, I believe -- no, I do not. It smacked 
22 something. 
23 Q. And as the Blazer ran over your wife, did it 
24 change lanes? 
25 A. After it ran over the wife, then it proceeded 
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1 to -- it made sort of a half circle like this. It came 
2 back into the eastbound lane and then disappeared over 
3 the hill. 
4 Q. How soon after your wife was run over did the 
5 Blazer get back in the correct lane of travel? 
6 A. I'm guessing by the time it was totally over/ 
7 30 yards or so. 
8 Q. All right. And did you ever hear the 
9 acceleration let up --
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
No. 
before you lost sight of it? 
It was -- it never let up. 
Using your pointer/ show where you saw it go. 
Again/ it was right there. There's a drop 
15 where it drops down over the hill right here and I lost 
16 sight of it there. 
17 Q. What I'd like to do at this point 1 with the 
18 Court's permission/ is show you some photographs on our 
19 screen 1 okay? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 MR. ADAMS: We might want to take a break at 
22 this point 1 Judge/ to discuss some of these. 
23 THE COURT: All right. And we probably need 
24 to get -- make sure our audio-visual is properly working 
25 and get our blinds sets so we can see. 
35 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 780 of 848
ROUGH DRAFT - UNCERTIFIED COPY - ATTORNEYS' USE ONLY 
1 Members of the Jury, take a few minutes. 
2 Again, of course, I admonish you not to discuss this 
3 case among yourselves nor with others nor should you 
4 form or express an opinion about it until it is finally 
5 submitted to you. With that, go ahead and take a few 
6 minutes and we'll get organized. 
7 
8 
THE WITNESS: May I leave? 
THE COURT: Yes. Why don't you go ahead and 
9 step down, sir, and take a break. We'll let you know 
10 when you're needed. 
11 (Jury not present.) 
12 THE COURT: All right. Now that the jury's 
13 out of the courtroom, Mr. Adams, please. 
14 MR. ADAMS: Yes, I'd like to see them, Judge, 
15 because -- and I'll tell you one thing is because --
16 THE COURT: I'm going to stop you just a 
17 moment. Yesterday when we were having problems with 
18 your voice, we noticed that when you started speaking 
19 where that microphone is it worked quite well. I just 
20 want to turn it to your direction because that will help 
21 everybody. 
22 
23 
24 
MR. ADAMS: Thank you, Judge. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. ADAMS: When we stipulated to that 911 
25 tape coming in yesterday, I asked Art, "Does that got 
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1 everything on it?" It didn't. It had the first several 
2 minutes cut off. That's why we had a problem with the 
3 transcript because that tape could have been edited, and 
4 the first few minutes of the recording didn't go in and 
5 the jury doesn't get to hear that. I'm not going to do 
6 that again. 
7 I'd like to see every picture before they show 
8 it to the jury. I think that's fair. I don't know 
9 what's on there. They gave us picture boards. We 
10 looked at those. I just think it's fair that we get to 
11 see these before they're put in front of the jury 
12 because I can't unring the bell or a picture before it 
13 goes up. Thank you, Judge. 
14 MR. VERHAREN: For the record, Judge, 911 tape 
15 has not been altered by my self. To my knowledge, 
16 that's the full 911 tape. That 911 tape, in its 
17 entirety, was provided to the defense in a notice that I 
18 gave a couple of weeks ago --
19 THE COURT: I'm going to stop you just for a 
20 moment. I don't think we're talking about the 911 tape. 
21 If that's not the full tape and the defense wants to 
22 admit the rest of it, they'll certainly have that 
23 opportunity, and I think that the doctrine of 
24 completeness would certainly authorize that. I know we 
25 had a discussion about the transcript and I know that a 
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1 transcriber would have a lot of difficulty trying to 
2 accurately transcribe that tape. That's another issue 
3 that I don't think we need to talk -- do you have any 
4 problem going through these real quickly with 
5 Mr. Adams 
6 MR. VERHAREN: No, but one thing I've learned, 
7 Judge, is it's really good to make a good record. So 
8 I'd like to put that down on the record. The other 
9 issue I'd like to put on the record is these exhibits. 
10 What was provided to Court and to Counsel yesterday is a 
11 binder. In that binder are all of our exhibits and 
12 they're all numbered. And those, again, were provided 
13 to the Court and Counsel yesterday. So Counsel was 
14 fully aware of the photographs that we were going to 
15 introduce today and those were handed to Counsel. They 
16 had copies of them in this binder, so they were fully 
17 aware of what we were going to introduce today as they 
18 were in terms of the 911 call. Thank you. 
19 
20 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Adams? 
MR. ADAMS: No, Judge. I think on the photos, 
21 there's only two or three that we got a problem with, 
22 the one you've already ruled to exclude. We're just 
23 trying to get this thing going without interrupting the 
24 jury every time one goes up there. 
25 THE COURT: All right. Well, if you want to 
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1 take a moment and run through the slides, we need to 
2 test our new blinds, as well. I don't know if we've had 
3 a chance to do. Mr. Hartman, I'll let you do that and 
4 go ahead and take your time. Make sure we have 
5 everything in order so that there's no surprises. 
6 (Recess.) 
7 THE COURT: Are we ready to get underway, 
8 Mr. Verharen? 
9 
10 
11 
12 
MR. VERHAREN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Adams? 
MR. ADAMS: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any matters we need to take up 
13 before we bring our jury in? 
14 MR. McHUGH: Your Honor, the only thing with 
15 regards to the slide show is Ms. Taylor is going to sit 
16 here and kind of look over my shoulder and be able to 
17 look at the slides we're going to put up before they get 
18 put up, and that way to make sure that the exhibits that 
19 we've shown the defense and I told them we're going to 
20 put up, are actually the ones that get up there. So 
21 we're trying to take precautions that nothing gets up 
22 there that shouldn't. 
23 
24 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. ADAMS: Yeah, that's so, Judge. It was 
25 just seven pictures, and what we've been given we've 
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1 compared ours with theirs and those seven pictures we 
2 don't have a problem. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Excellent. Certainly 
4 better to proceed cautiously rather than rush through 
5 things. And with that, let's bring our -- the jury back 
6 in. 
7 
8 
(Jury present.) 
THE COURT: All right. I think we're all 
9 back. Ready to get underway. Any time you're ready, 
10 Mr. Verharen, please. 
11 
12 Q. 
MR. VERHAREN: Thank you, Judge. 
Joel, what I'd like to do is to show some 
13 photographs now and start with No. 25. So if I could go 
14 ahead and dim the lights, Judge. 
15 
16 
17 Q. 
THE COURT: We can do that. 
MR. VERHAREN: Thank you. 
So we're looking at Exhibit No. 25, okay? Do 
18 you have that laser pointer with you still? 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Okay. What I'd like you to do is start on the 
21 objects in this photograph that are closest to us, okay? 
22 And we can see a purple-colored car. Can you describe 
23 which car that is? 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
That's Vonnette's Subaru, our Subaru. 
And then beyond that particular vehicle, we 
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1 can see a white Honda. Whose car is that? 
2 A. That's my daughter's, Jovan. 
3 Q. Then there is a yellow tarp laying on the 
4 road. What's under the yellow tarp? 
5 A. Vonnette. 
6 Q. Then we can see a couple of police vehicles, 
7 and those are probably pretty self-explanatory. What 
8 I'd like you to do, Joel, is using that diagram, show us 
9 where you went around your daughter's Honda as you came 
10 down Scarcella. 
11 
12 
A. 
Q. 
Where we went around? 
Yeah. Maybe you can show us, first of all, 
13 where the Honda was when you went around it, and then 
14 show us where you and Vonnette were when you went around 
15 it with the Subaru. 
16 A. The Honda would have been up in here, and then 
17 we came here, went around and pulled like that. Is that 
18 loud enough? 
19 Q. When the Blazer backed up and went around you 
20 and your wife in the Subaru, can you describe which 
21 direction it went, please. 
22 A. It backed up here and then went like this 
23 (indicating). 
24 Q. What part of the Subaru contacted the Blazer? 
25 Can you point to it? 
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1 
2 
A. 
Q. 
Right there (indicating). 
And after the Blazer went around that area and 
3 had impact with you and your wife's car, which direction 
4 did it go? 
5 A. It went left around like this (indicating) 
6 towards the Honda. 
7 Q. The eastbound lane, can you point to that for 
8 us, please. 
9 
10 
A. 
Q. 
(Witness complies.) 
At the time the Blazer went around that left 
11 corner of the Subaru and had impact, was the eastbound 
12 lane of Scarcella Road open? 
13 
14 
A. Yes. 
MR. ADAMS: Objection, Judge, that's leading. 
15 It's asked and answered. 
16 THE COURT: Sustained. That's been asked and 
17 answered. 
18 MR. VERHAREN: Q. Let's go to No. 26, okay? 
19 When you came over the rise that you described a little 
20 bit earlier on Scarcella Road and you saw some brake 
21 lights on the Blazer, whereabouts, using this 
22 photograph, did you see those brake lights? 
23 A. I seen the -- this is the snowbank where he 
24 came to a stop (indicating). That right in here would 
25 have been brake lights up to this and then backed up. 
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1 Q. Okay. Let's go to No. 29, please. Show us 
2 where, approximately, if you can recall, where your 
3 daughter's car was at the time of impact. 
4 
5 
A. 
Q. 
(Witness complies.) In the westbound lane. 
All right. And at the time of -- at the time 
6 the Blazer impacted the Honda there, were you and your 
7 wife still in the Subaru that we can just see off -- a 
8 little bit off to the left here? 
9 
10 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, we were. 
Can we go to No. 30, please. In your 
11 testimony, you described after you got out of the car 
12 running up to the back of the Blazer. Can you show us, 
13 as best you can using that photograph, about that 
14 location was where your right fist had the gun connected 
15 with the back of the Blazer? 
16 
17 
A. 
Q. 
18 Blazer --
19 A. 
It would have been like in here (indicating). 
After that occurred, I think you told us the 
I'm sorry. After -- and he started backing 
20 up, it would have been up in here (indicating) . 
21 Q. After the Blazer began to pull forward, you 
22 told us that you -- well, let me back up a little bit. 
23 After you connected with the back of the 
24 Blazer, you told us you ran up the passenger's side of 
25 the Blazer. 
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1 
2 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Okay. Can you show us using this photograph 
3 about where it was when you came up to the area where 
4 you fired that shot? 
5 A. Would have been right here (indicating) 
6 because I was -- this is what I seen when I was looking 
7 through the window. I seen --
8 MR. ADAMS: Objection, Judge, that's 
9 nonresponsive. 
10 
11 
12 
13 sir. 
14 
15 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. ADAMS: He already answered the question. 
THE COURT: Yeah. He's asking the location, 
THE WITNESS: Oh. 
THE COURT: And you can answer the question. 
16 I'm not sure ... 
17 THE WITNESS: It would have been right here 
18 (indicating). 
19 MR. VERHAREN: Q. And what part of the Honda 
20 could you see as you were looking through the two Blazer 
21 windows, the two front Blazer door windows? 
22 MR. ADAMS: Objection, Judge, that assumes 
23 facts not in evidence. There's no evidence that he 
24 could see the Honda. He's implying that he can see. 
25 THE COURT: Well, I believe he's already 
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testified to the portion of 
observe at this point, so I 
record. Overruled. 
could see 
A. 
Q. 
THE WITNESS: Seen 
MR. VERHAREN: 
Mr. Ellington, 
No, he did not. 
Where was he --
Q. 
did 
the Honda that he could 
think that's already on the 
the roof of the Honda. 
Now, at the time that you 
he ever look at you? 
MR. ADAMS: Objection, Judge, ask that that be 
10 struck. He doesn't know. 
11 
12 
THE COURT: Yeah, sustained. 
MR. ADAMS: Would you please ask the jury to 
13 disregard and not consider that answer as evidence. 
14 THE COURT: Well, I'll direct that the jury 
15 disregard that last response from Mr. Larsen. Continue. 
16 MR. VERHAREN: Q. Was Mr. Ellington facing 
17 forward in the driver's side part of the Blazer? 
18 MR. ADAMS: Objection, Judge. This whole 
19 sequence of events, we don't know when he's talking 
20 about. 
21 
22 
THE COURT: Well, let's clarify that, Counsel. 
MR. VERHAREN: Q. Joel, did I just ask you 
23 about where you were when you shot? 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, you did. 
Now I'm asking and did I ask you what you 
45 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 790 of 848
ROUGH DRAFT - UNCERTIFIED COPY - ATTORNEYS' USE ONLY 
1 could see through the windows at the time that you saw 
2 Mr. Ellington? 
3 
4 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, you did. 
All right. What I'd like you to do is talk 
5 about how Mr. Ellington was positioned at this 
6 particular time. 
7 A. 
8 forward. 
9 
10 
11 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
He was positioned in the driver's seat facing 
Which way was his head pointing? 
East. 
Now, when you sit in the vehicle, you're 
12 directing you pointed straight towards the windshield, 
13 or it could be pointed out the driver's side window, or 
14 it could be pointed out the passenger's side window, 
15 right? 
16 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
19 Objection. 
20 
21 question. 
22 
23 
Yes. 
Which way was Mr. Ellington's head pointing? 
MR. ADAMS: Asked and answered, Judge. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. You can answer the 
THE WITNESS: Out the front window, straight. 
MR. VERHAREN: Q. Did his head ever rotate in 
24 your direction or not? 
25 A. No, it did not. 
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1 Q. Let's go to No. 38, please. As best as you 
2 can -- well, I guess we have -- the jury hasn't seen 
3 this yet. Joel, do you recognize this vehicle? 
4 A. Yeah, that's the Blazer that Mr. Ellington was 
5 driving. 
6 Q. As best as you can, can you show us the area 
7 where you think the Blazer had impact with the Subaru? 
8 
9 
A. 
Q. 
Oh, right here (indicating) . 
And then if we could go to 41. This shows 
10 the -- Exhibit 41 shows the passenger's side of the 
11 Blazer; is that correct? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. And there appears to be a hole in the front 
14 left fender of that Blazer. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Do you know how that hole got there? 
That was from my gun. 
Can you show us using that photograph again, 
19 as best as you can, about where you were when you shot 
20 the hole in the fender aiming towards the motor? 
21 MR. ADAMS: Judge, I'm going to object to 
22 that. This Blazer was shot at a street, not where it's 
23 at now, so this is not relevant. This is misleading. 
24 THE COURT: Well, perhaps you can rephrase the 
25 question, Mr. Verharen. I'll sustain that objection. 
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1 MR. VERHAREN: Q. When you shot and left that 
2 hole on that fender of the Blazer, were you to the left 
3 of the hole or to the right of the hole, or some other 
4 place? 
5 
6 
7 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
To the left. 
How far to the left? 
I would have been standing right outside of 
8 the -- running, standing, I was looking right straight 
9 through, and that's when I pulled forward and shot where 
10 that hole is at. 
11 Q. How far away do you think the end of your gun 
12 was from the metal on that fender? 
13 
14 
A. 
Q. 
Three feet. 
Go to 43, please. Up near the top of 
15 Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 43, showing the back passenger 
16 side window, there appears to be some damage there. 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, there is. 
Before you shot at the motor, did you ever 
19 shoot that gun in this particular manner? 
20 
21 
A. 
Q. 
No, I did not. 
That damaged that's noted to the window there 
22 of the Blazer, did that damage occur before or after you 
23 shot at the motor of Mr. Ellington's vehicle? 
24 MR. ADAMS: Object to that, Judge. There's no 
25 foundation that he can tell us that. 
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1 
2 
THE COURT: I'll sustain. 
MR. VERHAREN: Q. In regards to the placement 
3 of your first shot, all right, was there ever a time 
4 when you shot before that time in this particular 
5 matter? 
6 
7 answered. 
8 
9 
10 and ... 
MR. ADAMS: Objection. That's been asked and 
THE COURT: I believe he's answered that, yes. 
MR. VERHAREN: Okay. I think we can go ahead 
11 Go ahead and shut it down and I got a few more 
12 questions for you, okay, Joel? 
13 
14 
15 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: Are we going to be back to the ... 
MR. VERHAREN: I was going shut her down and 
16 turn the lights on, Judge. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. Good. I just wanted to get 
18 our blinds back open, so ... 
19 
20 
21 
MR. VERHAREN: May I approach the witness? 
THE COURT: Please. 
MR. VERHAREN: Q. Joel, let me show you 
22 what's been marked as 79B. Take a moment and look at 
23 that. Does this appear to be the diagram of the scene? 
24 A. Yes, it does. 
25 Q. All right. And in that diagram, is there a 
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1 location marked where your wife's body lay after this 
2 happened? 
3 
4 
5 
6 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Is that where the arrow is? 
Yeah. 
Yes. 
What I'd like you to do, to the best of your 
7 memory -- do you have a pen? 
8 A. No, I do not. 
9 Q. Use my pen and mark again, to the best of your 
10 memory, the location with an X where you remember your 
11 wife being struck by the Blazer. 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
(Witness complies.) 
And maybe you could put your initials on that 
14 exhibit for us. 
15 
16 
17 
A. 
Q. 
(Witness complies.) 
I didn't shut it. 
Thanks for the warning. 
18 After this occurred and after you fired the 
19 remaining shots at the Blazer, did law enforcement 
20 appear? 
21 
22 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, they did. 
How long afterwards do you think it was? 
Several minutes, less than five. 
And in the moments after this happened and 
25 after you shot your remaining shots at the Blazer, did 
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1 you ever do something with the gun in this case? 
2 A. Yes, I did. I walked back and put it 
3 underneath the seat where it was. 
4 
5 
6 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Was that before law enforcement came? 
Yes, it was. 
All right. After law enforcement came, did 
7 you ever indicate to anyone where that gun was? 
8 
9 
10 
11 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I did. 
To who? 
Klinkefus. 
When Deputy Klinkefus arrived, was he the 
12 first officer? 
13 
14 
15 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes, he was. 
Did he then take possession of that gun? 
I -- I told him I had discharged the gun and I 
16 told him where it was. Eventually -- I don't know if it 
17 was him or another officer. 
18 
19 car? 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
You didn't see anybody take it out of your 
I couldn't for sure, no. 
All right. 
I don't remember. 
How long do you think you were at the scene 
24 there after law enforcement arrived? 
25 A. Probably 45 minutes. 
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1 Q. Okay. And what location were you directed to 
2 wait while this was sorted out? 
3 A. They separated the three of us. I was told to 
4 go across and stand by this fence. 
5 Q. 
6 anywhere? 
7 
8 
A. 
Q. 
And then at some point were you taken 
I was taken to Rathdrum Police Department. 
What happened at the Rathdrum Police 
9 Department? 
10 
11 
A. 
Q. 
They interviewed us. Took our statements. 
Did the detective who did the interview do 
12 that when you were all together or do it separately? 
13 A. Separately. We were all separated. 
14 Q. Couple days after this happened, were you 
15 interviewed again by another officer? 
16 
17 
18 
19 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I was. 
Who was that? 
Detective Maskell. 
All right. And did that occur when your two 
20 daughters were with you or were you separated as well? 
21 A. We were separated. That was at Kootenai 
22 County Sheriff's Office. 
23 Q. And since those two interviews, have you on 
24 three occasions testified in hearings? 
25 A. Yes, I have. 
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1 Q. Now, I want to back up a little bit and ask 
2 you just a couple more questions, okay? At the time 
3 that you shot, how far away was your wife from the 
4 Blazer? 
5 
6 
A. 
Q. 
Twenty feet. 
And at the time that you shot, was there 
7 anything in front of the Blazer in the eastbound lane? 
8 
9 
A. 
Q. 
No, there was not. 
What was, at the time you shot, in front of 
10 the Blazer in the westbound lane? 
11 A. My wife -- the back end of the Honda, the wife 
12 Vonnette. 
13 Q. In the weeks and months after this happened, 
14 did you feel bitter towards Deputy Klinkefus? 
15 A. Yes, I did. 
16 
17 
Q. What was the reason for that? 
MR. ADAMS: Objection, Judge. It's not 
18 relevant to any material issue in dispute here. 
19 
20 
21 a lawyer? 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. VERHAREN: Q. At some point did you go to 
Yes, I did. 
And did you have that lawyer file notice of a 
24 tort claim? 
25 A. Yes, I did. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
taxpayer 
What was the reason for that? 
Because I felt we were abandoned. 
By whom? 
By Officer Klinkefus. 
And whatever happened to that claim? 
I just dropped it because it's not the 
I'm not a sue person. It's not taxpayers or 
8 the county's fault. 
9 Q. After your wife was run over, did you attempt 
10 to aid her? 
11 
12 
A. 
Q. 
No, I did not. It was obvious she was dead. 
When the Blazer struck your wife, I think you 
13 told us she went to the ground; is that right? 
14 
15 
A. 
Q. 
16 Blazer? 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, she did. 
Did you ever see her being dragged by the 
No, I did not. 
Did you have a clear view of this as you 
19 watched this happen? 
20 A. I seen her head and neck above, then she 
21 disappeared that -- a little bit, and then reappeared 
22 below -- underneath, and as he went over the top of her. 
23 Q. Did you ever see any part of the Blazer 
24 dragging her along the road? 
25 A. No, I did not. 
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1 row there, red plaid flannel shirt. 
2 
3 
Q. 
A. 
Did she have camouflage pants on? 
I'm not sure on the pants, but I know she had 
4 a red -- she may well have. Exactly I can't -- I know 
5 she had a red, black, and checkered flannel shirt. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. VERHAREN: No further questions. 
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10 
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1 THE COURT: All right. I think we're ready to 
2 get underway with our redirect examination, 
3 Mr. Verharen, please. 
4 
5 Q. 
MR. VERHAREN: Thank you, Judge. 
Joel, do you remember Mr. Adams asking you 
6 questions just before we left about the issue of whether 
7 or not you told the two detectives that your wife had 
8 put her palms on the hood of the Blazer at the time she 
9 was run over? 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I do. 
What I'd like to do is go to those transcripts 
with those two detectives and describe that particular 
portion of your statements to them, describing what 
whereabouts your wife was hit, okay? 
A. Okay. 
Q. And let's start with No. 1, which would be 
17 Detective Stewart's report, and if you could go to 
18 page 4, line 17. 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
Page 4, 17? 
Yeah. And the way this transcript is laid 
21 out, you kind of have, through the transcript, three 
22 different portions where it goes up to -- I'm thinking 
23 that the transcript I have is probably different than 
24 
25 
the one Counsel has and that you have. 
A. Yeah. Doesn't look like it's 
2 
yeah. 
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1 Q. All right. Let me go to Detective Maskell's 
2 report on this issue, and what I'll do is I'll give this 
3 to Mr. McHugh and he can figure out with the other 
4 transcript they have where we're at, okay? 
5 Ready? So we're going to go to No. 2, which 
6 would be Detective Maskell's interview. 
7 
8 
9 
A. Okay. 
MR. VERHAREN: May I approach the witness? 
THE COURT: Please. 
10 MR. VERHAREN: Q. Let me get No. 1 for you 
11 for a moment while we look at No. 2. I'll just take the 
12 whole thing. 
13 All right. So with Detective Maskell, I'd 
14 like you to turn to page 77, line 3, and that portion of 
15 the interview with Detective Maskell you're describing 
16 what happened in terms of your wife; is that correct? 
17 Why don't you go ahead and look that over and make sure 
18 that that's the context that we're talking about. 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. 
On line 3, you started off the sentence here 
21 with, "Before I shot," do you see that? It goes, 
22 "Before I," and then on line 4 it says, "shot." 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
What I'd like you to do is read from that 
25 line, "Before I shot," and starting with those three 
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1 words, down to the rest of the line 9, okay? So from 
2 three to nine. 
3 A. "Before I shot, he had it floored going 
4 towards coming off of the car, the girls' car going 
5 towards my wife forward. She•s like" 
6 MR. ADAMS: Judge, excuse me. I'm sorry, 
7 Mr. Larsen. At this point, I'm going to object and I'd 
8 be glad to approach the Court and show you what he's 
9 going to have him read here. 
10 THE COURT: Please. I don't have a copy, so 
11 I'll need that assistance. 
12 (Discussion held at the bench.) 
13 MR. VERHAREN: Q. Joel, rather than read to 
14 nine, we're just going to read to line 6, and let me 
15 show you where to stop so we don't go any ·further than 
16 
17 
18 
that. 
A. 
Q. 
Please. 
Read from right here, "Before I," and then 
19 stop here on six after "hands up," okay? 
20 
21 
22 
A. Okay. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. "Before I shot, he had it 
23 floored going towards -- coming off of the car, the 
24 girls' car going towards my wife forward. She's like 
25 this, hands up. 11 
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1 MR. VERHAREN: Q. Did you ever tell Detective 
2 Maskell that your wife put her palms on the hood of that 
3 Blazer? 
4 A. No, she had her hands up like this 
5 (indicating). 
6 Q. Okay. Now, in terms of Detective --
7 THE COURT: Excuse me, Mr. Verharen. Just for 
8 the record, the witness had held his hands up above his 
9 shoulders with his palms facing outwards. Continue. 
10 MR. VERHAREN: Thank you, Judge. I should 
11 have done that. I appreciate that. 
12 Q. This time, Joel, what I'd like you to do is go 
13 to Detective Stewart's interview, which is No. 1. 
14 A. Do you have that? 
15 Q. I have it. I'm sorry. I'm going to have 
16 to -- Judge, would it be okay if I ask the question up 
17 next to the witness? 
18 
19 
THE COURT: That's fine. 
MR. VERHAREN: Thank you. And, Counsel, it's 
20 page 9, line 21 through 25 on page 9, and then on 
21 page 10 through line 3, stopping at "of her. 11 Would you 
22 like me to show you where I'm going? 
23 
24 here? 
25 
MR. ADAMS: Yeah, do we have the same one 
MR. VERHAREN: This is what I'm intending to 
5 
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1 do: Starting on line 21 and then going over here to 
2 page 10 and stopping on line 3 at "of her." 
3 
4 that. 
5 
MR. ADAMS: Let me just take a quick look at 
Okay. Your Honor, I'm going to, again, object 
6 to that. I guess we can approach. 
7 THE COURT: That'd be fine. 
8 
9 
(Discussion held at the bench.) 
MR. VERHAREN: Q. Joel, take a look at 
10 page 9. Start off, say, around line 21, go over to 
11 page 10 and around line 3. 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
Stop there? 
Yeah. Don't read it out loud. Just read it 
14 to yourself, and then I'm going to ask you a question or 
15 two about it. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. 
Did you read that? 
Yes, sir. 
And you're describing to Detective Maskell 
20 what happened at the instant your wife was struck by 
21 Mr. Ellington? 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, sir. 
And in that description to Detective Maskell, 
24 did you ever tell him that she put her palms on the hood 
25 of that Blazer? 
6 
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A. No, I did not. 
MR. VERHAREN: May I approach the witness 
again to get ahold of that transcript? 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
MR. VERHAREN: Q. Let me find No. 3. I think 
6 I should have that up there. And where I'd like you to 
7 go is page 412 of No. 3, okay? 
8 
9 
10 
11 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
412. 
You there? 
Yes. 
All right. Do you remember Mr. Adams asking 
12 you some questions from line 15 on 412 about whether or 
13 not she was running in the roadway? 
14 
15 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Okay. What I'd like to do is put that in 
16 context, so I'd like to start a little bit earlier than 
17 that and finish a little bit later than where he was 
18 asking about that one line to put this in context, okay? 
19 On line 13, you were asked the question, "Was 
20 she running or walking as she was crossing the road? 11 
21 What was your response on line 15? 
22 A. "I," and there's a couple dashes, "I 
23 couldn't,,. couple more dashes, "I don't think she was 
24 running. I just ... " 
25 Q. And then you were asked the question, "Well, 
7 
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1 did you not -- did you really get a good enough look to 
2 
3 
know?" 
What was your answer on line 19? 
4 A. "I just seen her out of the side of my -- my 
5 eyes right here. I knew where she was. I seen her 
6 because I remember when I shot I could see her." 
7 Keep going? 
8 
9 
Q. 
A. 
Yes, finish the sentence. 
11 And that's what I split the difference 
10 between her and the kids." 
11 Q. And what do you mean by that, split the 
12 difference between your wife and your children? 
13 A. Like between you and the judge, right here 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
(indicating), and that will the angle of my shot 
would have been between the girls and the wife. 
Q. On the issue of your speaking with Detective 
Stewart and whether you began to follow the Blazer 
before your daughters began to follow, do you remember 
that portion of Mr. Adams' questions? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, sir. 
Okay. What I'd like to do is go to that 
22 interview again and simply read a little past where 
23 Mr. Adams had been asking you some questions, so that's 
24 at line 7. 
25 And if I could, again, approach the witness, 
8 
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1 Judge? 
2 THE COURT: Certainly. 
3 MR. VERHAREN: Q. Page 7 of Detective 
4 Stewart's interview, after you talked about the portion 
5 with Mr. Adams that discussed where the girls were. 
6 
7 
8 Q. 
MR. ADAMS: Where is that? 
MR. VERHAREN: Page 7 . 
In your interview with Detective Stewart, did 
9 you further elaborate on the positioning of your car and 
10 your daughter's car in terms of where .Mr. Ellington was 
11 up on Brunner and then Ramsey? 
12 A. Yes, I did. 
13 Q. So what I'd like you to do then is start off 
14 here on line 17 where it says, "So I," and then stop on 
15 line 20 where it says, "Heading south," and let me 
16 confirm with Counsel. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
MR. ADAMS: I see it. Thank you. 
MR. VERHAREN: Q. You with me? 
Yes, sir. 
Okay. 
"So I -- he goes by the girls. They got cell 
22 phones. We don't -- we don't. Me and the wife don't 
23 have cell phones. So they take off. We go off behind 
24 them down Ramsey heading south. 11 
25 Q. Thank you. Mr. Adams was asking you some 
9 
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1 questions during the point in time where you could see 
2 Mr. Ellington's profile as you came up the passenger's 
3 side of the Blazer. Do you remember that? 
4 
5 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, sir. 
And he was asking you questions about how at 
6 that point you had your gun pointed at Mr. Ellington's 
7 head 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, sir. 
-- a short 
Yes, sir. 
Why didn't 
MR. ADAMS: 
distance away. 
you shoot Mr. Ellington? 
Objection, Judge, that's not 
13 within the scope. It's not relevant. He's already 
14 talked about how he divided the distance. That's --
15 
16 
17 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
MR. ADAMS: I never asked him. 
THE COURT: Well, overruled. You can answer 
18 the question. 
19 THE WITNESS: I seen the girls' roof of the 
20 car behind him going across here. I could see the roof 
21 of my daughter's car through the windows on the other 
22 side of Mr. Ellington. 
23 MR. VERHAREN: Q. Mr. Ellington was -- at 
24 this point he had backed off the Honda and he was going 
25 forward. 
10 
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A. 
Q. 
Yes, sir. 
Why did you feel the need to shoot at the 
3 motor if he was going from a distance away from your 
4 daughters? 
5 MR. ADAMS: Argumentative. It•s leading. 
6 Beyond the scope. 
7 THE COURT: Sustained. 
8 MR. VERHAREN: Q. Mr. Adams asked you the 
9 question about -- well, he told you that you got an 
10 adrenaline rush. Do you remember that? 
11 A. Yes, sir. 
12 Q. Did you ever say at any point in a prior 
13 proceeding, testify or tell a detective, that you got an 
14 adrenaline rush from any of these events that you•ve 
15 testified to? 
16 A. No, sir. 
17 Q. You were asked some questions about the injury 
18 to your left biceps, and then you also indicated you had 
19 a right shoulder injury. Maybe you can elaborate on 
20 that for us. How did you get a right shoulder injury 
21 before January 1st, 2006? 
22 A. I was pushing some barrels at work and I 
23 pinched something in that shoulder, and we were 
24 shorthanded at work. I had to keep working. And it was 
25 partially -- I mean, it hurt pretty bad, I needed a 
11 
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1 couple -- I worked a couple more days and had the 
2 weekend off, so then I -- I basically recovered from 
3 that, but it was hurting that. That's why then I had 
4 torn my biceps off because I couldn't catch myself with 
5 both hands. I grabbed this and it hurt, I let go, and I 
6 caught myself with my arm all the way stretched out, and 
7 that ripped my biceps off. 
8 Q. Do you remember Mr. Adams asking you some 
9 questions on page 77 of Detective Maskell's interview 
10 about no shots being fired after a certain portion or a 
11 certain point in time? 
12 
13 
14 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes, sir. 
Okay. Do you have that in front of you? 
That's 2? 
15 Q. Yeah. It's No. 2, and he had asked you the 
16 questions on page 77. 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. Whereat? 
What I'd like to do is put the whole 
19 conversation in context, okay, because I think that 
20 portion, you kept going with your answer from page 77 
21 over on to page 78. Does that appear to be correct to 
22 you? 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. 
So what I'd like you to do is on page 77, 
25 start from line 3 and read all the way to page 78, 
12 
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1 line 14, and let me confer with Counsel and let Counsel 
2 know what I'm referring to. 
3 
4 
MR. ADAMS: We got to approach, Judge. 
THE COURT: That's fine. 
5 (Discussion held at the bench.} 
6 MR. VERHAREN: Q. Joel, take a look at 
7 page 77, and why don't you back up all the way back to 
8 76 where you started your answer. Detective Maskell. 
9 Read through 77 and to 78, about half the page on 78. 
10 A. Whereat, 76? 
11 Q. Well, on 76, here on line 2, Detective Maskell 
12 asked you a question, okay? And then on line 25, the 
13 last line on page 76, you started off giving your 
14 answer, okay? 
15 A. Okay. 
16 Q. So read that. 
17 A. There on? 
18 Q. Yeah. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
THE COURT: Read it to yourself. 
THE WITNESS: Oh. 
MR. VERHAREN: Yeah, to yourself. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
23 MR. VERHAREN: Q. Just so you get your memory 
24 refreshed here. And then read all of page 77, and then 
25 stop right here on page 78, okay? 
13 
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A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. 
But all to yourself. 
Okay. 
Got it? 
Yeah. 
All right. And in this portion of your 
7 interview with Detective Maskell, you're describing how 
8 your wife got hit. 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. All right. And you're also describing when 
11 you took the shots that you took in this particular 
12 case? 
13 
14 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, sir. 
All right. On line 78 --
Page 78? 
Page 78, line 12, you told Detective Maskell, 
17 11 And that's when I emptied the rest of them at him and I 
18 couldn 1 t hit him. 11 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, sir. 
Right? 
Yes. 
And when you made that statement to Detective 
23 Maskell, was this after you described your first shot at 
24 the fender, Mr. Ellington striking and running over your 
25 wife, and then afterwards? 
14 
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Yes, sir. 1 
2 
A. 
Q. Okay. Go ahead and go to Detective Maskell's 
3 interview on page 7. Do you remember Mr. Adams' 
4 questions about the inference that you took the first 
5 shot when you were at the back of the Blazer? 
Could you say that ... 6 
7 
8 
9 
A. 
Q. Do you remember Mr. Adams' questions along the 
line of you taking the first shot when you were at the 
back of the Blazer as opposed to the passenger 1 s side --
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 
--
door of the Blazer? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And he read to you -- questioned you on 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
page 71 of Detective Maskell's interview. Do you recall 
that? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Okay. What I'd like to do is put that portion 
18 of your statements to Detective Maskell in context, 
19 okay? And I'd like to start off at page 11 -- I'm 
20 sorry, page 71, and I'd like to go to page 73, but let 
21 me confer with Counsel, and I think we're probably going 
22 to go up and speak with the Judge here. 
23 (Discussion held at the bench.) 
24 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, 
25 Mr. Verharen. 
15 
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MR. VERHAREN: Thank you, Judge . 
Q. Joel, page 71, Detective Maskell•s interview. 
So on line 8, you were asked a question by Detective 
Maskell. What we•re going to do here is r•m going to 
ask him -- r•m going to be Detective Maskell and ask the 
questions and you be yourself, okay? 
A. Okay. 
Q. And we're going to go from line 8 on page 71 
9 all the way through page 72, and then on to page 73 down 
10 to the line 8. We're going to read line 8 on page 73, 
11 okay? 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
14 line 8 --
15 
16 
A. 
Okay. 
All right. So let's go back to 71 and on 
Do I read this? 
THE COURT: Yeah. Read this one out loud, 
17 Slr. Thank you very much. 
18 
19 
THE WITNESS: All right. 
MR. VERHAREN: Q. So let me ask the question. 
20 It's on line 8, page 71, Detective Maskell, he says: 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
"And you came over here. What was the 
position of this vehicle when you took the 
first shot?" 
"It was -- it was like up -- up in here when I 
took the first shot. He was like I say, 
16 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
the side windows was tinted. I had the gun 
down like this. I came up alongside. As I 
just start to see the dash, I start to see the 
dash through the window. I'm getting up 
alongside the vehicle and I see his hand slam 
the gear shift down and punch it. 11 
11 Is that when he's still on the car or is that 
When he I S back here? II 
11 Well, because when he -- he didn't come back 
far enough. He just got off the girls and 
slammed -- and slammed and went, then he went 
like this and he -- he -- 11 
11 When you took your first shot, though, was 
that after you touched the back of his car?" 
It says, 11 Uh-huh, 11 but yes. 
"And was he pulling out this way when you took 
your first shot"? 
11 He was just -- he -- he was going and he was 
hitting. He was going into his -- into this 
part of the girls' car, I believe. He was 
going forward because I -- and --" 
And then you were asked the question: 
11 You kind of contacted him?" 
11 Yeah. And, you know, I'm still -- I'm still 
down the road or whatever, too. 11 
17 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
"So you're headed this way, too?" 
11 Yeah. Now, I am on -- I am on the going 
down the side of this vehicle. When I first 
see him, like I say, I see his hands were down 
like this, hit the gas. Okay. I know I 
can-- whatever that word is. 11 
11 Visualize? 11 
11 Yeah. Peripheral vision, I can tell that, 
you know, the wife's over here, his hand did 
that, and he's going forward, and I'm -- 11 
nyou saw him throw that thing into gear and 
stomp on the gas? 11 
"First thing I seen was his hand go like this, 
like that, and he stomped on it. 11 
nokay.n 
"Okay. Then it put him -- that's when I 
raised the gun. I was afraid of hitting the 
18 girls because I was looking through the window 
19 and the girls were on the other side. That's 
20 when I pulled ahead and shot the motor. 11 
21 MR. VERHAREN: Thank you. No further 
22 questions. 
23 
24 
25 
18 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CASE NO. CR- 06-1497 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL AND MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
Barry McHugh and Arthur W. Verharen, Kootenai County Prosecuting 
Attorney's Office, for Plaintiff State of Idaho. 
John Adams and Anne C. Taylor, Law Office of the Kootenai County 
Public Defender, for Defendant Jonathan Wade Ellington. 
I. SUMMARY OF PROCEDURE 
This case came before this Court for a second jury trial commencing on January 
18, 2012. Over the next ten days, the State sought to prove that the Defendant was 
guilty of one count of second degree murder (I. C. §§ 18-4001, 4002, and 4003) for the 
death of Vonette Larsen, and two counts of aggravated battery (I. C. § 18-907) against 
Jovon Larsen and Jolene Larsen. On January 31, 2012, the jury returned a verdict of 
guilty on all counts. 
The Defendant filed two post-trial motions on February 13, 2012: Defendant's 
"Motion for New Trial" and "Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal." The 
Defendant did not file any supporting documentation at that time. The Defendant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOT WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT- 1 
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noticed the post-trial motions for hearing on March 16, 2012. On March 13, 2012, the 
Defendant filed a "Motion to Continue," seeking to continue the hearing on the 
Defendant's post-trial motions. The Defendant also filed two binders containing the 
following: "Briefing in Support of Motion for Judgment of Acquittal," "Briefing in Support 
of Motion for New Trial," Exhibits A through J, "Citations in Support" (including copies of 
in excess of 40 cases and statutes and constitutional provisions). 
On March 14, 2012, this Court signed an order to continue the March 16, 2012, 
post-trial motions hearing. This Court sentenced the Defendant on March 26, 2012, and 
scheduled the hearing on Defendant's post-trial motions for April 24, 2012, in order to 
allow the State additional time to respond. This Court issued a "Judgment and 
Sentence" on April 3, 2012. 
On April 16, 2012, the State filed its "Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Post-Trial Motions" ("State's Opposition") and "Plaintiff's Exhibit List for Defendant's 
Post-Trial Motions" ("Plaintiff's Exhibits"). The day before the hearing, on April 23, 
2012, the Defendant filed a "Reply Brief," and the day of the hearing the Defendant filed 
a "Notice of Filing in Support of Defendant's Motion for New Trial" with an affidavit 
attached, and a "Notice of Filing in Support of Defendant's Post-Verdict Motions," with 
three transcripts attached. 
This Court heard from the parties and their witnesses on April 24, 2012. After the 
extensive testimony concluded, this Court took both of the Defendant's post-trial 
motions under advisement. This Court now issues its decision and order. 
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II. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL 
A. APPLICABLE LAW 
Idaho Criminal Rule 29(c) provides: 
If the jury returns a verdict of guilty . . . a motion for judgment of acquittal 
may be made or renewed within fourteen (14) days after the jury is 
discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during the 
fourteen day period. If a verdict of guilty is returned the court may, on such 
motion, set aside the verdict and enter judgment of acquittal .... It shall 
not be necessary to the making of such a motion that a similar motion has 
been made prior to the submission of the case to the jury. 
The best statement of the standard applied to a motion for judgment of acquittal is set 
forth in State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 683-84, 99 P.3d 1069, 1073-74 (2004): 
"On review of the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, the 
appellate court .. . determine[s] whether there is substantial evidence to 
support the challenged conviction." State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 644, 
962 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1998); State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 461, 988 
P.2d 685, 687 (1999). Substantial evidence to support the challenged 
conviction is present when "a reasonable mind could conclude that the 
defendant's guilt as to such material evidence of the offense was proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt." 
(Internal Citations Omitted.) 
B. ANALYSIS 
1. The State Provided Substantial Evidence Such that a Reasonable Mind 
Could Conclude that the Defendant Was Guilty of Second Degree Murder 
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. 
The Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal challenges the sufficiency of 
the evidence presented by the State in regards to the "intent" element of Count I. Thus, 
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jury instructions given is necessary before this Court can address the substance of the 
Defendant's arguments. 
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Upon retrial, the Defendant remained charged as per the Information filed on 
February 21, 2012. This Information charges the Defendant with "Murder in the Second 
Degree, Idaho Code 18-4001, 02, 03," in the opening paragraph, and Count I reads: 
That the defendant, JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, on or about the 1st 
day of January, 2006, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did 
willfully, unlawfully, deliberately, and with malice aforethought, but 
without premeditation, kill and murder Vonette L. Larsen, a human being, 
by striking and driving over Vonette L. Larsen with a vehicle inflicting 
injuries from which she died. 
(Information, February 21, 2006). The exact language from the Information is repeated 
in the charging instruction, Jury Instruction No. 7. 
As per Idaho Code § 18-4001, "murder" is defined as "the unlawful killing of a 
human being, ... , with malice aforethought." Idaho Code § 18-4003 distinguishes 
between first and second degree murder. The statutory definitions of first degree 
murder and second degree murder are reflected in Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 701 
("ICJI"). This Court gave ICJI 701 in Jury Instruction No. 16: 
Second degree murder is the killing of a human being without legal 
justification or excuse and with malice aforethought. 
The killing of a human being is legally justified when done in defense of 
self, another or property. You will be instructed on the elements of legal 
justification in a later instruction. 
Malice is defined in I.C. § 18-4002: "Such malice may be express or implied. It is 
express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the 
life of a fellow creature. It is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or 
when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart." 
Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 702, given by this Court in this case as Instruction No. 
18, provides as follows: 
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YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that for Mr. Ellington to be guilty of Murder in the 
Second Degree, the state must prove that the killing of Vonette Larsen 
occurred with malice aforethought. 
Malice may be express or implied. Malice is express when there is 
manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to kill a human being. 
Malice is implied when: 
1. The killing resulted from an intentional act. 
2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life, and 
3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and 
with conscious disregard for, human life.' 
When it is shown that a killing resulted from the intentional doing of an act 
with express or implied malice, no other mental state need be shown to 
establish the mental state of malice aforethought. The mental state 
constituting malice aforethought does not necessarily require any ill will 
or hatred of the person killed. 
The word "aforethought" does not imply deliberation or the lapse of 
time. It only means that the malice must precede rather than follow the 
act." 
This Court also defined when a homicide is "excusable" in Jury Instruction No. 19, an 
exact restatement of ICJI 1516. This Court also instructed the jury as to "self-defense," 
in Jury Instruction Nos. 36 and 37, both of which are identical to ICJI1518 and 1519. 
The Information, and as a result the charging instruction Jury Instruction No. 7, 
include one additional element of intent that is not reflected in either the statutes or the 
approved Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions: "willful." The Defendant objected to the use 
of ICJI 701 (Jury Instruction 16) and 702 (Jury Instruction 18), and instead proposed 
Defendant's Requested Jury Instruction No.1 which includes "willfully" as an element. 
The Defendant also submitted to this Court Defendant's Requested Jury Instruction No. 
2, which reads: 
Before you may find Mr. Effington guilty of Murder in the Second Degree 
as charged in Count I, the State must prove to you that Mr. Ellington 
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willfully, unlawfully and deliberately caused the death of Vonette L. 
Larsen. 
Deliberately, as charged by the State in Count I of the Information is 
defined as: 
An intent to kill executed in a cool state of blood, not in sudden passion 
engendered by lawful or some just cause or provocation; done with 
reflection; a dispassionate weighing process and consideration of 
consequences before acting. 
Unlawfully, as charged by the State in Count I of the Information, is 
defined as acting without legal justification or excuse. 
Willfully as charged by the State in Count I of the Information, means a 
purpose or willingness to commit the act in the Information. 
The Defendant supported his requested jury instructions with case law, but this Court 
denied the Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions Nos. 1 and 2.1 
a. The State presented sufficient evidence in regards to the intent 
element that is required by statute. 
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in regards to the requisite 
intent element for second degree murder. As discussed above, second degree murder 
requires that the State prove that the Defendant acted with malice aforethought when 
he killed Mrs. Larsen. Certainly, the question presented to the jury was whether the 
Defendant's acted with malice, whether the malice was express or implied, and whether 
the act occurred in defense of one's self. This Court has extensively reviewed the 
testimonial and physical evidence presented by the State. Specifically, the State 
provided physical evidence and expert testimony that the Defendant drove his vehicle in 
1 This Court notes that Count I in the charging document filed February 21, 2006, was certainly ripe for a 
due process challenge prior to either the first trial or the retrial because it included an element of intent 
that is not required by Idaho Code: "willfully." See State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 101 P.3d 699 (2004) 
and State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 115 P.3d 710 (2005). However, because no challenge was made 
prior to either trial, and it appears that the Defendant made a strategic decision to include the additional 
element and put the State to its burden on this additionai eiement, this Court cannot find error or 
prejudice. 
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the wrong lane of traffic, continued into the open eastbound lane, and did not attempt to 
brake or otherwise take any evasive action to avoid Mrs. Larsen. In fact, the State 
provided evidence that a reasonable mind could conclude that the Defendant 
maneuvered his vehicle in the very direction of Ms. Larsen. The Defendant did not 
submit any expert testimony and the State's evidence is corroborated in large part by 
the testimony of Jolene Larsen's and Joel Larsen's testimony. While the Defendant 
made significant efforts to reveal the inconsistencies and bias in the eyewitnesses' 
testimony and to deconstruct the State's expert's opinion, this Court cannot say that the 
Defendant successfully diminished the weight and credibility of the State's evidence 
such that a reasonable juror could not find that the Defendant acted with express or 
implied malice. 
This Court concludes that based on the testimony of the eyewitnesses and the 
State's expert, as well as the physical evidence regarding the acceleration and path of 
the Defendant's vehicle, the State submitted substantial evidence that a reasonable 
mind could conclude that the Defendant acted with malice aforethought when he 
accelerated his vehicle and struck Mrs. Larsen. The Defendant's Motion for Judgment 
of Acquittal, therefore, must be denied. 
b. The Defendant did not request, and the facts as presented do not 
require, an instruction regarding whether the Defendant acted in the 
heat of passion. 
It is markedly unusual that the Defendant has alleged that there is insufficient 
evidence that the Defendant acted "with a lack of passion as required for malice to be 
found," because, as discussed above, Idaho Code does not contain such a requirement. 
Regardless, the Defendant makes a twofold argument 1) the State was required to 
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prove that the Defendant "did not act in the heat of passion on sudden provocation," and 
2) that this Court was required to sua sponte give an instruction regarding a defense of 
"heat of passion on sudden provocation." 
The Defendant did not submit a request for a jury instruction regarding a defense 
of "heat of passion on sudden provocation." A defendant "may not assert as error the 
trial court's failure to give an instruction [he] did not request." State v. Pearce, 2007 WL 
1544152 (Ct. App. 2007), aff'd. 146 Idaho 241, 192 P.3d 1065 (2008), citing State v. 
Eastman, 122 Idaho 87, 90 831 P.2d 555, 558 (1992) (determining that "[t]he 
defendant's argument would mandate the trial court to instruct the jury upon any 
defense theory possible.") It is well settled that: 
while a defendant is entitled to an instruction where there is a reasonable 
view of the evidence presented in the case that would support the theory, 
it is incumbent upon the defendant to submit a requested instruction or in 
some other manner apprise the district court of the specific instructions 
requested as 'the trial court is not obligated to determine on its own what 
theories to instruct the jury on.' 
Pearce, 2007 WL 1544152, at 8, citing Eastman, 122 Idaho at 90-91, 831 P.2d at 558-
59. The !daho Supreme Court clarified the distinction between omission of a proposed 
jury instruction and failure to request the instruction in State v. Gomez: 
We further note that [not requesting a specific jury instruction] is 
distinguishable from the situation in which the Court has held that a 
defendant does not waive the right to a jury instruction by the failure to 
object to that instruction at trial. State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 225, 786 P .2d 
1127 (1990). Smith does not stand for the proposition that a defendant 
can fail to request a jury instruction and later allege error in the failure to 
give it. 
126 Idaho 83, 86 n. 2, 878 P.2d 782, 785 n. 2 (1994). 
Because the Defendant failed to request the instruction of "heat of passion upon 
sudden provocation" at trial, this Court cannot find error in not giving the instruction. 
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Regardless, even if this Court omitted the instruction improperly or was required to sua 
sponte provide an instruction regarding the "heat of passion upon sudden provocation," 
whether a person acts "unlawfully upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion and without 
malice aforethought" is the intent element of the lesser included offense of voluntary 
manslaughter. I. C. § 18-4006; ICJI 708. This Court instructed the jury in regards to the 
elements of voluntary manslaughter in Jury Instruction Nos. 27 and 28. As a result, no 
error occurred. While the Defendant seems to focus on the fact that the burden is on 
the State to prove "heat of passion upon sudden quarrel defense," and the burden 
would be on the State to do so as per Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 690 (1975), the 
facts of this case show that the Defendant really seeks a ruling that that the State must 
"disprove" the lesser included offense of manslaughter in order to sustain a conviction 
on the charged offense of second degree murder. The Defendant provides no legal 
authority for such a proposition, and it is a basic premise of criminal law that the jury 
must first consider the charged offense and make a determination before the lesser 
offense can be considered. 
Moreover, this Court notes the State's response that "[s]elf-defense and heat of 
passion are two different theories that cannot logically coexist in the same case: 'The 
affirmative defenses of self-defense is, of course, inconsistent with the claim that the 
defendant killed in the heat of passion."' (State's Opposition, p.7, citing Mathews v. 
U.S., 485 U.S. 58, 64, 108 S.Ct. 883, 887 (1988)). In this case, a reasonable view of 
the evidence presented by the State and the Defendant shows only that the Defendant 
was acting in defense of self, not lashing out due to the heat of passion resulting from a 
sudden quarrel. At no time did the Defendant show that he was acting in response to a 
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sudden quarrel, but instead attempted to show that he was in fear of his life as a result 
of the day's cumulative events. The Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal must 
therefore be denied. 
2. The State Provided Substantial Evidence that the Defendant Possessed the 
Requisite Intent Such that a Reasonable Mind Could Conclude that the 
Defendant was Guilty of Aggravated Battery Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. 
The Defendant argues that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to 
sustain the convictions for aggravated battery as alleged in Counts II and Ill of the 
Information. The Information charges the Defendant with committing aggravated 
battery against Jovon Larsen and Jolene Larsen in Counts II and Ill, in violation of I. C.§ 
18-903(a)(c); 18-907(b). These counts require that the State prove one of the following: 
"willfully and unlawfully uses force or violence upon the person of another; or 2) actually 
intentionally and unlawfully touches or strikes another person against the will of the 
other; or 3) unlawfully and intentionally causes bodily harm to an individual." (I.C. § 18-
903; ICJI 1203; Jury Instruction No. 23). "Willfully" means that the act is "done on 
purpose. On can act willfully without intending to violate the law, to injure another, or 
acquire any advantage." (ICJI 340; Jury Instruction No. 24.) 
The Defendant claims that the State failed to prove that he acted "willfully" when 
he hit the Honda driven by Jovon and Jolene Larsen. The State's eyewitness 
testimony, as well as the expert testimony by the State's expert, showed that the 
Defendant made a sharp left turn, accelerated, hit the Honda, and pushed the vehicle 
off the road. A reasonable jury could conclude, based on the evidence provided, that 
the Defendant "acted on purpose" when he hit Honda, given the acceleration, the 
alternate route and open lane of traffic available, and violence of the impact between 
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the vehicles. The Defendant has not persuaded this Court that a reasonable juror could 
not conclude that the Defendant acted willfully when he hit the Larsen sister's vehicle. 
As a result, the Defendant's Motion for Acquittal must be denied. 
3. This Court Declines to Reduce the Charge of Second Degree Murder to a 
Manslaughter Charge or Otherwise Alter the Verdict. 
The Defendant requests that this Court unilaterally reduce the charge from 
second degree murder to voluntary manslaughter, or otherwise alter the verdict. While 
this Court believes that the evidence presented would support a conviction for 
manslaughter, as discussed above, this Court cannot unilaterally reduce the charge or 
otherwise alter the verdict because this Court is not a "reviewing" court, and cannot 
"vacate the conviction and sentence for the greater offense and enter a judgment of 
conviction on the lesser offense," as the Defendant requests. As a result, the 
Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal must be denied. 
Ill. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
A. APPLICABLE LAW 
Idaho Criminal Rule 34 provides: 
the court, on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to the defendant 
if required in the interest of justice . . . . A motion for a new trial based 
upon the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before 
or within two (2) years after final judgment. A motion for a new trial based 
on any other ground may be made at any time within fourteen (14) days 
after verdict, finding of guilt or imposition of sentence, or within such 
further time as the court may fix during the fourteen day period. 
Granting or denying a motion for a new triai because it is in the interest of justice is 
discretionary. State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 648 P.2d 203 (1982). Idaho Code§ 19-
2406 limits the instances in which the trial court's discretion may be exercised: 
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2. When the jury has received any evidence out of court other than that 
resulting from a view of the premises. 
3. When the jury has separated without leave of the court after retiring to 
deliberate upon their verdict, or been guilty of any misconduct by which a 
fair and due consideration of the case has been prevented. 
4. When the verdict has been decided by lot or by any means other than a 
fair expression of opinion on the part of all the jurors. 
5. When the court has misdirected the jury in a matter of law, or has erred 
in the decision of any question of law arising during the course of the trial. 
6. When the verdict is contrary to law or evidence. 
7. When new evidence is discovered material to the defendant, and which 
he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at 
the trial. When a motion for a new trial is made upon the ground of newly-
discovered evidence, the defendant must produce at the hearing in 
support thereof the affidavits of the witnesses by whom such evidence is 
expected to be given, and if time is required by the defendant to procure 
such affidavits the court may postpone the hearing of the motion for such 
length of time as, under all the circumstances of the case, may seem 
reasonable. 
B. ANALYSIS 
1. The Verdict is Not Contrary to Law or the Evidence Presented 
a. A reasonable jUr'J could conclude that the Defendant killed Mrs= 
Larsen with malice aforethought. 
This Court adopts its analysis set forth above in Part 11.8.1, and concludes that 
the verdict as rendered by the jury was not contrary to the law or the evidence 
presented. The Defendant's Motion for New Trial must be denied. 
b. A reasonable jury could conclude that the Defendant had the 
requisite intent to be found guilty of aggravated battery. 
The Court adopts its analysis set forth above in Part 11.8.2, and concludes that 
the verdict as rendered by the jury was not contrary to the law or the evidence 
presented. The Defendant's Motion for New Trial Must be denied. 
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2. This Court Properly Denied the Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions 
a. The Defendant's requested jury instructions substantially differ from 
the jury instructions approved by the Idaho Supreme Court and do 
not accurately reflect the required elements of the charge. 
As set forth in Schaefer v. Ready: 
Use of the [Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions] is not mandatory, only 
recommended. Needs v. Hebener. 118 Idaho 438, 442, 797 P.2d 146, 150 
(Ct.App.1990). However, any court that chooses to vary from a jury 
instruction previously approved by the Idaho Supreme Court, does so with 
the risk that the verdict rendered may be overturned on appeal. See State 
v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 647, 962 P.2d 1026, 1031 (1998). While it 
clearly is not error to modify an [ICJI] instruction, such modification will 
constitute error if the modified instruction does not conform to the state of 
the law or omits elements basic to the case. Ramco v. H-K Contractors. 
Inc., 1181daho 108, 111,794 P.2d 1381, 1384 (1990). 
134 Idaho 378, 381-82, 3 P.3d 56, 59-60 (Ct. App. 2000). This Court hereby adopts its 
analysis set forth above in Part 11.8.1, and concludes that it properly rejected 
Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions Nos. 1 and 2 because, even though the 
proposed instructions reflected the elements as charged in the Information, the 
proposed instructions would, in this Court's opinion, create confusion amongst the jurors 
and varied too greatly from the jury instructions approved by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
The Defendant's Motion for a New Trial, then, must be denied. 
b. The Defendant did not request an instruction regarding a "lack of 
passion." Regardless, the facts as presented do not entitle the 
Defendant to such an instruction. 
This Court hereby adopts its analysis set forth in Part II.B.1.b and concludes that 
it was not required to sua sponte give an instruction regarding a "heat of passion upon 
sudden quarrel defense." Moreover, the facts as presented to not entitle the Defendant 
to such an instruction because it would have been inconsistent with the Defendant's 
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presented defense of self-defense, a defense that this Court instructed the jury on. The 
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial, then must be denied. 
3. This Court Properly Denied the Defendant's Motion for New Trial/ Motion to 
Dismiss. 
a. The Brady Information Was Provided to the Defendant in Time for Trial. 
Prior to trial, the Defendant moved to dismiss the case based on an alleged 
Brady violation by the State. According to the information this Court received from the 
parties at the hearing on the Defendant's motion, the State disclosed evidence from a 
forensic examiner on January 12, 2012. The State had not previously disclosed the 
information, and apparently, the new information amounted to a finding that a Mrs. 
Larsen was excluded as the source of fingerprints on the hood of the Defendant's 
vehicle. The Defendant sought dismissal of the case for a violation of the Defendant's 
due process rights. 
This Court applied the standard of Brady at the hearing on the Defendant's 
motion on January 17, 2012, and concluded that the material and exculpatory 
information was turned over prior to the retrial when it came into possession of the 
prosecution and that the Defense could make effective use of the information in time for 
the retrial. The Defendant has not persuaded this Court that the ruling was in error. As 
a result, this Court must deny the Defendant's Motion for New Trial. 
b. While Mr. Verharen improperly commented on the existence of the 
fingerprints on the hood of the Defendant's vehicle, the Defendant 
properly objected, the Prosecutor was admonished, and a curative 
instruction given. 
The Defendant also seeks to revisit this Court's ruling in regards to an issue of 
possible prosecutorial misconduct committed by Mr. Verharen during the trial 
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proceedings. During the proceedings, the prosecutor, even though he had been 
instructed by this Court not to reference anything about fingerprints found on the hood 
of the Defendant's vehicle, did so on two occasions. The Defendant objected to the 
references and moved for a mistrial based on the comments. This Court, in accordance 
with the analysis required by State v. Perrv, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 
(201 0) and other applicable law, denied the motion for a mistrial, admonished Mr. 
Verharen for disobeying this Court's order, and instructed the jury as follows in Jury 
Instruction No. 42: "You are instructed that Vonette L. Larsen's prints were not found on 
the hood of the Blazer." 
This Court is aware of the prior instances of prosecutorial misconduct committed 
by Mr. Verharen and noted in State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P .3d 727 (2011) and 
other decisions. This Court addressed the Defendant's desire for dismissal based on 
Mr. Verharen's prior misconduct in this Court's "Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss" issued September 14, 2011. This Court reiterates that 
the intent required by Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 671-672, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 
2087-2088 (1982), that the prosecutor goad the Defendant into moving for a mistrial in 
order to avoid acquittal, is not met by Mr. Verharen's statements about the fingerprints 
or palm prints on the Defendant's vehicle. Because the intent required by Kennedy was 
not present in this matter, this Court is reluctant to revisit its ruling. The Defendant's 
Motion for New Trial must be denied. 
c. Juror Misconduct Did Not Occur 
The Defendant also desires that this Court revisit its ruling in regards to the type 
written note submitted to this Court. The jury ceased deliberations for the \Neekend, but 
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upon their return one juror brought a type written question and submitted it to the other 
jurors. The jury then submitted the type written question to this Court. The Defendant 
alleged then, and realleges now, that the juror committed misconduct by typing a 
question outside of the jury room. 
This Court cannot see how any misconduct occurred and the Defendant failed to 
show any prejudice he suffered as a result of the typewritten question. There is no 
evidence that the juror considered extraneous information or improperly communicated 
or deliberated out of the jury room. It appears that the juror simply thought of a question, 
typed the question, and submitted it to the other jurors in the jury room when 
deliberations recommenced. The Defendant has merely asked this Court to revisit its 
ruling, and this Court is reluctant to do so based on the information and argument 
provided. This Court, then, must deny the Defendant's Motion for new Trial. 
4. The Defendant is Not Entitled to a New Trial Based on "New Evidence." 
The Defendant asserts that based on new evidence he is entitled to a new trial. 
As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Ellington: 
A defendant who has been found guilty of a crime may seek a new trial 
under I.C. § 19-2406 "[w]hen new evidence is discovered material to the 
defendant, and which he could not with reasonable diligence have 
discovered and produced at the trial." I.C. § 19-2406(7). "Newly 
discovered evidence warrants a new trial only if the defendant 
demonstrates: (1) the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to 
the defendant at the time of trial; (2) the evidence is material, not merely 
cumulative or impeaching; (3) it will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) 
failure to learn of the evidence was not due to a lack of diligence on the 
part of the defendant." Stevens, 146 Idaho at 144, 191 P.3d at 222 (citing 
State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d 972, 978 (1976)). "[A] 
defendant wishing to gain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence 
must show that the evidence meets all four of the requirements set out in 
Idaho law." Stevens, 146 Idaho at 146, 191 P.3d at 224. "Motions for a 
new tria! based on nevvly discovered evidence are disfavored and should 
be granted with caution, reflecting the importance accorded to 
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considerations of repose, regularity of decision making, and conservation 
of scarce judicial resources." /d. at 144, 191 P.3d at 222 (citing State v. 
Hayes, 144 Idaho 574, 577, 165 P.3d 288, 291 (Ct.App.2007)). 
151 Idaho at 72, 252 P.3d at 753. 
The Defendant claims that the State's expert John Daily testified falsely that the 
"impact between the Subaru and Blazer could not have spun the Blazer in a 
counterclockwise direction." (Defendant's Motion for New Trial, p.36.) According to the 
Defendant, he could not have discovered that Mr. Daily's testimony was based on the 
incorrect theory of "rotational mechanics," prior to trial and that the testimony is 
inconsistent with the text books used by Mr. Daily: "Fundamentals of Crash 
Reconstruction" and "Fundamentals of Applied Physics for Traffic Accident 
Investigators." 
The State is correct that the Defendant's "new evidence" fails the Drapeau test. 
First, the State disclosed Mr. Daily and his opinions and the texts that Mr. Daily used 
prior to trial. The Defendant also disclosed Mr. Rochford and his materials as a potential 
expert for the Defendant prior to trial. Notably, the Collision Reconstruction Report 
prepared by Mr. Rochford prior to trial states "The Blazer was rotated counter clockwise 
by the impact from the Subaru." (Inland NW Traffic Investigation Collision 
Reconstruction Report, p.9.) However, the Defendant chose not to put Mr. Rochford on 
the stand or submit his report as an exhibit during the trial to rebut, impeach, or 
otherwise contradict Mr. Daily's testimony. Thus, the information was known to the 
Defendant at the time of trial and is therefore not "newly discovered." 
Next, the evidence offered by Mr. Rochford as set forth during the April 24, 2012, 
hearing on the Defendant's Motion for New Tria!, is at best impeachment evidence that 
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the Defendant could have used during trial to impeach Mr. Daily's use of the "rotational 
mechanics" theory. However, the Defendant chose not to call Mr. Rochford. 
Third, the testimony of Mr. Rochford would not have produced an acquittal in 
regards to the second degree murder charge because his testimony did not address the 
events between when the Defendant's vehicle struck the Larsen sister's vehicle and 
when the Defendant's vehicle struck Mrs. Larsen. Instead, Mr. Rochford's testimony 
addressed the events between when the Defendant turned around at the snow bank 
and when the Defendant struck the Honda. Thus, only the juror's decision in regards to 
the charges of aggravated battery would be impacted. 
The Defendant seems to argue that the jury would not have convicted the 
Defendant of the aggravated battery counts because Mr. Rochford's testimony would 
have shown that the Defendant did not act "willfully" when he struck the Honda with his 
vehicle. Mr. Rochford's expert opinion was simply that if the Subaru was moving when 
the Defendant's vehicle struck it, then the Defendant's vehicle would have involuntarily 
spun counterclockwise towards the Honda. In contrast, Mr. Daily testified that when the 
Defendant's vehicle struck the Subaru, the Subaru was at rest and, applying the theory 
of rotational mechanics, in his opinion that the Defendant purposefully turned to the left, 
accelerated, and hit the Honda driven by the Larsen sisters. Notably, the Defendant 
cross-examined Mr. Daily and the eyewitnesses on this very point: whether the Subaru 
was at rest or moving when the Defendant's vehicle struck the Subaru and its impact on 
the direction of travel. Given the physical evidence, the evidence of acceleration, and 
the corroborating testimony from the eyewitnesses, it is this Court's opinion that Mr. 
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Rochford's testimony would not have produced an acquittal on the aggravated battery 
charges. 
Finally, because the Defendant had Mr. Daily's opinion, the exhibits, and his 
materials available prior to and during trial, as well as Mr. Rochford available to analyze 
Mr. Daily's materials and opinions prior to and during trial (which Mr. Rochford did), the 
Defendant actually discovered the inconsistent statements and/or incorrect application 
of the rotational mechanics theory prior to and during trial. Thus, the Defendant fails the 
fourth prong of the Drapeau test. The Defendant's Motion for New Trial, then, must be 
denied. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict is hereby 
DENIED. The Defendant's Motion for New Trial is hereby DENIED. 
-t"'-
DATED this '0 day of June, 2012. 
,0J~ P~~ oe.c_ 
John Patrick Luster 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Case No. CRF 06-1497 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) MEMORANDUM IN 
) OPPOSITION TO MOTION 
) FOR ADMITTANCE TO BAIL 
) AND STAY OF EXECUTION 
JONATHAN ELLINGTON, ) OF SENTENCE 
) 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW, Arthur Verharen, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, and 
hereby submits the state's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Admittance to Bail and 
Stay of Execution of Sentence. 
APPLICABLE LAW AND ARGUMENT 
Idaho law directs that, following conviction, "no bail shall be allowed when the defendant has 
been sentenced" "for a term of incarceration exceeding five (5) years." I.C. 19-2905. The 
statute was amended in 1986 following State v. Carrington, 108 Idaho 53 9 (1985), a case that 
found I. C. 19-2905 was trumped by I.C.R. 46. The amendment provoked by State v. Carrington 
to I.C. 19-2905 added the phrase "[n]ot withstanding any rule of court or statutory provision to 
the contrary, no court of the state shall have the power to alter the right to bail pending appeal as 
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limited therein." I.C. 19-2905. Pursuant to the amendment to I.C. 19-2905 that occurred post 
State v. Carrington, one sentenced to prison in excess of five years is not entitled to bail: 
"However, we would note that under I.C. § 19-2905 bail is not permitted when the defendant has 
been sentenced to a term exceeding five years. Trefren was sentenced to a ten-year indeterminate 
period. Therefore, under I.C. § 19-2905, Trefren would not be eligible for bail pending appeal." 
State v. Trefren, 112 Idaho 812, 814 (Ct. App. 1987). Unfortunately, the opinion appears to lack 
self confidence and exudes something less than conviction that the amendment to the statute 
means that I.C. 19-2905 reigns paramount over I.C.R. 46 because the Court of Appeals found it 
necessary to further examine the issue under I.C.R. 46. Id. Ultimately, State v. Trefren has been 
interpreted to hold that the analysis ofbail under I.C. 19-2905 and I.C.R. 46 should guided by an 
abuse of discretion standard. State v. Sabin, 120 Idaho 780, 782 (Ct. App. 1991). 
In our case the defendant urges the Court to release him on bond and stay execution of 
his sentence. The defendant makes this argument despite his sentences in excess of five years 
and the clear language ofl.C. 19-2905 barring bail in his situation. In support ofhis argument, 
the defendant relies upon State v. Carrington but fails to note the amendment to I.C. 19-2905 or 
case law subsequent to the amendment. Obviously, State v. Carrington's legal significance in 
terms of the discrepancy between I.C. 19-2905 and I.C.R. 46 became negated following the 
amendment to I.C. 19-2506 over 25 years ago. In any event, State v. Trefren appears to control 
this particular issue and, pursuant to I. C. 19-2505, the defendant is not entitled to bail. 
Bail should still be denied in the event the Court is not persuaded by State v. Trefren and 
makes the determination that the amendment to I.C. 19-2905 fails to modify the legal conclusion 
that I.C.R. 46 triumphs over I.C. 19-2905 because the issue is one of procedure and not 
substantive law. First, bail should be derJed on the basis that the appeal is frivolous. The issues 
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cited for appeal by the defendant have been argued ad nauseam before this Court and there is 
little sensibility in litigating those issues again. In sum, it is the state's position that Court's 
pretrial, trial and post trial decisions were correct and that the defendant's appeal issues are 
frivolous. 
Bail should also be denied if the Court ultimately rules on the merits ofthe defendant's 
motion and evaluates the factors under I.C.R. 46(c). At the time ofhis arrest, the defendant was 
in violation of his probation in a misdemeanor case and, as a result, had an active bench warrant 
that had been outstanding for some time. His criminal history is multistate and is substantial, 
primarily consisting of violent crimes against other persons such as assault convictions. His past 
work and family history is sporadic. He has no family in Idaho nor does he own property in 
Idaho. The offenses for which he was convicted were acts of extreme violence. He has been 
sentenced to a lengthy prison term and the length ofhis incarceration, up to the maximum of his 
sentences, is up to the Department of Corrections. Based upon the factual background of this 
case of which the Court is well aware, denial of bail pending appeal is not an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above stated reasons, the state respectfully requests that the defendant's 
Motion for Admittance to Bail and Stay of Execution of Sentence be denied. 
DATED this__£__ day of July, 2012. ~JuV\(~ 
ARTHUR VERHAREN 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ____,3__ day of July, 2012, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing \vas fa.-xed to the Kootenai County Public Defender's Office. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ~-~ --------
TO BAIL AND STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENC~ 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 843 of 848
Log of 1 K-COURTROOM1 7/9/2012 Page 1 of2 
Description CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wade 20120709 Bond Hearing 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth I 
Court Reporter Valerie Nunemacher I 
w PA Art VerHaren (-- ~ DA Anne Taylor x~\ / 
Date 11 fll::IJL012 Location -COURTROOM1 \ 
Time 11~ ... "~~ Note 
03:31:33 PM J Calls case - PA VerHaren, DA Taylor present with defendant, in 
custody, for Rule 35 hearing and motion for appeal bond. 
I 03:31:57 PM loA Ready 
03:31:59 PM IPA Ready 
03:32:15 PM DA We ask for credit for time served- as of March 26, 2012 he had 
served 2,128 days. The other part of the Rule 35 is 
I 03:32:48 PM II J II You took into account the time he was released? I 
03:32:59 PM Yes We ask that you retain jurisdiction. We talked about the 
changes he had made while in custody and while he was released. 
He went back into his faith and he stopped using alcohol and 
tobacco. You wanted to see more formal training. The retained 
jurisdiction program has that and he can get the training before he 
would ask you for probation. 
Motion for appeal bond. I think you have a pretty good idea of the 
DA issues -we had an extensive hearing post-verdict. I'd like to talk 
about why he should be allowed to post bond. The property bond 
was sufficient and he stayed in contact with me. He made it back 
timely for trial each and every day. He was out after the verdict 
pending sentencing hearing. We could expect the same thing 
pending appeal. When we came to the bond hearing you heard 
from his brother in Utah. He's rejoined his faith of origin and it 
requires no alcohol consumption. He has family and extended 
family in Utah to be there for him. If the property bond were put 
I back into place that is plenty to assure he'll return. 
I f"\").")f"\.'"IA ra~ I 
U0.0:1.L<t riVI Rule 35 - you are well aware of the facts and his criminal history - I. 
prison was appropriate and to impose a rider does not show the 
seriousness of the offense. I think that you can consider the second 
PA 
sentence a Rule 35 as the 2nd sentence was substantially less. I 
don't think you should reduce the sentence further or impose a 
rirl~=>r I II 1 u··--·· 
Bond- ICR 46(c)- the court should deny the motion You know the 
circumstances of this case. He was out with an outstanding BW 
file://R:\LogNotes- HTML\District\Criminal\Luster\CR 2006-1497 Ellington, Jonathan Wa... 7/9/20: ·· 
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON 39838 844 of 848
Log of 1K-COURTROOM1 7/9/2012 Page 2 of2 
03:42:50 PM 
DA 
03:45:55 PM II PA 
03:46:04 PM 
j 
when this offense occurred. RE: BW history- He has a history of 
not appearing for court and crimes of violence. He does not appear 
to have strong ties to Idaho - no family or property in Idaho. He had 
a sporadic work history and a history of moving around and 
different relationships. 
Def does have prior criminal history - but I disagree that it is crimes 
of violence. His prior history is misdemeanor history. The BW were 
in DUI and inattentive with the most recent in 2002. He did 5 1/2 
years incarceration - got out and rode a Greyhound and showed up 
for incarceration. His most recent history shows him showing up for 
sentencing. That speaks pretty well that he's going to follow 
through with his obligations. He has good friends here. The 
property bond could be used still. The property is in Idaho and he 
would be in Utah with family if the court allows. In prison he spent 
his time thinking and learning. He is in a different place when it 
comes to alcohol and will take ETG or what ever the court requires. 
Alcohol is not in his future. He should be allowed to be out on 
property bond. 
No objection to credit for time served. 
CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED- MOTION GRANTED- 2,128 PLEA 
FOR LENIENCY- comments- retained jurisdiction is not 
appropriate and there is not a lawful basis for reduction at this 
point. APPELLATE BOND - I don't feel the appeal issues are as 
significant as they were the first time around. DENY PA to prepare 
order DA to prepare order as to credit for time served. 
03:~A·~l======9F==============================================~I 
03:'" . L4..EM II End 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
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